State of Minnesota,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1856

Court of Appeals Chutich, J.

State of Minnesota,

R e s p o n d e n t ,

vs. Filed: August 4, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Rebecca Ann Powers,

Appellant.
________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Tyler J. Kenefick, Assistant St. Louis County
Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer L. Lauermann, Assistant
State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

_______________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. To establish the reduction in the va lue of physical property damaged by a
defendant and the degree of the defendant’s culpability wh en charged with criminal
damage to property, the phrase “cost of repa ir and replacement” set forth in Minnesota
Statutes section 609.595, subdivision 1(4) (2020), unambi guously includes reasonable
estimates of the cost to repair or replace the damage.
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2. Sufficient evidence suppo rted the jury’s verdict of first-degree criminal
damage to property when the State presented a reasonable estimate that the cost to repair
the damage to the property exceeded the $1,000 felony threshold.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
This case raises a narrow issue of statutory interpretation: Does the phrase “cost of
repair and replacement” in Minnesota Statutes section 609.595, su bdivision 1(4) (2020),
defining first-degree criminal damage to property, permit the State to present evidence of
estimates or quotes to determine the reducti on in value of the prop erty damaged by the
defendant? Appellant Rebecca Powers seeks review of an opinion of the court of appeals
affirming her conviction for first-degree crim inal damage to property. She argues that
allowing the jury to consid er only estimated costs to repair or replace the damaged
property, rather than the actual costs of repair and replacement, would impermissibly add
the word “estimated” to the language of the statute. Powers further asserts that because the
property owner did not repair or replace the damaged property, the estimates presented to
the jury on the cost to do so were insufficient to support he r conviction for first-degree
criminal damage to property. Because we c onclude that reasonable estimates on the cost
to repair or replace damaged property are incl uded in the meaning of the statutory phrase
“cost of repair and replacement,” we furthe r hold that sufficien t evidence supported
Powers’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
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FACTS
The following facts were established at the jury trial of Rebecca Powers. On
August 18, 2018, while driving home, C.M. saw two women on the porch of a home in her
neighborhood attempting to pry open the front door with a metal object. C.M. testified that
her town is small, and the “carrot colored car” parked in front of th e house looked out of
place, especially given that she believed the ho use to be unoccupied. She recognized the
distinct car as belonging to the former resi dents of the house who had been evicted, and
recognized one of the women as Powers. Three days later, C.M. told K.J., the girlfriend of
the homeowner, about what she had seen.
K.J. testified that she managed the hous e for her boyfriend, homeowner E.H., and
had been living in the rental house herself. After speaking with C.M., K.J. noticed stress
marks on the inside of the door near the lock and some cracked weather sealing. She could
also see damage to the metal by the lock and had previously noticed that the door would
not stay closed even when locked. K.J. then called the police.
That same day, an officer came to the hou se to investigate. The officer saw pry
marks on the front door and frame, as well as a crack in the frame by the latch plate. He
photographed the damage; the photos were later shown to the jury. The officer spoke with
C.M. who provided a partial license plate number for the orange car. When the officer ran
the number through the database, he discovered that the car was registered to Powers. C.M.
later identified Powers in two different photo line ups and identified her again at trial.
E.H., the homeowner, testified that he obtained an estimat e on the cost for a
replacement door from Lowe’s Home Center. The damaged wooden door was old and
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could not be replaced with an exact replica, so the homeowne r asked the clerk at Lowe’s
“to find the door that matche[d]” the origin al. The clerk provided him with a written
replacement estimate for a “Craftsman 36 x 85 inch fiberglass entry door” and installation
supplies for $1,382.05 (after taxes). E.H., a contractor, testified that repairing and
replacing the door would take him three and a half hours at his repair rate of $69 per hour,
for a total of $207. He submitted a handwritten estimate to that effect. The total estimates
for the door, hardware, and labor costs came to $1,589.05, exceeding the $1,000 monetary
threshold for first-degree criminal damage to property.
E.H. testified on cross-examination that he did not look for a used door or seek out
less expensive repair options b ecause he “only use[s] Lowe’s .” He ultimately lost the
house in tax forfeiture proceedings and did not repair or replace the door. E.H. then
withdrew a request previously made for restitution, which Powers had challenged.
The jury convicted Powers of first-degr ee criminal damage to property under
section 609.595, subdivision 1(4). The distri ct court stayed imposition of sentence and
placed Powers on probation for 3 years. Powers appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed
her conviction. State v. Powers , No. A19-1856, 2020 WL 6 846369, at *3 (Minn. App.
Nov. 23, 2020). Powers petitioned our court for review, which we granted.
ANALYSIS
When a sufficiency-of-the-ev idence claim is based on the meaning of the statute
under which the defendant has been convicted, the matter presents a question of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn.
2019). Once we interpret the statute, however, we then conduct “a painstaking analysis of
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the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State
v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989).
I.
We turn first to the question of whether the plain language of the criminal damage
to property statute permits the use of reasonable estimates on the repair or replacement cost
to establish the pertinent va lue threshold for the amount of damage caused by the
defendant. Powers argues that because the word “estimated” is not included in the
language of the statute, to allow estimates to be used to calculate the value of the damage
caused would add an element to the statute not contemplated by the Legislature. The State,
on the other hand, contends that estimates ar e included within the meaning of the term
“cost” and so a plain language reading of the statute compels their inclusion in determining
whether the damage to the property meets the threshold amount. We agree with the State.
We first determine whether the statutory language, “value of the property . . .
measured by the cost of repair and replacement” is unambiguous. Our aim in interpreting
a statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Minn. Stat . § 645.16 (2020). The
language of a statute is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007). If so, we “may apply
canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432,
435 (Minn. 2017). If a statute is unambiguous, we apply the statute’s plain meaning. State
v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018). When the words are not defined in the
statute, we may look “to dictionary definitio ns to determine a term’s plain and ordinary
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meaning.” Id. at 626. “In addition, the meaning of a word is informed by how it is used
in the context of a statute.” State v. Rogers, 925 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2019).
Subdivision 1(4) of the criminal damage to property statute reads:
Whoever intentionally causes damage to physical property of another
without the latter’s consent may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both,
if . . . the damage reduces the value of th e property by more than $1,000
measured by the cost of repair and replacement.

Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4) (emphasis added).

Because the Legislature has not defined the statutory terms “value” and “cost,” we
may look to dictionary defi nitions to establish their pl ain and ordinary meaning. State v.
Schouweiler, 887 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 2016) (“We generally interpret words and phrases
according to their common and or dinary meaning, but we in terpret technical words and
phrases according to their special, technical meaning.”). Neither party has argued that
either term has a specialized or technical me aning, and we agree. Consequently, we may
use lay dictionaries to determine their common and ordinary meaning.
Merriam-Webster defines “cost” as “the amo unt or equivalent paid or charged for
something: PRICE.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 262 (10th ed. 2001).
Similarly, the American Heritage Dictionary defines “cost” as the “amount paid or required
as payment for a purchase; a price.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 434 (5th ed. 2011). Both of these definitions explic itly incorporate the word
“price” into the definition of “cost.” Merriam-Webster defines “value” as “a fair return or
equivalent in goods, services, or money for something exchanged: the monetary worth of
something: the marketable price.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1301 (10th
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ed. 2001). The American Heritage Dictionary defines “value” as “[a]n amount, as of goods,
services, or money, considered to be a fair and suitable equivalent for something else; a
fair price or return.” The American Heritage Dictiona ry of the English Language 1913
(5th ed. 2011).
Because the definitions of “cost” in those dictionaries include the “price” of goods—
what is being charged for an item—and the “price” of services, these definitions show that
it is possible to establish the cost of an item without actua lly buying it or paying for the
item, which in this case is th e needed repair services. Th e definition of value as “the
monetary worth of something” reinforces that conclusion . The definitions of “cost” and
“value” are therefore consistent with an obj ective measurement based on the fair market
value of an item or service, which need not be solely limited to the price actually paid for
an item or the services needed to repair or replace the damaged property.
Reasonable estimates are a measure of the pr ice of a good or service and therefore
are evidence of the “cost” of that good or service. Accordingly, we do not read a different
concept into the statute, but rather acknowledge a component part of the statute as written.
Because a reasonable estimate is one way to measure the cost of a good or service, the plain
language of section 609.595, subdivision 1(4), unam biguously allows for reasonable
estimates to be considered when assessing the reduction in the value of property as a result
of the damage, measured by the “cost of repair and replacement.”
In addition, the structure of section 609. 595 itself supports th e use of reasonable
estimates to measure damaged property. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (holding
that we analyze a statute as a whole to de termine ambiguity). Reading the statute as a
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whole, section 609.595, subdivision 1(4), and its accompanying subdivisions show that the
Legislature intended to base the severity of the punishment on the amount of damage
caused. Put differently, the degrees of cu lpability within the statute are demarcated
principally by the extent of the damage caus ed as measured by the cost of repair or
replacement. See Minn. Stat. § 609.595. For example, the threshold for first-degree felony
criminal damage to property, as previously noted, is over $1,000. Minn. Stat. § 609.595,
subd. 1(4). The threshold for second- and third-degree crimin al damage to property is
$500–$1,000. Id., subds. 1a(a), 2(a). Finally, the th reshold for fourth-degree criminal
damage to property is any reduc tion in value under the $500 limit. Id., subd. 3. Each of
these degrees of criminal damage to propert y is punished differently, with first-degree
criminal damage to property resulting in the most severe punishment.1
Powers’s interpretation undermines this legislative scheme because it would
predicate the severity of the crime based not upon the amount of damage that the defendant
caused, but upon the victim’s initiative and ability to repair the damage. It does not make
sense that a victim’s inability to pay to repair or replace the damaged property would lessen
the defendant’s culpability.2 The only logical reading of th e statute’s plain language and

1 Although other factors may distinguish among degrees of the crime, such as
targeting a victim for their “perceived race, color, religi on, sex, sexual orientation,
disability . . . , age, or national origin,” Mi nn. Stat. § 609.595, su bd. 2(b), even these
aggravating factors are categorized by the amount of damage caused. Id. (“Whoever
intentionally causes damage to another person’s personal property . . . may be
sentenced . . . if the damage reduces the value of the property by not more than $500.”).

2 In fact, adopting Powers’s position could re sult in a paradox: the more damage done
to the property, the less likely it would be that a victim could repair or replace the more
extensive and expensive damage. In that event, a defendant who causes extensive damage
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structure is to focus the assessment of the degree of culpability on the defendant’s actions,
not on the action or inaction of the victim.
In sum, based upon the plain language and the structure of the statute, we conclude
that evidence of estimates may be used to establish the “cost of repair and replacement” in
section 609.595, subdivision 1( 4). Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly held that
estimates could be used to determine the reduction in the value of the property and to
establish whether the felony threshold has been met.
II.
Because we have determined that the statute unambiguously includes estimates
when calculating the reduction in value of the property due to the damage caused, we next
conduct “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whethe r the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorab le to the conviction, was suffi cient to permit the jurors to
reach the verdict which they did.” Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430.
Applying this standard, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to
establish that the reasonable reduction in value of the door due to the damage exceeded the
$1,000 felony threshold. Here, the jury saw photographs of the damage done to the door.
The homeowner testified that he went to Lowe’s and asked for a door that most resembled
the one that was damaged. The State pr esented evidence of the written estimate of
$1,382.05 that the homeowner received from Lowe’s for a new door and the parts
necessary to replace the damaged one. In addition, the homeowner testified about the time

that could not be readily paid for could evade prosecution as compared to a defendant who
caused slight damage that could be more easily repaired or replaced by a victim.
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that it would take him to install the new door and the standard hourly rate that he charges
as a contractor, resulting in an estimated charge of $207. The total cost of the estimated
labor and materials that it would take to replace the damage d door was $1,589.05. 3
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that Powers’s
conviction was based on sufficient evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Affirmed.

3 Even setting aside the homeowner’s valuatio n of his own labor, the cost of materials
(the door and the installation supplies) alon e totaled $1,382.05, surpassing the felony
threshold. Moreover, Powers did not directly contend on ap peal that the estimates were
unreasonable and should be rejected for that reason. Although estimates can be taken into
consideration to determine the value of the damage to property, defendants, of course, are
at liberty to attack the reasonableness of any quote or estimate at trial.