In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: N. A., D. M., and G. T., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1882

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
N. A., D. M., and G. T., Parents.

Filed April 20, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File Nos. 53-JV-19-69, 53-JV-19-88

David A. Samb, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assi stant County Attorney, Slayto n, Minnesota (for respondent
Nobles County Community Service Agency)

Angie Kopplow, Worthington, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant-mother seeks review of a dist rict court order adjudicating her three
children in need of protection or services and terminating her parental rights to two of these
children. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it (1) terminated
her parental rights on the statutory gro unds of neglect and palpable unfitness,

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(2) determined that termination was in the children’s best interest, and (3) adjudicated the
children in need of protection or services (C HIPS). Because we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant N.A. (mother) has the three children involved in this case,1 arising from
her relationship with two fathers. Mother and G.T. are the parents of twins: a daughter,
A.S.T. (child one), and a son, A.M.T. (child two) (colle ctively, the twins), born in
November 2013. Child one has generalized anxiety disorder and child two has autism and
sensory-processing disorder and is largely nonverbal. The twins are in kindergarten, have
individual educational plans, and receive th e services of a one-on-one paraprofessional.
Child two also receives outpatient speech and occupational therapy. Mother and D.M. are
the parents of a son, A.M. (child three), who was born in July 2017.2
2018 CHIPS petition
In April 2018, respondent Nobles County Community Service Agency (the county)
received anonymous reports that mother “had been and was conti nuing to use drugs,”
specifically methamphetamine, throughout her pregnancies. On June 13, 2018, a county
social worker received a report that child one “nearly drowned” in a pool while in mother’s

1 The record shows that mother has a fourth child, who is not involved in these proceedings.

2 Only mother’s parental rights are at issue in this appeal. G.T. did not appeal the district
court’s order terminating his parental rights. G.T. is currently in prison and has minimal
contact with the children. D.M., child three’s father, was involved in the CHIPS
proceeding and entered an admission in July 2019. The district court deferred disposition
until after the TPR trial.

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care. On June 7, child one was found unresponsive in the pool and mother drove her to the
hospital rather than call an ambulance. The hospital admitted child one to intensive care
and mother later obtained child one’s discharge against medical advice.
On the same day the social worker recei ved this report, th e county removed the
twins from the home after the di strict court issued an orde r authorizing an emergency
protective-care hold. Because the county was unable to dete rmine child three’s
whereabouts, the district court issued an ex parte order for emergency protective custody
for child three. On June 14, the county filed a CHIPS pe tition for all three children and
placed them into foster care. Hair-follicle testing showed that the children had been
exposed to methamphetamine. On August 13, the district court adjudicated the children in
need of protection or services. Mother and so cial worker developed a case plan. Mother
and the children began receiving services, incl uding individual and family therapy with a
professional clinical counselor (therapist).
In late August 2018, moth er attended inpatient chemical-dependency treatment and
aftercare in St. Cloud. By the end of November, the children joined mother for a trial home
visit. In January 2019, the children moved with mother to a townhome in Worthington. In
March 2019, the district court terminated juri sdiction, mother regained full physical and
legal custody over the children, who had spent 285 days in the county’s custody. Mother
and the children continued to receive services from the social worker and therapist.
2019 CHIPS and TPR petitions
“Immediately” after mother regained custody of the children, the social worker and
therapist observed “behavior changes by mother that they associated with drug use.” The

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next month, the social worker required mother to wear a drug patch, but mother removed
the patch twice before it could be tested. The social worker also “had to schedule a doctor’s
appointment for the children as they had been sick for two weeks” and mother had not
made an appointment. And th e social worker “continued to get reports from different
people in the community that there was a lot of traffic going in and out of [mother’s] house”
during this time.
Also, the therapist reduced her weekly in-home therapy visits with the family from
nine to three hours per week because she “felt the children were attaching to her and not to
the Mother.” After she reduced her visits, th e therapist noticed that mother “was more
closed off” with her, the children were “more dysregulated,” and “we were kind of
regressing a little bit.” The therap ist told the social worker th at she felt “like something’s
going on” and that “there’s so much emotion dysregulation she was fearful to leave [the
children in] the home.”
Mother’s probation agent began supervisi ng her at the end of January 2019 for a
third-degree driving-while-impaired offense. At the end of April, mother’s urine test was
positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines. Mother’s May urine test also returned
positive for methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana. The probation agent issued
a violation report on May 10, 2019, and police arrested mother.
While in jail, mother adm itted to the social worker th at she had recently used
methamphetamine twice in her garage and made a similar statement later to law
enforcement, adding that she relapsed on me thamphetamine once in the garage while the
children slept. Based on mother’s admission, law enforcement obtain ed and executed a

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search warrant at mother’s home on May 16 . Law enforcement found “a small white
plastic baggie . . . underneath a cushion of a couch located in the ga rage” with “a white
crystalized substance” inside the baggie. The white substance later tested positive for
methamphetamine.
On the same day police executed the search warrant, the county filed a CHIPS
petition on behalf of the three children and removed them from mother’s care. The twins
remained together and in the same foster home they had for the 2018 CHIPS petition. The
county eventually placed child three with his father in Worthing ton. The petition alleged
that the children were without proper parent al care and that the children’s environment
was injurious or dangerous under Minn. Stat . § 260C.007, subd. 6(8)-(9) (2018). Mother
entered a denial.
Mother and the social worker prepared a case plan, which mother signed. The case
plan addressed the children’s safety, mother’s drug use, and her attempts to hide her drug
use. The case plan required mother to provide a safe and clean home for the children, show
sobriety through drug-patch testing and urine testing, and complete a chemical-dependency
assessment and follow the recommendations.
In June, the children completed hair-follicle testing and all three children’s samples
tested positive for exposure to methamphetamine; child one’s sample tested positive for
ingestion of methamphetamine.
On July 5, 2019, th e county filed a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition
seeking to terminate mother’s parental rights to the twins. The petition cited Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (b)(4), (b)(5) (201 8), and alleged that mother had relapsed

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and was using methamphetamine, based on fa iled tests and her own admission, mother
was trying to tamper with and was not co operating with drug te sting, police found
methamphetamine in mother’s garage, and hair-follicle testi ng showed that the children
had been exposed to methamphetamine. Mother entered a denial.
On August 12, mother’s urine tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother had
five negative drug tests during the rest of A ugust. In early September, mother failed to
appear for two urine tests, wh ich her probation agen t considered positive test results. On
September 6, mother was uncooperative with ur inalysis instructions and tried to tamper
with her sample. Mother submitted an insufficient sample, again considered a positive test
result by probation. The probation agent issued a second violation report.
A one-day trial occurred on the TPR and CHIPS petitions on September 12, 2019.
The district court took judicial notice of the 2018 CHIPS case and received five exhibits:
police reports, two probation violation reports, the children’s 2019 hair-follicle-test reports,
and a forensic toxicologist’s curriculum v itae. The county presented evidence from the
social worker, a forensic toxicologist, a po lice detective, the probation agent, and the
therapist, who testified to the facts summarized above as well as provided some additional
facts. Mother testified and called her moth er and father (maternal grandparents) as
character witnesses. G.T. also testified.
The detective, who executed the search warrant at mother’s home, testified that the
twins and the maternal grandmother were at the home when police executed the warrant.
The district court later found, based on the detective’s testimony, that mother “denied that

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the baggie of methamphetamine was hers and [stated] that the couch that it was located in
was” from “off the curb” in Worthington.
After the county removed the children from the home in May 2019, mother
participated in supervised visits with her children. As summarized by the district court, the
social worker testified that the visits “initially involved all the children, but then shifted to
visits with the mother and one of the children at a time” be cause visits with all three
children were “too much” for mother.
The therapist testified that she has wo rked with mother a nd the children since
August 2018, providing both family and children-only sessions. The therapist testified, as
summarized by the district court, that the children “were behind in their development when
she began working with the fa mily,” the children made prog ress while they resided with
mother at her treatment program in St. Cl oud, but they “regressed during sessions upon
being return[ed] to the Mother’s custody.”
The therapist testified that the twins “do better in th erapy sessions” when mother
does not attend, and that they “do better in therapy while they are in foster care versus when
they are in their Mother’s cu stody.” The therapist also testif ied that “being in and out of
foster care has had a negative effect” on th e children because it ha s hurt the children’s
“ability to relate and trust others,” “their re gulation” has been affe cted, and it has been
“very stressful.” The therapist testified that she “has safety concerns for the children if they
were returned to the care of the Mother.” And when she di scussed her safety concerns
about mother’s drug use, moth er “has been wanting suppor t” and has been “very open”
with the therapist.

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The forensic toxicologist testified about the children’s hair-follicle testing and stated
that the twins’ samples showed that th ey had been environmentally exposed to
methamphetamine. The toxicologist also testif ied that child one’s sample tested positive
for amphetamine, a metabolite of methamphe tamine, which means she had ingested
methamphetamine; child three’s sample te sted positive for meth amphetamine exposure
and THC.3 The toxicologist testified that the “detection window” for the samples was 90
days, meaning the exposure or ingestion occurred within the past three months. On
cross-examination, the toxicologist stated th at he could not comment on the effects of
methamphetamine exposure.
The district court also received the gua rdian ad litem’s (GAL) written report from
September 2019 in which she recommended that mother’s parental rights be terminated
and that the children be adjudicated in need of protection or se rvices. The GAL also
recommended that it is in the twins’ “best interests to reside in a safe, stable and permanent
home where they can be provided with consistent care and nurturing,” and that, “[n]either
parent is able to meet the children’s need at this time or in the fo reseeable future.” The
GAL wrote that mother “does not have a home fo r the children to reside in if they were
returned to her care today, and has not show n she is willing or able to make long-term
changes to provide for her children’s basic ne eds, their developmental needs, or their
emotional needs.”

3 We note that the district court’s TPR order at one point erroneously stated that child three
tested positive for amphetamines. But the district court’s TP R order accurately stated the
test results in other sections and mother does not raise this as an error on appeal.

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District court’s TPR order
The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order on
November 4, 2019, terminating mother’s parental rights to the twins and adjudicating the
children as CHIPS. Along with the factual fi ndings already discussed, the district court
summarized mother’s testimony, stating “that she desires another chance to care for her
children, and that she would like to go to trea tment.” The district court also found that
mother testified that “she had not manipulated urine tests, although she admitted that she
had a friend fill a condom with urine in order to manipulat e a urine test, although she
ultimately decided to not manipulate the test.”
The district court found that mother failed “several drug tests” since being placed
on probation in January and that mother “has not been compliant with probation, and has
submitted urine tests which have tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and
THC.” The district court found that mother “has manipulated and attempted to manipulate
urine tests” which required the probation agent to use methods such as placing a “hat” on
the toilet seat and dying the toilet water blue to “prevent [mother] from dipping the sample
in the toilet water.” The district court al so found that mother “has been rude,
confrontational, and generally noncompliant with probation staff.”
The district court found that the maternal grandparents’ testimony was not credible.
As summarized by the district court, the mate rnal grandmother testified that “she was
present in the Mother’s home during the in cidents in which methamphetamine use was
occurring in the garage, and th at she was ensuring the childre n were taken care of.” The
district court found that grandmother “bla med others for the drug use occurring in the

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Mother’s home,” and grandmother testified that mother “would have been better off if she
lied about her drug use, instea d of being honest.” The dist rict court also found that
grandmother “directly accused law enforc ement of planting the methamphetamine
discovered in the Mother’s garage.” The district court found that grandmother was biased
in mother’s favor. The district court found not credible grandfather’s testimony that mother
is “the best mother in the world” and “even when she is using.”
In its conclusions of law about the termination petition, the district court determined
that the county “made reasonable efforts to reunify [the twin s] with the parents and to
finalize the permanent plan of reunification for the children. Thes e efforts have been
unsuccessful.” The district court found the coun ty’s efforts “have been reasonable to the
point of being exhaustive.” The district court found that the county arranged for mother’s
chemical-dependency treatment, provided supervised visita tion between mother and the
children, provided intensive in-home therapy, met the children’s mental-health and medical
needs when mother could not, and social worker had even helped mother with her laundry.4
The district court also determined that mother is not “presently able to resume caring
for the children, and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.” The district court
determined that the co unty “proved by clear and convin cing evidence that grounds for
termination of the parental rights” exist under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (child
neglect) and subd. 1(b)(4) (palpable unfitness ). The district court determined that the

4 On appeal, mother does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite her with the tw ins apart from repeati ng mother’s testimony
that she could have used more help from the county with her transportation needs.

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county proved “by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights would
be in the children’s best interests.”
As to the CHIPS petition, th e district court determined that the county proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the children needed protection or services under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8) and 6(9), beca use the children’s “b ehavior, condition, or
environment are such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others. An injurious or
dangerous environment may include, but is not limited to, the exposu re of children to
criminal activity in the children’s home.”
Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Parental rights are terminated only for “grave and weighty reasons.” Matter of
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). “A natural parent is presumed to
be suitable to be entrusted with the care of his child.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. ,
853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). We will affirm an involuntary
termination if at least one statutory criteri a for termination is supported by clear and
convincing evidence, the county provided reasonable efforts to reunite the parent and child,
and termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703,
708 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.03 (p roviding standard of proof is
“clear and convincing eviden ce” for CHIPS petition); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03,

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subd. 2(a) (providing standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence for TPR petition
for non-Indian child).5
When reviewing a decision to terminate pa rental rights, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error, but “we review its determ ination of whether a
particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse
of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). Appellate cour ts defer to the district court’s assessment of witness
credibility and the weight given to the evidence. See In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d
393, 396 (Minn. 1996) (“[A] district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility
of witnesses.”); see also In re Welfare of J.H. , 844 N.W.2d 28, 39 (Minn. 2014) (“On
matters of credibility and the weight to be given the testimony of witnesses, we defer
to the juvenile court.”). “Because the be st-interests analysis involves credibility
determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a
record, we give considerable deferenc e to the district court’s findings.” In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).

5 We note that the Minnesota Rules of Ju venile Protection Proc edure were amended
effective September 1, 2019. See Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure, No. ADM10-8041 (Minn. Aug. 30, 2019).

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I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in finding that clear and
convincing evidence supports termination of mother’s parental rights on the
statutory ground of neglect.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), provid es that a district court may terminate
parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence “that the parent has substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or negl ected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Under the statute, parental duties include,
but are not limited to, “providing the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education,
and other care and control necessary for the ch ild’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Pare ntal duties also include a
duty to “protect and care for the child.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at
902 (quotation omitted).
The district court found that mother “repeatedly exposed her children to
methamphetamine,” used methamphetamine in her garage, and “engaged in conduct that
has exposed her young children to methamphetamine on two occasions within a year” with
one of those instances occurring “within mere months” of re gaining custody. The district
court found that mother’s drug use and the twins’ exposure to methamphetamine was “a
complete abdication of a parent’s duty to protect her children from harm.”
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that her
“failure to remain sober” caused her to “neglect to comply with her parental duties.” The
county responds that record evidence supports the district court’s determination that mother
neglected to perform her parental duties based on evidence that mother “was unable to
interact meaningfully with all three children simultaneously during supervised visits,” the

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social worker had to schedule doctor appoin tments for the children when they were ill,
mother’s care of the children declined when services were reduced in March 2019 upon
restoring children to mother’s custody, mother used methamphetamine while the children
were at home, and the children were out of mother’s care for over 365 days in 2018 and
2019.
A district court may terminate parental rights if the petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence that a parent’s continued substance abuse led to the parent’s repeated
neglect of parental duties. See In re Welfare of the Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 655
(Minn. App. 2018). The record supports the district cour t’s findings that mother’s
methamphetamine use has led to the twins’ removal from the home twice in one year and
led to their exposure to methamphetamine based on hair-follicle tests in summer of 2018
and 2019. Child one’s 2019 test showed that she had also ingested methamphetamine.
During the spring of 2019, when the social worker and therapist suspected that mother had
relapsed, the social worker had to arrange fo r medical care for the twins because mother
neglected to make appointments.
Mother admitted to using methamphetamine in her garage while the children were
sleeping, and police found methamphetamine in the garage. Mother’s failed drug-patch and
urine tests, along with her positive urine test three days before the c ourt trial, support the
district court’s determination that mother was continuing to use methamphetamine and
attempting to conceal her use before and throughout the CHIPS and termination petitions.
It is true that therapist testified that mother was “definitely always trying to care for [the
twins] and [to] love them,” but also testified that mother ha s continually failed to satisfy

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her parental duties and was unable to provide for the twins’ needs for a stable and safe
home.
Mother makes three additiona l arguments, which we discu ss in turn. First, mother
argues that the district c ourt erroneously relied on In re Welfare of the Child of A.M.C .,
claiming that her conduct differs from the appellant’s conduct . 920 N.W.2d at 655. In
A.M.C., this court determined that the district court’s termination of the mother’s parental
rights was supported by the record becaus e the mother had many opportunities for
treatment, yet relapsed, and her continued use of controlled substances “prevented her from
parenting or meaningfully interacting with [child.]” Id. Here, mother also received
inpatient and outpatient treatment , relapsed, and admitted drug use, at times in the home
while the children were sleeping, which has led to the children’s removal from the home
twice in one year. Mother exposed the twins to methamphetamine, and child one ingested
methamphetamine. Also, the therapist’s testim ony established that mother’s relationship
and ability to care for the twins deteriorated after she resumed drug use. The facts here are
analogous to A.M.C.
Second, mother argues that the district court’s finding that “other people were
coming to [mother’s] home to use illegal drugs with her” was unsupported by record
evidence. But the social worker testified that she had received reports that “there was a lot
of traffic going in and out of [mother’s] house,” from which she inferred that mother may
be using drugs with ot her people. Maternal grandmother also testified that she blamed
“other people” for mother’s dr ug use. While we find no direct evidence for the district
court’s finding that “other people” used drugs with mother in the home, we conclude that

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any error was harmless because the district c ourt did not rely on this factual finding as a
basis for its termination decision.
Third, mother acknowledges that the twins were exposed to methamphetamine but
argues that “nothing on the record demonstrat es that this has ca used the children any
specific or identifiable harm.” We are not persuaded, in part, because Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), does not require the petitioner to show harm. Rather, the county
had to show that mother’s drug use repeatedly prevented her from performing her parental
duties, and it has met this burden.
More importantly, keeping children away from illegal substances is a parental duty
that mother repeatedly faile d to satisfy. Methamphetamine is a Schedule II drug under
Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(d)(2) (2018), and it is illegal to possess it under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2018 ). And causing or permitting a child to be exposed to
methamphetamine is a crime in Minnesota. Mi nn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(b) (2018).
Forensic testing of the twins’ hair sa mples prove that they were exposed to
methamphetamine, child one had ingested methamphetamine, and law enforcement found
methamphetamine in mother’s garage while the twins were present at the home. The
district court had ample evidence to support its conclusion that mother repeatedly neglected
her parental duties by failing to keep the children safe from methamphetamine and criminal
activity.
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found
that the statutory basis of neglect of parental duties was satisfied, we do not decide whether
the district court abused its discretion when it determined that mother was palpably unfit.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the best-interest
factors.

When the district court determined that the county had proved at least one statutory
ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, it was then required to consider
whether termination was in th e twins’ best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subds. 1(b), 7 (2018); see also In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545
(Minn. App. 2009) (“[T]he district court must consider the child’s best interests and explain
why termination is in the best interests of the child.”). The district court must consider
(1) the child’s interest in pres erving the parent-child relationship, (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the relationship, and (3) “any competing interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d at 92. “Competing
interests include health considerations, a stab le environment, and the child’s preference.”
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. When a statutory basis to termin ate parental rights is present,
ultimately, “the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.
The district court determined that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the
twins’ best interests. It relied on testimony from the social worker and therapist that moving
the twins in and out of the foster-care system and mother’s drug use had harmed the twins’
development.
Mother argues that the district court di d not consider the three required factors
because it did not specifically di scuss either the twin s’ or mother’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship or explain how it weighed the three factors. The county

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responds that “the district court clearly ar ticulated the correct legal standard, and its
analysis certainly addresses these interests, ” and that the district court “clearly, though
implicitly, found that the [twins’] need for a stable home environment outweighed any of
the other considerations.”
While it would have been preferable if the district court had made specific findings
on each of the three factors in the same section of its decision that discussed the twins’ best
interests, the district court’s TPR order in cludes detailed findings about the twins’ and
mother’s interests in preser ving the parent-child relati onship, the twins’ competing
interests, and implicitly suggests that it weighed the three statutory factors.
As for the twins’ interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the district
court relied on the therapist’s testimony and fo und that mother’s be havior during visits
“negatively affect the children” and mother needed to visit with the children one at a time
because “visits with all the children were in itially too much for [mother] to handle.” The
district court also found that the twins had special needs and “do better” in therapy sessions
when mother is not present. The district court found that the “children are at risk for
attachment-related problems later in life if they do not form a close bond with a caretaker
who can provide for them, physically and emotionally.”
The district court also cons idered mother’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship when it found that mother “desires another chance to care for her children,”
and that “she would like to go to treatment.” But the district court also assessed the maternal
grandparents’ testimony and found it “showed on ly that [mother] doe s not have the kind
of family support she needs” to stop using drugs.

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As for the twins’ competing interests, the district court found that the “children are
in need of a stable, permanent, and safe living environment.” The district court found that
the children had been in foster care for over 365 days and “are in need of consistent, stable,
safe, and predictable parenting” because the current “instability is negatively affecting”
their “development and cannot continue.” The di strict court also fo und that the children
“require services to meet their mental hea lth and developmental needs,” child two is “a
high-needs child,” and his “development is behind other children of his age.” The district
court also found that child two “is not able to identify dangerous situations on his own and
requires constant supervision.” The district court also found that the children were exposed
to drugs on at least two occasions in the last year, the “children are in desperate need of a
stable, drug-free environment,” and the children “cannot afford” to wait “for the parents to
become capable, stable parents.” See generally In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. ,
814 N.W.2d at 92 (stating competing interest s include “health considerations, a stable
environment, and the child’s preference”).
The district court implicitly weighed all th ree best-interest fact ors throughout its
TPR order. While a more explicit discussion is preferable, we will affirm when the district
court’s findings are supported by the record, it corr ectly applied the law, and its implicit
determinations are evident. See In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P. , 678 N.W.2d 703, 711
(Minn. App. 2004) (holding that “[a]lthough the trial court did not go into great detail,” it
concluded that the child’s need for stability and nurtur ing outweighed any competing
interest). This is not a case in which the district court has made no findings about the best
interests of the children. See, e.g., In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003)

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(remanding to the district cour t to “explain its rationale” when it made no findings about
the children’s best in terest). Unlike in Tanghe, the district court made detailed findings
about the twins’ intere st in the parent-child relations hip, mother’s interest in the
parent-child relationship, and the twins’ comp eting interest, and decided that termination
was in the twins’ best interest. We conclude that the district court did not err in its
evaluation of the best-interest factors.
III. The district court’s adjudication of the children to need protection or services
was within its discretion.

To adjudicate a child in need of protection or services under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6 (2018), the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that one of the
statutory grounds exists and that the chil d needs protection or services as a result . In re
Welfare of Child of S.S.W. , 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009); see also Minn. R.
Juv. Prot. P. 49.03 (requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard).
The district court determined that the three children, and in particular child three,
needed protection or services because of mother’s “unabated drug use” and her “repeated
exposure of the children to illegal drug use in the home.” The district court adjudicated the
children in need of protecti on or services under Minn. Stat . § 260C.007, subd. 6(8) and
6(9). Subdivision 6(8) provides that a child ne eds protection or services if the child “is
without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, physical disability, or state
of immaturity of the child’s parent, guardia n, or other custodian.” Subdivision 6(9)
provides that a child needs protection or serv ices if the child’s “b ehavior, condition, or
environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others. An injurious or

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dangerous environment may include, but is not limited to, the expo sure of a child to
criminal activity in the child’s home.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9).
Mother argues the district court abused its discretion “by finding that there is clear
and convincing evidence that th e [c]hildren were without prope r parental care due to the
state of their [m]other.” Mother contends th at record evidence shows “that the children
were in good health and [m]other never left the children without adult supervision.” We
disagree and conclude that the record supports the district court’s factual findings and its
CHIPS determination. The therapist testified that the “children were delayed in their
development” when she began working with them and that mother’s drug use “gets in the
way of her availability and ability to parent her child ren.” Because of mother’s
methamphetamine use, the children have been exposed to methamphe tamine, the county
removed them from the home twice in one year, and the twins resided in foster care for
over 365 days since June 2018.
Mother also argues that, although testing confirmed that the children were exposed
to drugs, “the record does not demonstrate how this exposure had been injurious to the
children.” Exposing a child to illegal substances and criminal activity, as discussed above,
creates a dangerous environment that supports an order for protection and services. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9). We conclude th at the district court did not err when it
adjudicated the three children in need of protection or services.
Affirmed.