Larry Demetrius Pearson,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1897

Ramsey County Gildea, C.J.

Larry Demetrius Pearson,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: July 29, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove He ights, Minnesota, for
appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, Saint
Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s third petition
for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

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O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
A Ramsey County jury found appellant Larry Demetrius Pearson guilty of first-
degree premeditated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm in connection with the
April 2006 death of Corodarl Merriman. We affirmed his convictions i n an appeal that
consolidated Pearson’s direct appeal and his appeal from the denial of his first
postconviction petition. State v. Pearson (Pearson I), 775 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Minn. 2009).
In 2017, w e affirmed the denial of Pearson’s second petition for postconviction relief .
Pearson v. State (Pearson II), 891 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. 2017). In 2019, Pearson filed
a third petition for postconviction relief, which is the petition at issue in this appeal.
Concluding that Pearson’s petition was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c)
(2018), the district court denied the petition without a hearing . Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS

At trial, the State proved that Pearson met Merriman’s brother on April 22, 2006, in
a parking lot while Merriman sat in a nearby van. When the meeting sparked an altercation,
Pearson fatally shot Merriman.1
Pearson was arrested the next day, and on April 25, 2 006, he was charged by
complaint with one count of second-degree intentional murder (“second-degree murder

1 The facts relating to Merriman’s murder and Pearson’s trial are detailed in
Pearson I, 775 N.W.2d at 158–59. We discuss here only those facts relevant to Pearson’s
third postconviction petition.

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case”). Although Pearson made a speedy trial demand o n May 15, 2006, he withdrew the
demand on June 28, 2006.
When the parties appeared for trial on August 28, 2006 , the Sta te requested a
continuance, explaining that it had discovered evidence that required further investigation.
The distr ict court judge denied the request and the second-degree murder case was
dismissed. The Minnesota Court Information S ystem entry for August 28, 2006, reads:
“DISM CHRGS PER PROS. MOTION, DEFT OR’D ON THIS . . . CH MATTER, DEFT
HAS A PAROLE HOLD AEJ.”
That same day , a warrant and complaint were issued for the arrest of Pearson
charging him with unlawful possession of a firearm (“firearm case”).2 Because Pearson
was still in custody, the warrant was recalled and a different district court judge set bail at
$50,000.
On November 15, 2006, a Ramsey County grand jury indicted Pearson for first-
degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2018), second-degree intentional
murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018), and second-degree attempted murder,
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), 609.17 (2018), for his involvement in the shooting
(“first-degree murder case”).3 Bail was set at $1,000,000.

2 The complaint alleged that Pearson unlawfully possessed a firearm on April 23,
2006, the day after Merriman’s death. The firearm case was dismissed after Pearson was
indicted for first-degree premeditated murder.

3 The indictment also alleged that on April 23, 2006, the day after Merriman’s death,
Pearson unlawfully possessed a firearm, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 (2018).

4
On December 19, 2006, the parties appeared before a different district court judge.
In arguing for bail, Pearson’s attorney referenced the August 2006 hearing that was held in
the second-degree murder case. More specifically, she said:
Just to give the Court a little background information on this case . . .
this case was set for j ury trial on August 28 of 2006 . . . and at that time the
defense was prepared and ready to proceed with trial that morning. It was
on that morning that the State . . . made a request to the Court that they
receive a continuance of that jury trial date, and that request was denied. At
that time the defense was still prepared to proceed to trial, and at that time
the State moved to dismiss the case.

The case was dismissed, and . . . we asked that, if this case were to be
charged at any point in the future, that it would be charged by summons and
complaint rather than a warrant, and [the judge] granted our request and
indicated that Mr. Pearson would be released on the matter , and any
proceedings that would follow would be issued by summons and complaint.

Unbeknownst to the defense and, I believe , also to [the judge], the
State either intended to file or had already filed [the complaint in the firearm
case] . . . so Mr. Pearson was never released from custody.

(Emphasis added.) In light of the release order that was issue d when the second -degree
murder case was dismissed in August 2006, Pearson’s attorney argued that the district court
should release Pearson on his own recognizance in the first-degree murder case. The State
argued that bail should remai n at $1,000,000. A s part of the State’s argument, the
prosecutor said:
I asked [the judge] for a continuance. He denied the motion for a
continuance, so I dismissed the case so that we could finish our investigation
based upon what we thought we had found at the crime sc ene and based on
what we saw in the van.

It was only after the case was dismissed that the defen se asked that
any recharge . . . be done by summons and complaint. I would submit to the
Court that a judge . . . lacks jurisdiction to order the State to d o anything in
a dismissed case.

5

(Emphasis added.) After considering the parties’ arguments, the district court ordered that
bail remain at $1,000,000.
Following a jury trial, the district court convicted Pearson of first -degree
premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1).4 The court sentenced Pearson to life in
prison without the possibility of release.
Pearson filed a direct appeal and a motion to stay the appeal to allow him to pursue
postconviction relief , which we granted. In his first petition for postconviction relief,
Pearson alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in part because she failed to fully pursue
the suppression of his videotaped statement to police and because she failed to cross -
examine Merriman’s brother about Merriman’s prior bad acts. The district court denied
the petition, and Pearson appealed. We consolidated Pearson’s appeals and later affirmed
his convictions and the district court’s denial of his first petition for postconviction relief.
Pearson I, 755 N.W.2d at 158.
Pearson filed a second petition for postconviction relief in December 2014. 5
Pearson II, 891 N.W.2d at 594. The district court denied the second postconviction
petition, and we affirmed. Id. at 593.

4 In addition, the district court convicted Pearson of unlawfully possessing a firearm
on the day after Merriman’s death and imposed a concurrent 60-month sentence.

5 In his petition, Pearson raised three primary claims. First, he contended that he had
newly discovered evidence, an affi davit signed by J.B., who claimed he witnessed the
shooting. Pearson II , 891 N.W.2d at 594. Second, he argued that “trial counsel was
ineffective when she advised him to decline a plea offer for second-degree murder.” Id. at
594–95. Third, he asserted that the attorney who represented him in his first postconviction

6
On June 11, 2019, Pearson filed a third postconviction petition , alleging that the
district court dismissed the second-degree murder case on August 28, 2006, because the
State violated his right to a speedy trial. 6 To support his allegation, Pearson submitted an
affidavit that described his recollection of the August hearing. 7 Pearson also relied on the
recollections of his cousins and the transcript of the December 2006 hearing. According
to Pearson and his cousins, the district court dismissed the second -degree murder case
because the State violated his right to a speedy trial. Based on his allegation that the district
court dismissed the second -degree murder case because the State violated his right to a
speedy trial, Pearson asserted three claims.
First, th e district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction over the first -degree
murder case because the second-degree murder case was dismissed based on a speedy trial
violation, and the dismissal order required that any future charges be filed by summons and
complaint. Second, appellate counsel was ineffective in the consolidated appeal when she
failed to orde r a transcript of the August 2006 hearing and challen ge the district court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction. Third, counsel was ineffective in the second postconviction
proceeding because he was unable to raise issues based upon the transcript of the August

proceeding was ineffective when she failed to call Merriman’s brother to establish a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and when she advised him to withdraw a conflict-
of-interest claim against his trial attorney. Id. at 595.

6 This allegation ignores the undisputed fact that Pearson waived his right to a speedy
trial on June 28, 2006.

7 It was no longer possible to order a transcript from the August 2006 hearing because,
under the relevant document retention policy, the court reporter destroyed her recording of
the hearing.

7
hearing. Acknowledging that the 2 -year statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(a) (2018), had expired, Pearson tried to invoke the interest s-of-justice exception,
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2018).
The district court denied the third postconviction petition w ithout a hearing.
According to the district court, Pearson’s attempt to invoke the interests -of-justice
exception was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), because his claims arose
more than 2 years before he filed the third petition in June 2019.8 The court explained that
Pearson’s claims for relief were not grounded in the existence, or lack, of a transcript.
Instead, his claims we re grounded in his assertion that the dismissal at the A ugust 2006
hearing somehow precluded his subsequent indict ment and conviction for the murder of
Merriman.
The district court determined that Pearson knew or should have known about his
first claim no later than December 19, 2006, when the parties discussed the impact, if any,
of the August 2006 dismissal of the second-degree murder case on the first-degree murder
case. As for his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in the consolidated appe al
when she failed to order a transcript of the August hearing , the district court determined
that Pearson knew or should have known about the claim no later than September 26, 2008,
when his first postconviction petition was denied. Finally , the district court determined
that Pearson knew or should have known about his third claim no later than April 2016,

8 The district court also concluded that Pearson’s claims were procedurally barred
under State v. Knaffla , 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 197 6). Because we conclude that the
claims are untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), we do not address whether they
are procedurally barred under Knaffla.

8
when his second postconviction petition was denied . Because Pearson filed his third
postconviction petition in June 2019, more than 3 years after the second postconviction
petition was denied, the district court concluded that Pearson’s attempt to invoke the
interests-of-justice exception was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) , and
denied Pearson’s petition. Pearson appeals.
ANALYSIS
Pearson argues that the district court erred in denying his petition. Under Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018), a person convicted o f a crime who claims that his or her
conviction was obtained in violation of a constitutional or statutory right may file a petition
for postconviction relief. The postconviction statute requires that petitions be filed within
2 years of the “appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2). The statute contains exceptions to the 2-year time bar, id.,
subd. 4(b), but “[a]ny petition invoking an exception . . . must be filed within two years of
the date the claim arises ,” id., subd. 4(c). The statute also requires that the d istrict court
hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records
of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). A district court accepts “the fac ts alleged in the petition as true
and construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner” to determine whether an
evidentiary hearing is required. Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017). We
review the denial of a postconviction petition for abuse of discretion and any issues of law
de novo. Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).

9
The district court determined that Pearson’s attempt to invoke the interests -of-
justice exception to the 2-year statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), was
untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). Pearson argues that the district court
abused its discretion, making two primary arguments. First, he argues that challenges to a
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction are never untimely. Second, he asserts that he did not
personally learn about any of his claims until January 11, 2018 , and therefore the
invocation of the interests-of-justice exception in his June 2019 petition for postconviction
relief was timely.9 We consider each argument in turn.
A.
The district court concluded that Pearson’s alleged subject-matter jurisdiction claim
was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (c). Pearson argues that a challenge to
subject-matter jurisdiction is never untimely , and therefore the district court abused its
discretion.

9 Pearson also argues that we should exercise our supervisory powers over the
administration of justice and grant a new trial based upon cumulative error. Because we
conclude that no cumulative error occurred, we will not do so . And while Pearson relies
on Vang v. State, 788 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 2010), and Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726
(Minn. 2011), to support his contention that we can reach the merits of his claim even if it
is untimely, these cases are inapposite. In Vang, we reviewed the convictions and sentences
of an indigent 14-year-old defendant. 788 N.W.2d at 113–15. Even though the claim was
untimely, because of the case’s “exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, we
exercise[d] our inherent authority to directly review the juvenile court’s actions.” Id. at
114–15. Similarly, in Montanaro, we reached the merits of a postconviction appeal that
was untimely under section 590.01 “for reasons of judicial economy.” 802 N.W.2d at 731–
32 (reaching the merits “without deciding that [the defendant] ha[d] satisfied one of the
time bar exceptions in [section 590.01]” ). Pearson has not shown that h is case is
exceptional like Vang or that it presents judicial economy concerns like Montanaro.

10
Even if Pearson is correct that challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction are never
untimely under the postconviction statute, his argument is unavailing because his allegation
cannot be viewed as one challenging the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the
first-degree murder case. Pearson’s claim is not that the district court lacked the power to
hear the criminal case ari sing from the death of Merriman. Rather, Pears on argues that ,
because the second -degree murder case was purportedly dismissed due to a speedy trial
violation, the later charges were improper. That is not a claim challenging the district
court’s power to hear the later-filed charges. See Reed, 793 N.W.2d at 731 (explaining that
challenges to subject -matter jurisdiction “relate to ‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the case ’ ” (quoting United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630
(2002))); see also Johnson v. State, 916 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2018) (“ A district court
has subject-matter jurisdiction to convict a defendant of all crimes cognizable under the
laws of the State of Minnesota. ”). Instead, it is a claim that the district court ought not to
have exercised its statutory or constitutional power based on the events that allegedly
occurred at the August 2006 hearing. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Pearson’s first claim was untimely.
B.
Next, Pearson argues that even if the alleged subject-matter jurisdiction claim could
be time-barred, the district court erred because Pearson did not personally learn that his
attorney failed to order a transcript of the August 2006 hearing until January 11, 2018.
Therefore, he asserts, his petition should have been heard under the interests -of-justice
exception, which provides that a court may hear an untimely petition when “the petitioner

11
establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the
interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). We disagree.
The interest s-of-justice exception in subdivision 4(b)(5) is subject to the 2-year
statute of limitations in M inn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d
550, 558 (Minn. 2012). Under subdivision 4(c), “[a]ny petition invoking [the interests-of-
justice exception] must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(c) . And such a claim accrues “based on an objective ‘knew or should
have known’ standard.” Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 558 (quoting D.M.S. v. Barber ,
645 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 2002)). It is not a “subjective, actual knowledge standard.”
Id. There is no question in this case that , under the objective standard, Pear son’s claims
arose more than 2 years before he brought them in June 2019.
In support of his third postconviction petition, P earson sign ed an affidavit that
alleged the following facts. He attended the August 2006 hearing. The district court
dismissed the charges because the court believed that the prosecution was trying to do “an
end-around” the legal process. He was then held on an illegal -possession-of-a-firearm
charge. A few months later, he was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder.
Even if we view these facts in a light most favorable to Pearson, he is conclusively
entitled to no relief . A person objectively should have known about the purported claim
no later than December 19, 2006 , when the parties discussed the impact, if any, of the
August 2006 dismissal of the second -degree murder case on the first -degree murder case.
As the district court ob served, the existence, or lack, of a transcript of the Augu st 2006
hearing did not preclude Pearson from raising his claim. See Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d

12
781, 788 (Minn. 2015) (explaining that the interests-of-justice exception “is triggered by
an injustice that caused the petitioner to miss the primary postconviction deadline, not the
substantive merits of the petition”).
We reach the same conclusion for Pearson’s claims that his appellate counsel was
ineffective both for the consolidated direct appeal and first postconviction petition and for
his second postconviction petition. As to his consolidated appeal, Pearson knew or should
have known about his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel no later than the
date of oral argument, which was May 12, 2009, because he would have known that
appellate counsel failed to make any argument based upon the August 2006 hearing.
As to his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on his second
postconviction appeal, Pearson knew or should have known about the claim no later than
September 15, 2016, the date that the reply brief was filed, because at that time it was clear
that appellate counsel did not raise the argument. 10 As with the first claim, the existence,
or lack, of a transcript of the August 2006 hearing did not preclude Pearson from raising
his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that Pearson’s attempt to invoke the interest s-of-justice exception was untimely under
section 590.01, subdivision 4(c).11

10 Pearson’s second postconviction appeal was heard on our nonoral calendar.
11 The State argues that Pearson’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
on his second postconviction appeal fail s as a matter of law because neither the United
States Constitution nor the Minnesota Constitution affords him effective assistance of

13
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.

Affirmed.

counsel on a second appeal. W e need not address that issue because the clai m is time -
barred.