In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1876

In re the Marriage of:

Matthew James Ulness, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Jill Marie Ulness, n/k/a Jill-Marie Stefano,
Respondent.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-16-7365

John T. Burns, Jr., Burns Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Roselyn J. Nordaune, Nordaune & Friesen, PLLC, Wayzata, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pr esiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Matthew James Ulness challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to modify his spousal-mainte nance obligation to his former wife, respondent Jill-Marie
Stefano. Ulness argues that the district court abused its discretion by not finding that his

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income had substantially decreased or that St efano had failed in an obligation to become
self-supporting. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2017, Ulness and Stefano entered into a stipulated judgment and decree (the J&D)
dissolving their marriage. For purposes of determining spousal-maintenance, the parties
stipulated that Ulness’s gross monthly inco me, from his employment as a sales manager
for a medical device company, was $13,978 ($7,579 in salary and $6,399 in commissions
and incentives). They also s tipulated that Stefano’s gros s monthly income, based on her
work as a hair stylist and on imputed in come, was $1,495. Based on these agreed-upon
amounts, Ulness was ordered to pay Stefano spousal maintenance of $5,000 per month for
60 months. A hearing to review the issue of spousal maintenance was scheduled toward
the end of the 60-month period.
In July 2019, two years after the J&D and three year s before the scheduled review
hearing, Ulness moved to modify the mainte nance obligation by terminating or reducing
his obligation. The basis for Ulness’s motion was two-fold: (1) his income had decreased
for reasons beyond his control, and (2) Stefano had an obligation to become self-sustaining.
As to the first basis, Ulness argued that a recent and ongoing Federal Drug Administration
investigation into the drug-elu ting stents that he sells has adversely impacted his sales.
Ulness believed that, because of the anticipated impact this investigation would have on
his sales, he would not receive a bonus for his 2019 sales, and he urged the district court to
exclude any potential bonus from his monthly gross income. As to the second basis, Ulness

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argued that Stefano’s need for spousal maintenance should be reconsidered in light of her
failure to take sufficient efforts to become self-supporting.
The district court denied Ulness’s motion in August 20 19. It found that Ulness’s
income had not substantially decreased for two reasons. First, the district court calculated
Ulness’s monthly gross income for the first si x months of 2019 as $12,183. The $12,183
monthly figure included all of Ulness’s 2018 sale bonus, which wa s paid to Ulness in
January 2019. While the $12,183 figure was a decrease to Ulness’s monthly gross income,
the district court found that the decrease wa s too small to be statutorily considered a
substantial change in circumstances. Second, the district court reasoned that it was
premature to conclude that Ul ness would not receive a bonu s for his 2019 sales. Ulness
brought the motion in July 2019, and the district court determined that, while Ulness may
fear additional decreases to his monthly gross income, those decreases had not yet
materialized. The district court also found th at Stefano did not have an obligation under
the J&D to become self-supporting.
Ulness appeals.
D E C I S I O N
We review the decision to modify a spousal-maintenance obligation for an abuse of
discretion. See Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709-10 (Minn. 1997). A district court
abuses its discretion regarding maintenance if its findings of fact are unsupported by the
record or if it improperly applies the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn.
1997) (quoting Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)). We review factual

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findings for clear error but consid er questions of law de novo. Melius v. Melius , 765
N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2009).
Modification of spousal maintenance is governed by Minn. Stat. § 518A.39 (2018).
A party seeking to modify spousal maintenance bears “a dual burden.” Hecker, 568 N.W.2d
at 709 (discussing Minn. Stat. § 518.64 (1996), since renumbered to Minn. Stat. § 518A.39
and amended in ways not relevant here). Fi rst, the moving party must establish “a
substantial change in one or more of th e circumstances identified in the statute.” Id. An
obligor’s substantially decreased gross income is a statutorily identified circumstance.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)(1). Second , the moving party must establish that the
substantial change makes the initial obligation “unreas onable and unfair.” Hecker, 568
N.W.2d at 709. Because the district court denied Ulness’s motion on the ground that there
was no substantial change in Ulness’s circum stances, we do not need to address whether
the change, if there was one, makes the in itial obligation unreasonable and unfair. We
therefore consider only the issue of Ulness’s asserted substantial change in circumstances.
We do not presume that the district court has erred; the party asserting error has the
burden of showing it. Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n , 804 N.W.2d 366,
372 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr. Inc. , 237 N.W.2d 76,
78 (Minn. 1975)). Thus, we w ill not reverse unless Ulness can affirmatively establish the
asserted errors. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn , 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944). Ulness
asserts three errors, which we turn to now.

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Bonus income
First, Ulness argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that it
was premature to assume that he would not recei ve a bonus for his 2019 sales. Bonuses
may be part of a party’s income, even if th ey are “not guaranteed and uncertain as to
amount,” provided that they are “a depe ndable form of periodic payment.” Desrosier v.
Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. App. 19 96). Here, at the time of his spousal-
maintenance-modification request, Ulness ha d not yet completed his 2019 sales year.
Because of this, the district court found that Ulness’s assumption that he would not receive
a 2019 bonus was premature and speculative. The district court r easoned that “[b]onuses
are, by their very nature, dependent on multiple factors and [are] therefore to some degree
unpredictable.” The district court conclu ded that Ulness had not met his burden of
establishing that he would not receive a 2019 bonus.
The district court’s finding is not clea rly erroneous. The record reflects that,
although Ulness’s sales might have declin ed, his commissions had not substantially
declined at the time of his motion. Moreover, at the time that Ulness brought his motion, it
was too soon to know whether the decline in the sales of one product that his team markets
would continue long-term or how it would aff ect his 2019 bonus, if at all. Ulness argues
that his decline in sales suggests he will not meet the criteria that would be necessary to
trigger his bonus. But the district court did not clearly err by determining that it was too
soon to know what Ulness’s 2019 bonus would be when half of the year still remained.
Ulness maintains that his bonus should not be included be cause it is not a
dependable source of income th at is expected to continue . He relies on our decision in

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Haasken v. Haasken , in which we affirmed the distri ct court’s decision to exclude any
bonuses from the husband’s income. 396 N.W.2d 253, 261 (Minn. App. 1986). But
Haasken does not compel the conclu sion that the district court clearly erred here. In
Haasken, the husband received a bonus depending on the profitability of the store that he
managed and his past bonuses ranged from $0 to $9,000. Id. Here, in contrast, Ulness has
not shown that he ever failed to receive a bonus or that his bonuses varied so dramatically
in amount as to make them not dependable.
Instead, this case is more like Desrosier, where we reversed a district court’s
exclusion of bonus income because the bonuses had been a dependable form of payment.
551 N.W.2d at 508-09. In that case, the dist rict court expected the bonuses to continue,
although they were not guarant eed and the amount was uncertain. Id. Here, the record
includes evidence that, although the amount of each bonus may be uncertain from year to
year, the bonuses have remained an integral and significant part of Ulness’s income and he
has always received one. The record thus supports the finding that Ulness did not establish
that his bonus income had become not dependable.
Ulness argues that the district court clea rly erred in evaluating whether his bonus
was a dependable source of income because the district court observed that Ulness had not
shown that there was “zero possibility” that he would receive a 2019 bonus. But the district
court also explained, “Mr. Ulness has failed to meet his burden of showing a substantial
decrease in his gross income. Hi s gross income was higher than expected in 2018 and is
not substantially below expectations for 2019. While he may fear additional decreases as a
result of changes in the drug-elu[t]ing st ent market, those decreases have not yet

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materialized.” This finding is supported by the record, and Ulness has not shown that the
district court clearly erred by declining to assume that he would not receive a bonus.
Prorating of the 2018 bonus in Ulness’s gross monthly income
Second, Ulness argues that the district court miscalculated his monthly gross income
by prorating the 2018 bonus he received in January 2019 over the first six months of 2019
rather than over all 12 months. He then argue s that, if the district court had correctly
calculated his monthly gross income, his monthly gross income would have decreased by
more than 20%, which is statutorily considered to be a substantial change in circumstances.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5).
The district court’s calculation of income for spousal-maintenance purposes is a
factual finding that we will not reve rse unless it is clearly erroneous. Peterka v. Peterka,
675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004). But even if, on appeal, a complaining party
shows that the district cour t committed an error, we will not reverse unless the error is
prejudicial. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring ha rmless error to be ignored); Goldman v.
Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (citing this aspect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 61);
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987) (stating that “[a]lthough error
may exist, unless the error is prejudicial, no grounds exist for reversal”).
Ulness may indeed be correct that the mo re appropriate calculation of his gross
monthly income would prorate his 2018 bonus over all 12 months of 2019 rather than over
only the six months that had passed at the time of the motion to modify. But any error is
harmless. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b )(5), creates a rebuttable presumption that a
substantial change has occurred if the gross in come of an obligor, through no fault of the

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obligor, has decreased by at least 20%. Even if the district court had prorated the 2018 sales
bonus over 12 months, Ulness’s monthly gross income still does not constitute a statutorily
substantial change because it does not represent a decrease of at least 20%. For that reason,
any error is harmless.
Stefano’s self-supporting efforts
Finally, Ulness argues that the district c ourt erred by determining that his spousal-
maintenance obligation should be reduced because Stefano has made insufficient efforts to
become self-supporting. The district court concluded that there was no basis to impose such
an obligation on Stefano since Ulness agreed to the J&D just two years earlier, the J&D
already imputed income to Stefano, and the J&D contemplated no obligation on Stefano to
increase her income during the 60-month spousal-maintenance period.
Ulness relies on Hecker to argue that, where parties have negotiated an agreement
for temporary maintenance, th ere is a presumption that th e obligee will make reasonable
efforts to reach self-sufficien cy. 568 N.W.2d at 709-10. In Hecker, shortly before her
maintenance award expired, the maintenance re cipient sought to increase and extend her
award. Id. at 707. Here, Stefano (the recipient) did not seek to increase or extend her
maintenance award; rather, Ulness sought to decrease his maintenance obligation and did
so only 24 months into the 60-month obligation to which he had stipulated. While Stefano
has an obligation to try to become self-sufficient, Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198
(Minn. 1987); see Hecker, 568 N.W2d at 710 n.4, it was well within the ambit of the district
court’s discretion to decline to penalize Stef ano for failing to become self-sufficient less
than half-way through the maintenance period.

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On this record, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Ulness’s motion to modify spousal maintenance.
Affirmed.