State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1846

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Francis Martinez,
Appellant.

Filed December 14, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-8686

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County A ttorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assi stant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presid ing Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Steven Francis Martinez pleaded guilty to failure to register as a predatory
offender. During the plea colloquy Martinez acknowledged that he failed to inform the

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Bureau of Criminal Apprehensi on (BCA) of his current address, but did not say whether
he notified local law enforcement or his corr ections agent of his change of address as
required by statute. On direct appeal from judgment of conviction, Martinez argues that
he should be permitted to with draw his guilty plea because it lacked an adequate factual
basis. Because we agree that Martinez’s statements in the plea colloquy were insufficient
to establish a factual basis for his guilt, we reverse and remand to allow Martinez to
withdraw his guilty plea.
FACTS
In 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged Martinez with failure to register as
a predatory offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2018).
On July 8, 2019, Martinez signed a petition to enter a pl ea of guilty to the charged
offense. During the plea heari ng, the only questions asked of Martinez in support of his
guilty plea were by the prosecutor as follows:
Q: At some point after yo u filled out [the] change of
information card, you left the [St. Paul] residence. Is
that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And did you update your information with the BCA?

A: No, I didn't.

Q: And you understand that th at’s a violation of the terms
of your requirement to register. Is that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And you’re pleading guilty because you are guilty?

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A: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, if that’s sufficient?

THE COURT: I believe it is. What I’m going to do is
accept your plea of guilty and adjudicate
you guilty of the charge.

After accepting Martinez’s guilty plea and adjudicating him guilty of the charge, the
judge ordered Martinez to complete a presentence investigation (PSI).
The district court sentenced Martinez to 39 months’ imprisonment subject to a stay
of execution, and placed him on supervised probation for three years. Martinez appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Martinez argues that he must be allowed to withdraw his plea because it was not
constitutionally valid. The stat e counters that Martinez’s pl ea colloquy, when combined
with the contents of the complaint and PSI, establishes a constitutionally-valid factual basis
for the plea.
To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, and whether a
defendant’s plea is accurate is a question appellate courts review de novo. State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be accurate, a plea must be established on a proper
factual basis.” Id. A defendant may be entitled to wit hdraw an inaccurate guilty plea on
the ground that an inaccurate plea is a “manifest injustice.” Id. at 93-94.
Establishing a proper factual basis is “t ypical[ly]” accomplished “by asking the
defendant to express in his own words what happened.” Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581,
589 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94). “T he defendant’s statement
usually will suggest questions to the court which then, with the assistance of counsel, can

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interrogate the defendan t in further detail.” State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.
1983). “It is to be hoped that the trial judge, in [accepti ng a plea], will ask the questions
with respect to the factual basis for the crime so as to avoid the rather common inclination
of counsel to elicit these facts by leading questions.” State v. Hoaglund, 240 N.W.2d 4, 6
(Minn. 1976).
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (201 8), Martinez was subj ect to the following
registration provision: “[A]t least five days before [Martinez] starts living at a new primary
address, including living in another state, [M artinez] shall give writ ten notice of the new
primary address to the assigned corrections agent or to the law enforcement authority with
which [Martinez] currently is registered.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b) (emphasis
added). Martinez was also require d to “give written notice to the assigned corrections
agent or to the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area of [Martinez’s]
primary address that [he] is no longer living or staying at an address, immediately after
[he] is no longer living or staying at that address.” Id. (emphasis added).
Martinez’s plea colloquy failed to establish whether he gave notice of a new primary
address to his assigned corrections agent or to law enforcement at least five days before he
began living at his new address. Instead, in response to the state’s leading questions,
Martinez agreed only that he had not informed the BCA that he had left his registered
address. Martinez was never asked, and therefore never admitted, that he failed to provide
timely written notice of his new primary address to his assigned corrections agent or to the
law enforcement authority to which he is currently registered.

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The state argues that we may nevertheless conclude that his guilty plea was accurate
when considered with the information set forth in the co mplaint and the PSI. We are not
convinced the legal authority cited by the state establishes that we may consider the
complaint or the PSI, neither of which were offered as evidence, to supplement Martinez’s
statements in order to dete rmine whether his guilty plea wa s constitutionally accurate.
Moreover, neither document provides the ne cessary factual basis that was absent from
Martinez’s colloquy, and so we conclude that—even if supplemented as the state
suggests—Martinez’s plea would still not be constitutionally accurate.
The complaint states, in re levant part, that “Martinez ’[s] current whereabouts are
not known. Martinez has not registered a new address with the BCA and he has not
registered as homeless.” The PSI report states, in relevant part, “[Martinez] was
interviewed for this presentence investigation. When asked about the current offense, Mr.
Martinez stated he ‘took off’ because he knew” he “violated [his] supervised release.” But
neither statement addresses the statutory requ irement that Martinez inform his assigned
corrections agent or law enforcement authority, and so they add nothing to Martinez’s plea
colloquy. Even if we were to consider the complaint and PSI as respondent urges, neither
document provides additional information to establish his guilt.
Reversed and remanded.