In the Matter of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1831

In the Matter of:

Kathryn Marie Larson, on behalf of Minor Child, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Keith Norman Marohn,
Appellant.

Filed June 29, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-FA-19-139

Leigh J. Klaenhammer, Roseville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Norman Marohn, North Branch, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Keith Marohn appeals from the di strict court’s order for protection (OFP)
granted to respondent Kathry n Marie Larson on behalf of th e parties’ child, E.A.M.
Appellant argues that the district court (1) should have issued a subpoena duces tecum

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compelling the production of Isanti County Family Services (ICFS) records, (2) should not
have quashed the subpoena duce s tecum for E.A.M.’s counse ling records, (3) improperly
allowed witness intimidation at the hearing on the petition, and (4) improperly found the
existence of domestic abuse. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 24, 2019, respondent, on behalf of minor child E.A. M., petitioned for an
OFP against appellant. Appellant is E.A.M .’s father and respondent’s ex-husband.
Respondent alleged in the petition that on May 19, 2019, appellant became frustrated with
E.A.M. for playing with her phone case. She further alleged that appellant grabbed
E.A.M.’s right forearm, forcibly grabbed E.A.M.’s phone out of her hand, grabbed her left
wrist, kicked her in the right knee, and dra gged her up the stairs to her bedroom while
holding her by her wrists. The petition alleged that appellant then prevented E.A.M. from
leaving her bedroom by holdi ng onto the door handle. Th e petition further alleged that
E.A.M. eventually took her ph one back and texted respondent that she was afraid of
appellant. Finally, the petition alleged that E.A.M. was seen by a doctor on May 22, 2919,
for bruises on her arm and knee, and that an x-ray was taken of her knee.
The district court issued an ex parte OF P and set a hearing date for May 31, 2019.
On May 30, 2019, a guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed to represent E.A.M. The order
naming the GAL “authorizes and directs” that the GAL have access to all relevant records,
including “[s]ocial services records” and “[m]edical, coun seling, therapy, treatment,
mental health and protected h ealth records.” The order stat ed that the GAL could not be
prevented from obtaining relevant information because of, among other things, a “[c]laim

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of legal privilege or other claimed right to confidentiality” or the Minnesota Government
Data Practices Act (MGDPA).
Because appellant was not gi ven adequate notice of it, the originally scheduled OFP
hearing was continued to June 7. Appellant informed the district court of his intention to
subpoena E.A.M.’s counseling records.
At the continued hearing on June 7, 2 019, appellant requested another continuance
because the subpoenas he had requested ha d not yet been issued. The hearing was
continued to July 8, 2019.
On June 11, 2019, the district court issu ed subpoenas, including one directed to
E.A.M.’s therapist. That subpoena was served on the therapist on June 14, 2019.
On June 24, 2019, E.A.M.’s therapist wrot e the district court to request that the
subpoena requiring her to produce E.A.M.’s counseling records be quashed. The letter
argued that releasing E.A.M.’s records woul d harm E.A.M.’s mental health and “would
have an impact on the trust that [E.A.M.] has come to expect in a therapeutic session.” The
letter stated the therapist’s “clinical opinion th at it is not in [E.A.M.] ’s best interest to
release any copies of diagnostic assessments or therapeutic progress notes to either parent.”
The district court temporarily granted the motion to quash the subpoena for E.A.M.’s
counseling records and “reserve[d] the rights of the parties to be heard on the issue.”
On June 24, 2019, appellant requested two more subpoenas, including one for
records from ICFS. The district court reserv ed taking any action on appellant’s request
and stated that the request “may be heard at the next hearing.”

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On July 8, 2019, the parties appeared for a hearing on the OFP as well as to address
a motion by appellant to remove the district c ourt judge. The district court judge granted
appellant’s motion to remove, and explained to appellant that it therefore declined to
consider appellant’s subpoena request. The hearing was c ontinued to August 14 before a
different district court judge.
On July 19, 2019, respondent’s attorney wrote to the district court and requested a
telephone conference “to address [appellant]’s subpoenas” before the hearing scheduled
for August 14.
The district court conducted a telephone conference on August 6, 2019, and quashed
appellant’s subpoena for E.A.M .’s counseling records. It also declined to issue the
requested subpoena compelling ICFS to produce records.
Late on August 12, 2019, appellant retained counsel. The day before the scheduled
OFP hearing, appellant’s counsel contacted the district court to request a continuance. The
district court granted the request and th e OFP hearing was again rescheduled for
September 20, 2019.
At the OFP hearing on September 20, 2019 , the district court heard testimony from
E.A.M., respondent, the GAL, two of appellant ’s other children, appellant, and a former
police officer. The subpoena issues were not revisited.
E.A.M testified that, after her sister’s wedding, she got in he r father’s car and
thought he was taking her to the Braham Police Station for a parenting exchange. E.A.M
testified that her father instead took her to his house. E.A.M testified that appellant

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“seemed to forget that [E.A.M] was suppos ed to go back to [her] mom’s house and so
[appellant] said that he would take [E.A.M] to [her mom’s house] tomorrow.”
E.A.M testified that she agreed to stay at appellant’s house for the night and that the
following day around 6:00 p.m. she asked to go to respondent’s hous e. E.A.M testified
that appellant “said like stuff like ‘you owe me,’ and [that he] never agreed to it and . . . I
started fiddling with my phone case, . . . then he took my right forearm and left wrist and
kicked me and then he tried to drag me up the stairs.” E.A.M testified that she felt scared
when appellant grabbed and kicked her.
E.A.M testified that appellant took her to her room and that she stayed in her room
for a while to give both herself and appella nt time to “cool down and have some time
apart.” Around 8:00 p.m., E.A.M got to re spondent’s house, and respondent called the
police. E.A.M testified that respondent “tried to make a document of it by calling the police
but then they wouldn’t.” The court clar ified, “They wouldn’t write it down?” E.A.M
answered, “Yeah—Yes.” E.A.M testified that respondent took her to the doctor because
E.A.M. had bruises on her knee and left forearm.
The GAL testified that E.A.M “is very cons istent in what she says and appears to
be truthful.” She supported issuance of the OFP.
Respondent testified concerni ng the events of May 19, that E.A.M. texted her
expressing a desire to come “home” because sh e did not feel safe at appellant’s house.
Respondent testified that E.A.M. told her that appellant “grabbed her arm, she was kicked,
she was forced into her bedroom. The be droom door was held sh ut for some time.”
Respondent eventually went to appellant’s hous e to pick up E.A.M. When she arrived,

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E.A.M. ran out of the garage with her backpack and appellant followed “ten feet behind.”
Respondent testified that once E.A.M. was in the car, respondent “took off as quickly as
[she] could to avoid any confrontation with [appellant] just due to him chasing [E.A.M.].”
Respondent testified that when they got to her house she tried to make a police report.
Respondent testified that she eventually got a return call from the police department and
was “told by the officer that the phone call was inappropriate because it was just discipline.
[The officer] was disgusted by the phone call. [The officer] said that she encouraged
[appellant] to make an HRO report on me.”
Ms. Samuelson, a former Cambridge Polic e Department officer, testified that, on
May 19, 2019, she received a call from appe llant “who wanted to report a possible
harassment complaint against his former wife .” Appellant expressed concerns about
respondent blocking his driveway. Ms. Samuel son testified that she advised appellant to
call the police the next time he had issues of this sort to obtain a restraining order.
Ms. Samuelson testified that “[s]everal hours later” her dispatch contacted her and told her
that respondent was repeatedly calling and asking to speak with her. Ms. Samuelson called
the phone number given to her by dispatch and spoke with bo th E.A.M. and respondent.
Ms. Samuelson testified that E.A.M. told her that appellant grabbed her right forearm and
took her phone. Ms. Samuelson testified that, in resp onse to E.A.M. telling her that
appellant took her phone away, she told E.A. M., “Okay, he’s allowed to do that, that’s
discipline.” In response to being told by E.A. M. that appellant tried to lock her in her
bedroom, Ms. Samuelson testifie d that she said, “He’s also allowed to do that too.”
Ms. Samuelson testified that she eventually spoke with respondent at which point she told

7
respondent “to act like an adult and to speak with her ex-husband as adults and not involve
law enforcement.” Ms. Samuelson testified that she had not yet formed any opinion about
respondent, despite her having advised appellant to get a restraining order if he had future
problems with respondent.
Appellant testified that on May 19, 2019, he could tell that E.A.M. was “waiting for
somebody.” Appellant testified:
[S]o I kind of talked to [E.A.M .] and I said, look, you know,
here’s the situation, you haven’t seen me for months, it’s your
dad’s time, I think a weekend w ith your dad would be okay,
you can stay for the weekend. You know, she wasn’t engaging
and so I said why—why don’t you go up to your—why don’t
you go up to your bedroom and just spend some time up in your
bedroom. I didn’t force her or anything like that. I wasn’t
locking her in the car—or in the—in the room, right, but it was
just kind of a, I want her away from that wall, away from the
window. She went upstairs for a few minutes, she came back
down again, and then ran out the garage door.

When asked if he took E.A.M.’s phone from her, appellant testified, “No . . . Well, I asked
for her phone, . . . I . . . didn’t force her to grab it from her but it was very much a daddy,
give me your phone moment, you know, very stern . . . voice. She kind of handed it over
and stomped away.”
Appellant was asked how he would explai n E.A.M.’s bruises on her arms and on
her knee. Appellant responded, “That’s a gr eat question. The children sometimes will
come home from their mom’s house complaining about what their mom has done to them.
If I had to really speculate I would assume that possibly [respondent] became violent with
[E.A.M] afterwards.”

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The district court found the testimony of E.A.M. to be credible and the testimony of
appellant and Ms. Samuelson to be not credible . The district court found that appellant
“committed acts of domestic abuse against [E.A .M.] . . . by grabbing her by the arms,
kicking her in the knee, dragging her upstairs [and] locking her in her room.” The district
court issued a two-year OFP.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appellant was not prejudiced by the di strict court’s error in denying his duces
tecum subpoena request for social services records from ICFS.

Appellant argues that the district court e rred when it declined to issue a subpoena
duces tecum to compel the production of social services records. Appellant contends that
“[t]he hearing outcome would have been different if [he] had access to the social services
records.”1
From the rather sketchy record 2, appellant seems to have wanted ICFS to produce
two categories of records—records pertai ning to the two curre nt child-protection

1 Our task on appeal is made more difficult by respondent not havi ng submitted a brief.
Without a brief from respondent, we are left to closely examine the record on appeal
without the benefit of respondent’s position. If respondent agrees that appellant should be
granted relief, she should register that agreement with this court; and, if she does not agree,
the appellate process would benefit from respondent arguing either that there was no error
below or that any error was harmless. This is particularly so where, as here, the record on
appeal is imperfect. We have decided the case based on a careful review of the record as
constituted.

2 No transcript of the August 6, 2019 phone conference exis ts. Appellant instead filed a
statement of proceedings pursua nt to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.03. The district court
responded to appellant’s statement of proceedings with its corrections under Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 110.05.

9
assessments arising out of the events of May 19, 2019 (apparently one assessment for each
of the children), and old records of prior “false reports.”
In June 2019, appellant requested a subpoen a for a social worker supervisor with
ICFS. Appellant requested “r ecords concerning him or his minor children,” as well as
“access to records or a statemen t identifying how many other people in the county had
never been found to abuse but [were] investigate[d] more than him.”
“The [district] court has broad discretion in granting or denying discovery requests.”
Connolly v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 373 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Minn. App. 1985). We will not
reverse a district court’s discovery decision unle ss the district court abused its discretion.
Ciriacy v. Ciriacy, 431 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. App. 1 988). “A district court abuses its
discretion by misapplying the law.” Sanvik v. Sanvik, 850 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App.
2014).
At a hearing on July 8, 2019, the district court briefly addressed and attempted to
clarify what records from ICFS appellant desired to access:
COURT: Turning then to th e issue of—I think there was—
[appellant], there was a request—there was a second request
for a subpoena that was on the same sheet that was a subpoena
for an agency representative.
APPELLANT: [ICFS]’ investigative records.
COURT: And again, has the request been made directly to the
agency?
APPELLANT: Yes. And request denied until the
investigation is complete.
COURT: I see.
APPELLANT: And that’s why it was separate and later than
all of the other subpoena requests.
COURT: I see. And what reco rds is it that you’re seeking
exactly?

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APPELLANT: Any records rela ted to the—the investigation
for—for [E.A.M.]. And there is a concurrent investigation that
they’re doing for [appellant’s s on]. So any records related to
those two.

On August 6, 2019, the dist rict court held a telephone conference “to address two
subpoenas requested by [appellant].” One of those requested subpoen as was intended to
compel ICFS to produce the re cords appellant sought. Duri ng the conference, appellant
argued that “[t]his subpoena was needed since ICFS denied his data access request in a
letter where they cited a policy of not releasi ng records during an ongoing investigation.”
Appellant argued:
Since ICFS was the ag ency investigating, they would have
witness statements, medical r ecords, photographs, and any
other evidence. In addition, [respondent] had a history of
making child abuse claims which were recorded by ICFS and
would be part of the defense. These ICFS records had already
been provided to the [GAL] who was expected to testify for the
[respondent].

Respondent’s attorney allegedly “stated she did not have a prob lem with the request.” In
his statement of proceedings, appellant st ates, “[Respondent]’s Attorney confirmed the
[GAL] had access to these records.”
The district court denied appellant’s request for a subpoena directed to ICFS
“because the information [appellant] sought was determined to be privileged under Minn.
R Civ. P. 45.04(b) and no exception applied that would allow for its disclosure.”
The district court abused its discreti on by denying appellant’s subpoena request.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.01(c), “[t]he court administrator shall issue a subpoena, signed
but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall complete it before service.”

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(Emphasis added.) Under appropriate circumstances, it seems that a district court can limit
a party’s ability to invoke the power of the court by denying the issuance of a subpoena.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.01(e), 45.05 (addressing penalties for improper use and improper
responses to a subpoena). However, the re cord as constituted does not support any
determination by the district court that appellant is subject to a limit on his ability to obtain
subpoenas. And rule 45.04(b), on which the district court re lied in declining to issue the
subpoena, provides that any claim of privil ege in withholding in formation sought by a
subpoena “shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the nature of
the . . . things not produced th at is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the
claim.” None of that was done here. ICFS never asserted any claim of privilege—because
no subpoena was issued as required by rule 45.01(c). We see no legal basis for the district
court to have denied issuance of the subpoena directed to ICFS, particularly in the absence
of any claim of privilege by ICFS. That was error as to both categories of ICFS records—
current and old.
But the district court’s e rror in declining to issue th is subpoena does not end the
inquiry. In addition to demonstrating error, an appellant must demonstrate on appeal that
the district court’s error prejudiced the appell ant. Although the district court abused its
discretion by declining to even issue the subpoe na directed to ICFS, “unless the error is
prejudicial, no grounds exist for reversal.” Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98
(Minn. 1987).
As to the records concerni ng the current family asse ssments, appellant fails to
demonstrate that the district court’s error prejudiced him.

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In his brief, appellant alleges—without citation to the record —that “[t]he [GAL]
had already been granted access” to the ICFS records. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.03
(“Whenever a reference is made to a part of the record that is not reproduced in the
addendum of any party, the refe rence shall be made to the pa rticular part of the record,
suitably designated, and to the specific pages of it.”). The question before us on appeal is
whether appellant was prejudiced by the distri ct court not having issued the requested
subpoena; it is not whether the records appellant sought were revealed to the GAL. Worth
noting, however, is that the record does not establish that the GAL accessed any particular
records of ICFS. The GAL expressed general awareness of the current assessments being
conducted by ICFS, and she testified at the OFP hearing that it was her “understanding that
there’s a family assessment that’s been opened.” On cross-examination, she testified that
she believed the family assessment was “stil l open pending the outcome of this Order for
Protection hearing.” The record does not support appellant’s contention that the GAL had
actually accessed any ICFS records.
As concerns whether appellant was prejudi ced by the district court’s erroneous
refusal to issue the requested subpoena, the MGDPA provides:
Active or inactive investigative da ta that identify a victim of
child abuse or neglect reporte d under section 625.556 are
private data on individuals. Ac tive or inactive investigative
data that identify a reporter of child abuse or neglect under
section 625.556 are confidential data on individuals, unless the
subject of the report compels disclosure under section 626.556,
subdivision 11.

Minn. Stat. § 13.82, subd. 8 (2018).

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Minnesota law concerning the reporting of maltreatment of minors provides that
“data acquired by the local welfare agency . . . during the course of [a child maltreatment]
assessment or investigation are private data on individuals.” Minn. Stat. § 626.556,
subd. 10(i) (2018). “An indivi dual subject of a record sh all have access to the record”
under chapter 13. Minn. Stat . § 626.556, subd. 11. (2018 ). “Any person conducting an
investigation or assessment under [section 626.556] who intentionally discloses the name
of a reporter prior to the completion of the investigation or asse ssment is guilty of a
misdemeanor.” Id.
We think the individual subjects of th e child-protection assessments sought by
appellant in this case were the children. Appe llant does not appear to argue otherwise.
And appellant makes no argument on appeal that he should have been afforded access to
the ICFS records notwithstanding the provisions of sections 13.82, subdivision 8, and
626.556. To our view, those statutes do not appear to allow individuals to access records
concerning an open and ongoing child-prot ection investigation in the circumstances
present here. This would seem to be part icularly important in cases where the person
requesting access to the open ch ild-protection records is one of the very people whose
conduct toward the children was being “assessed.”
Had the district court issued the requested subpoena to ICFS, as it should properly
have done, it seems certain that the agen cy would have inv oked sections 13.82,
subdivision 8, and 626.556. Once it did so, it appears from the reco rd as constituted that
the records would have been determined to be confidential at the time of the hearing on the
OFP petition—because there were then two open child-protection assessments.

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Therefore, and although the district court erred when it declined to issue the
requested subpoena, the docu ments sought by appellant relating to the then-active
assessments would not have been subject to disclosure to him. The district court’s error in
not issuing the subpoena is therefore harmless as relates to the active assessments.
As to the ICFS records of prior assessment s, the district court’s error in not having
issued the subpoena upon appellant’s request must again be examined for prejudice.
Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 98. The significance of the old records that appellant emphasizes
on appeal is that he wanted to show that fals e reports were made agai nst him in the past.
He was able to and did make that very poin t at the hearing without having accessed the
ICFS records. Appellant testified that there had been false reports alleging him to have
committed child abuse in the pa st. At the conclusion of the OFP hearing, appellant’s
counsel argued that “there’s a huge history . . . of [respondent] making false accusations”
and argued that the current reports had not resulted in any child-protection proceedings
being formally commenced by the county.
The ICFS records concerning the old “false reports” might have provided some
additional detail, but the detail of the reports was not the purpose for which appellant was
referencing them. His point was that the older reports were false. Whatever details were
in those old reports were details of which he disputed the accuracy. Any additional detail
that might have been gleaned from the old reports was therefore irrelevant.

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Although the district court erred in not i ssuing the requested subpoena duces tecum
directed to ICFGS, appellant has not demonstrated on appeal that he was prejudiced by the
error.3
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by quashing appellant’s duces
tecum subpoena for E.A.M.’s counseling records.

Appellant argues that the district cour t abused its discretion by quashing his
subpoena for E.A.M.’s counseling records and contends that the district court’s error
prejudiced him.
The decision to quash a subpoena “is within the discretion of the [district] court.”
Phillippe v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 374 N.2d 293, 297 (Minn. App. 1985). “This court
will not reverse a [district] court’s discovery decision in the absence of an abuse of
discretion.” Ciriacy, 431 N.W.2d at 599.
“In ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena, the court should balance the need of the
party to inspect the documents or things ag ainst the harm, burden, or expense imposed
upon the person subpoenaed.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]he court shall exercise its
power with liberality in issuing orders which justice requires for the protection of parties
or witnesses from unreasonable annoyance, e xpense, embarrassment, or oppression.”
Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762, 769 (Minn. 1956).

3 As discussed, and despite the breadth of the GAL’s appointment order allowing her access
to records regardless of the MGDPA, it is not at all evident from the record that the GAL
accessed any ICFS records. None were produced at the evidentiary hearing and the GAL
did not identify any facts that seem to have come from ICFS records.

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The district court issued the requested subpoena for the records of E.A.M.’s
counselor. The subpoena was served on June 14, 2019. In response to the subpoena, the
counselor wrote the district court requesti ng “an order quashing said subpoena duces
tecum.” She explained:
Due to current allegations of abuse, there is an Order for
Protection on file and releasing records would be considered
third party contact. Further, it is in this clinician’s opinion that
the release of these records would be detrimental to the mental
health of [E.A.M.]. To do so would have an impact on the trust
that [E.A.M.] has come to expect in a therapeutic session. The
release of records could interfe re with [E.A.M.’s] treatment
moving forward and may affect current and future therapy
relationships. . . . I am seeking to protect the confidentiality of
[E.A.M.]’s mental health records in order to protect [E.A.M.’s]
ability to speak freely about he r relationships and concerns
regarding each parent.

The counselor further explained that she did not believe it was in E.A.M.’s best interest to
release the records to either parent.
In response to the counse lor’s request, the district c ourt ordered the “[m]otion to
quash temporarily granted” and “reserve[d] th e rights of the parties to be heard on the
issue.”
During the August 6, 2019 telephone conference, the district court addressed the
subpoena for E.A.M.’s counseling records. During that conference, the counselor’s
attorney appeared and reiterated the counselor’s earlier arguments opposing release of the
records. Appellant argued that “the couns eling records were ne eded for a complete
defense.” Appellant noted th at the counselor had previous ly testified against him and
asserted that the GAL had access to the counseling records. Finally, appellant argued that

17
he needed access to E.A.M.’s records to “ensur[e] fairness in the hearing” and because
“fostering the relationship between child and fa ther should be paramount to the concerns
for the relationship between chil d and counselor.” The distri ct court denied appellant’s
request and quashed the subpoena. In quashing the subpoena, the district court determined
that the information sought wa s privileged under Minn. R. Ci v. P. 45.04(b) and that “no
exception applied that would allow for its disclosure.”
“On timely motion, the court on behalf of which a subpoena was issued shall quash
. . . the subpoena if it . . . requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no
exception or waiver applies.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.03(c)(1)(C). “When information subject
to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that it is privileged . . . the claim shall be made
expressly and shall be supported by a desc ription of the nature of the documents,
communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to enable the demanding party to
contest the claim.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.04(b)(1).
E.A.M.’s counseling records are presump tively privileged. Although E.A.M. did
not assert the privilege, her therapist recogni zed the issue and brough t it to the district
court’s attention, satisfying the requirement of rule 45.04(b) that there be a claim of
privilege with a supporting ratio nale for the assertion of the claim. We do not have on
appeal a verbatim record of the telephone conference that resulted in the order quashing
the subpoena, but from th e limited record, appellant fails to show that the district court
abused its discretion in quashing the subpoena seeking production of E.A.M.’s counseling
records.

18
III. The record does not reveal any witness intimidation.

Appellant argues that “[p]rejudicial erro r was committed when th e [district] court
failed to provide safety for witnesses to testif y in court.” Appellant contends that “[t]he
attorney for [respondent] approached, ques tioned, and harassed the witnesses for the
Appellant about their upcoming testimony in the courtroom hallway.”
“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the trial c ourt in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). “[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It
must be made to appear affirmatively before th ere can be reversal.” Loth v. Loth , 35
N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring
harmless error to be disregarded). Appellant must show that the district court erred. Id.
Appellant did not raise this issue with th e district court and the record reveals no
witness intimidation. If any th ere was, appellant concedes th at it was not brought to the
district court’s attention. That being so, appellant has not preserved this issue for appellate
review. Peters v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 657, 477 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn. App. 1991).
IV. The record supports the district court’s determinatio n that appellant
committed domestic abuse against E.A.M.

Appellant argues that the record does not support the district court’s conclusion that
appellant committed domestic abuse against E.A.M.
The Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2018), allows persons
claiming to be victims of domestic abuse to petition for an OFP. To obtain relief by way
of an OFP, the petitioner must allege that domestic abuse occurred and explain “the specific

19
facts and circumstances from which relief is sou ght.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4(b).
Under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act:
“Domestic abuse” means the following, if committed against a
family or household member by a family or household
member:
(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault;
(2) the infliction of fear of im minent physical harm, bodily
injury, or assault; or
(3) terroristic threats . . . ; cr iminal sexual conduct . . . ; or
interference with an emergency call . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a).
“We review the district court’s decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.”
Ekman v. Miller , 812 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. App. 20 12). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018)
(citation and quotation omitted).
E.A.M. testified that appella nt grabbed her right forearm and left wrist, kicked her,
dragged her up the stairs, held her bedroom do or shut so that she could not get out, and
took her phone away. The GAL testified—without obj ection—that E.A.M. “is very
consistent in what she says and appears to be truthful.” The district court made its ruling
from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing, stating:
The Court finds that [E.A.M.] was contacting her
mother by her phone, that that made [appellant] upset, that he
grabbed [E.A.M.]’s arms, took her phone and drug her upstairs
and put her in her room and locked her in there because he was
afraid that she was going to leav e because she didn’t want to
be there as she had done in the past.
Accordingly, I find that [appellant] is the father of
[E.A.M.], that he committed acts of domestic abuse against

20
[E.A.M.] as noted by grabbing her arms, kicking her in the
knee, dragging her upstairs and locking her in her room.

In issuing the two-year OFP, the district court considered the testimony of E.A.M.,
appellant, the GAL, two of appellant’s childre n, respondent, and a former police officer.
The district court found the te stimony of E.A.M. to be cred ible and expressly found the
testimony of the former police officer and appellant to be not credible.
The district court’s written findings, wh ile summary and consisting only of a finding
that appellant “grabbed and kicked the minor child,” ar e sufficient to support the
determination that domestic abuse occurred. We defer to the district court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988). Much of appellant’s argument consists of his insistence that the district court ought
to have believed his evidence and not the child’s testimony. To be sure, the record reveals
sharply conflicting versions of what happened on May 19. The evidence would also have
supported a finding that appellant did not do what respondent and the child allege him to
have done. But our task is not to revisit fact ual questions resolved by the district court.
“That the record might support different findings does not render them defective.” Muschik
v. Conner-Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. App. 2018). The reco rd supports the
district court’s findings and its determination that appellant committed domestic abuse.
Affirmed.