A19-1878

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1877
A19-1878

Court of Appeals Thissen, J.
Took no part, Anderson, J.
Walmart Inc.,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: August 18, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Winona County,

Respondent,

Martin County,

Respondent.
________________________

Edward F. Fox, Mark R. Bradford , Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota , for
appellant.

Marc J. Manderscheid, Andrew M. Carlson, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Karin Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Paul Ellison, Assistant County Attorney,
Winona, Minnesota; and

Terry W. Viesselman, Martin County Attorney, Fairmont, Minnesota, for respondents.

Mahesha P. Subbaraman, Subbaraman PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae
Alliance Property Consultants, Inc.

Diana L. Longrie, Longrie Law Office, Maplewood, Minnesota, for amicus curiae
Chambers Self-Storage Oakdale, LLC.

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Anthony C. Paulmbo, Anoka County Attorney, Jason J. Stover, Christine Carney, Assistant
County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Suzanne W. Schrader, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sara L. Bruggeman, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Peter J. Orput, Washington County Attorney, James Zuleger, Assistant County Attorney,
Stillwater, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
Appellant’s constitutional claims asserting discrimination in the tax assessments of
its properties that violates the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV , § 1, and
the Uniformity Clause, Minn. Const. art. X, § 1, are subject to the limitations period set
forth in Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd, 1(c) (2020), and, consequently, are barred as untimely.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
Appellant Walmart, Inc. owns real property improved with a Walmart Supercenter
store in respondents Martin County and Winona County (the Counties). In this
consolidated appeal, Walmart claims that , for tax purposes , the Counties overvalued the
properties, or unfairly or une qually assessed the value of the properties as compared with
other similarly situated properties. Walmart alleges that the Counties engaged in willful,
intentional, unlawful, or systematic discrimination in their tax assessments and asserts that
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such discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause and Walmart’s right to uniformity
in taxation. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. X, § 1.
Walmart contends that it may proceed with its constitutional claims independent of
the statutory remedy in Minn. Stat. ch. 278 (2020), which provides a means to challenge
property tax assessments . It accordingly argues that the statutory deadline for bringing
such challenges set forth in Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1(c) (2020), does not apply to its
constitutional claims. We disagree. We hold that if a taxpayer’s challenge to a property
tax assessment is a claim of unfair or unequal assessment, chapter 278 provides the
exclusive remedy for such a challenge, even if the challenge is framed as a constitutional
violation of the taxpayer’s right to equal protection or uniformity in taxation. Because
Walmart’s claims allege that the Counties have unfairly or unequally assessed its
properties, they are subject to the limitations period of chapter 278 and are time -barred.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
Walmart owns real property improved by Supercenter stores in Fairmont (Martin
County) and Winona (Winona County) (the Properties). Walmart alleges that, for tax years
2013 through 2018, the Counties “willfully, intentionally , and unlawfully” discriminated
against the company by placing an assessed value greater than market value on the
Properties or by unfairly or unequally assessing the value of the Properties as compared
with other similarly situated properties. Specifically, Walmart alleges in each complaint:
The . . . County Assessor’s 2013 through 2018 valuations and assessments
of [Walmart’s] Real Property intentionally and systematically discriminated
against [Walmart’s] Real Property as compared to similarly situated
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properties of the same class in the same taxing district, resulting in prohibited
unequal assessments as evidenced by the Comparison Chart . . . . These
disparities and discriminatory, unequal assessments are the result of valuing
[Walmart’s] Real Property at substantially more than its actual, fair market
value or, in the alternative, valuing similar properties at substantially less
than their actual, fair market value.

Walmart attached an “Unequal Assessment and Lack of Uniformity Chart” for each
property that allegedly “demonstrate [d] the gross disparity between [the Counties’] 2013
through 2018 assessments of [Walmart’s] Real Property and the actual market sales and
assessments of similar real property” in the respective counties as well as statewide.
Walmart alleges that this unequal treatment is intentional and violates its equal protection
rights under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
its right to uniformity in taxation under Article 10, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution.
Walmart filed its complaints in district court in May 2019. The Counties moved to
dismiss Walmart’s complaints under Rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district courts in Martin County and Winona County concluded that
Walmart’s complaints challenged its property tax assessments and thus were subject to
section 278.01, including the time -bar under that statute that requires a property tax
challenge to be filed on or before April 30 of the year in which the tax becomes payable ,
Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1(c). Because Walmart filed its claims after that date, the
district court granted the Counties’ motions and dismissed the complaints.
Walmart appealed both orders. In a consolidated appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed. Walmart Inc. v. Winona Cnty., Nos. A19-1877, 19-1878, 2020 WL 3956251, at
*1 (Minn. App. July 13, 2020). The court of appeals agreed with the district courts that
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Walmart’s claims fell within the scope of section 278.01 and were barred by the limitations
period for claims under that section. Id. The court of appeals did not reach Walmart’s
separate argument that chapter 278 does not apply because a taxpayer may bring its equal
protection and uniform taxation claims independently of the statutory remedy provided by
chapter 278 —a possibility left open by our decision in Programmed Land, Inc. v.
O’Connor, 633 N.W.2d 517, 529 –30 (Minn. 2001). Walmart, 2020 WL 3956251, at *7.
Instead, the court of appeals concluded that Walmart failed to plead its constitutional
claims sufficiently. Id. We granted Walmart’s petition for review.1
ANALYSIS
This case comes to us from the court of appeals after the district courts granted the
Counties’ motions to dismiss Walmart’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Minn.
R. of Civ. Proc. 12.02(e). We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim
de novo. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003). A
party fails to state a claim under Rule 12.02(e) when its complaint does not “ set forth a
legally sufficient claim for relief.” Id. “We accept factual allegations in the complaint as
true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014).

1 The court of appeals also affirmed the district courts’ decisions that Walmart failed
to state a claim for relief under 42 U .S.C. § 1983. Walmart, 2020 WL 3956251, at *11.
Although Walmart asserts in its brief to our court that the court of appeals erred by
upholding the dismissa l of its section 1983 claim, Walmart did not raise this issue in its
petition for review. Thus, this claim is forfeited, and we do not address Walmart’s
arguments regarding its section 1983 claim. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509,
515 (Minn. 2012); Anderly v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 236, 239–40 (Minn. 1996).
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The central question in this case is as follows: Do Walmar t’s claim s that the
Counties willfully, intentionally, and unlawfully discriminated against the company in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Uniformity in Taxation Clause of Artic le X, section 1 , of the
Minnesota Constitution fall within the scope of chapter 278, such that Walmart is subject
to the limitations period set forth in section 278.01? This is a question of law , which we
review de novo. See Programmed Land, 633 N.W.2d at 522.
We begin with an overview of the statutory route to challeng e a property tax
assessment. Chapter 278 provides a mechanism for taxpayers to challenge assessments
levied on their properties based on one of five enumerated grounds: (1) the property tax
was partially, unfairly, or unequally assessed ; (2) the assessed property was overvalued ;
(3) the property tax is illegal ; (4) the taxpayer already paid the tax ; or (5) the property is
exempt from property tax. See Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1(a) (2020);2 Programmed

2 Subdivision 1(a) provides:
Any person having personal property, or any estate, right, title, or interest in
or lien upon any parcel of land, who claims that such property ha s been
partially, unfairly, or unequally assessed in comparison with other property
in the (1) city, or (2) county, or (3) in the case of a county containing a city
of the first class, the portion of the county excluding the first class city, or
that the parcel has been assessed at a valuation greater than its real or actual
value, or that the tax levied against the same is illegal, in whole or in part, or
has been paid, or that the property is exempt from the tax so levied, may have
the validity of the cla im, defense, or objection determined by the district
court of the county in which the tax is levied or by the Tax Court by serving
one copy of a petition for such determination upon the county auditor, one
copy on the county attorney, one copy on the count y treasurer, and three
copies on the county assessor. The county assessor shall immediately
forward one copy of the petition to the appropriate governmental authority
in a home rule charter or statutory city or town in which the property is
7
Land, 633 N.W.2d at 522 (stating that chapter 278 “provides a cause of action to bring five
types of challenges to property taxes”). Critical to this case, a challenge to a tax assessment
made under chapter 278 must be filed on or before April 30 of the year in which the tax
becomes payable. Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1(c).3 Further, a taxpayer’s chapter 278
challenge must be limited to a single tax year. Minn. Stat. § 278.02 (2020) (“No petition
shall include more than one assessment date.”). Walmart filed its complaints, which
asserted claims based on the tax assessments levied against the Properties for tax years
2013 through 2018, in May 20 19. Because there is no question that Walmart missed the
“on or before April 30” filing deadline for the tax years 2013 through 2018, Walmart’s
claims are untimely if Walmart is held to the limitations period set forth in chapter 278.

located if that city or town employs its own certified assessor. A copy of the
petition shall also be forwarded by the assessor to the school board of the
school district in which the property is located.
Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1(a).

3 The process of calculating, imposing, and collecting annual property taxes s pans
two calendar years. See Summit House Apart. Co. v. C ounty of Hennepin , 253 N.W.2d
127, 129 (Minn. 1977) (stating that there is “a one -year lag between the assessment and
the collection of real estate taxes”). For example, taxes payable in 2020 are based on taxes
assessed in 2019. The cycle begins on January 2 of the assessment year when the assessor
places a value on the property. See Minn. Stat. § 273.01 (2020). Property tax statements
based on the assessed value (and the tax rate adopted by the taxing entity) are sent to the
property owner no later than March of the year following the assessment year —the taxes-
payable year—and are due in May and October of that year. See Minn. Stat. §§ 276.04,
subd. 3 (mailing of tax statements), 279.01, subd. 1 (property tax due dates and penalties
for nonconformity) (2020).
Taxpayers have several opportunities over a period of months to challenge the
assessed value of the property. The property owner can seek relief directly from the
assessor. The taxpayer can appeal in the spring of the assessment year to the local boards
of appeal and equalization. Minn. Stat. § 274.01, subd. 1 (2020). Or the taxpayer may
appeal directly to the district court or the Minnesota Tax Court. Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd.
1(a). That appeal must be filed by April 30 of the taxes-payable year. Id.
8
We therefore turn to the question of whether Walmart’s claim that the Counties
violated the company’s rights to equal protection and uniform taxation by assessing the
Properties differently than other similarly situated properties falls within the scope of one
of the five enumerated statutory categories set forth in section 278.01, subdivision 1(a). If
a challenge to a property tax assessment is based on one of the five statutory grounds,
chapter 278 provides the “exclusive means” for bringing such a challenge. Programmed
Land, 633 N.W.2d at 523. But we have also said that section 278.01 “does not provide a
cause of action for all possible challenges to property taxes.” Id.
In Programed Land, and later in Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis, 823 N.W.2d 638,
647 (Minn. 2012), we opened the door (albeit in dicta) to the possibility that, if a taxpayer’s
claim of an unfair or unequal assessment is framed as a violation of constitutional rights ,
the taxpayer could challenge the assessment independently of the procedures set forth in
chapter 278. Importantly, w e did not recognize in Programmed Land or Odunlade an
independent basis for asserting constitutional claims outside of chapter 278. Rather, we
simply declined to answer whether taxpayers “may proceed independe ntly under either
[constitutional] theory” because we concluded that the alleged assessment error s at issue
in those cases did not violate either constitutional provision. Programmed Land , 633
N.W.2d at 530; s ee Odunlade , 823 N.W.2d at 647 (“We need not, and do not, decide
whether chapter 278 precludes [taxpayers’] constitutional claims because we conclude that
these claims fail as a matter of law.”) Today, we answer that question.
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We start our analysis by considering how a taxpayer proves an unfair or un equal
assessment claim under section 278.01, subdivision 1(a). 4 A claim of unfair or unequal
assessment requires a court to compare the actual market value and tax assessment of the
property in question with the actual market value and tax assessment of similarly situated
properties. United Nat’l Corp. v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 299 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Minn. 1980); see
Programmed Land, 633 N.W.2d at 5 30. If the ratio of the assessed value to the actual
market value of the property in question is less than the rat io of the assessed value to the
actual market value of other comparable properties in the same taxing district, then a claim
of unfair or unequal assessment may be stated. Anacker v. C ounty of Cottonwood , 302
N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. 1981).5
This concept of unfair or unequal assessment mirrors the equal protection test for
unfair and unequal taxation set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States: a property
owner suffers a violation of the Equal Protection Clause when other owners’ similarly

4 Walmart also alleges that the Counties intentionally overvalued its properties, which
is another basis for a claim under section 278.01, subdivision 1(a). An overvaluation claim
is demonstrated when the assessed value of the property exceeds the market value of the
property. United Nat’l Corp. v. C ounty of Hennepin , 299 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn. 1980).
Generally, while placing an assessed value on a property in excess of its market value
violates Minnesota law, it is not a violation of equal protection or uniformity in taxation.
See id. (stating that our decisions do not support a constitutional claim based solely on a
disparity between a market value and a property’s selling price). Walmart does not assert
a violation that falls within the scope of the other three categories set forth in section
278.01.

5 For instance, if the assessed value of the property in question is $1,000 and its actual
market value is $1,000, but the average assessed value of comparable properties is $800
and their average market value is $1,000, then a claim of unfair or unequal assessment may
be viable.
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situated properties are assessed at a lower rate, where the difference in taxation is shown
by comparing the share of total property tax es assessed in a jurisdiction allocated to the
first property relative to the value of the property with the share of total property taxes
assessed in a jurisdiction allocated to the similarly situated properties relative to the value
of those properties. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n of Webster Cnty.,
W. Va. , 488 U.S. 336, 345 –46 (1989). In other words, the basic operational test to
determine whether an assessment is “unfair or unequal” under section 278.01, subdivision
1(a), and the basic operational test to determine whether an assessment violates the
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and uniform taxation are the same.
We have also stated that “a taxpayer will not meet the evidentiary burden of
establishing a violation of rights protected under the federal or state constitution , unless
he can demonstrate that the disparity about which he complains resulted from the
intentional or arbitrary or systematic undervaluation of other properties.” United Nat’l
Corp., 299 N.W.2d at 76 (emphasis added).6 And while we have not found in our decisions
“any support for the claim that a dual standard, one constitutional and the other statutory ,
should be applied” in unfair or unequal assessment cases, we have also never definitively
decided that a taxpayer must show intentional, arbitrary, or systematic undervaluation of
other properties to prove a chapter 278 claim of unfair and unequal assessment, or whether

6 We have declined, however, to adopt definitively all of the requirements o f the
federal constitution’s Equal Protection Clause as the standard for the Minnesota
Constitution’s Uniformity in Taxation Clause. See United Nat’l Corp., 299 N.W.2d at 77
n.5 (observing that “the requirements under the uniformity clause of the state co nstitution
and the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution are not coterminous”).
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a simple error by the assessor will suffice. Id. at 77–78 (declining to decide whether, under
section 278.01, subdivision 1(a), a taxpayer might establish an unfair or unequal
assessment claim by showing that, as a result of simple error rather than intentional,
arbitrary, or systematic conduct, the assessment is high as compared with other properties);
see Anacker, 302 N.W.2d at 346 ( holding that the plaintiff’s section 278.01 claims failed
because the plaintiff made no showing of unequal assessment or overvaluation).
What is clear, however, is that to the extent that the requisite showing of the taxing
authority’s intent may differ between the statutory remedy and constitutional claims , the
proof required to establish the narrower constitutional claim is properly characterized as a
subset of the proof required to establish a broader claim encompassed by section 278.01,
subdivision 1(a). Stated another way, the broadest possible test to determine whether the
statutory prohibition on unfair or unequal assessments in section 278.01, subdivision 1(a)
(including proof that undervaluation of other properties is intentional, arbitrary, systematic,
or perhaps simple error) , is inclusive of the test for whether an assessment violated a
taxpayer’s equal protection and uniform taxation rights (including proof that
undervaluation of other properties is intentional, arbitrary , or systematic). Accordingly,
claims asserting violations of those constit utional rights may be brought under section
278.01, subdivision 1(a).
We return, then, to the central question before us: Does Walmart’s claim that the
Counties violated the company’s equal protection and uniform taxation rights by assessing
its Properties differently from other similarly situated properties fall within the scope of
the “unfair or unequal” category in section 278.01, subdivisions 1(a)?
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The Counties’ answer to this question is straightforward: Walmart’s complaints
allege that, for discriminatory reasons, the Counties intentionally assessed properties
comparable to Walmart’s properties at substantially less than their fair market value while
valuing Walmart’s properties closer to their fair market value. But once stripped of their
constitutional garb, the Counties assert, Walmart’s claims are simply that the Counties
assessed Walmart’s properties unfairly or unequally as compared with other properties.
That is one of the grounds for a property tax challenge enumerated in section 278 .01,
subdivision 1(a), for which chapter 278 provides the exclusive remedy. Consequently, the
Counties argue, Walmart’s claims fall within the scope of section 278.01, subdivision 1(a),
and so Walmart must comply with that section’s limitations period.
We agree with the Counties. The plain language of section 278.01, subdivision 1(a),
makes no exception for constitutional claims that fall within one of the five categories of
claims listed in the statute. See Vill. Lofts at St. Anthony Falls Ass’n v. Hous. Partners III-
Lofts, LLC, 937 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Minn. 2020) (stating that we must follow the plain and
unambiguous language of a statute); State v. Carson, 902 N.W.2d 441, 44 6 (Minn. 2017)
(rejecting the argument that the Legislature could not have intended what the words of the
statute plainly said); Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001)
(stating that a court cannot add meaning or words to a statute that were intentionally or
inadvertently left out).
Further, the statute does not prohibit a taxpayer from bringing an equal protection
or uniformity in taxation challenge under chapter 278. As noted above, the test for whether
an assessment violate s the statutory prohibition on “unfair or unequal assessments” in
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section 278.01, subdivision 1(a), is the same as or broader than, and therefore inclusive of,
the test for whether an assessment violate s a taxpayer’s equal protection and uniform
taxation rights under the federal and state constitutions . Therefore, we hold that if a
taxpayer’s challenge to its property taxes is a claim of unfair or unequal assessment, or one
of the other grounds set forth in section 278.01, subdivision 1(a), chapter 278 provides the
exclusive remedy for such a challenge. This is true even if the challenge were framed as a
constitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniformity in Taxation
Clause.7

7 The court of appeals did not reach the question of whether taxpayers may pursue,
independently of chapter 278, a claim that a tax assessment violates the taxpa yer’s rights
to equal protection or uniformity in taxation. See Walmart, 2020 WL 3956251, at *7. The
court instead determined that, even if an independent pathway were open for such a claim,
Walmart failed to state such a cla im under Rule 12.02(e). Id. In so ruling, the court of
appeals erred in two ways.
First, the court of appeals reasoned that Walmart’s allegation that the Counties acted
“willfully, intentionally and unlawfully” by overvaluing or unfairly or unequally assessing
Walmart’s properties was insufficient to state a claim. Id. at *8–9. We disagree. Minnesota
is a notice -pleading state. Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs. , 953 N.W.2d 496, 500
(Minn. 2021); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 (“A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . .
shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief and a demand for judgment for the relief sought . . . .”).
Notice-pleading permits a plaintiff to plead a claim “ ‘by way of a broad general
statement which may express conclusions rather than . . . by a statement of facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.’ ” Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 602 (quoting N. States Power Co.
v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 ( Minn. 1963)). “ The functions of a pleading today are
simply to give fair notice to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with
sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader’s theory upon which his claim for relief is based.”
Id. (quoting N. States Power Co., 122 N.W.2d at 29), 605 (explaining that “[t]he focus [of
the pleading] is on the ‘incident’ rather than on the specific facts of the incident”).
Walmart’s complaint provides fair notice to the Counties of the incident giving rise to it s
claims and is sufficient to allow the Counties to understand the theory upon which its
claims are based.
Second, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that Walmart’s allegation that
the Counties’ conduct was an “ ‘intentional and willful failure to p erform both [their]
14
Moreover, we have repeatedly concluded that the Legislature intended the statute to
provide the exclusive means to challenge an assessment when the challenge is based on
one of the five types listed in section 278.01, subdivision 1(a). See, e.g., Odunlade, 823
N.W.2d at 644. We have grounded that conclusion on the “purpose and function” of the
statute and on the Legislature’s use of broad language to describe the types of permitted
challenges and the remedies available to the taxpayer who succeeds with a statutory claim.
Programmed Land, 633 N.W.2d at 526. We have stated that “when the legislature enacted
[chapter 278], it did so for the purpose of providing a rather simple remedy for the taxpayer
to have his real estate tax grievances determined.” Land O’Lakes Dairy Co. v. Vill. of
Sebeka, 31 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Minn. 1948). Thus, we have concluded that chapter 278 was
enacted to benefit both the taxpayer and the state. See State v. Elam, 84 N.W.2d 227, 230
(Minn. 1957) (“[W]e think it is apparent from the express wording of the statute that the
act was passed for the benefit of the state as well.”). As we noted in Programmed Land,
[t]he taxpayer benefited because chapter 278 provided a means to object to
property taxes without first having to default and then answer in delinquent
tax proceedings, and the state benefited because, by providing a cause of
action without having to default, chapter 278 limited or prevented tax
delinquency and enforced the prompt collection of taxes, ensuring a reliable
stream of revenue . . . .

statutory and [their] common law duty ’ ” to assess Walmart’s property and similarly
situated properties “ ‘upon a uniform basis’ ” was legally insufficient. 2020 WL 3956251,
at *9. The court of appeals deemed the conduct of the Counti es to be “at best[]
‘bureaucratic errors’ or ‘an erroneous or mistaken performance’ of the duties imposed on
the county assessors” under the statute. Id. (citing our decision in Programmed Land where
we determined that bureaucratic errors could not amount to a constitutional violation). This
reasoning incorrectly reads adverse inferences against Walmart. See Walsh, 851 N.W.2d
at 606 (“We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”).
15
633 N.W.2d at 525–26.
With these objectives in mind, we have declined to undermine the Legislature’s
intent “by allowing a significant number of tax grievances to be free of the chapter 278
filing limitation and, consequently, actionable years after the taxes were due.” Id. at 526.
We have also noted that no right to appeal from an assessment existed at common law; it
is a purely statutory right and , accordingly, requires strict compliance. See Ewert v. City
of Winthrop, 278 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. 1979); Vill. of Edina v. Joseph , 119 N.W.2d
809, 816 (Minn. 1962) (explaining that appeals from tax assessments, “their course, and
the time and manner in which they are to be allowed and perfected are of statutory origin”).
To prevail on its argument that section 278.01 , subdivision 1(a), does not provide
the exclusive remedy for challenging a tax assessment based on constitutional claims of
equal protection and uniformity in taxation, Walmart must demonstrate that the statute
excludes such claims from its purview. But Walmart points to nothing in the plain language
of the statute that makes an exception for claims asserting equal protection and uniformity
in taxation challenges to assessments. Rather, Walmart asserts that the standard for a
constitutional claim differs substantively from the standard for a statutory claim. Walmart
also urges that the Tax Court lacks the jurisdiction to resolve constitutional claims and
contends that, in any event, chapter 278 does not provide an adequate remedy for
constitutional claim s because the truncated limitations period hampers the taxpayer’s
ability to muster the necessary evidence. We now turn to those arguments.
Walmart first argues that an independent remedy for equal protection and uniformity
in taxation violations is appro priate because the standard for proving that a property tax
16
assessment violates either of these constitutional provisions is different from the standard
for proving a statutory violation under section 278.01, subdivision 1(a). In particular,
Walmart argues that a constitutional violation requires a showing of intentional, arbitrary,
or systematic discrimination while a clai m under chapter 278 does not. As discussed
above, Minnesota law is unclear on that point. See United Nat’l Corp., 299 N.W.2d at 77–
78. But a side from a possible difference between the required mental state for
constitutional and statutory claims, the op erational test is the same. See id. at 76. Most
importantly, even if the required mental states are different, the dispositive question is not
whether section 278.01 requires intentional, arbitrary, or systematic discrimination. The
relevant question is the inverse: Does section 278.01, subdivision 1(a), allow a taxpayer to
bring such a claim that is the result of intentional, arbitrary, or systematic discrimination?
The answer to that question is plainly “Yes.”
Once again, nothing in chapter 278 prev ents a taxpayer from challenging an
assessment as unfair or unequal simply because the government acted intentionally,
arbitrarily, or systematically in imposing the tax.8 Further, the remedies that Walmart seeks

8 In reaching this conclusion, we note that Walmart’s reliance on A.F. Moore &
Associates, Inc. v. Pappas, 948 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2020), is misplaced. A.F. Moore applied
the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, in the context of an Illinois procedure that denied
the taxpayer all opportunity to have an equal protection claim heard. A.F. Moore, 948 F.3d
at 895 (explaining that the Illinois statute provided no state forum for a constitutional claim
because it limited the taxpayer to challenging only the correctness of the valuation and
prevented any inquiry into the methodology or intent of the assessor, a necessary
prerequisite for proving an equal protection claim). Walmart is not similarly denied all
opportunity to prove that the Counties assess ed its properties at a higher rate than
comparable properties, thus rendering those assessments unfair or unequal. To the
contrary, section 278.01, subdivision 1(a), and our case law expressly provide Walmart
that opportunity.
17
in its complaints —a reduction in the asse ssed value of its Properties and a return of its
alleged overpayments made from 2013 through 2018—are the same remedies that Walmart
would receive had it prevailed in a challenge brought under chapter 278 asserting that an
assessment was unfair or unequal.9
Next, Walmart argues that the Legislature could not have meant for constitutional
claims to be addressed under chapter 278 because section 278.01, subdivision 1(a), permits
a taxpayer to seek relief before a tax court. To support its argument, Walmart cites Erie
Mining Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue , 343 N.W2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984), and Wilson
v. Commissioner of Revenue , 619 N.W.2d 194 , 199 (Minn. 2000), and points out that the
tax court, as an arm of the exe cutive branch, lacks original jurisdiction to decide
constitutional challenges to property taxes brought initially in the tax court. It makes no
sense, Walmart asserts, for the Legislature to create a procedure to resolve a taxpayer’s
constitutional claims while also permitting such claims to be brought in a forum with no
power to address those claims.
But Walmart’s argument ignores the plain language of chapter 278. Although the
statute permits taxpayers to bring their claims in tax court, it also provides taxpayers with
the option of proceeding in district court , which has jurisdiction to decide constitutional

9 Walmart also argues that the remedies set forth in chapter 278 are insufficient
because the statute does not empower the tax court, which was established by the
Legislature, to enjoin a county from discriminating in future cases. This argument is not
persuasive. When a court de termines that a county’s assessment process in a particular
instance violated the Equal Protection Clause and/or the Uniformity in Taxation Clause by
imposing a disproportionate tax on a particular taxpayer, the county will continue to use
that process at its peril.
18
questions. See Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1 (a). In addition, even if Walmart’s claims
were brought initially in the tax court, we have adopted a process by which the tax court
could acquire jurisdiction over Walmart’s constitutional challenges.
All tax matters over which the tax court has jurisdiction should be filed with
the tax court. If any party raises a constitutional issue, the tax cour t should
stay the proceedings and refer the constitutional question to the district court.
The district court may either decide the constitutional issue or refer the matter
back to the tax court which will then have subject matter jurisdiction to rule
initially on the constitutional issue. If the tax court should declare any matter
unconstitutional and no appeal is taken to this court, that ruling shall only be
the law of the particular case involved.

Erie Mining Co., 343 N.W.2d at 264. Consequently, the alleged statutory inconsistency
that Walmart identifies is easily reconcilable and provides no basis for discerning a
legislative intent to allow constitutional claims to be asserted independent ly of chapter
278.10

10 Walmart also asserts that because the tax court’s jurisdiction is limited to “questions
of law and fact arising under the tax laws of the state,” Minn. Stat. § 271.01, subd. 5 (2020),
it can never decide a claim—even under the process outlined in Erie—that an assessment
violates the constitution, even if the constitutional provision (like the Uniformity Clause of
the Minnesota Constitution) expressly relates to taxes. The cases Walmart cites as support
for that proposition are distinguishable.
In Benigni v. County of St. Louis , the taxpayer alleged that the local assessor
engaged in a pattern of harassment and requested that the assessor be ordered to stop the
harassment. 585 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Minn. 1998). We held that the tax court lacked the power
to make such an order regarding a common law fraud claim. Id. at 54. Here, in contrast,
the constitutional claims relate to tax assessments.
In Johnson v. County of Hennepin, No. 27-CV-14-07031, 2015 WL 2329349, at *2
(Minn. Tax Ct. May 12, 2015), a tax court decision from which we denied a petition for
mandamus and a writ of certiorari, see Johnson v. County of Hennepin, A15-1339, Order
at 6 (Minn. filed Oct. 23, 2015), the taxpayers alleged that the c ounty violated their
constitutional rights by secretly approaching the district court to make an ex parte request
to quash the taxpayer’s petition. Unlike this case, the taxpayers in Johnson did not allege
that the taxes imposed on the ir property were unc onstitutional. They argued that the
19
Finally, Walmart argues that chapter 278 does not provide an adequate remedy to
address its equal protection and uniformity in taxation claims because it may take a
taxpayer longer than 1 year to perceive that a county assessor is intentionally discriminating
by assessing the taxpayer’s property at a higher rate than comparable properties and to
gather the evidence to support such a claim. Therefore, Walmart argues, we should
construe section 278.01 to exclude equal protection and uniformity in taxation claim s to
avoid unconstitutionally hobbling a taxpayer’s ability to vindicate those constitutional

process of proceeding ex parte was unconstitutional, a claim that was beyond the
jurisdiction of the tax court. See 2015 WL 2329349, at *2–3.
Walmart’s reliance on Knick v. Township of Scott , Pa., ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct.
2162 (2019), is also misplaced. Walmart claims that, under Knick, requiring property
owners to meet the 1-year limitations window in section 278.01, subdivision 1(c), imposes
on property owners the untenable choice of bringing e qual protection or uniform taxation
claims prematurely or facing dismissal of those claims for missing that deadline. But that
is just another way of saying that the limitations period may violate the Due Process Clause
as applied, which is not properly presented for our review.
Knick is also distinguishable for other reasons. It turned on a close analysis of when
the right to compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution first attaches, id., ___ U.S. at _ __, 139 S. Ct at 2170–71, which is not
at issue in this case. And Knick is an exhaustion of state remedies case. See id., ___ U.S.
at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2172 –73. The Supreme Court’s concern about the so -called
“preclusion trap” was that the exhaustion r equirement essentially took away the power of
the federal courts to provide constitutional relief. Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.
The case before us is not about whether a claimant must exhaust certain remedies before
proceeding in a federal forum. It is about the contours of the state remedy itself. Walmart’s
concern seems to be that a tax court ’s conclusion that the taxpayer failed to establish that
an assessment was unfair or unequal under the statute will be dispositive of a claim that an
assessment violates the equal protection and uniform taxation clauses. That may be so, but
it is also not a concern here, when the constitutional claim is a subset of the statutory claim
and, as such, resolution of the statutory claim also resolves the constitutional claim.

20
rights with a tightly truncated limitations period.11 See State v. Irby, 848 N.W.2d 515, 521–
22 (Minn. 2014) (discussing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance). We disagree.
The language of section 278.01, subdivision 1 (a), is clear. It makes no exceptions
for constitutional claims that fall within one of the five categories of property tax
challenges set forth in the statute. Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1(a); see Irby, 848 N.W.2d
at 521–22 (stating that the constitutional avoidance doctrine applies only after the statute
is found to be ambiguous).12
In conclusion, chapter 278 is the exclusive process for Walmart to challenge the
Counties’ assessment of its Properties for violating Walmart’s constitutional rights to equal
protection and uniformity in taxation under the federal and state constitution s. Because

11 Walmart did not directly challenge the constitutionality of section 278.01,
subdivision 1(c), on due process grounds. See Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 817
(Minn. 1957) (explaining that what is a reasonable time within which to assert a right is a
matter of legislative discretion, exercised “in light of the nature of the subject and purpose
of the enactment, and we have said that ‘the courts will not inquire into the wisdom of the
exercise of this discretion by the legislature in fixing the period of legal bar, unless the time
allowed is manifestly so short as to amount to a practical denial of justice’ ” (quoting Hill
v. Townley, 47 N.W. 653, 654 (Minn. 1891)). Consequently, that issue is not before us ,
and we express no opinion on whether the limitations period in section 278.01, subdivision
1(c), satisfies due process in this case.

12 In Programmed Land, we rejected a facial due process challenge to the limitations
period in section 278.01 , subdivision 1 (c). 633 N.W.2d at 529. The taxpayers in
Programmed Land claimed that there was in sufficient time between the receipt of their
final property tax statements in March of the taxes-payable year and the deadline for filing
a challenge to the rate under chapter 278. Id. at 528. We reached this conclusion because
the statute provided the taxpayers with several months, after receiving an earlier written
notice, in which they could file a challenge to the tax rate applied to their property, and
because the statute provided for other remedies (like commissioner granted abatements
under Minn. Stat. § 270C.86 (2020)—formerly § 270.07, subd. 1 (2000)) for improperly
imposed taxes.
21
these claims were not brought within the time limitations set forth in section 278.01,
subdivision 1(c), Walmart’s claims are time-barred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Affirmed.

ANDERSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.