The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the district court applied the statutory spousal-maintenance factors to the record evidence and acted within its discretion in setting the amount of spousal maintenance. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded wife $3,000 in monthly permanent spousal maintenance.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In re the Marriage of: Christine J. Curtis v. Gregory M. Curtis 887 N.W.2d 249
- Lee v. Lee 775 N.W.2d 631
- Marriage of Peterka v. Peterka 675 N.W.2d 353
- Marriage of Rask v. Rask 445 N.W.2d 849
- Marriage of Dobrin v. Dobrin 569 N.W.2d 199
- Marriage of Kampf v. Kampf 732 N.W.2d 630
- Vettleson v. Special School District No. 1 361 N.W.2d 425
- Marriage of Lyon v. Lyon 439 N.W.2d 18
- Marriage of Chamberlain v. Chamberlain 615 N.W.2d 405
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1899
In re the Marriage of:
Timothy John Goettl, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Tonna Lorraine Goettl,
Respondent.
Filed October 19, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge
Cook County District Court
File No. 16-FA-18-51
Tyson Smith, Nora Huxtable, Smith Law, PLLC, Grand Marais, Minnesota (for appellant)
Timothy A. Costley, Costley & Morris, P.C., Two Harbors, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Smith , Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
In an appeal from a judgment and decree granting dissolution after a 31 -year
marriage, a ppellant-husband challenges a district court ’s award of permanent spousal
maintenance in the amount of $3,000 a month. While appellant agrees that respondent-wife
2
is entitled to permanent spousal maintenance, he argues that the district court abused its
discretion because the amount of spousal maintenance awarded is “in excess of its finding
of [respondent’s] reasonable needs.” We conclude that the district court applied the
statutory spousal-maintenance factors to the record evidence and acted within its discretion
in setting the amount of spousal maintenance. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Timothy John Goettl and respondent Tonna Lorraine Goettl married in
December 1987. The parties lived together in a home they owned in Lutsen. On March 5,
2018, husband petitioned for dissolution. The parties do not have joint minor children.
The district court’s temporary order provides context for its subsequent permanent
spousal-maintenance decision. Wife moved the district court for temporary relief under
Minn. Stat. § 518.131 (2018), requesting that husband pay $25,000 for her attorney fees
and temporary maintenance of $4,000 a month. Wife also asked for temporary possession
of the parties’ marital home , to which the h usband agreed, but he opposed wife’s other
requests. After a hearing, the district court awarded wife $1,257 per month in temporary
spousal maintenance, but denied wife’s request for husband to pay her attorney fees.
The parties agreed on many issues, including the division of all marital property and
debt. The parties stipulated that wife would receive : the homestead valued at $275,000,
husband’s investment accounts, her own investment accounts, her personal checking and
savings accounts, the parties’ joint investment account, the parties’ join t checking and
savings accounts, two snowmobiles, a snowmobile trailer, and a four-wheeler. The parties
stipulated that husband would receive : the parties’ interest in two business es (plumbing
3
and real estate) that the parties owned with husband’s brother, the parties’ timeshare
property (after paying wife $5,000 for h er marital share of this asset), a snowmobile, a
canoe, a trailer, his personal savings and checking accounts , and the parties’ joint health
savings account. The parties also agreed that they would keep their respective vehicles and
their respective credit card debt. Lastly, husband agreed to pay wife an equity -balancing
payment of $35,000 within 60 days of the district court’s dissolution order.
But the parties did not agree on spousal maintena nce. During the trial, h usband,
wife, and husband’s brother testified. Husband and his brother are partners, as mentioned
above, and husband’s brother testified about the businesses. The district court received 24
exhibits, including tax returns and financial documents for the two businesses; an appraisal
of the marital home; the parties’ tax returns; statements for various investment, checking,
and savings accounts; and credit card statements.
The district court issued written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order
for judgment and decree. The district court first found that wife was “unable to provide
adequate self- support, after considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances,” and therefore concluded that spousal
maintenance was appropriate under Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2018).
More specifically , the district court determined that wife would not “be able to
provide adequate self-care through appropriate employment.” The district court found that
wife received a high school diploma, worked part -time during the marriage as a server,
housekeeper, and certified nursing assistant, and also was a stay-at-home parent taking care
of their home and children from previous marriages. The district court determined that
4
“wife’s age and lack of advanced training or education ” contributed to her inability to
support herself. The district court also found that the partie s “maintained a middle to
upper-middle class standard of living” during the marriage. The parties paid their bills on
time, “did not incur mortgage debt,” and “[t]he parties generally purchased items that they
wanted, but did not spend past what their income allowed.” The parties vacationed and
went on yearly cruises, travel led to casinos on weekends, and paid their adult children’s
expenses at times.
Next, the district court analyzed the eight nonexclusive factors provided in Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018), to determine the amount and duration of maintenance. On
the first factor, wife’s financial resources, the district court found that wife’s reasonable
monthly expenses are $3,696, which it reduced from her claimed expenses of $4,926. The
district court rejected or reduced wife’s monthly budget for food , internet, uninsu red
medical expenses, health insurance, and home heating costs.
The district court found that wife is currently unemployed, but that she earned
$2,004.17 per month in her last job as a housekeeper. The court found that wife quit
housekeeping because “she believed it was too physically demanding,” and wife credibly
testified that “she has not looked for jobs since December 2018.” The court also stated that
wife did not explain why she could not work, so it imputed $2,004.17 of income to her
based on her earnings history.
The district court recognized that wife received “significant assets” by stipulation,
including the parties’ home unencumbered by a mortgage, her vehicle unencumbered
by a loan, the parties’ retirement accounts, and a $35,000 equaliz ation payment. After
5
considering wife’s budget, imputed income, and assets, the district court determined wife
is unable to meet her own needs “without some level of financial assistance.”
On the second factor, wife’s education or training, the district court found that wife
was 54-years old, earned a high school diploma, and received training as a certified nursing
assistant, but also found the training had “likely expired” and wife had no other training or
education. The court also noted that employment opportunities are limited in the Cook
County area, and therefore found wife can become “partially self-supporting.” On the third
factor, marital standard of living , the court found that the pa rties lived a middle to
upper-middle class lifestyle and relied on its earlier findings. On the fourth factor, marriage
duration and wife’s absence from employment, the court found that wife was “primarily a
homemaker” but also worked part-time so “she was not absent from” the service industry.
On the fifth factor, wife’s forgone employment opportunities, the district court found
that wife worked during the marriage, but “gave up the opportunity to pursue a career
separate from jobs in the service industry” becau se she took care of their children. The
court also found that wife voluntarily left her position as a certified nurs ing assistant and
its “likely” retirement benefits. On the sixth factor, wife’s age and emotional/physical
condition, the court found wife was in good condition, but noted that she testified working
as a housekeeper was “too physical for her current age and health.”
On the seventh factor, husband’s ability to pay maintenance and meet his own
needs, the district court found that husband’s reasonable monthly expenses are $3,912 per
month, his monthly income is $10,557, and he has the ability to pay his own expenses and
spousal maintenance in the amount of $3,000 per month. Lastly, on the eighth factor, each
6
party’s contribution to marital property , the court found husband helped establish two
businesses and wife contributed to husband’s efforts in her work as a homemaker and
through part-time jobs.
Based on the record evidence and its analysis of the statutory factors, the district
court awarded wife $3,000 in monthly permanent spousal main tenance. The district court
left open the parties’ ability to pursue modification in the future , because both parties are
near retirement and expect a change in income.
Husband moved for amended findings and asked the district court to reduce the
permanent spousal-maintenance award. Husband argued that the maintenance award
exceeded wife’s need, and should be reduced to $1,691.83, the difference between wife’s
imputed income and her approved budget. Wife argued that the record supports the amount
of maintenance awarded. After a hearing, the district court issued additional findings of
fact and conclusions of law, but denied husband’s request to reduce the amount of
maintenance.
The district court’s amended findings stated that a “purely mathematical calculation
would dictate maintenance” in the “precise amount” of the difference between wife’s
imputed income and her expenses, or $1,691.83. B ut the district court was troubled that
this calculation would create a “disparity in disposable income” that does not “continue the
standard of living enjoyed by both parties during the marriage.” The district court observed
that husband’s proposed maintenance award would yield $4,953.17 for him in “surplus
income each month” after considering husband’s expenses, while wife would have “just
enough to meet her expenses under a fixed budget.”
7
Returning to the parties’ marital standard of living, the district court found that the
parties “bought what they needed, paid off their credit card bills each month, and had plenty
of disposable income for entertainment and travel.” The district court described their
marital standard of living as “having sufficient money to do what they wanted to do, with
money left over at the end of the month.” And t he district court found that “many” of the
parties’ expenditures “do not lend themselve s to rigid budget line items.” On the other
hand, the district court found that if it reduced the amount of spousal maintenance, “only
[husband] would mainta in [the marital ] lifestyle post -dissolution.” The district court
determined that would yield “an unjust result in this case.”
The district court also found that husband has the ability to pay the maintenance
award, his own expenses, and maintain the marital standard of living for both parties. The
district court concluded that an award of $3,000 per month in permanent spousal
maintenance was appropriate based on all relevant factors.
Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Spousal maintenance is “an award made in a dissolution or legal separation
proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support
and maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2018). A district court may
award maintenance to a party who shows a need for maint enance under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 1 (2018), and associated caselaw. Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 251
(Minn. 2016).
8
If a party shows a need for maintenance, the district court may award maintenance
in an amount and for a duration it deems “just” after considering “all relevant factors,”
including those listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018). See Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at
251; see also Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (2018) (addressing when a maintenance award
“shall” be permanent).
The maintenance “to which a [maintenance recipient] is entitled is not simply [the
amount] which will supply her with the bare necessities of life. Rather, the [maintenance
recipient] can expect a sum that will keep with the circumstances and living standards of
the parties at the time of the divorce.” Lee v. Lee , 775 N.W.2d 631, 642 (Minn. 2009)
(quotations omitted); see Peterka v. Peterka , 675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. App. 2004)
(stating that the purpose of a maintenance award “is to allow the recipient and the obli gor
to have a standard of living that approximates the marital standard of living, as closely as
is equitable under the circumstances”). When addressing the amount of a maintenance
award, “[n]o single statutory factor is controlling and each case must be determined on its
own facts.” Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. App. 1989).
District courts have “broad discretion” when addressing maintenance, and appellate
courts review a district court’s decision on maintenance for abuse of that discretion. Dobrin
v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). A district court abuses its discretion if it
misapplies the law, makes findings unsupported by the record, or resolves the matter in a
manner that is “against logic and the facts on record.” Id. Appellate courts review a district
court’s findings of fact for clear error. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. A finding is clearly erroneous
if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by
9
the evidence as a whole.” Kampf v. Kampf , 732 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007).
The parties agree that wife is entitled to permanent maintenance. But husband
challenges the amount of maintenance and argues that (a) the award of $3,000 in monthly
maintenance is excessive because it is more than the difference between the income the
district court imputed to wife and the sum of her monthly line-item budget; (b) the district
court’s finding of wife’s line-item budget must be affirmed; (c) the district court mistakenly
concluded that the marital standard of living means maintenance should include “extra
income available at the end of the month”; and (d ) “the district court improperly focused
on [husband’s] ability to pay.” We discuss each argument in turn.
A. Maintenance exceeding the difference between wife’s budget and
her imputed income
The district court found that the line-item expenses in wife’s monthly budget totaled
$3,696, imputed monthly income to wife of $2,004.17, and awarded her $3,000 in monthly
maintenance. Husband argues that this maintenance award is excessive because it leaves
wife with a $1,308.17 monthl y surplus after paying the line -item expenses in her budget.
On this record, we reject husband’s argument.
The district court noted that this is not the typical case: “More often than not, there
is not enough money to cover all the parties’ expenses once the parties separate into two
households, and determining a maintenance amount becomes a difficult exercise of
slashing proposed budgets. This case is in the fortunate minority. The parties’ marital estate
was substantial, as is [husband’s] income.”
10
In his posttrial motion, husband argued that the maintenance award was excessive
because it was more than the difference between what the district court found to be the sum
of the line-item expenses in wife’s budget, and the income it imputed to her. The district
court rejected husband’s argument, stating, among other things, that the parti es’ marital
standard of living historically “included money left over each month,” and that the
expenditures made by these parties “do not lend themselves to rigid budget line items.”
In other words, while the district court redu ced some of wife’s claimed line -item
expenses, it also functionally found both that the categories represented by those line items
did not account for all the parties’ spending, and that their spending did not account for all
of their income. Thus, the district court implicitly found that the monthly expenses
necessary to allow wife to approximate the marital standard of living exceeded the sum of
the line-item expenses in her budget.
Here, mechanically using the line items in wife’s budget to calculate a hard cap on
the amount of maintenance to be awarded to her would be dubious because it would require
a maintenance award inconsistent with the purpose of maintenance as described in Lee and
Peterka. See, e.g., Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 642 (holding that a maintenance recipient “can
expect a sum that will keep with the circumstances and living standards of the parties at
the time of the divorce ”) (quotations omitted); see also Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 358. The
district court recognized this in its order denying husband’s posttrial motion, stating that
reducing wife’s maintenance award to match the difference between the sum of her
line-item expenses and the income imputed to her would be “unjust,” would fail to
11
“continue the standard of living enjoyed by both parties during the marriage,” and would
allow “only [husband]” to “maintain [the marital] lifestyle post-dissolution.”
While the district court’s decision to set maintenance in an amount greater than the
difference between wife’s imputed income and the sum of the line -item expenses in her
budget may have been atypical, this is an atypical case. And the district court’s decision
accords with both the purpose of a maintenance award and the district court’s explanation
of its decision. Critically, the district court’s explanation of its decision is fully supported
by the record. Thus, in this unusual case, husband has not shown that the district court
awarded wife excessive maintenance simply because he has shown that the award is more
than the difference between wife’s imputed income and the sum of the line-item expenses
in her budget.
B. Wife’s monthly budget
Husband notes that the line -item expenses in wife’s budget include “discretionary
expense categories ” such as “entertainment/dining out,” “recreation/travel,” gifts, a
personal allowance, and charitable donations, and asserts that these expenses are
reasonable “in light of the standard of living.” He argues that because wife’s line -item
expenses already “include[d] discretionary expenditures” and was “proper in light of the
parties’ marital standard of living,” it “must be upheld.” Wife did not file a notice of related
appeal to challenge the district court’s findings of her expenses. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
103.02, sub. 2; 104.01, subd. 4; 106 (addressing a respondent’s ability to obtain review of
a district court’s ruling adverse to that respondent). For that reason, we read husband’s
argument to challenge the district court’s implicit finding that wife’s line-item expenses do
12
not fully reflect the expenses necessary to allow her to approximate the marital standard of
living. Implicit findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See Vettleson v. Special Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 361 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. App. 1985).
The district court found that
the parties bought what they needed, paid off their credit card
bills each month, and had plenty of disposable income for
entertainment and travel. Many of those expenditures do not
lend themselves to rigid budget line items. Instead, the parties’
standard of living can best be described as having sufficient
money to do what they wanted to do, with money left over at
the end of the month.
Husband seeks to have this finding affirmed; therefore, he is not disputing that the marital
standard of living included the parties having “money left over at the end of the month.”
The disposition, during the marriage, of the money left over at the end of the month, is less
than clear. We note, however, that the district court was understandably concerned about
the parties’ future retirements, and that the line items in wife’s budget do not include
retirement savings. Whatever happened to the money left over at the end of the month,
limiting wife’s expenses to only the line items in her budget would understate the marital
standard of living by omitting those unspent amounts. For that reason, the district court’s
implicit determination that the line items in wife’s budget do not accurately represent the
marital standard of living is not clearly erroneous. As the district court noted in its order
denying husband’s posttrial motion, if it adopted husband’s position on this point, “only
[husband] would maintain [the marital] lifestyle post-dissolution. [Wife] would not.”
13
C. Extra income
Husband asserts that courts award maintenance to “meet need,” and that “[m]oney
‘left over’ is money not needed.” So, he contends, the district court’s award to wife of more
maintenance than she needs to meet the line -item expenses in her budget stems from the
flawed rationale that “the marital standard of living require[d] [wife] to have extra income
available at the end of the month.”
Husband relies on Lyon v. Lyon , to assert that “[m]oney ‘left over’ is money not
needed.” 439 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. 1989). Lyon held that “because maintenance is awarded
to meet need, maintenance depends on a showing of need.” Id. at 22. But Lyon offers
limited guidance on setting the amount of a maintenance award. In Lyon, the supreme court
reversed a maintenance award, ruling that the income the maintenance recipient would earn
from her property award was sufficient to meet her needs and, as a result, she did not need
any maintenance. Id. That is not the case here; these parties agree that wife needs
permanent maintenance.
While husband acknowledges that a maintenance award to “pay for luxury or
discretionary expenses is permissible when warranted by the standard of living,” he argues
that awarding maintenance “simply for the sake of providing a party extra income is not.”
Husband’s argument misses the mark. A district court determines need at the marital
standard of living. Peterka , 675 N.W.2d at 358; see Chamberlain v. Chamberlain ,
615 N.W.2d 405, 410 -122 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing the importance of the marital
standard of living in setting a maintenance award), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000).
Here, husband does not dispute the district court’s finding that the parties’ marital standard
14
of living included significant disposable income for discretionary expenditures. The district
court determined the amount of maintenance to meet the wife’s needs at the parties’ marital
standard of living and did not award income simply “for the sake of providing a party extra
income,” as husband contends. We discern no abuse of discretion.
D. Husband’s ability to pay
The district court found that “even after paying the Court’s award of $3,000 per
month and his own expenses, [husband] will still have nearly triple the disposable income
each month of [wife] ($3,645 to $1 ,308).” Husband argues that this facet of the district
court’s ruling shows that it “focused too heavily on [his] ability to pay” in justifying its
maintenance award. On this record, we disagree.
The dissolution judgment contains four singled -spaced pages systematically
addressing, in detail, each of the statutory maintenance factors listed in Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2. Husband’s income was a consideration in the district court’s analysis
of those factors, as were, among other things, wife’s ability to earn an income, the parties’
expenses, and the marital standard of living.
Husband is correct that the district court found he would have “nearly triple the
disposable income” of wife after paying the $3,000 maintenance award. The district court
also found that husband ha s the ability to pay the maintenance award, while meeting his
own needs and “maintain[ing] the standard of living from du ring the marriage.” Reading
the district court’s findings as a whole, we cannot avoid the conclusion that it considere d
all relevant factors—including husband’s income and his own needs —when it set wife’s
maintenance award.
15
Finally, husband contends that the maintenance award “equalize[d]” the parties’
incomes. Wife responds by noting that the district court did not try t o equalize income,
pointing out that, as a matter of arithmetic, she receives only 26% of the parties’ monthly
total disposable income. Without more, we must agree with wife that this maintenance
award was neither intended to nor actually did “equalize” the parties’ incomes.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it awarded wife $3,000 in monthly permanent spousal maintenance.
Affirmed.