Erin Elisabeth Dancour, n/k/a Erin Elisabeth Meyers, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1854

Erin Elisabeth Dancour,
n/k/a Erin Elisabeth Meyers,
Appellant,

vs.

Elie E. Dancour,
Respondent.

Filed September 21, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-19-165

Joel M. Anderson, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for appellant)

Samantha J. Gemberling, Wolf, Rohr, Gemberling & Allen, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pr esiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
In this child-support dispute, appellant-mother argues that the district court abused
its discretion by failing to (1) award her attorn ey fees; (2) establish respondent-father’s

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medical-expense obligation; and (3) order father to pay educational expenses. We affirm
the district court’s rulings on attorney fees and health-care expens es, but we reverse and
remand for enforcement of father’s obligation to share in educational expenses.
FACTS
Appellant Erin Elisabeth Dancour, n/k/ a Erin Elisabeth Meyers (mother) and
respondent Elie E. Dancour (father) met in medical school in New Orleans and married in
2011. The parties later moved to New York. Mother is from Minnesota; father considers
New York to be his home. The parties’ one child (the child) was born in February 2015.
In 2017, the parties moved to Indiana for father’s fellowship.
In December 2017, mother petitioned for dissolution of marriag e. On March 1,
2018, a summary decree of dissolution of marriage (the decree) was filed in Indiana. The
parties shared joint legal cu stody of the child. Mother was awarded primary physical
custody, and father was awarded reasonable pa renting time. Father was ordered to pay
mother $18 per week in child support. Then, beginning May 1, 2019, and each year after,
the parties were required to complete a “tru e-up” calculation to determine whether father
owed child support. The true-up formula used the parties’ incomes from the prior year, the
number of overnights each party had with the child, and the amount each party paid in day-
care costs and health-insurance premiums. Father then would submit a lump-sum payment
to mother by May 15 of each year if he underpaid child support. This formula allowed for
child support to be based on the parties’ actual incomes because the weekly child-support
amount from the true-up calculation would be come the weekly child-support amount for

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the next year. Mother was responsible for maintaining health insurance for the child, and
the parties agreed to share educational and agreed-upon extraordinary expenses.
In May 2018, mother and the child m oved to Minnesota. Mother petitioned to
transfer jurisdiction of registration of the decree to Minnesota. On February 25, 2019, the
decree was confirmed. On February 26, 2019 , mother moved for an order to show cause
for father’s failure to pay child support. On March 11, 2019, mother moved to find father
in contempt for failing to pay child support, claiming that he owed $936.
In April 2019, father moved to deny mo ther’s motions, asserting that his child-
support obligation was not due until the true-up upcoming in May 2019. Father admitted
that he had not paid mother child support, but he claimed that the parties agreed that he did
not have to pay weekly child support if he di d not protest mother’s move to Minnesota.
Despite this agreement, however, father stated that he would pay mother what he owed.
Following a hearing, the referee filed an order finding that the parties agreed to
continue the contempt motion and participate in mediation. The referee also found that the
parties agreed to proceed with the May 2019 true-up, but going forward, child support
would be established under th e Minnesota child-support gui delines. At mediation on
May 27, 2019, the parties were unable to reac h any agreements, but father paid mother
$1,000.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their true-u p calculations. Based on father’s true-
up submission, he owed mother $37,940 in child support. Fa ther disputed expenses in
mother’s true-up submission, such as those re lated to an au pair, preschool, and museum
and zoo memberships.

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At a June 27, 2019 evidentiary heari ng on mother’s contempt motion, father
tendered mother a check for $37,940. The re feree determined that father should not be
held in contempt because he was in substantial compliance.
On September 20, 2019, the referee filed an order. Based on the true-up formula,
the referee determined that father, after the payment he submitted, owed mother an
additional $5,085. The referee determined father’s new child-support obligation under the
Minnesota child-support guidelines, but rese rved ruling on father’s medical-expense
obligation because mother had not supplied current health-insurance costs for the child.
In addressing father’s challenges to moth er’s true-up submission, the referee found
it reasonable that mother hired an au pair and that father did not deny his involvement in
the hiring process. The referee determined that father provided no documentation that he
objected to the child being enrolled in preschool for the 2019-20 school year and ordered
him to contribute to those costs. But beca use mother failed to provide documentation
related to her enrollment of the child for th e 2018-19 school year, the referee concluded
that “[a]bsent an agreement . . . the [c]ourt is unwilling to require that father pay for
preschool prior to June 2019.” The refer ee denied in part mother’s requests for
reimbursement for extraordinary expenses and denied her request for attorney fees. After
mother’s request for reconsideration was deni ed pursuant to Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11,
this appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
Attorney fees
Mother first argues that it was an abuse of discretion to deny her request for attorney
fees. Mother claims that she is entitled to attorney fees based on her contempt motion and
the decree; thus, mother seeks conduct-based and contractual attorney fees. “The standard
of review for an appellate court examining an award [or denial] of attorney fees is whether
the district court abused its discretion.” Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999).
Conduct-based attorney fees may be im posed “against a party who unreasonably
contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1
(2018). Conduct-based a ttorney fees are warranted when a party’s behavior throughout
litigation has been “duplicitous and disingenuous” to the extent of increasing the time and
expense of the proceeding. Redmond v. Redmond , 594 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Minn. App.
1999). The requesting party bears the burden of establishing that the other party’s conduct
unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding. Geske v. Marcolina,
624 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. App. 2001).
Here, the referee denied mother’s request for over $27,000 in attorney fees,
concluding that father did not unreasonably contribute to the length or expense of the
proceeding. We agree.
Mother failed to satisfy her burden to show that father unreasonably contributed to
the length or expense of the proc eeding. First, father asserted that he did not pay weekly
child support, relying on an ag reement he reached with mother regarding her desire to
relocate. The parties’ decree states that it is in the child’s best interests that the parties live

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“in close proximity to one another.” Yet mother decided to relocate to Minnesota with the
child before father had comple ted his commitment to his fello wship in Indiana. Father
claimed that because mother wanted to move, and he wanted to prevent her from moving,
they agreed that she would move with the child and he would not have to pay weekly child
support. Father claimed that he was not earning a substantial income during his fellowship,
and he therefore needed the additional funds to visit the child. Mother did not contradict
father’s assertion that this was the parties’ arrangement or that he reasonably believed that
he did not owe mother weekly child support.
Further, the referee found th at when mother filed her contempt motion in March
2019, father owed less than $1 ,000 in child support. Father then tendered $1,000 in May
2019 and raised genuine challe nges to mother’s true-up submission, which needed to be
resolved. The r ecord supports these findings. See Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d
279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (stating that findings of fact will be sustained unless they are clearly
erroneous). Father timely responded to mo ther’s motions and submitted payment for his
alleged child-support arrears. Thus, moth er failed to show that father unreasonably
contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding.
Mother also claims that she is entitled to attorney fees because it is provided for in
the decree. This is a matter of contract interpretation, which is an issue reviewed de novo.
See Ertl v. Ertl, 871 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Minn. App. 2015). The hold-harmless provision in
the decree, upon which mother re lies, relates to third-party actions. For example, this
provision would require father to hold mother harmless for any fees he incurred, including
attorney fees, in an action brought by a third party for his failure to pay an outstanding debt

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that he agreed to pay and was incorporated into the decree. This provision does not reach
attorney fees associated with mother seeking to collect child support. Based on this record,
we see no abuse of discretion in the referee’s denial of mother’s request for attorney fees.
Medical-expense obligation
Mother next argues that the referee shoul d not have reserved a determination on
father’s medical-expense obligation because the child-support guidelines require findings
on basic support. Mother asserts that the pa rties agreed that the weekly medical-expense
premiums were $128.56. But while finding this figure accurate for the true-up calculation,
the referee stated: “Based on mo ther’s failure to provide a ny information related to the
child’s current medical and dental insurance costs, the [c]ourt will reserve father’s medical
support obligation at this time.”
A submission in the record that used an Indiana child-support calculator indicated
that the child’s weekly hea lth-insurance premium was $128.5 6. But mother’s insurance
would have changed after she moved to Mi nnesota and undertook a position with a new
employer. However, there is nothing in the record showing health -insurance costs after
May 2019. See Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk , 668 N.W.2d 235, 24 3 (Minn. App. 2003)
(“[A] party cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in her favor when one of
the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the
evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the question.”), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). Thus, the referee did not abuse its discretion in reserving a ruling
on father’s medical-expense oblig ation until it is presented wi th current information to
calculate the obligation.

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Educational expenses
Finally, mother argues that father should reimburse her for educational expenses.
The referee determined that father was responsible for preschool expenses for the 2019-20
school year, but not the 2018-19 school year because mother did not provide
documentation showing that father agreed to the child’s enrollment for the 2018-19 school
year. The referee was unwilling to require fath er to pay preschool e xpenses “[a]bsent an
agreement, or documentation that mother di d not unilaterally enroll the child.” We
disagree with the referee’s determination, because, under the decree, educational expenses
need not be approved by father.
Regarding educational expenses, the decree provides: “For preschool, primary and
secondary education expenses, the parties sha ll share payment of tuition, private primary
and/or secondary education expenses based upon their respective percentage shares of
income . . . unless the parties agree otherwis e, in writing.” This provision requires the
parties to share in the expense, unless they agree otherwise; it does not require the expense
to be preapproved. If the parties had intended to have the expense preapproved, they could
have included it in the decr ee as they did for extraordinary expenses. Under the
extraordinary-expense provision, the parties are required to consult with each other in
advance of enrollment; the education-expense provision does not include this requirement.
Therefore, father was required to pay, and it was his burden to object rather than mother’s
burden to prove that father approved, the educ ational expenses. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand for the district court to make a determination of the amount father owes mother

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for the child’s educational expenses, in doi ng so, the district court may exercise its
discretion to reopen the record.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.