Robert Lee Crum, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1828

Robert Lee Crum, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 26, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-14-3840

Robert Lee Crum, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Geoffrey A. Hjerleid, Assistant Coun ty
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Robert Lee Crum appeals from the denial of his motion to correct his 128 -month
prison sentence. The district court denied the motion on the ground that it raised the same

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issue that Crum had raised in a prior motion to correct sentence, which this court had
considered and rejected. We conclude that Crum’s second motion to correct sentence is
barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In June 2014, the state charged Crum with six drug-related offenses based on
allegations that he sold cocaine on four occasions between May 7, 2014, and June 13, 2014.
An Olmsted County jury found him guilty of all six charges. The district court sentenced
him to 161 months of imprisonment.
Crum pursued a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. He argued to this
court that the district court erred by denying his pre-trial motion for a continuance, which
he had requested so that he could hire a private attorney. We rejected the argument and
affirmed the conviction. State v. Crum , No. A15 -1372, 2016 WL 4420691 (Minn. App.
Aug. 22, 2016).
In October 2016, the supreme court granted Crum ’s petition for review and stayed
further proceedings pending a final disposition in two other cases. State v. Crum, No. A15-
1372 (Minn. Oct. 26, 2016) (order). In September 2017, the supreme court vacated the
stay and remanded the case to this court “for consideration of the application of section 18
of the Drug Sentencing Reform Act to petitioner’s sentence for first -degree controlled
substance crime, in light of State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2017).” State v. Crum,
No. A15-1372 (Minn. Sept. 19, 2017) (order). We reversed the district court’s sentencing
order and remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Crum, No. A15-1372 (Minn. App.
Dec. 14, 2017) (order op.).

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On remand, Crum challenged the district court’s calculation of his criminal-history
score. In February 2018, the district court sentenced him to 128 months of imprisonment.
Crum did not seek appellate review of the amended sentencing order.
In April 2018, Crum filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence pursuant to rule
27.03, subdivision 9, of the rules of criminal procedure. The district court denied the
motion on the ground that the issues raised by the motion had been considered and rejected.
Crum appealed. This court construed Crum’s pro se appellate brief to make one argument:
that the district court miscalculated his criminal -history score by including prior Illinois
convictions from 1995, which, he asserted, had decayed. We affirmed on the ground that
the three Illinois convictions had not decayed because Crum committed his Olmsted
County offenses within 15 years of the expiration of the Illinois sentences. Crum v. State,
No. A18 -0872, 2019 WL 115332, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 7, 2019) (citing Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.B.1.c (2016)).
In August 2019, Crum filed a second pro se motion to correct his sentence pursuant
to rule 27.03, subdivision 9. Crum again argued that the district court miscalculated his
criminal-history score by including prior Illinois convictions from 1995. The district court
filed a short order in which it denied the motion. The district court stated that the motion
“does not raise any new issues ” and that “Defendant’s arguments have alread y been
rejected by the court several times and by the court of appeals. ” The district court further
stated, “Defendant is not entitled to seek post -conviction relief on the same grounds as an
earlier motion that was appealed and affirmed.” Crum appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Crum argues that the district court erred by denying his second motion to correct
sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9. He contends that the district court erred by
construing his motion as a petition for post -conviction relief and by impliedly reasoning
that it is procedurally barred by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). He also
reiterates his argument that the district court miscalculated his criminal -history score by
relying on prior convictions from Illinois. In response, the state argues that the district
court did not err by dismissing Crum’s motion because his “arguments had been raised and
rejected by the Court several times and by the court of appeals.”
A.
A district court “may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law. ” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. An offender may obtain a correction of his or her sentence by
filing a motion to correct sentence. See, e.g., Townsend v. State , 834 N.W.2d 73 6, 739
(Minn. 2013); Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 2011). An offender also may
challenge his or her sentence in a petition for post-conviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 1(1) (2018). This court has stated that the “remedy in rule 27.03, subdivision 9, . . .
coexist[s] with the postconviction remedy.” Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 317 (Minn.
App. 2012).
The two means of challenging a sentence are subject to different procedural
requirements. For example, an offender may not file a post -conviction petition to assert a
claim that previously was raised on direct appeal or that could have been but was not raised
on direct appeal. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741; see also Quick v. State, 757 N.W.2d 278,

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280 (Minn. 2008). Similarly, “matters raised or known but not raised in an earlier petition
for postconviction relief will generally not be considered in subsequent petitions for
postconviction relief.” Powers v. State, 731 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Minn. 2007). But a motion
to correct sentence filed pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, is not barred by the Knaffla
doctrine. State v. Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747, 751-52 (Minn. App. 2013); cf. Townsend,
834 N.W.2d at 739 ( “We have not yet addressed whether . . . the procedural bar under
Knaffla appl[ies] to a motion to correct a sentence under rule 27.03, subdivision 9.”).
Crum is correct that he invoked rule 27.03, subdivision 9. His filing clearly states
that he moved “for correction of unlawful sentence pur suant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 9.” The district court referred to Crum’s filing as a “post-conviction motion pursuant
to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9.” The district court cited Powers as the legal basis for
its dismissal of Crum’s motion . In that case , Powers filed a motion to correct sentence
pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, but the district court treated the motion as a post -
conviction petition. Powers, 731 N.W.2d at 500-01 n.2. Powers did not challenge that
treatment on appeal. Id. For that reason, t he supreme court appl ied the Knaffla doctrine
and concluded that Powers’s petition was procedurally barred. Id. at 501. But in this case,
the district court noted that Crum was relying on rule 27.03, subdivision 9, and Crum has
consistently described his request as a motion to correct sentence . Consequently, the
Knaffla doctrine and Powers do not apply.
B.
As noted above, the state argues that the district court did not err by dismissing
Crum’s motion because he previously had m ade the same argument to both the district

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court and this court and because this court had rejected the argument on the merits. Indeed,
in our opinion affirming the district court ’s denial of Crum ’s first motion to correct
sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, we addressed and resolved Crum’s
argument as follows:
Crum argues that the district court should not have
considered his out -of-state convictions when it calculated his
criminal-history score. He states that his 1995 Illinois
convictions a re decayed because more than fifteen years
passed before his 2014 offense. However, as the sentencing
guidelines prescribe, it is not the year of the conviction that
matters but instead the date of discharge or expiration of the
sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.c. The expiration date
of Crum’s prior Illinois convictions was December 17, 2001.
Thus, his current 2014 offense fell within fifteen years of 2001,
and his prior convictions may be considered when computing
his criminal-history score. Fur ther, even if Crum urged this
court to consider his parole date in 2000, the fifteen -year time
bar still does not apply. Crum ’s Illinois convictions were not
decayed and the record supports the finding that his criminal -
history score was 10 points.

Crum, 2019 WL 115332, at *2. The argument that we addressed and resolved in our prior
opinion is , in essence, the same argument that Crum asserted in his second motion to
correct sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, and the same argument that he now
asserts on appeal.
“The doctrine of law of the case is a rule of practice followed between the Minnesota
appellate courts and the lower courts. ” Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 743-44 n.1 (Minn.
1994). “It is a discretionary doctrine developed by the appell ate courts to effectuate the
finality of appellate decisions.” Id. The doctrine applies in criminal cases as well as civil
cases. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 732 N.W.2d 612, 623 (Minn. 2007). The supreme court

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has applied the doctrine to bar a post -conviction petition alleging a claim that previously
had been considered and rejected on direct appeal. Lynch v. State, 749 N.W.2d 318, 321
(Minn. 2008). The supreme court also has applied the doctrine to bar a motion to correct
sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, on the ground that the motion raised an issue
that previously had been raised and decided in a prior motion to correct sentence pursuant
to rule 27.03, subdivision 9. Townsend v. State, 867 N.W.2d 497, 501 (Minn. 2015).
In this case, Crum filed a motion to correct sentence pursuant to rule 27.03,
subdivision 9, in August 2019 in which he made an argument that he previously had made
in his April 2018 motion to correct sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9 . T he
district cou rt correctly stated that Crum’s August 2019 motion did “not raise any new
issues” and that his argument previously had been rejected by the court of appeals. In so
stating, the district court effectively recognized that it was bound by the law of the case .
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Crum’s second motion to correct sentence
pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9. See Townsend, 867 N.W.2d at 501.
Affirmed.