Jetaun Helen Wheeler, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1799

Jetaun Helen Wheeler, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-27810

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Following an evidentiary hearing, appellant challenges the postconviction court’s
denial of her petition to withdraw her guilty plea to aiding and abetting unintentional
2
second-degree murder, arguing the manifest-injustice standard. Because the postconviction
court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the district court judge’s conduct did
not make appellant’s plea involuntary under the totality of the circumstances, we affirm.
FACTS
Wheeler supported her plea-withdrawal request by arguing that the district court
judge “improperly injected herself into plea negotiations” before and during trial and
coerced Wheeler’s guilty plea. These facts, therefore, are based on the postconviction
court’s findings and focus on the parties’ plea negotiations. The facts are also summarized
in the supreme court opinion filed in Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2018)
(Wheeler II).
Wheeler’s offense and district court proceedings
In late July or early August 2013, E.S. was murdered at the home of his girlfriend,
appellant Jetaun Helen Wheeler. Police found E.S.’s body in Wheeler’s freezer on
August 21 when police obtained and executed a warrant to search the home after E.S.’s
family reported him missing. Two of Wheeler’s children may have witnessed the murder;
one later told a therapist of seeing Wheeler and her friend restraining E.S. and striking him.
The state charged Wheeler with intentional second-degree murder, which has a
presumptive 306-month guidelines sentence for a person with no criminal history. 1 The
state notified Wheeler of its intent to seek an upward durational departure at sentencing

1 The presumptive guidelines sentencing range for second-degree intentional murder is 261
to 367 months for a person with no criminal history. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2012).
3
based on aggravating factors of particular cruelty to the victim and presence of the children
during the victim’s death.
In the months leading up to trial, Wheeler so ught to plead guilty to manslaughter,
but the state refused this offer. Two weeks before trial, on July 3, 2014, the district court
held a pretrial hearing on evidentiary issues and discussed a competency hearing to
determine whether Wheeler’s two young children, about nine- and ten- years old, could
testify. At the hearing, the judge encouraged the parties to resolve the case, stating that she
would “really like someone to extend an offer” because there were “negatives on both
sides,” “wins and losses on a lot of elements in this case,” “[i]t is a pretty serious situation
to have children of the defendant having to come to court and testify possibly against their
own mother,” and “you never know what the jury is going to do.”
On July 7, the district court issued its pretrial rulings, reserving only four issues for
trial. The postconviction court found that “[e]ach side prevailed on some of their motions.”
On July 8, prosecutor Judith Hawley informed the judge in an email, with a copy to defense
counsel, that the parties had not reached a plea agreement. Hawley’s email described the
current offers: The state had offered to reduce the charge to second- degree unintentional
murder with a prison sentence of 240 months.2 And Wheeler had offered to plead guilty to

2 The state’s offer is an upward durational departure; second-degree unintentional murder
has a presumptive range of 128 to 180 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A.

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second-degree manslaughter with a sentencing range of probation up to a “double
departure” of 96 months in prison.3
The judge responded to both parties by email on July 8, describing and rejecting
Wheeler’s offer by saying the offer “isn’t something this court is willing to do.” The judge’s
email also stated: “Given what facts the court is aware of, a plea to unintentional 2nd degree
murder with a prison term the parties can agree on (something in the range of x months and
240 months) appears to be more realistic.” The case went to trial. The postconviction court
found that, on the first day of voir dire, July 14, “the parties put these same offers [made
earlier] on the record.”
On Wednesday, July 16, Wheeler’s children visited the courtroom to familiarize
themselves with it in case they were called to testify. The judge and counsel were present
for the children’s courtroom visit, but not the jury or Wheeler. The judge spoke with the
children and found them competent to testify.
After the first day of trial testimony, on Thursday, July 17, the judge asked about
plea negotiations, saying: “I just want[] an update. It’s my understanding that the state did
get permission to offer to do an unintentional second-degree murder for some range within
the box . . . [but] the defendant declined?” Defense counsel told the district court that they
would speak to Wheeler about the state’s new offer over the weekend. The state put its

3 The defense offer is an upward durational departure; second- degree manslaughter has a
48-month presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A.
5
offer of unintentional second-degree murder for a guidelines sentence of 128 to 180 months
on the record by the end of the day.4
Trial continued on Friday , July 18. According to later testimony at the
postconviction evidentiar y hearing, the state called law-enforcement witnesses who
testified about finding E.S.’s body and the jury viewed the freezer where his body was
found. And the postconviction court found that the state suggested, on Monday, they would
be offering photographs of E.S.’s body and intended to call at least one of Wheeler’s
children as a witness. The postconviction court also found that the state told Wheeler the
new offer would be withdrawn if the children testified.
Defense counsel Nancy Laskaris later testified at the postconviction evidentiary
hearing that, on Saturday, July 19, she and her co-counsel, Somah Yarney, spent “a couple
of hours” with Wheeler explaining to her that they did not feel the case would go well.
They were concerned that “the judge’s feelings were so strong about resolving” the case
due to the children having to testify, the physical evidence was incriminating, and Wheeler
would be sentenced harshly if she was convicted. Wheeler eventually decided to plead
guilty. Wheeler’s attorneys and the prosecutors agreed upon terms over the weekend.
At the beginning of the third day of trial testimony, on Monday, July 21, Wheeler
agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of aiding and abetting second- degree

4 The postconviction court found the attorneys had differing recollections about an
in-chambers conference concerning the state’s new offer. The attorneys’ testimony about
the in-chambers conference is discussed in detail below.
6
unintentional murder in exchange for the parties’ agreement to request sentencing within
the guidelines range of 128 to 180 months.
At a sentencing hearing one month later, the district court imposed a 172- month
prison sentence. During the sentencing hearing, the district court judge stated she was
“appreciative of the fact that the parties were able to come to some agreement” and that the
children were “suffering,” which “prompted Ms. Wheeler to enter a plea [of guilty].” The
prosecutor stated, “[W]e’re all thankful that [the two children] did not have to . . . testify.”
And defense counsel also stated during the sentencing hearing that Wheeler “gave up her
right to trial . . . to protect her children.”
Wheeler’s first postconviction petition
Over a year later, Wheeler sought to withdraw her guilty plea, asserting in a
postconviction petition that the district court judge’s participation in the plea negotiations
coerced her plea, resulting in a manifest injustice. The postconviction court, the same
judge, denied the petition without a hearing. This court affirmed, relying on existing
caselaw and reasoning that the district court judge “did not excessively involve [herself]”
in plea negotiations because the judge did not offer a specific plea or threaten to impose a
specific sentence. Wheeler v. State, 889 N.W.2d 807, 816 (Minn. App. 2017) (Wheeler I),
rev’d by Wheeler II. Wheeler sought further review, which the supreme court granted.
Identifying the threshold issue on appeal as “what it means for a district court judge
to ‘participate’ in the plea bargaining negotiation itself,” the supreme court reversed and
remanded to the postconviction court. Wheeler II, 909 N.W.2d at 562. The supreme court
addressed three points in its analysis. First, the supreme court stated, “The principle that a
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district court judge may not participate in the plea bargaining negotiation itself, which
we first recognized in State v. Johnson, . . . 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968), is not solely a
prohibition on judicial plea offers, promises, or threats. It also prohibits unsolicited judicial
comments regarding the propriety of the parties’ competing settlement offers.” Wheeler II,
909 N.W.2d at 560.5
Second, “A judge does not participate in the plea bargaining negotiation by merely
inquiring into the status of the parties’ plea negotiations, sharing general sentencing
practices, or disclosing nonbinding plea and sentencing information at the joint request of
the parties.” Id. The supreme court applied these standards in determining that the district
court had participated improperly in the plea negotiations in the judge’s July 8 email “by
providing unsolicited comments regarding the parties’ competing settlement offers and
proposing a plea deal of its own.” Id. at 567.6
And third, “When a defendant proves that a Johnson violation has occurred, the plea
is invalid only if it is involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 560. In
other words, the supreme court refused to invalidate every plea in which a Johnson
violation occurs, and instead adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determine

5 Wheeler II overruled earlier court of appeals decisions that had interpreted Johnson to
mean that a district court judge is prohibited from becoming “excessively involved” in plea
negotiations. 909 N.W.2d at 564. The supreme court specifically overruled State v.
Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2004) and Anderson v. State, 746 N.W .2d
901, 905 (Minn. App. 2008).

6 We note that the supreme court stated, “[w]e do not reach the issue of whether the district
court participated when it encouraged the parties to ‘try to resolve’ the case to avoid the
‘serious situation’ of having the Wheeler’s children testify.” Id. at 566 n.5.
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whether a plea is involuntary due to the district court’s improper participation in plea
negotiations. Id. at 567-68. The supreme court determined that this analysis mirrors “the
standard voluntariness inquiry” in plea-withdrawal cases. Id. at 568.
To facilitate proper consideration of the voluntariness of Wheeler’s plea, the
supreme court remanded to allow Wheeler to amend her postconviction petition under the
new rule of law and for the postconviction court to decide whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing to develop a factual record. Id. at 568-69. The supreme court characterized the
voluntariness inquiry as fact-based and dependent on “the nature and extent of the judge’s
conduct, together with a variety of other factors bearing on the plea’s validity.” Id.
Wheeler’s postconviction evidentiary hearing
The remand was assigned to a new district court judge, who held a postconviction
evidentiary hearing on January 24, March 4, and March 6, 2019, and heard testimony from
two defense counsel, Wheeler, and two prosecutors.
Both defense counsel testified about events leading to Wheeler’s guilty plea. Before
July 2014, Laskaris stated that she proposed a second- degree manslaughter plea, but the
best offer from the state was “bottom of the box for [the] intentional” murder charge.
According to Laskaris, Wheeler “absolutely” refused to plead guilty to intentional murder
because Wheeler asserted that E.S. was killed while Wheeler was defending herself after
E.S. suddenly hit her on the head with a closet rod, knocked her down a flight of stairs, and
sat on her to prevent her from calling 911. Wheeler also refused the state’s offer of 240
months for a plea to unintentional murder on July 3, 2013, and Laskaris thought Wheeler
did not have “any other choice” than to go to trial. Laskaris also testified that, after she
9
received the July 8 email from the judge suggesting a sentencing range, she withdrew an
offer of proof supporting Wheeler’s offer to plead guilty to a manslaughter offense.
Laskaris testified about events during the trial. For example, during the children’s
July 16 courtroom visit, Laskaris testified that one child “was very shutdown, he didn’t
look good.” According to Laskaris, the judge told the parties, outside the children’s
presence and in chambers on July 17, that it “would be very traumatizing for the children
to . . . testify” and urged Wheeler to accept the state’s new offer. Laskaris said the judge
also told the parties that if Wheeler accepted the state’s offer, she would not sentence
Wheeler to either the bottom or top of the box.
Laskaris testified that, at this point, she believed Wheeler was under pressure to
resolve the case because the district court had ruled the children were competent to testify,
and Wheeler did not want them to testify. Also, Laskaris believed that if Wheeler did not
plead guilty, “any trial rulings, [and] sentencing if [Wheeler] were convicted[ ,] would not
have been favorable.”
About the “couple” hour meeting that she and Yarney had with Wheeler on
Saturday, July 19, Laskaris testified she told Wheeler that she had a strong likelihood of
being convicted and serving “an excessive amount of time” in prison . She also explained
to Wheeler that “the judge’s feelings were so strong about resolving ” the case and “ they
were putting it all on [Wheeler].” According to Laskaris, “it was what we told [Wheeler]
about the judge’s attitude and how the trial would go that . . . swayed her.”
As for what happened after the jail meeting with Wheeler on Saturday, July 19,
Laskaris testified that the defense offered that Wheeler would plead guilty to aiding and
10
abetting unintentional second-degree murder for “a 150- month-middle-of-the-box
sentence to allow closure.” She added that the prosecutors had to obtain supervisor
permission before they could agree to the offer. Wheeler later amended the offer to a
guidelines range of 128 to 180 months.
Yarney testified consistently with Laskaris’s testimony, describing how Wheeler
“very much wanted to go to trial” and turned down initial offers. She also testified that
Wheeler’s oldest son “was very emotional” when he came to court on July 16. His foster
mother had told the defense attorneys that the oldest son had started wetting the bed “in
anticipation of the trial.” Yarney testified that the judge had a “very visible emotional
response to the idea of the kids testifying, and she made it clear that she wanted us to
resolve the case” and “push[ed]” for Wheeler to plead guilty.
Yarney testified that on Saturday, July 19, she and Laskaris told Wheeler “about the
[j]udge’s reaction to the children and our fears of potential trial tax or more severe penalty
if she were to be convicted after trial.” Yarney agreed that it was “only” after this discussion
that Wheeler decided to accept the plea. Yarney defined a “trial tax” as “after trial if a
defendant is convicted . . . the [j]udge is going to give a harsher penalty because of forcing
witnesses to come to court and go through the trial process.” Yarney testified that Wheeler
would not have accepted the state’s offer if the judge had not “specifically said that she
didn’t want those children to have to testify.”
Wheeler’s testimony was less specific than her attorneys’ testimony. She testified
that she was not guilty of the charged offense and, based on the advice of counsel, she
believed the state’s case, at most, proved second-degree manslaughter. Wheeler also
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testified that, at first, she wanted to go to trial becau se she knew she was not guilty of
second-degree murder, even though her children might have to testify and the state reduced
her proposed prison time in successive offers. She stated that “the major factor in me
pleading guilty is because I felt like the [j]udge will be harsh on me if I had not took a plea”
and because the judge insisted the case be resolved. But Wheeler also stated that she felt
“pressed” to take a plea because the judge and prosecutors kept rejecting defense counsels’
plea offers. And Whe eler testified that she felt “overwhelmed by everything” at trial.
Wheeler also testified that she “relied on [her attorneys] completely.” The postconviction
court found that Wheeler’s testimony about how she was “influence[d] varied throughout
the postconviction hearing.”
The prosecutors, Hawley and Sarah Stennes, also testified. Hawley verified the
sequence of plea offers by the parties. She testified that when Wheeler’s oldest child
practiced sitting in the witness stand, he became “very, very distressed” and assumed a
fetal position. She also testified that, after seeing the child’s demeanor, she reduced the
prison time on the offer of unintentional second-degree murder from 240 months to 180
months, and added that the offer would be withdrawn if the children were called to testify
at trial. Hawley agreed that the judge was not responsible for the new offer and she did not
“feel pressure from the judge” to settle. She explained that more severe punishment is a
risk in any case that goes to tria l because the district court may learn of evidence during
trial that would not have been revealed during a plea hearing.
Stennes also verified the timing of the plea offers from the state to Wheeler. She
testified that, when the parties were far apart in their initial negotiations, the judge “was
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frustrated with both sides, that neith er side was willing to budge.” She also described the
judge as having “a very strong control over her courtroom” and appearing “formal.” And
she stated that the state’s managing attorney controlled the offers and approved the state’s
offer of 240 months on unintentional second-degree murder during the early days of trial.
According to Stennes, the judge had no “memorable changes in her demeanor at all” on
Friday, July 18, and “[s]he maintained professionalism throughout the trial.” Stennes also
saw nothing “unusual” in the judge’s demeanor on Monday, Jul y 21, when the court
received Wheeler’s guilty plea.
The postconviction court made detailed factual findings in its order following the
evidentiary hearing, including a precise chronology of plea negotiations leading up to
Wheeler’s final decision to accept the state’s plea offer, and long quotes from the trial
transcripts and the testimony offered during the postconviction evidentiary hearing.
Applying the totality -of-the-circumstances test set out in Wheeler II, the postconviction
court found that Wheeler “pled guilty due to the overwhelming odds of being convicted at
trial” and “the trial court’s actions did not make [Wheeler’s] plea involuntary based on an
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.” This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court’s order denying a request
for postconviction relief. Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). “Under this
standard of review, a matter will not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of
the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. As to “factual matters, [appellate]
13
review is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the
postconviction court’s findings.” Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn. 2003). A
postconviction court’s credibility determinations are entitled to deference and will be
disturbed “only when, after a thorough review of the record, [the appellate court is] left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ander sen v. State ,
940 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn. 2020). A postconviction petitioner must prove the facts
alleged in the petition b y a preponderance of evidence. State v. Hurd , 763 N.W.2d 17, 34
(Minn. 2009).
“Guilty pleas facilitate the efficient administration of justice, and more than a
change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty plea.” State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382
(Minn. App. 2011). “A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea
once it has been entered.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). But “the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely
motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. An involuntary plea de monstrates
manifest injustice. Butala, 664 N.W.2d at 339. “A plea is involuntary when it is induced
by coercive or deceptive action.” Johnson v. State, 925 N.W.2 d 287, 289 (Minn. App.
2019) (quotation omitted); see State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994) (stating
that “the government may not produce a plea . . . by mental coercion overbearing the will
of the defendant”) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470
(1970)).
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Wheeler argues that the district court judge’s involvement during pretrial and trial
proceedings “significantly influenced [her] decision” to plead guilty. She contends that the
trial judge coerced her guilty plea by weighing in on specific negotiations, urging
resolution of the case so that the children would not have to testify, and leading her to
conclude, based on the trial judge’s demeanor, that she would pay a “trial tax” and be
sentenced more harshly if she did not plead guilty. The postconviction court addressed
Wheeler’s assertions in its analysis of the totality of the circumstances that led to her guilty
plea. We address each of Wheeler’s arguments in turn.
Pretrial plea negotiations
First, Wheeler argues that the judge’s improper involvement in the early plea
negotiations affected her attorneys and their advice for her to plead guilty . Wheeler II
provides important context to this argument because the supreme court determined, based
on uncontroverted facts, that the district court judge was improperly involved in the plea
negotiations. 909 N.W.2d at 567. The supreme court found that the district court
improperly gave “unsolicited feedback” in the July 8 email about both Wheeler’s
“proposed charges and sentences,” which “took away some of Wheeler’s bargaining
power.” Id. at 566. And Wheeler II determined that the judge’s email suggested sentencing
parameters of between “x months and 240 months” as a “more realistic” sentence. Id. at
566-67. But the supreme court did not determine whether Wheeler’s plea was involuntary
and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether “a manifest injustice exists
[due to] . . . the nature and extent of the judge’s conduct, together with a variety of other
factors bearing on the plea’s validity.” Id. at 568.
15
The postconviction court found that the July 8 email, while improper, had little
effect on Wheeler’s plea because, between July 8 and the first day of voir dire, on July 14,
the parties did not alter their proposals. The postconviction court found that the 172-month
sentencing result ultimately achieved by Wheeler’s plea was much better than the high end
of the range—240 months—suggested by the trial judge in the July 8 email and repeated
in the state’s offer on the first day of trial. And the postconviction court found that Wheeler
“was even able to bargain for ‘aiding and abetting’ and arguing sentencing within the
range.”
The postconviction court observed that the July 8 email occurred after the district
court had issued most pretrial rulings and before the children had visited the courtroom on
July 16. The postconviction court determined that the July 8 email was merely “a factor
contributing to [Wheeler’s] desire to resolve the case, but it was not the reason she entered
the voluntary plea agreement.” The postconviction court emphasized that, in considering
the totality of the circumstances leading to Wheeler’s guilty plea, the district court judge’s
email “did not suggest any form of punishment or bias would later be held against one side
or another.” The postconviction court’s findings are supported by record evidence and not
clearly erroneous.
Concern about the children testifying
Second, Wheeler argues that the district court judge’s repeated statements about the
children unfairly affected the negotiations. Laskaris testified the judge told the parties, off
the record, that they “needed to resolve [the] case so that [ Wheeler’s] children wouldn’t
have to testify.” But the postconviction court found that all four attorneys and the judge
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were affected by Wheeler’s oldest child’s response to visiting the courtroom on July 16
and that this consideration was not improper.
Prosecutor Hawley testified that, after observing the child in the courtroom , she
changed her plea offer and reduced the sentence range “becau se it was the right thing to
do.” And the state’s new offer occurred on the day after the children’s visit to court, the
first day of trial testimony. Hawley also testified that she made the offer contingent on the
children not testifying and that the children were scheduled to begin testifying after the
weekend recess. Based on this and other testimony, the postconviction court found that
seeing the children in the courtroom “led the attorneys to renew settlement
discussions . . . and seriously negotiate the case,” and that “preventing the children from
testifying was the paramount concern of the attorneys, the judge, and at the time of the
trial, [Wheeler].”
According to the postconviction court, Wheeler’s focus on her children was evident
in how the defense conveyed their final offer. While the state’s new plea offer was pending,
Wheeler told the prosecutors that she intended to accept the offer if the state reduced the
charge to aiding and abetting. Defense counsel then asked the prosecution on Wheeler’s
behalf that her children be “notified immediately . . . so they know they will not have to
testify.” The postconviction court found that the defense repeated the same request twice
by email while Wheeler waited to hear whether the prosecution would amend the charge.
And Wheeler entered her plea, as agreed, on Monday, a day that the state had mentioned
they might call the oldest child as a witness. The postconviction court concluded that “the
17
well-being of the children was of utmost concern to the Defense attorneys” during final
plea negotiations.
The postconviction court reasoned that Wheeler’s desire to enter a plea and “spare
her children from testifying . . . does not amount to an improper inducement.” The
postconviction court found that, while the district court judge desired “to avoid having the
children testify,” “there is no evidence suggesting that [the judge] would have done
anything to force settlement or dismissal to prevent them from being called.” And the
postconviction court found that the district court judge’s “pressure to settle was applied to
all attorneys and focused on the children.” For example, when Wheeler entered her plea,
the prosecutor noted that “[a]ll parties were concerned about calling those children as
witnesses.” We conclude that the record supports the postconviction court’s finding that
the district court did not coerce Wheeler to plead guilty by discussing concerns about the
children testifying.
In-chambers conference during trial
Third, Wheeler appears to contend that the trial judge attempted to convince her
attorneys that she should plead guilty during an in-chambers discussion. On the record on
July 17, the district court said, “I just want[] an update.” On the record, Laskaris responded
that she planned to spend most of Saturday speaking with Wheeler about the state’s latest
offer. Only Laskaris testified that, in an off-the-record conversation, the judge urged that
the parties “really needed to resolve this case.”
Prosecutor Hawley testified there was an in-chambers discussion and she did not
have a “totally clear recollection” of it. Hawley also testified she did not remember that the
18
judge was involved in plea negotiations and specifically testified that the judge “was not
responsible for [the state’s plea] offer and she was not responsible for any timeframe at
which it would be withdrawn.” 7 The postconviction court found the attorneys’
recollections differed about whether, during the in-chambers discussion, the trial judge
agreed not to sentence Wheeler at the top or bottom of the presumptive range.
Based on the conflicting testimony about the in-chambers discussion, we cannot
conclude that the postconviction court erred by relying on the prosecutor’s testimony
that the judge’s conduct was not improper during the in-chambers discussion. The
postconviction court reasoned that “even if this Court accepts that the trial judge agreed
not to sentence at the top or bottom of the box during a conversation in-chambers, that
statement does not amount to improper inducement as it is still substantially lower than
what [Wheeler] faced if convicted at trial.”
Wheeler II prohibits “judicial participation in the plea bargaining process itself,”
including “generat[ing] and propos[ing] a plea deal not presented by the parties.”
909 N.W.2d at 567. But Wheeler II clarifies that “[a] judge does not violate this bright-line
rule, however, by inquiring into the status of negotiations, sharing general sentencing
practices, or disclosing nonbinding plea and sentencing information at the joint request of
the parties.” Id. at 565. The postconviction court found that the trial judge sought an update
on negotiations on Friday, July 17, and urged the parties to resolve the case, but it did not

7 Testimony from co-counsel did not clarify the conflict between Laskaris’s and Hawley’s
testimony. Defense co-counsel Yarney was not sure of the dates of plea offers during the
first week of trial. Prosecutor Stennes could not remember the specifics of plea
negotiations.
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find that the trial judge participated in plea discussions during the in -chambers meeting.
This finding is not clearly erroneous.
“Trial tax” and judicial demeanor
Fourth, Wheeler contends that the district court judge improperly influenced her to
plead guilty because of the “trial tax” or penalty she would suffer if she decided to go to
verdict, and because of the trial judge’s overall demeanor. The postconviction court found
that, after her attorneys conversed with Wheeler on Saturday, July 19, and reviewed the
trial to date, “including the judge’s attitude,” they recommended that Wheeler plead guilty
because trial rulings and sanctions would not be “favorable” if she continued. But Wheeler
herself testified that other factors also influenced her decision to plead guilty, including her
attorneys’ advice, her own confusion, and her realization that the state had declined
repeatedly her attorneys’ prior plea offers.
The postconviction court specifically rejected Wheeler’s claim about the trial
judge’s demeanor and conduct, stating “[g]eneral concern over a judge’s demeanor is not
the same as being induced to enter a plea based upon a judicial officer’s participation in
the plea-bargaining process.” The postconviction court reasoned that, while defense
counsel may have feared adverse trial rulings and a harsher sentence if the trial went to
verdict, counsel did not “specify any anticipated negative rulings during their
postconviction testimony. ” And the postconviction court found that defense counsel’s
concern about a “trial tax” was not based on any statement “directly uttered by the trial
judge.” The postconviction court also rejected Wheeler’s claim about receiving a harsher
sentence if she went to verdict, identifying this concern as “inherent in every plea
20
negotiation” and stating Wheeler’s case is “no exception to this general rule.” These
findings and conclusions are supported by the record.
Other factors
Finally, the postconviction court also identified four other factors that influenced
Wheeler’s decision to plead guilty, none of which involved the district court judge. First,
the postconviction court described the strong evidence presented by the state on Friday,
July 18, recounting that witnesses testified about finding E.S.’s severely injured body
folded inside a small freezer. Witnesses also testified about Wheeler’s conduct to cover up
E.S.’s death, including lying to E.S.’s family by saying he had gone to Chicago and
destroying E.S.’s property. The jury also viewed the freezer during trial on July 18. The
state planned to continue this line of proof on Monday, July 21, by introducing photographs
of E.S.’s body and calling the children to testify. The postconviction court considered the
evidence presented at trial, as well as evidence under consideration for admission, and
determined that Wheeler pleaded guilty “due to the overwhelming odds of being convicted
at trial.”
Second, the postconviction court found that the trial judge was not involved in final
plea negotiations, which occurred over the weekend and included emails between the
defense and prosecuting attorneys, and not the trial judge.
Third, despite Wheeler’s claim that the trial judge’s July 8 email an d the
in-chambers discussion hamstrung the defense during plea negotiations, defense counsel
procured a favorable plea agreement, specifically, a reduced charge of aiding and abetting
and a reduced sentence duration (from an upward departure of 240 months on Monday,
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July 14, to a guidelines sentence of 128-180 months on Thursday , July 17). The
postconviction court also observed that this defense offer followed the state’s offer of “a
more generous deal after days of trial when the case [was] going well for the State [which]
is an unusual occurrence.”
Based on the final plea agreement, the postconviction court also determined that,
contrary to Laskaris’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the defense team did not believe
the trial judge was “completely hostile to their side of the case.” As the postconviction
court noted, the plea agreement reached by the parties fell between their July 7 offers,
agreed the state would not seek aggravating factors, and agreed the parties would argue a
durational range to the trial judge, meaning that defense counsel believed the trial judge
would consider their requested sentence.
Fourth, on Monday, July 21, Wheeler provided a factual basis for the plea and
responded “no” when asked by her attorney if she had been threatened “in any way ” in
deciding to plead guilty. See Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2013) (“Solemn
declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” (quotation omitted)).8 The
postconviction court found Wheeler’s testimony during the plea hearing merited credence.
Ultimately, t he totality of the circumstances support the postconviction court’s
determination that the trial judge’s demeanor and conduct over the course of the

8 Wheeler cites caselaw that invalidates guilty pleas as involuntarily entered even though
the district court followed the formalities of Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01 in accepting the guilty
pleas. We do not find this caselaw helpful. Un der the Wheeler II test, which considers all
the facts surrounding a defendant’s plea, compliance with rule 15.01 is one factor in
determining whether Wheeler’s plea was voluntary.
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proceedings did not coerce Wheeler to plead guilty or otherwise make her plea involuntary.
The postconviction court reviewed the trial and postconviction evidence and the overall
timeline of plea offers and statements by the district court judge, as well as Wheeler’s
testimony about what influenced her decision to plead guilty. The postconviction court’s
factual findings and conclusions are well- supported by record evid ence and not clearly
erroneous. While some evidence offered at the postconviction evidentiary hearing could
have supported a different conclusion, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine
witness credibility on postconviction review. See Opsahl v. State, 710 N.W.2d 776, 782
(Minn. 2006) (“[O]ur standard of review reminds us that the postconviction court is in a
unique position to assess witness credibility, and we must therefore give the postconviction
court considerable deference in this regard.”).
We conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Wheeler’s petition to withdraw her guilty plea because the record supports the court’s
determination that Wheeler’s plea was voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances.
Affirmed.