State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1892

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed August 17, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-18-462

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Rebecca P. Wolters, Assistant County Attorney,
Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for violating predatory-offender
registration requirements, appellant Eric Wils on argues that (1) his convictions must be

2
reversed because he did not wa ive his right to a jury trial after respondent State of
Minnesota amended the complaint to add a se cond charge, and (2) the district court’s
findings of guilty were legally inconsistent because the district court found him guilty of
failing to register the same address as both a primary and a secondary address. We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
The facts, as established at a bench tria l, are as follows. In February 2018, a law
enforcement officer was traveling down Main Street in Cambridge and observed a white
Ford Expedition. The officer ran the Expe dition’s license plate and saw that it was
registered to an owner with a suspended driver’s license. Th e officer conducted a traffic
stop and identified the driver as Wilson. After speaking with Wilson, the officer noted from
electronically available records that Wilson was required to register as a predatory offender
until January 2021. The officer asked Wilson his address for the citation, and Wilson
provided an address in Cambridge. The addr ess on Wilson’s driver’s license and in the
records system did not match the Cambridge a ddress provided, so th e officer spoke with
Wilson about his registration requirements. Wilson expressed that he thought he had thirty
days to make the address change after moving, and the officer instructed him that he needed
to update his address with law enforcement right away.
After the traffic stop, the officer opened an investigation to monitor whether Wilson
updated his address. He began driving by the Cambridge address that Wilson had provided
to see how often Wilson was there. He obser ved the white Ford E xpedition, which was

3
registered to Wilson at a Minneapolis address, along with a red van that was registered to
Wilson at the Cambridge address, frequently pa rked at the home. He did not see Wilson
himself at the Cambridge address. Based on these observations, the officer requested a
packet of informatio n from the Minnesota Bu reau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) on
Wilson’s documentation related to his predat ory-offender registration requirements. A
form contained in the packet and signed by Wilson indicated that Wilson understood that
he needed to register all changes to his primary address five days prior to moving, and any
changes to places he stayed overnight on a regular or occasional basis within five days of
the change.
The officer also requested information from the postal service regarding Wilson. A
postal worker in Cambridge indicated that she began delivering mail to Wilson at the
Cambridge address in February 2018 and did so until June 2018, when the postal service
received a request indicating that mail for the “entire family” should be forwarded to a
Minneapolis address.
Based on this information, the state char ged Wilson in June 2018 with one count of
violating predatory-offender registration requirements under Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 5(a) (2016), specifically by failing to report a change to his primary address. A jury
trial was eventually scheduled for March 4, 2019. When the parties appeared on that date,
though, Wilson requested a court trial instead of a jury trial. The district court questioned
Wilson to ensure that his jury -trial waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The
district court granted the request and proposed that the bench trial be held the following

4
day. In discussing whether a next-day trial was feasible, Wilson’s counsel disclosed that
he had a statement from Wilson’s fiancé, who might be called as a witness, that he had not
yet provided to the state. The state indicated that it might need more time to prepare for the
trial based on the contents of the statement, but the parties agreed to move forward with
trial the next day and request a continuance if necessary.
After the March 4 hearing co ncluded, and on that same day, the state interviewed
Wilson’s fiancé and, after that, amended the complaint to add a second count. The second
count also charged Wilson with violating predatory-offender registration requirements
under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a), but it referenced the statutory requirement to
register not only primary but also secondary addresses.
1
When the parties appeared for trial on Ma rch 5, the district court asked whether
Wilson had received the amended complaint and reviewed it with counsel. Wilson’s
attorney responded, “Yup, I’ve had a chance to speak to him about that. We’ve gone over
a few different offers from the State somewhat based on that as well and we would like to
proceed to trial.” The district court then commenced the benc h trial, and the state called
two witnesses—the investigating officer and the postal service worker who delivered mail
to Wilson at the Cambridge address. Wilson di d not testify or call any witnesses. At the
end of the trial, the parties requested time to file written closing arguments and the district
court granted that request.

1 The probable-cause statement in the amended complaint indicates that Wilson’s fiancé
stated that Wilson would frequently spend the night at the Cambridge address, where she
resided, but that he would return to Minneapolis for work.

5
The district court found Wilson guilty of both counts. It late r adjudicated Wilson
guilty on both counts, sentencing him to 19 months’ imprisonment on count one but staying
execution. The district court did not impose a sentence for the seco nd count because the
parties agreed that it arose out of the “same behavioral incident” as the first.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court plainly erred by fa iling to obtain a renewed jury-trial waiver
after the state amended the complaint, bu t the error did not affect Wilson’s
substantial rights.

Wilson argues that both of his convictions must be reversed because he did not
waive his right to a jury trial after the state amended its complaint to add a second count of
violating predatory offender registration requirements.
The United States and Minnesota constitutio ns guarantee criminal defendants the
right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art.
1, §§ 4, 6. Defendants may waive their right to a jury trial if th e waiver is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Dettman , 719 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Minn. 2006). In
Minnesota, the defendant must personally waive the jury-trial right and the waiver must be
made either “in writing or on the record in open court,” only after the court has advised the
defendant of his right to a jury trial and th e defendant has had an opportunity to consult
with counsel. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, su bd. 1(2)(a). “[W]hen the State amends the
complaint after a defendant’s ju ry-trial waiver, the district court must obtain a renewed

6
waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial on the newly added charge.” State v. Little,
851 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Minn. 2014).
Wilson does not dispute that he initially made a valid wa iver of his right to a jury
trial on March 4, 2019. He contends that the district court erred when it did not obtain a
renewed waiver after the state amended its complaint to add a second count. The record
reflects that, although the district court asked Wilson’s attorney about the amended
complaint, Wilson did not make a personal waiver of his jury trial after the state amended
the complaint. Statements from counsel cannot constitute a valid waiver. See id. (rejecting
the state’s argument relying on a post-amendment statem ent by defense counsel and
emphasizing that the waiver must be provided by the defendant personally). Under Little,
the district court’s failure to obtain a rene wed waiver following the amended complaint
was an error. Id.2
Because the district court erred by failing to obtain a renewed jury-trial waiver, we
must next determine whether Wilson is entitled to relief. Wilson urges this court to apply
the structural-error standard of review and thereby automatically reverse both convictions,

2 It is unclear whether the state contests that an error occurred, or whether it argues only
that any error was not “plain.” The state argues that the controlling cases on amended
complaints without renewed jury-trial waiv ers “involve amendments that brought more
serious charges and penalties,” whereas, here , “the amended compla int merely added an
additional count that mirrored the original.” But the holding of Little is clear: “We therefore
expressly state what our previous case law makes obvious: when the State amends the
complaint after a defendant’s ju ry-trial waiver, the district court must obtain a renewed
waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury tr ial on the newly added charge.” 851 N.W.2d at
883. Thus, to the extent that the state argues that the relativ ely less serious nature of the
amendment to the complaint rendered a rene wed waiver unnecessary, we reject that
argument.

7
while the state argues that the plain-error sta ndard of review applies and the convictions
should stand. We begin by determining which standard applies.
A. The plain-error standard of review applies in this case.

“Generally, most constitutional errors are reviewed for harmless error.” State v.
Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. 2011). When an issue is not raised in the district
court, though, the issue is forfeited and appellate courts ordinarily review the forfeited issue
for plain error. State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649-50 (Minn. 2018). But “there are a
very limited class of errors, referred to as structural errors, that require automatic reversal
of a conviction.” Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 851 (quotation omitted).
Structural errors are “defects in the c onstitution of the trial mechanism, which defy
analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards beca use the entire conduct of the trial from
beginning to end is obviously affected.” State v. Dalbec , 800 N.W.2d 624, 627 (Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted). “In general, struct ural errors ‘necessarily render a trial
fundamentally unfair’ and ‘d eprive defendants of basic protections without which a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its functio n as a vehicle for dete rmination of guilt or
innocence.’” State v. Petersen, 933 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. App. 2019) (quoting Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1999)). Structural error has been
found in “a very limited class of cases.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117
S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997).3

3 Johnson provides a survey of these cases, which includes Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (constitutionally deficient reas onable-doubt instruction to
jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984) (denial of the right to a public

8
A trial error, on the other hand, “may be quantitatively assessed in the context of the
other evidence presented in order to dete rmine whether it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Colbert v. State , 870 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted). Generally, “it is the duty of a reviewin g court to consider th e trial record as a
whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
In Little, the supreme court expressly declined to consider whether forfeiture and
plain-error review categorically “apply to the requirement that defendants [must]
affirmatively waive their jury-trial rights. ” 851 N.W.2d at 883-84. The supreme court
determined that it need not resolve the question because, even under the plain-error
standard, Little was entitled to a new trial. Id. at 884.4 In analyzing whether the plain error
affected Little’s substantial rights, the supr eme court noted that the amended complaint
added a more serious charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, which significantly
increased Little’s sentencing exposure. Id. at 885. It also observed, based on statements
from both Little and his defense attorney, that Little may not have known about the new
charge at all before trial began . Id. In light of these facts, the supreme court determined

trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984) (denial of the right to self-
representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963) (a total
deprivation of the right to counsel); and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927)
(lack of an impartial trial judge). 520 U.S. at 469, 117 S. Ct. at 1549-50.

4 In an opinion concurring in pa rt and dissenting in part in Little, Justice Stras concluded
that failure to obtain a rene wed jury-trial waiver after an amended complaint is not
structural error, particularly because the impact of the error is not difficult to assess. Id. at
891-94 (Stras, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

9
that it could not “assume that Little and his counsel fully discussed the advantages and
disadvantages of waiving a jury trial.” Id. The supreme court concluded that the plain error
affected Little’s substantial rights, and went on to determine that reversal was required “to
ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 886.
In Kuhlmann, decided before Little, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the plain-
error standard of review when the district court failed to obtain the defendant’s personal
waiver of his jury-trial right on a single element of the offenses—the previous-conviction
element. 806 N.W.2d at 851-52. The charged o ffenses required the state to prove that
Kuhlmann had qualifying previous convictions, and Kuhlmann’s counsel stipulated that he
did. Id. at 847. The supreme court determined th at the district court erred by failing to
obtain Kuhlmann’s personal waiver of his jury -trial right as to the previous-conviction
element, but that the error was not structural. Id. at 852. It reasoned that Kuhlmann received
a jury trial on all other elements of the charged offenses, the trial would have proceeded in
“exactly the same manner” had the district court obtained a proper waiver, and the jury
would have received the same instructions. Id. The supreme court also noted that
Kuhlmann had never suggested th at he wanted to require the state to prove his prior
convictions to the jury. Id. The supreme court concluded that “the [district] court’s failure
to obtain a personal waiver in this case falls into the category of ‘trial errors’ occurring in
the prosecution of the case, rather than a defect in the constitution of the trial mechanism.”
Id.

10
Reviewing this case in light of that caselaw, we conclude that no structural error
occurred here. The record shows that Wilson was aware of the amendment to the complaint
and had discussed options in light of the amendment with his attorney. Like in Kuhlmann,
Wilson never suggested that he would like to have the second count tried to a jury, and the
trial proceeded in essentially the same manner that it would have had there been a valid
waiver. See id. at 851-52. The amendment in essence added a new theory of liability, as
the two counts charged violations of an id entical statutory provision, with the only
distinction being that one re garded a “primary” address and the other a “secondary”
address. We thus discern here no error “in the constitution of the trial mechanism,” id. at
852, and hold that the error in Wilson’s ca se falls into the trial-error category. We
accordingly turn to applying the plain-error standard of review.
B. Wilson is not entitled to relief und er the plain-error standard of review.

Under the plain-error standard of review , appellate courts determine whether there
was (1) an error (2) that was plain and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.
Id. If each of these prongs is satisfied, an a ppellate court may grant relief if it determines
that the error “seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id.
at 853.
As explained above, the district court’s fa ilure to obtain a renewed jury-trial waiver
from Wilson after the state amended its complaint was an error, satisfying the first prong.
Under the second prong, “[a]n e rror is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is typically
established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v.

11
Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). The rule from Little
necessitating a new waiver in this instance is clear, and the second prong is accordingly
satisfied.
With respect to the third prong, the s ubstantial-rights requirement, the defendant
“bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of
the error would have had a significant effect” on the proceeding. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d
24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); Little, 851 N.W.2d at 884. “An error affects
substantial rights if the error was prejudici al and affected the outcome of the case.”
Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 853.
In Little, the supreme court found that substa ntial rights were affected when the
newly added charge significantly increased the potential punishment and the record
suggested that the defendant did not know about the new charge before trial. 851 N.W.2d
at 884. Distinguishably here, the added charge represented, as the state explains in its
appellate brief, a “secondary theory of liability” under the same statutory provision as the
first charge. There was no risk of an increased punishment, as the defendant could not be
sentenced on both counts.5 Furthermore, the record shows that Wilson did know about the
amended complaint and that he and his attorney had discussed how to proceed in light of
the amendment. Even if the district court had followed the proper procedure under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a), of advising Wilson of his ri ght to a jury trial on the new

5 As explained in more detail below, the par ties and district court agreed, in regard to
sentencing, that the counts arose out of the same behavioral incident.

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charge and obtaining another waiver, nothing in the record sugges ts that Wilson would
have opted for a jury trial. We conclude that Wilson has not met his burden of showing a
reasonable likelihood that the absence of the waiver error would have had a significant
effect on the proceeding. See Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 38.
Even if the third prong were satisfied, t hough, we are not persuaded that this error
“seriously affect[ed] the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Kuhlmann, 806
N.W.2d at 853. The fairness-and-integrity prong is satisfied only “in those circumstances
in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519,
528 (Minn. 2016) (citations om itted). Wilson argues that the fairness and integrity of the
proceeding was affected because the state’s addition of a count “cau ght the defense flat-
footed and made Wilson’s chances of an acquittal through a court trial less likely.” But the
addition of a count based on failure to register a secondary address—which the state added
based on statements from Wilson’s own po tential witness—did not add a difficulty for
Wilson specific to a court trial. Regardless of the type of trial, the state had strong evidence
of Wilson’s failure to register the Cambridge address that Wilson did not rebut.
Again, the district court asked defens e counsel whether Wilson had received the
amended complaint, and counsel responded that he had, that they reviewed it together, that
they reviewed “a few different offers from th e State,” and that Wilson wished to proceed
with the scheduled bench tria l. The evidence that the st ate presented about Wilson’s
activity at the Cambridge address and his regi stration requirements appears to be almost
exactly the same evidence it would have presented absent the new count. Nothing suggests

13
that Wilson was unfairly surprised by the testimony and exhibits offered by the state. And
again, the new charge did not have the potential to increase the penalty Wilson faced, unlike
the charge in Little which was for a “much more serious offense.” 851 N.W.2d at 886.
In sum, we conclude that Wilson is not entitled to reversal of his convictions on the
basis that he did not again waive his right to a jury trial after the state amended the
complaint to add a second charge.
II. The district court’s findings of failing to register the same address as both a
primary and secondary address are legally inconsistent.

Wilson next argues that the district court’s two findings of guilt are legally
inconsistent. Whether verdicts are inconsistent is a legal question that appellate courts
review de novo. State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 325 (Minn. 2005).
“Nothing in the constitution re quires consistent verdicts.” Id. But while the
Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “logically inconsistent verdicts do not entitle
a defendant to a new trial,” it has revers ed convictions where the verdicts were legally
inconsistent. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989) (“Moore I”); see State v.
Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 94-95 (Minn. 1990) (“Moore II”) (reversing and remanding for a
new trial because guilty verdicts for both first-degree premeditated murder and second-
degree manslaughter were inconsistent). “Verdict s are legally inconsistent when proof of
the elements of one offense negates a necessary element of another offense.” State v. Cole,
542 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn.1996).

14
The district court found Wilson guilty of two counts of violating predatory-offender
registration requirements under Minn. Stat. § 2 43.166, subd. 5(a). Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 5(a), is the general penalty section of the registration statute and states:
A person required to register under [Minn. Stat. § 243.166]
who was given notice, knows, or reasonably should know of
the duty to register and who: (1) knowingly commits an act or
fails to fulfill a requirement that violates any provision of this
section . . . is guilty of a felony . . . .

The requirements of section 24 3.166 include that registrants “provide to the corrections
agent or law enforcement auth ority the following information: (1) the person’s primary
address; [and] (2) all of the person’s seco ndary addresses in Minnesota, including all
addresses used for residential or recreatio nal purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd.
4a(a)(1)-(2) (2016). In regards to primary addresses, the registration requirements specify
that, barring certain exceptions, “at least five days before the person starts living at a new
primary address . . . the person shall give written notice of the new primary address to the
assigned corrections agent or to the law en forcement authority w ith which the person
currently is registered.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b) (2016).
A “primary address” is statutorily define d as “the mailing address of the person’s
dwelling.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(g ) (2016). A “secondary address” is “the
mailing address of any place where the person regularly or occasionally stays overnight
when not staying at the person’s primary address.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(i)
(2016).

15
Wilson argues that the two guilty findings are legally inconsistent because the
definitions of “primary address” and “secondary address” exclude a finding that the same
address was both. He emphasizes that a secondary address is, by definition, a place a person
stays “when not staying at the person’s primary address.” Id.
The state argues that the evidence at tria l showed that Wilson used the residence and
that the “use could have been either as pr imary or secondary residence. The primary or
secondary status of a reside nce may be fungible depending on shifting circumstances.”
(Emphasis omitted.)
While there may be circumstances where the nature of an address is “fungible,” the
state did not prove that this was the case he re. The amended complaint contains the same
offense date, February 20, 2018, for both counts. And the parties agreed at sentencing that
the offenses arose out of the “same behavioral incident.” The district court’s findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order do not su ggest that the offenses occurred separately
when the nature of the address shifted; the district court merely concluded that the evidence
was sufficient to show that Wilson “knowingly violated the requirements of his predatory
offender registration by failing to register the [Cambridge address] as either a new primary
address or a secondary address.” (Emphasis added .) These circumstances, along with the
state’s evidence at trial and the parties’ post-trial written submissions, make clear that the
two counts were meant to reflect the same registration violation. Accordingly, we hold that
the district court made legally inconsistent findings of guilt because the same address
cannot, by statutory definition, be both a primary and secondary address, so “proof of the

16
elements of one offense negates a necessary element of another offense.” Cole, 542 N.W.2d
at 50.
Having determined that the findings of guilt are legally inconsistent, we must next
determine the relief to which Wilson is entitled. Wilson argues that, pursuant to State v.
Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1992) (“ Moore III”), we must reverse both convictions
because both verdicts are invalid. But a close reading of Moore III, in conjunction with the
cases that preceded it, persuades us that we need only reverse one conviction in this case.
In Moore II , the supreme court determined that jury verdicts for first-degree
premeditated murder and second-degree mans laughter were legally inconsistent and
accordingly reversed and remanded for a new trial. 458 N.W.2d at 94-95. In Moore III, the
appellant argued that the district court erred on remand by allowing retrial on charges other
than second-degree manslaughter. 481 N.W.2d at 359. The supreme court rejected that
argument, explaining that it did not intend to exonerate appellant of the more serious first-
degree murder charge:
To hold, as we did in [Moore II], that verdicts are legally
inconsistent is not to imply, as defendant seems to argue, that
conviction of the lesser offense necessarily implies reasonable
doubt about the defendant’s guilt of the greater offense. Rather
it is to recognize that the u nderlying factual findings upon
which the verdicts were made are invalid. Because no valid
verdict was returned, we remanded without limiting
instructions.

Id. The supreme court went on to note that a reason it remanded the case in the manner that
it did in Moore II was that Moore’s trial counsel had engaged in an unauthorized concession
of guilt on the second-degree manslaughter conviction. Id.; see Moore II, 458 N.W.2d at

17
95. The supreme court in Moore III then concluded, “We hold that legally inconsistent
guilty verdicts require reversal and, where the remand for a new trial is without express
instructions, the defendant may be retried on all charges.” 481 N.W.2d at 360. It is this
conclusion that Wilson re lies on to argue that both guilty verdicts in his case must be
reversed.
While the language of Moore III initially appears to support Wilson’s contention,
the context of the appeal persuades us that the supreme court was not prescribing the
necessary remedy for every case of legally inconsistent verdicts. Moore II supports this
conclusion because the supreme court there noted that the appellant was requesting either
a new trial or that the court reduce the conviction to second degree manslaughter. 458
N.W.2d at 95. In deciding which remedy to choose, the supreme court explained that, while
it “might be inclined to reduce the conviction . . . pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611.02 (1988),”
a new trial was the more appr opriate remedy under the ci rcumstances because Moore’s
trial counsel had improperly conceded his guilt on the second-degree manslaughter
conviction. Id.
Here, unlike in the Moore cases, Wilson’s convictions resulted from a bench trial,
not a jury trial. We thus have available to us the district court’s written factual findings to
examine in order to determine whether any conviction can be sustained. In Moore II, the
state of mind elements for first-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter were
inconsistent, 458 N.W.2d 90, so the jury’s verdicts necessarily depended on invalid factual
findings, Moore III, 481 N.W.2d at 359. Here, we can examine whether the district court’s

18
findings, absent the error, are sufficient to support one conviction of violating predatory-
offender registration requirements under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a).
The district court found, consistent with the record, th at Wilson gave the
investigating officer the Cambridge address at the February 2018 traffic stop. The officer
later observed vehicles register ed to Wilson at the Cambri dge address, and the postal
service delivered mail to Wilson at the Ca mbridge address for months. These findings
support the district court’s conclusion that Wilson failed to register the Cambridge address
as his primary address and are not rendered invalid by the inconsistent finding of guilt for
not registering a secondary address. We acco rdingly affirm Wilson’s conviction on count
one but vacate the conviction on count two because it is base d on the legally inconsistent
proposition that Wilson failed to register th e same Cambridge address as a secondary
address. We remand to the district court to correct the warrant of commitment accordingly.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.