, A19-1884

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1883,
A19-1884

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
K. B. M. and B. F. D., Parents.

Filed June 1, 2020
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-JV-19-1420

Joshua E. Haugen, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant B. F. D.)

Elizabeth A. Walker, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant K. B. M.)

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Lisa M. Tufts, Assistant County Attorney,
Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent Becker County Human Services)

Sheri L. Johnson, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presidin g Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Human services removed K. B.M. and B.F.D.’s child ren from their care after
investigating a report that the parents were using illegal drugs and discovering that the
parents and children all test ed positive for methamphetamine . Human services imposed
court-adopted case plans that required the parent s to end their drug use but, after months
of the parents’ noncompliance, petitioned to terminate parental rights because the parents

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had not corrected the co nditions leading to the out-of-hom e placement. The district court
granted the termination petition, concluding that neither parent had substantially completed
the assigned case plan because neither overcame their drug dependency and demonstrated
long-term sobriety. We affirm because th e evidence supports the district court’s
determinations that the pa rents failed to substantially complete their case-plan
requirements and that termination is in the children’s best interests.
FACTS
K.B.M. (mother) and B.F.D. (father) had one child in 20 12 and a seco nd in 2014.
The parents separated in January 2018 and took turns caring for the children. Both children
were in father’s care in Au gust 2018 when Becker County Human Services received a
report that mother and father were using drugs and neglecting the children. Social worker
Cristie Cahlin learned that father and the children were staying at a friend’s home, and she
unsuccessfully tried to visit them. A few days later, human services received a report that
mother had overdosed on drugs and was hosp italized. Cahlin and a police officer found
father and the children at the friend’s home. Human services collected a urine sample from
father, revealing methamphetamine, amphet amine, marijuana, and alcohol. Human
services directed father to sign a safety pl an arranging for the friend to serve as the
children’s primary caretaker until human services could determine that father could provide
safe care.
Within a week Cahlin learne d that father had violated the plan by taking the children
and going to a different friend’s home. Human services successfully petitioned to remove
the children from father and place them in protective care. The district court ordered both

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parents and the children to submit to hair-follicle testing. Mother and father tested positive
for amphetamine, methamphetamine, hydroc odone, oxycodone, and ecstasy, and the
children both tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Each parent blamed
the other for the children’s exposure to drugs.
Human services case manager Erica Jepson met with the parents at the emergency
protective-custody hearing and believed that they seemed r eceptive to completing a case
plan. Jepson finalized a case plan with mother in September 2018. She scheduled a meeting
with father to develop a case plan for him, but father did not show up. In December 2018
caseworker Tessa Hunter met with both parents and created a case plan for father. The case
plans were identical. They generally required each parent to take steps to stop using drugs,
complete a parental-capacity evaluation, ob tain stable housing, regularly meet with
family-resource workers, maintain visits with the children, and remain law-abiding.
Eleven months after filing the protec tive-services petition, human services
petitioned in July 2019 to terminate mother’s and father’s parent al rights on various
statutory grounds. Human services filed an amended petition in Au gust 2019, narrowing
its allegations to two statutory grounds for te rmination. One of them was that the parents
failed to correct the conditions that led to the out- of-home placement. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2018). The district court conducted a be nch trial in October
2019 and terminated parental rights after it concluded that clear and convincing evidence
supported that statutory ground, that human services had made reasonable efforts to reunite
the parents and children, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Both
parents appealed and we consolidated the cases.

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D E C I S I O N
Mother and father each ch allenge the order terminati ng their parental rights. A
district court may terminate parental rights if it determines that a statutory ground for
termination exists, that termina tion is in the children’s best interests, and that reasonable
efforts to reunite the parents and children either were made or were not required. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8 (2018). Both parents challenge the district court’s
determination that a statutory termination gro und existed, and mother also challenges the
district court’s best-interests determination.
I
Mother and father argue that the district court erred by terminating parental rights
based on the statutory ground that the cond itions leading to the children’s out-of-home
placement went uncorrected. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). We give
considerable deference to the district cour t’s decision to terminate parental rights.
In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We review the
district court’s factual findings to determin e whether they are supported by substantial
evidence and not clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn.
2001). We “closely inquire[] into the sufficien cy of the evidence to determine whether it
was clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of Children of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d 703, 708
(Minn. 2005). The eviden ce must address conditions as they existed at the time of the
termination hearing. In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
The district court determined that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate
parental rights under Minnesota Statutes se ction 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5), which

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requires a showing “that following the child’ s placement out of the home, reasonable
efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the
child’s placement.” The statute creates the following presumption:
It is presumed that reasonable efforts under this clause have
failed upon a showing that:
(i) a child has resided out of the parental home under court
order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the
preceding 22 months. . . . ;
(ii) the court has approved the out-of-home placement
plan . . . ;
(iii) conditions leading to the ou t-of-home placement have
not been corrected. It is presumed that conditions
leading to a child’s out-o f-home placement have not
been corrected upon a showing that the parent or parents
have not substantially complied with the court’s orders
and a reasonable case plan; and
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the social services
agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). The district court determined that the elements were
met to satisfy the presumption. Neither parent disputes that the children resided outside the
home for 12 months, that the court approved th e placement plans, or that human services
made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite the family. Instead, their
arguments focus on the district court’s determination that they did not substantially comply
with their case plans.
Each parent’s case plan generally impos ed the same six requirements: (1) to
cooperate with human-services providers to ensure that th ey were receiving necessary
services; (2) to complete a parental-capacity evaluation; (3) to address concerns about
substance abuse; (4) to obtain stable hous ing and employment; (5) to regularly attend

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supervised visitation with the children; and (6) to remain la w-abiding. The district court
concluded that mother complie d only with the requiremen t to cooperate with human
services and failed to comply with any of the others, and that father failed to comply with
any of the requirements. The parents acknowledge that they did not actually complete their
case plans but contend that they “substantially” completed them. We examine each parent’s
circumstances in turn and conclude that their contentions fail.
Mother’s Case Plan
The district court determined that mother did not complete most of her case-plan
requirements, highlighting mostly her failure to address her drug use and show long-term
sobriety. Mother argues that she adequately addressed her drug use. The record offers some
support for her contention. It shows that she remained sober for just over six weeks leading
up to the termination trial. Caseworker Tessa Hunter testified that mother entered a
residential treatment program in August 2019 and completed the program one month later.
Mother then moved into a residential trea tment facility about one week before the
termination trial. On the trial date in October 2019, mother had been sober for 45 days—
which was the longest she claimed to have remained sober in at least four years.
But Hunter also testified that she did not believe that mother had satisfactorily
completed the drug-use part of her case plan because she did not demonstrate long-term
sobriety or any sobriety outside of a structured facility. The district court found Hunter’s
opinion credible and adopted her conclusion, which the record supports. Mother’s 45-day
sobriety period followed eight months of fa iled treatment programs and her failure to
remain sober after leaving treatment facilities. Mother abandoned or was discharged from

7
five different treatment programs between January and July 2019, mostly because she was
still using drugs. In one of the programs , mother was caught using suboxone and
methamphetamine. She took Xanax to anot her program and offered it to other
drug-dependent clients. In another attemp t, staff found a loaded syringe among her
possessions. The program was willing to allow mother to stay and urged her to do so, but
she left anyway.
We recognize, as did the district c ourt, that mother showed considerable
improvement by the time of the termination trial. But the district court found that she failed
to show she could achieve long-term sobriety. The finding rests reasonably on mother’s
actions in the immediately preceding trea tment programs, which demonstrate only a
temporary commitment to sobriety . The district court also re cognized that mother’s only
demonstrated sobriety occurred within the “highly structured environment of a residential
treatment facility.” Although the district court was required to consider the circumstances
at the time of trial, see Chosa , 290 N.W.2d at 769, those circumstances included only
temporary sobriety in a manner that left the district court unconvinced of mother’s capacity
for long-term sobriety. Mother’s drug us e was the primary reason the children were
removed from her care, and, despite her progress immediately before the trial, the evidence
supports the district court’s finding that moth er had not yet shown that she could remain
drug-free so as to provide a safe environment for her children.
Mother relatedly argues that there was insufficient evidence that the conditions
leading to the children’s placem ent were likely to continue. See In re Welfare of T.D. ,
731 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. App. 2007) (“The court must make its decision based on

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evidence concerning th e conditions that exist at the time of termination and it must
appear that the conditions giving rise to th e termination will conti nue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.” (quotation omitted)). But the district court inferred reasonably from
the circumstances that mother will likely continue to struggle with using drugs in the long
term.
The district court also found that mother failed to complete several other case-plan
requirements. It found that she did not regularl y visit the children. Th e record shows that
there were spans of several months during which mother missed almost all scheduled visits.
Along with her delayed attempt to succeed in a drug-treatment program, the lengthy gaps
in her visits breached the case plan’s direct ive for regular visits and suggest a lack of
parental commitment to the children’s needs. The district court also determined that mother
did not complete the portions of her case plan requiring her to undergo a parental-capacity
evaluation and to obtain stab le housing and employment. Mother does not dispute the
accuracy of the district court’s findings but insists that she could not reasonably complete
these requirements until she had fully addr essed her substance- abuse problems. Her
argument overlooks the significance of her having a year to complete her case plan. This
lengthy period accommodated the reasonable c oncern that some case-plan requirements
will take months to complete or depend on first completing others. The record supports the
district court’s conclusion that mother fa iled to substantially complete most of her
case-plan requirements.

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Father’s Case Plan
The district court determined that father had not substantially completed his case
plan either, observing in particular that he did not show sobrie ty or even show an interest
in fulfilling his case plan. Fath er argues against these observ ations, but the record belies
his arguments.
The district court concluded that father did not address his drug use because he did
not produce evidence that he had completed any chemical-dependency services and had
not demonstrated long-term sobriety. The record shows that father did make some effort
to address his drug use. He completed a chemical-use assessment in February 2019, which
recommended that he undergo in patient treatment. He reporte d to an inpatient treatment
program in March 2019, but he was unsucce ssfully discharged after one month for
repeatedly fraternizing with a female client.
It is true that the facility reported th at father remained sober throughout the
treatment program before his discharge. But af ter the discharge, father did very little to
further address his drug use. The discharge summa ry deemed father to be “at high risk of
relapse without continued supportive services as evident by his past usage history and non-
commitment to following through with [treatment] assistance.” The report recommended
that he participate in an additional treatment program. Father never did so. He told Hunter
that he did not believe additional residential treatment was necessary. Father gave neither
Hunter nor the district court an y evidentiary basis to support his claim that he needed no
additional treatment, in part because he failed to participate in ran dom drug testing that
Hunter arranged for him. Hunter testified that she had limited contact with father after his

10
discharge and that she never received evidence that he completed any other
chemical-dependency program or an updated chemical-use assessment.
Father argues that he adequately ad dressed his drug-depe ndency problems. He
testified at trial that he was clean and beli eved that the residen tial treatment program
sufficiently resolved his chemical-dependency issues, even though he did not complete the
program. He insists that he was discharged for a reason unrelated to continued use and
therefore still achieved the und erlying goal of the program. This argument overlooks the
fact that the treatment facility concluded that he had a high risk of relapsing at the time of
discharge and the fact that he rejected th e encouragement to obtai n additional inpatient
treatment.
Father’s insistence that he never tested positive for drugs in the months immediately
before the termination trial carried little weight with the district cour t. The district court
recognized that the only corroboration for fath er’s claim of post-discharge sobriety was a
single oral drug test and that father did not participate in random drug testing. The district
court had an ample basis on the record to find that father failed to address the drug-use
concerns emphasized in his case plan.
The district court also had an evidentiary basis to find that father failed to complete
his case-plan requirement to cooperate with human-service providers. Father missed his
case-plan development meeting with human se rvices in October 2018 and did not meet
with human services to set up a case plan until December, four months after the children’s
removal. Hunter testified that, after father left the treatment progr am in April 2019, he
contacted her only to receive a phone card and gasoline vouchers and had little contact with

11
human services. Father does not succeed in challenging the district court’s no-cooperation
finding.
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that father also failed to
complete other parts of his case plan. He faile d to consistently visit the children, missing
numerous consecutive sessions an d eventually causing human services to suspend his
visitation. He did not complete a parental-cap acity evaluation, as he did not schedule one
until one year after the children had been removed, and he had completed just one session
of the evaluation before trial. Father also re mained homeless on the trial date, failing to
meet the case-plan requirement to obtain stable housing. He testified that he was “really
close” to getting approved for housing, explaining his intent to move in with his girlfriend
while acknowledging that her parental rights to her own child had been terminated. Father
speculates that housing is “not an insurm ountable problem and is curable within a
reasonable timeframe,” but his speculation is not supported by the record. The district court
did not err by determining that father failed to substantially complete his case-plan
requirements.
Conclusion
We observe that this is not a case of me re technical failures to complete case-plan
requirements. Both mother and father failed to complete not just the majority of their
case-plan requirements, but the most signi ficant ones. The childre n were removed from
mother’s and father’s care chiefly because of drug use. Their drug use not only defeated
their ability to care for the children, it exposed the children to the drugs directly and left
them with dangerous substances in their ow n developing bodies. It left the parents

12
homeless and unemployable, with no place to care for the children safely and no economic
means to provide for their support. Their drug use directly impaired their ability to parent
the children and is central to our decision. Recognizing both the harm they had already
caused by their drug use and the continued danger, the case plan implicitly gave each parent
a choice: abandon the drugs or lose the chil dren. Although both parents showed some
effort, neither exhibited the degree of comm itment sufficient to co mpel the finding that
they would abstain from drugs in the long term. We are satisfied that the district court had
a sufficient basis to conclude that neither pa rent corrected the conditions leading to the
out-of-home placement.
II
Mother also challenges the district cour t’s conclusion that termination of parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. In addition to determining the existence of a
statutory ground, the district court cannot te rminate parental rights unless it also finds
that the best interests of th e children favor termination. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7;
T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708. A district court must consider: “(1) the child’s interests in
preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interests in preserving the
parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). When the parent’s interests and the child’s interests conflict, the child’s
interests prevail. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. We review a district court’s
best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).

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The district court determined “that the children’s need for safety and stability
outweighs any interest in main taining the parent-child bond.” The record supports this
determination. Although mother’s positive interaction with th e children during her visits
strengthens her interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, this interest is lessened
by the infrequency of her attendance at the scheduled visits. And her failure to adequately
end her drug problem weighs heavily against her. Mother had more than one year to address
the problems in her case plan and managed it in a way that left the district court reasonably
doubtful that she could attain long-term sobriety, secure st able housing, or maintain
sufficient employment. The children’s interests include being cared for by a sober parent
in a safe and stable environment, and the di strict court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that termination of parental rights serves the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.