State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1862

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven LeCuyer,
Appellant.

Filed December 7, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-17-1572

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Abigail H. Lambert, Assistant County Attorney,
Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decide d by Jesson, Presiding J udge; Larkin, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After returning from watching “Bachelor in Paradise” with her sister-in-law, K.L.
believed she was home alone. Then her ex-husband, appellant Steven LeCuyer, appeared

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in her bedroom. K.L. escaped two hours later. LeCuyer was charged with false
imprisonment, domestic assault (fear), a nd stalking (while possessing a dangerous
weapon). Based on an errant statement in volving LeCuyer’s past behavior which was
played for the jury, LeCuyer argues that the lack of redaction amounts to prosecutorial
error. In addition, he challenges the district court’s refusal to disclose the victim’s medical
records and the entry of mu ltiple convictions for includ ed offenses. Because the
prosecutorial error was not prejudicial and th e medical records did not contain relevant
evidence, we affirm in part . But because stalking is an included offense of false
imprisonment, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
In 2017, LeCuyer and his wife, K.L., separate d. LeCuyer lived with his sister in the
Twin Cities and K.L. remained in the residen ce they had shared on her family’s farm in
Albert Lea. Following the separation, th ey still communicated fr equently and LeCuyer
regularly spent time during the summer with K.L., including overnight stays.
In September 2017, around 6:30 p.m., Le Cuyer arrived at K.L.’s residence to
retrieve some personal property. K.L. and LeCuyer had corresponded earlier that day, so
she knew he would be arriving. They briefly spoke in her dr iveway before K.L. left to
watch “Bachelor in Paradise” with her sister-in-law at her brother’s house. While she was
away, K.L. received several texts from LeCuyer regarding her dogs and his safe. Following
the last text exchange at 8:09 p.m., K.L. be lieved that LeCuyer had left her house. When
K.L. returned to her locked home at around 9:20 p.m., LeCu yer’s truck was no longer in

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the driveway. His boots, however, stood next to the dining room table. K.L. called
LeCuyer twice, but the calls went straight to voicemail. What transpired next is disputed.
According to K.L., she then walked into the bedroom only to be thrown onto the
bed by LeCuyer, who had emerged from the clos et. LeCuyer wore a cut-off T-shirt with
several curtain ties knotted around his neck. But he was naked from the waist down. K.L.
then noticed an engraved golden gun in LeCuyer’s hand and proceeded to scream. LeCuyer
took her phone away, telling her to calm down, shut up, and that she would not be calling
anyone. K.L. started gagging as a ruse to go to the bathroom, but LeCuyer said he would
follow her into the room. He then sat at the foot of the bed, between K.L. and the bedroom
door, and they talked for about two hours. K.L. believed that LeCuyer was suicidal based
on their conversation, which included his a nger about their marriag e and how K.L. had
“betrayed” him. When asked about the gun, LeCuyer said it was for him and not for K.L.,
and eventually he placed the gu n in a dresser drawer. K.L. admits that LeCuyer never
pointed the gun at her.
It is undisputed that around 11:30 p.m., LeCuyer allowed K.L. to go to the bathroom
to change into her pajamas. After putting on her pajama pants, K.L. realized she could
escape. K.L. left the bathroom, grabbed her car keys, and sped to the police station. When
she arrived, she was wearing her work top, pajama bottoms, and no s hoes. K.L. gave a
statement to the police about the previous two hours.
The following morning, LeCuyer met with a detective and recounted the night
before. According to LeCuyer, K.L. called him at 9:02 p.m. a nd asked him to stay at her
house and “hang out.” Once she arrived home, they talked about th eir relationship for a

4
few hours before she left and he went to bed. LeCuyer said that he regularly deleted his
call log and text messages, including from that morning, so there was no proof of the call.
He claimed he never had a gun.
Police conducted a forensic search of LeCuyer’s cell phone records and determined
there was no call from K.L.’s phone to LeCuye r’s phone at 9:02 p.m. Officers also
discovered LeCuyer’s truck behi nd a barn. Police searched LeCuyer’s truck and K.L.’s
residence and outbuildings. Only one curtai n tie was located, a nd no gun or ammunition
was recovered.
The state charged LeCuyer with false imprisonment, 1 domestic assault (fear),2 and
stalking (while possessing a dangerous weapon).3 LeCuyer pleaded not guilty.
During a pretrial motion heari ng, the state informed the court that it planned on
playing eight separate portions of video of K.L. reporting the incident to the police.
According to the state this amounted to roughly 40 minutes of the recording, and references
to prior criminal cases involv ing LeCuyer were omitted. Th e defense counsel looked at
the video transcript and approved the portion that was to be introduced into evidence.
In a second pretrial motion hearing, LeCuyer requested a release of K.L.’s medical
records. Specifically, LeCuyer believed that there could be relevant evidence, due to
K.L.’s history of brai n lesions from multiple sclerosis, such that she might experience
memory lapse, substantial co gnitive impairment, or episodes of psychosis and delusions

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2016).
2 Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2016).
3 Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 3(a)(3) (2016).

5
that could undercut her credibility. The distri ct court performed an in camera review of
the records and denied the motion, concluding that the medical records did not contain
relevant evidence.
At trial, held over two days in April 2019, the jury heard from eight witnesses,
including police officers, friends and family, as well as LeCuyer and K.L. In addition, the
prosecution played the partially redacted video of K.L.’s report to the police. One portion
of the 40-minute video included this exchan ge between K.L. and Deputy Hable that
revealed LeCuyer had a recent brush with au thorities. The deputy questioned K.L. as
follows:
Q: —to see if there’s vehicles coming or going, or whatnot.
I would almost bet on that. But I’m sure that Sergeant
Bennett’s coordinating enou gh manpower to get out
there. If he’s—if he says he’s going to commit
suicide—.

. . . .

A: Yep. He knows what’s goi ng to happen. We just got
done—he was facing life in prison two months ago.

Q: Okay. Does he have a parole agent—

(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor stopped the recording and asked to approach the bench,
where the prosecutor and defens e counsel argued over whose fault it was that a “clearly
inadmissible” section was included and not flagged for redaction.
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel requested that the court skip to the
next portion of the video and then discuss so lutions for the errant section in chambers.
Later, when asked by the cour t about a possible solution, de fense counsel suggested that

6
he ask LeCuyer whether or not he has any criminal convic tions as a mitigation to the
disclosure. A cautionary instruction, defense counsel stated, might further draw attention
to the statements that “some jurors, frankly, may not have even heard.” The court decided
against a cautionary instruction, and instead let LeCuyer testify about not having prior
convictions. Later, when questioned, LeCuye r affirmed that he had never “had any
criminal convictions of any kind.”
The jury acquitted LeCuyer of stalking (while possessing a dangerous weapon), but
found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of stalking (without a dangerous weapon),
false imprisonment, and domestic assault (fear). The district court entered convictions for
all three verdicts, but only sentenced on the felony count of false imprisonment to time
served and probation. LeCuyer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
LeCuyer challenges the errant playing of video testimony as a prosecutorial error
and evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, he requests reversal of the
district court’s decision to withhold confid ential medical records as possibly containing
relevant information for his defense, as well as for entering too many convictions in
violation of Minnesota Statute section 609.04 (2016). We address each issue in turn.
I. Playing a clip of inadmissible evidence by the prosecution amounts to plain
error but it did not affect LeCuyer’s substantial rights.

LeCuyer first contends that he should be afforded a new trial because the prosecutor
committed prejudicial plain error by introducing a recorded statement from K.L. to police

7
without redacting references to LeCuyer “f acing life in prison” and having a “parole
agent.”
Defense counsel did not ob ject to the admission of the portion of the police
statement at trial. This court reviews unobjec ted-to claims of prosecutorial error under a
modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under
this standard, LeCuyer must establish that the error was plain. Id. An error is plain if it is
“clear or obvious.” State v. Waiters , 929 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. 2019) (quotations
omitted). Then the burd en shifts to the state to demons trate “that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the absence of the [error] would have had a significant effect on the [jury’s
verdict].” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotations omitted).4
Plain Error
First, the court must consider whether the playing of the offending portion of video
constitutes an error. In general, “eliciting in admissible evidence” is a form of improper
conduct for prosecutors that is considered error. Id. at 300 (citing State v. Harris ,
521 N.W.2d 348, 353–54 (Minn. 1994)). An d it is undisputed that the clip was
inadmissible.
Next, the court must consider whether th e committed error constit utes plain error.
Here, the error is clear and obvious. The Minnesota Rules of Evidence outline strict
guidelines for admitting ev idence of a defendant ’s prior bad acts. See Minn. R.

4 If the state fails to meet this burden, this court then considers whether to address the error
“to ensure fairness and the integr ity of judicial proceedings.” State v. Parker ,
901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017).

8
Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of another crime, wr ong, or act is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”). The video here
clearly depicts both an officer and K.L. disc ussing LeCuyer’s prior bad acts involving an
arrest—a topic that both the parties and judge appeared to agree was inadmissible at trial.
But unlike cases involving witnesses giving unexpected, inadmissible testimony, this was
a video that had been reviewed multiple times by the prosecutor. See State v. Huffstutler,
130 N.W.2d 347, 348 (M inn. 1964) (stating that “the pr osecution is entirely responsible
for [the inadmissible evidence’s] presence in the record”).
In sum, because the prosecutor submitted the video without redacting the prejudicial
references to criminal conduct, the error was plain.
Substantial Rights
Because the facts establish plain error, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate
that the error did not affect LeCuyer’s substantial rights. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.
When evaluating the effect of alleged error on a defendant’s substantial rights, this court
considers the pervasiveness of improper sugg estions and the strength of evidence against
the defendant. Parker, 901 N.W.2d at 926. We also consider a defendant’s opportunity to
rebut the improper evidence. State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 803 (Minn. 2014).
We turn first to consider the pervasivene ss factor. The video clip was played only
once. The statements consumed less than 30 seconds in an over 40 -minute video played
for the jury. And the errone ous comments of LeCuyer’s prior act were neither addressed
by any other witness nor used by the prosecutor in closing argument.

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With this context in mind, we consider th e strength of the evidence against LeCuyer.
Here, the evidence was relatively strong. The jury not only heard testimony from K.L.
describing the events, but al so considered physical evidence, including a photograph and
video of what K.L. wore to the police st ation (work top, pajama bottoms, no shoes),
photographs of the curtains before and afte r the disappearance of the curtain ties, and
photographs of the disheveled closet the following morning—all potentially corroborative
of her testimony. And while LeCuyer contends that this is a “close case in which credibility
was the central issue,” we no te that the jury had far mo re evidence than the fleeting
recording upon which to question LeCuyer’s credibility. LeCuyer’s own testimony
included admissions that he lied to police about a phone call from K.L.—which he asserts
was the sole reason why he claimed to have stayed in K.L.’s residence—and that he deleted
his call and text logs after being contacted by police but before questioning.
Finally, we observe that LeCuyer had an opportunity to rebut. The cure proposed
by defense counsel was that LeCuyer testify that he does not have any criminal convictions,
and he did so.
In sum, we conclude that the error did not impact LeCuyer’s substantial rights. The
error was not pervasive, the state’s evidence was sufficiently strong, and LeCuyer had an
opportunity to rebut th e evidence. This inst ance of prosecutorial error does not require
reversal.

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II. LeCuyer did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel
failed to discover, redact, and react to prejudicial statements in the video.

Next, LeCuyer argues that his conviction should be reversed due to ineffective
assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to discover the prejudicial statements played
in the video, as well as the failure to remedy the disclosure.
Minnesota courts have adopted the two-prong Strickland test when reviewing a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bobo v. State , 820 N.W.2d 511, 516
(Minn. 2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064 (1984)). The two prongs of the Strickland test are: (1) the defendant must prove that
counsel’s representation fell be low an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the
defendant must prove there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
result of the proceeding woul d have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–96,
104 S. Ct. at 2064–70. We need not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if
one is determinative. Id. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. In this case, the prejudice prong is
determinative.
While not precisely the same, the prejudice prong analysis is similar to that of the
substantial rights portion of the plain error an alysis. As discussed above, the state’s
evidence against LeCuyer is strong. Be cause LeCuyer could not show that the
prosecutorial error was prejudicial and affected his substantial rights, similarly there is not
prejudice under the Strickland test.

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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was no
relevant information in K.L.’s medical records.

LeCuyer also contends that this court sh ould conduct an inde pendent review of
K.L.’s medical records. Specifically, his defense relies on his knowledge of K.L.’s
multiple-sclerosis-induced brai n lesions which he argues can cause memory lapse,
substantial cognitive impairment, and episod es of psychosis and delusions that could
undercut her credibility.
A crime victim’s past medical records ar e “generally protected from disclosure by
the physician-patie nt privilege.” State v. Kutchara , 350 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn.
1984); see Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(d), (g) (2016). “Howev er, the medical
privilege . . . sometimes must give way to the defendant’s right to confront his accusers.”
Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d at 926. When a criminal defendant requests protected records “the
district court may screen the confidential reco rds in camera to balance the right of the
defendant to prepare and present a defense ag ainst the rights of victims and witnesses to
privacy.” State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2012) (citing State v. Paradee,
403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987)). To obtain an in camera review of protected
information, the defend ant must make a “plausible show ing that the information sought
would be both material and favorable to his defense.” Id. (quotations omitted). When
conducting in camera review, the district cour t is tasked with reviewing the protected
information for “all relevant evidence that might help [the defendant’s] defense.” Paradee,
403 N.W.2d at 642. This factual determination is ultimately subject to judicial review by

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this court. Id. On appeal, this court reviews the same material for an abuse of discretion.
Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d at 349.
The district court granted LeCuyer’s request for an in camera review of K.L.’s
medical records. Following the district c ourt’s review, it found “that no relevant or
admissible information is contained in those records and as such they shall remain private
and confidential.”
Having reviewed all of the confidential medical documents in the record, we
similarly conclude the records simply do not contain information relevant or helpful to
LeCuyer’s case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying access to the
privileged records.
IV. The district court erred by entering mu ltiple convictions involving included
offenses.

Finally, LeCuyer contends that the district court erred by entering convictions for
stalking and domestic assault, arguing that these are lesser-include d offenses of false
imprisonment. “A lesser degree of the same crime” or “a crime necessarily proved if the
crime charged were proved” constitute included offenses . Minn. Stat. § 609.04,
subd. 1(1), (4). In determini ng whether an offense constitutes an included offense, we
look to the statutory elements and apply de novo review. State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540,
552 (Minn. 2012).
Turning to the convictions, LeCuyer was found guilty of three offenses—domestic
assault, false imprisonment, and stalking. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.2242, subd. 1(1); .255,

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subd. 2, .749, subd. 2(1) (2016). The distri ct court imposed a sentence only for false
imprisonment.
As a result, we begin by examining whether stalking is a lesser-included offense of
false imprisonment. Someone is guilty of false imprisonment if they intentionally confine
or restrain another person without their c onsent while knowing they lack the lawful
authority to do so. Minn. Stat . § 609.255, subd. 2. Someone is guilty of stalking if they
directly or indirectly intend to injure the person, property, or rights of another by the
commission of an unlawful act . Minn. Stat. § 609.749, su bd. 2(1). Here, LeCuyer’s
stalking charge was based upon the “unlawful act” of false imprisonment against K.L. in
her bedroom. Since the stalking count was pr emised on the false imprisonment, the false
imprisonment count was “necessarily proved” when stalking was proved and so LeCuyer
cannot be convicted of both offenses. Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(4). As a result, after
the district court entered a conviction and imposed a sentence on the included offense—
the felony count of false imprisonment—the stalking conviction was improper.
We turn next to whether domestic assaul t is a lesser-included offense of false
imprisonment. Someone is guilty of domestic assault (fear) if they commit an act with
intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 1(1). It is possible to commit fals e imprisonment without committing domestic
assault because it is possible to knowingly confine someone without intending to cause fear
in another of immediate bodily harm or death. See, e.g., State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660,
664 (Minn. 2006) (“The protec tions of section 609.04 will not apply if the offenses
constitute separate criminal acts.”). Inversely, it is possible to cause fear in another of

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immediate bodily harm or death without unlaw fully confining them. As a result, neither
domestic assault nor false imprisonment are included offenses of the other under Minnesota
Statute section 609.04, subdivision 1(4), permitting a conviction for both offenses.
Because the district court erred in entering judgment of conviction for stalking, we
reverse and remand for the district court to vacate the conviction and issue an amended
sentencing order.
In summary, we conclude that the prosec utorial error did not affect LeCuyer’s
substantial rights as to require a reversal a nd we determine there was no prejudice to find
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the counts of false imprisonment and domestic
assault but reverse and remand for the district court to vacate the judgment of conviction
for the count of stalking.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.