State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1849

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Precious Sylvanna Williams,
Appellant.

Filed December 7, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-1452

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Michael A. Seasly, Assistant City Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
When a security guard patrolling a building in downtown St. Paul tried to deescalate
a verbal altercation between appellant and another woman, appellant assaulted the security

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guard. The responding police officers wore body cameras that recorded interviews with
the victim and a witness. At her jury trial, the jury found appellant guilty of disorderly
conduct and fifth-degree assault. Appellant challenges the admission of the camera footage
on the ground it is inadmissible hearsay. We affirm.
FACTS
At around 6:45 p.m. on February 25, 2019, police officers Samuel Keller and David
Rud responded to a call at the U.S. Bank building (building) in St. Paul. When they arrived,
the Metro Transit Police Department had appellant in custody. The officers conducted an
investigation. Officer Keller interviewed the victim, D.A., and Officer Rud interviewed
the witness, B.C. Both officers wore body cameras and recorded the interviews.
The state charged appellant with fifth-degree assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd.
1 (2018), and two counts of disorderly conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subds. 1(1), (3)
(2018). The district court conducted a two-day jury trial. The state called five witnesses.
Appellant testified on her own behalf and called no other witnesses.
Trial testimon y established these facts. D.A. worked as a security guard for the
building and was on duty the evening of February 25, 2019. While sitting at the security
desk on the second floor of the building , D.A. heard “loudness” on the first floor. D.A.
went down the escalator and saw appellant arguing with another woman. Appellant was
“very upset; very, very upset” and was “very, very, very aggressive.” D.A. stepped
between both women and tried to calm down appellant. After about three to four minutes,
appellant began acting like she wanted to fight the woman. D.A. told appellant she needed
to either calm down or leave the vestibule. Appellant said she was not going anywhere and

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tried to get around D.A. to the other woman. D.A. leaned against the glass of the vestibule
to block appellant.
In response, appellant tried to slap D.A., but missed. D.A. grabbed appellant’s wrist
to keep her from attempting to slap him again. As D.A. held appellant’s wrist, appellant
grabbed D.A.’s necktie. Appellant never let go of D.A.’s necktie and continually tried to
twist it and choke D.A. Because appellant would not let go of D.A., he and another security
guard walked her outside. While D.A. tried to move appellant outside, she continued to
choke, scratch, and kick him in the groin.
B.C. testified that around 6:45 p.m. on that day, she was inside the vestibule of the
building with her two children waiting for their bus. B.C. saw appellant and another
woman arguing in the vestibule. Soon after, D.A. arrived and asked appellant to leave but
appellant refused. B.C. saw appellant first smack D.A. and then beat, hit, and kick him in
his groin. B.C. heard D.A. tell appellant “I’m not going to hit you” and ask appellant to let
him go. Appellant would not let go of D.A. and continued to grab him. It took both D.A.
and the second security guard to get appellant out of the building. B.C. never saw D.A.
strike appellant and believed appellant was the aggressor. B.C. and her children believed
the incident was “crazy ,” and so B.C. called the police and told them that a girl was
attacking a man. B.C. had a clear view of the incident for the 10 to 15 minutes it last ed,
she recorded the attack on video, and she showed the video to police.
After D.A. and B.C. testified, the state sought to introduce the body-camera footage
of the officers’ interviews with D.A. and B.C. Appellant objected, asserting that she did
not impeach D.A. or B.C., and there was thus no need to bolster their credibility; instead,

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the footage would be cumulative. The state argued the footage was nonhearsay evidence
under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) that would help the jury in evaluating the credibility of
both D.A. and B.C. The district court admitted the footage of both officers’ body cameras
into evidence as (1) prior consistent statements under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B ), and
(2) present sense impressions und er Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(D) . T he jury watched the
footage.
At the end of trial the jury found appellant guilty on all three c harges. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges the admission of the officers’ body-camera footage at trial and
argues that the district court abused its discretion by a dmitting the footage because it was
inadmissible hearsay. “Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district
court, and we will not reverse an evidenti ary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014 ). “A [district] court abuses its discretion
when it acts arbitrarily, without justification, or in contravention of the law.” State v. Mix,
646 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). Appellant
bears “the burden of establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that [the]
appellant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003).
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is generally not admissible unless a n exception to the hear say rule
applies. State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020) (citing Minn. R. Evid.

5
802). The Minnesota Rules of Evidence provide instances when an out-of-court statement
is not hearsay. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d). Two such instances are relevant here : prior
consistent statements and present sense impressions. We discuss each in turn.
A. The footage is admissible as a prior consistent statement.
Appellant argues that the footage was inadmissible as a prior consistent statement
for two reason s. First, appellant claims that she did not impeach either witness’s
credibility. Second, according to appellant, the footage was not consistent with trial
testimony because the footage contained evidence besides both witne sses’ out -of-court
statements.
Out-of-court statements are admissible as prior consistent statements when: (1) the
declarant testifies at trial, (2) the declarant is subje ct to cross -examination, and (3) the
statements are “consistent with the declarant’s testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in
evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a witness. ” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Prior
consistent statements are not automatically admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B),
however. The district court must first determine that the witness’s credibility has been
challenged and that the statement will bolster the witness’s credibility. State v. Nunn, 561
N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. 1997).
On the threshold question of whether appellant challenged the witnesses’ credibility,
appellant argues that under Nunn, the district court erred in admitting the footage. The
court in Nunn held that prior consistent statements must help the jury in evaluating the
witness’s credibility and “[t]hus, before the statement can be a dmitted, the witness’ [s]
credibility must have been challenged , and the statement must bolster the witness’ [s]

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credibility with respect to that aspect of the witness’ [s] credibility that was challenged.”
Id. A defendant challenges a witness’s credibility by disputing his or her recollection of
the events surrounding the crime. Id.
Here, the holding in Nunn supports admission of the footage. The district court
determined that appellant challenged the witnesses’ credibility at trial by disputing their
recollections of the events surrounding the crime. Thus, the district court determined that
it was particularly important to know who acted at what times, and the footage would help
the jury in assessing credibility. We agree that appellant challenged the credibility of both
D.A. and B.C. by disputing their recollection s of the events and that the prior consistent
statements were, therefore, helpful to the jury.
Having determined that appellant challenged the witnesses’ credibility, we turn to
appellant’s second argument that because the footage differs from trial testimony it
contains inconsistent statements and thus should not have been considered a prior
consistent statement. Trial testimony and the prior statement need not be identical to be
considered consistent. State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. App. 2000) , review
denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 2000) . It is sufficient if the prior statement is simply reasonably
consistent with the trial testimony. State v. Zulu, 706 N.W.2d 919, 924 (Minn. App. 2005).
A prior statement is not reasonably consistent with trial testimony when the inconsistencies
affect the elements of the charge so that, if believed by the jury, they would legally escalate
the criminal charge. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d at 110.

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Appellant argues that the footage of D.A.’s interview differed from his trial
testimony because it contained these five statements:1 (1) D.A. described appellant’s
behavior as ridiculous, (2) the second security guard stated that he felt the need to step in
when he saw appellant kicking D.A., (3) Officer Keller told D.A. he had a right to defend
himself, (4) the second security guard stated that D.A. tried not to defend hi mself, and
(5) D.A. stated that he did not touch appellant other than holding her wrists. Appe llant
similarly co ntests the footage of B.C.’s interview with Officer Rud because it includes
these five statements to which she did not testify at trial: (1) B.C. described the attack and
stated that appellant would not leave, was s creaming, started attac king D.A., and that it
took both security guards to get appellant out of the building; (2) B.C. showed Officer Rud
her cell-phone video of the attack; (3) B.C. stated that appellant went crazy and that D.A.
is a nice man; (4) B.C. stated she felt bad for D.A. and hoped he gets a raise; and (5) Officer
Rud gave stickers to B.C.’s children.
In our review of the footage of both witnesses’ interviews and their trial testimony,
we conclude that they do not diverge so much so that they were not reasonably consistent.
Nor do they legally escalate the criminal charges against appellant. To convict appellant
of fifth-degree assault the state had to prove that she intentionally inflicted or attempted to

1 Appellant appears to claim that beside s the footage differing from trial testimony, the
state should have redacted certain portions of the f ootage before publishing it to the jury.
But appellant did not object on these grounds at trial and has therefore forfeited that issue
on appeal. See State v. Mosley , 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 n.2 (Minn. 2014) (finding that an
evidentiary issue was not preserved for appeal when the defendant made an objection on
due-process grounds, but failed to state the specific ground of object ion under an
evidentiary rule).

8
inflict bodily harm on another . Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2). The state established
this element when D.A. testified that appellant choked, scratched, and kicked him, and
when B.C. testified that appellant beat, hit, and kicked D.A. The other details D.A. and
B.C. described in their interviews, if true, did not raise appellant’s conduct to a higher level
of criminality than the fifth-degree assault charge.
Similarly, to convict appellant of the first count of disorderly conduct the state had
to prove that she engaged in brawling or fighting. Minn. Stat. § 609.72 , subd. 1(1). The
state established this element when D.A. and B.C. testified that appellant attacked D.A. To
convict appellant of the second count of disorderly conduct the state had to prove that she
engaged in offens ive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct or language that
tended to reasonably arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others. Id., subd. 1(3). The
state established this element (1) when D.A. testified appellant was aggressive, yelled, tried
to fight another woman, and physically attacked him, and (2) when B.C. testified the attack
was “crazy” and that she called the police for help. Again, the other details D.A. and B.C.
described in their interviews, if true, did not raise appellant’s conduct to a higher level of
criminality than the charges of disorderly conduct.
Consistency does not require trial witnesses to recite their prior statements verbatim.
Bakken, 604 N.W.2d at 109. We conclude the footage was reasonably consistent with the
trial testimony, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
footage as prior consistent statements.

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B. The footage is admissible as a present sense impression.
Out-of-court statements are not hearsay “if the declarant testifies at the trial, is
subject to cross -examination concerning the statement, and the statement describes or
explains ‘an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition or immediately thereafter.’” Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 418 (Minn. App.
2009) (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 801 (d)(1)(D)). Appellant argues that the footage is not
admissible as a present sense impression under State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580 (Minn.
1980), because too much time passed between the assault and recording of the footage. In
Pieschke, the supreme court determined that statements made within a few minutes of an
accident qualified as a present sense impression but those made an hour later did not
because too much time had passed. 295 N.W.2d at 584. The court stated the purpose of
requiring that the statement be “made contemporaneously with the event or immediate ly
thereafter [is] so that there is little time to consciously fabricate a story.” Id. at 583. Thus,
Pieschke established a continuum of time, ranging from a few minutes up to an hour, when
a statement may qualify as a present sense impression. Id. at 584.
Here, the footage captured an ongoing police investigation shortly after the assault.
It is unlikely that either witness had time to “consciously fabricate a story” and thus did
not undermine the purpose of Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(D). Id.
We conclude that the district court’s decision to admit the footage as a present sense
impression is not contrary to the time spectrum established by caselaw. The district court
did not abuse its discretion. See Mix, 646 N.W.2d at 250 (“A [district] court abuses its
discretion when it acts . . . in contravention of the law.”).

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Having concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
the footage as a prior consistent statement or present sense impression, we briefly discuss
appellant’s claim that the admission of the footage impacted the verdict. Even if appellant
could show that the district court committed error by admitting the footage, appellant is not
automatically entitled to a new trial. See Nunn, 561 N.W.2d at 907 (“Reversal is warranted
only when the error substantially influences the jury’s decision.”). Appellant must also
establish that the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Id. We conclude that nothing
in the record shows that the admission of the footage prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
Affirmed.