State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1830

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott Howard Meyer,
Appellant.

Filed November 23, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-18-885

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jason Loos, Rochester City Attorney, Brent R. Carlsen, Assistant City Attorney, Rochester,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Zorislav R. Leyderman, The Law Office of Zorislav R. Leyderman, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Scott Howard Meyer challenges his conviction for violating a harassment
restraining order following a decade of contentious litigation with his former partner over

2
their son. The conviction centered on a message Meyer sent entitled “Book,” wherein
Meyer stated his plan to document this litigation history. Meyer argues that the evidence
regarding the book message was insufficient to support his conviction and that he was
denied a complete defense when the district court sustained objections to testimony and
closing arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
Meyer is a 60-year-old neurosurgeon. Meyer and Emily Peterson were previously
in a relationship and have a son who was 11 years old at the time of trial. The parties never
married. Shortly after their son was born, Peterson separated from Meyer, and moved to
Iowa with their son, triggering years of contentious litigation.
In October 2017, Peterson applied for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against
Meyer following many text exchanges, includi ng the persistent threat of writing a book
about their litigation history. The district c ourt granted Peterson’s request for an HRO.
Meyer was ordered to not hara ss Peterson and to not venture within two 500-foot blocks
of her home or workplace. The HRO limited Meyer to contact Peterson “through Our
Family Wizard to discuss child-related issues only.” 1 The HRO was effective until
January 8, 2020. Meyer challenged the HRO as being vague and ove rbroad. This court
upheld Meyer’s challenge stating that it is not vague and that someone with “common
intelligence” would not need to guess at its meaning. Peterson v. Meyer, No. A18-1185,

1 Our Family Wizard is a court-appointed co mmunication website for families that have
difficulty with communication.

3
2019 WL 2168770, at *5 (Minn. App. May 20, 2019), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1112 (2020).
The circumstances central to this appeal began on February 6, 2018. According to
testimony at trial, Peterson received thre e messages from Meyer through Our Family
Wizard. Two referenced his son by name.2 A message titled “Book” allegedly was not a
child-related issue. That message from Meyer said:
I am writing a book. It will be based upon everything in the
public record already related to what has transpired between
you and me and the courts. I have already hired a writer. The
book is in the works. Names will be named, all that are within
the public record.

Half an hour after he sent the book messa ge, Meyer arrived at the Olmsted County
Government Center and asked to speak to an officer to turn himself in. Meyer proceeded
to share the book message, his driver’s license , a copy of the HRO, and indicated that he
had violated the HRO. When speaking to an officer, Meyer said, “According to the HRO,
that [message] is a violation. . . . I purposely did this to violate that so I could be arrested.”
He also explained that the message was “not about a child, it’s about a book I’m writing.”
Following additional investigation, the officer mailed a misdemeanor citation for an HRO
violation.

2 The second message, titled “[Child],” stated: “I am going to tu rn myself in for violating
the HRO. Please make sure [child] is taken care of after school today.” The third and final
message titled “Pick up [child] today,” stated: “I will pick up [child] today. They refused
to arrest me.” There is no dispute that these messages were child related and did not violate
the HRO.

4
A jury trial on the HRO violation was held in October 2019. Meyer, Peterson, and
the responding officer testified to the events of the morning of February 6. The parties
disputed that the book message was child relate d. After several atte mpts to mention the
decade-long history of litigation and argu ments regarding the HRO’s vagueness, the
district court sustained objections to por tions of the cross-examination of Peterson,
Meyer’s testimony, and Meyer’s closing arguments. On October 15, 2019, the jury found
Meyer guilty of violating the HRO. Meyer was sentenced to probation and a $500 fine.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Meyer challenges his conviction, first by arguing that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict. We review this claim by considering the facts—viewed
in the light most favorable to the conviction—and determining whether the evidence was
sufficient for a jury to reach its verdict. Second, he contends that the district court
improperly sustained objections against test imony and his closing arguments, which we
review for an abuse of discretion.
I. Sufficient evidence supports Meyer’s conviction for violating the HRO.
Meyer first argues that the state did not prove he violated a term of the HRO beyond
a reasonable doubt. To obtain a conviction, the state must prove that (1) there is a
restraining order, (2) the defendant knows of th e order, and (3) there is a violation of the
order. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b) (2016). Here, the state only needed to prove that
there was a violation of the order, because Meyer stipulated to the first two elements. But

5
the parties disagree about whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the message in
question was not about a child-related issue.
An appellate court assesses the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction
by determining whether the evidence in the record would permit a jury to conclude that the
defendant was guilty beyo nd a reasonable doubt. State v. Pratt , 813 N.W.2d 868, 874
(Minn. 2012). Direct eviden ce is “evidence that is ba sed on personal knowledge or
observation and that, if true, proves a f act without inference or presumption.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 20 17) (alteration omitted) (quotation
omitted). The court’s review of direct evidence is limited to a close analysis of the record
to determine whether the evid ence, when viewed in the li ght most favorable to the
conviction, is sufficient to allow the jury to reach the verdict that it did. State v. Webb ,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court must assume “the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore ,
438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
With the relevant standard in mind, we tu rn to the direct evidence provided to the
jury at trial. Meyer admitted in his testimony that the HRO said he “could not talk about
the book,” and that messages about the book we re “what they said I harassed [Peterson]
with” in the past. And in contrast to the other messages sent on February 6, which included
the name of his son in the subject line an d message body, the book message did not
explicitly reference his son. Additionally, Meyer told the officer that he knew the message
was a violation that could lead to an arrest. When viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, this direct evidence is sufficient to show that Meyer violated a term of the HRO

6
which explicitly limited contact with Peterson to discussions of child-related issues on Our
Family Wizard.
Still, Meyer contends that although the book message “in isolation, appears to
violate the HRO,” the jury cann ot be allowed to consider the message in a vacuum and
“ignore critical testimony and context provided by the defendant and the alleged victim.”
This misstates the state’s burden. The jury only needed to find that Meyer’s message was
not child-related and therefore violated a term of the HRO, as Meyer acknowledges that he
sent the message and is aware of the HRO. Accordingly, the evid ence is sufficient to
sustain Meyer’s conviction for violating the HRO.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion when limiting testimony and
closing arguments.

Next, Meyer argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court
committed prejudicial error depriving him of his constitutional right to present a defense
by excluding relevant testimony and a portion of his closi ng arguments, both regarding
his defense theory. Meyer’s defense theory was that the message about the book was child
related even though it did not mention or refere nce his child. To esta blish this theory, he
sought to offer testimony providing context for the book, demonstrate that Peterson knew
the book was about their son, and argue that the language of the HRO was so vague that it
permitted Meyer to discuss his book as long as it involved their son.
First turning to the excluded testimony, Me yer contends that the district court’s
evidentiary rulings erroneously restricted his right to present a complete defense by
sustaining objections to testimony involving the context of the book message. Specifically,

7
Meyer argues that because the book he has threatened to write involves his child, his lawyer
should have been able to ask more questions about Peterson’s understanding of the book,
as well as the background of the court cases that would make up the book.
To review this allegation, we consider the discretion of the district court on rulings
of evidentiary and procedural matters. A reviewing court “will only overtur n a lower
court’s evidentiary ruling if that court abused its discretion.” State v. Griller ,
583 N.W.2d 736, 743 (Minn. 19 98). A defendant claiming the district court erred bears
the burden of proving the decision was erroneous and prejudicial. State v. Rhodes ,
627 N.W.2d 74, 84 (Minn. 2001).
Like all defendants accused of criminal behavior, Meyer “has the constitutional
right to present a complete defense.” State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2009).
But the evidence proffered in su pport of the defense must still comply with the rules of
evidence. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Minn. 2010). Even relevant evidence
“may be inadmissible where its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential
to cause unfair prejudice, to confuse th e issues, or to mislead the jury.” State v. Harris,
521 N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Minn. 1994); see Minn. R. Evid. 403.
Based on our review of the testimony, Meyer was able to present a complete
defense. As the district court acknowledge d, it sought to avoid confusing the jury by
introducing too much detail on the ten-year hi story of litigation. But, despite sustained
objections to some testimony, Meyer was able to ask several questions about the parties’
understanding of the book message. For exam ple, Meyer’s lawyer elicited the following
testimony from Peterson regarding her understanding of the context of the book:

8
Q: Now going to Exhibit Number 3. This will be the
exhibit where he talks abou t the book. Ms. Peterson,
this is not the first time yo u’ve heard about the book.
Correct?
A: Correct.
Q: Prior to February 6, 2018 , Mr. Meyer has told you he’s
writing a book. Correct?
A: Correct. I was surprised that he was telling me again.
Q: You were what?
A: I was surprised he was te lling me again about it when
he had already notified me about this.
Q: Okay. Is it true, ma’am, that Mr. Meyer had told you
that he is writing a book about your attempts to prevent
him from parenting [child]?
A: I don’t know all the wording, but I know is myself and
others involved are going to be outed and everyone will
know—I don’t know all the words that were used.
Q: Is it true, Ms. Peterson, that Mr. Meyer told you prior to
these messages that he sent to you on February 6 that he
would include in his book all the ways that you’ve used
the court system to prevent him from being able to see
his son?
A: I think that’s accurate.

And later, over the state’s objection, Meyer’s lawyer was allowed to ask Peterson what the
subject matter of the proposed book was abou t, to which she responded: “the litigation
revolving around [child].” Similarly, during Meyer’s testimony, he was asked to explain
the context of the “Book” message. Meyer responded that the b ook was child-related
because “the whole book is based on [child].”
Turning to the closing argument, Meyer cont ends that the district court substantially
restricted his ability to expl ain to the jury that the language in the HRO is vague,
particularly what is considered a “child-related issue.” However, similar to the testimony,
defense counsel was able to express that the language in the HRO was a “very vague” term

9
that could include books . Additionally, he articulated th e defense theory that the jury
needed context in order to determine the meaning of “child-related,” stating:
[T]he question in this case does come down to whether the
message about the book is child related. But in order for you
to decide whether or not the message about the book is child
related, you have to have context. Because without context, it
is not clear what the me ssage is intended to say . And if you
look at that message and consider the testimony that was given,
you will come to the conclusi on that the message about the
book is about [child]. It is about their son and it is child related,
and for that reason, Mr. Meyer has to be acquitted.

(Emphasis added.) In sum, defense counsel wa s able to explain his theory, and the court
did not sustain an objection to his point until his second iteration of describing the HRO as
“very vague.”
3
Despite Meyer’s assertions, a complete defense is not a limitless defense. Jenkins,
782 N.W.2d at 224. Outside of the presence of the jury, the district court warned the parties
that retreading arguments and history from th e previous court battles would only confuse
the jury of the facts and cons iderations necessary for this narrow issue. Regardless,
Meyer’s counsel was able to ask questions supporting his defense theory as well as
articulate his defense theory in his closing arguments. Through examination of both Meyer
and Peterson, the jury heard testimony about the context for the book, that Peterson
understood that the book woul d reference their son, and the argument that the language

3 The district court explained that because this court already ruled on the constitutional
vagueness of the HRO, Meyer’s counsel was not allowed to address it in his closing. Meyer
contends that he was instead trying to argue that the HRO language was vague in the
colloquial sense. We do not ne ed to resolve this dispute because, as discussed above,
Meyer already had the opportunity to argue that it was vague.

10
could be vague. Limiting testimony and argument in this fashion does not rise to the level
of an abuse of discretion.
In summary, there is enough evidence for a jury to determine that a message
threatening a tell-all book is not a child-related issue and for us to affirm the sufficiency of
the evidence. Additionally, b ecause the defense was able to articulate a defense theory
through multiple witnesses, sustained objec tions to repetitious and often irrelevant
testimony does not clear the bar of reversing thoughtful rulings from a district court as an
abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.