In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. A. J. and A. J. H., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1901

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. A. J. and A. J. H., Parents.

Filed April 20, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-JV-19-127

Scott Lee Nokes, Glencoe Law Office, Glencoe, Minnesota (for appellant mother J.A.J.)

Amy E. Olson, Assistant McLeod County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent
McLeod County Social Services)

Erica Mendez, Gaylord, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
The district court terminated a woman’s parental rights to her four-year-old child.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
mother and the child. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that
the county made such efforts. Therefore, we affirm.

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FACTS
The appellant, J.A.J., is the mother of a girl, K.L.H., who was born in 20 15.
K.L.H.’s father is A.J.H. J.A.J. has two older children from a previous relationship, T.R.E.
and T.M.E. The parental rights to T.R.E. and T.M.E. are not at issue in this appeal.
A. Carver County CHIPS Case
This appeal arises from judicial proceedings in McLeod County, but the relevant
background includes prior administrative and judicial proceedings in Carve r County,
which were based on four reports that J.A.J. neglected her children.
First, in June 2016, Carver County received a report that J.A.J. and A.J.H. had used
marijuana in the presence of T.R.E., T.M.E., and K.L.H. and had locked the children in a
bedroom. Second, in March 2017, Carver County received a report that T.R.E., who then
was eight years old, was providing care for her younger siblings and that J.A.J. and A.J.H.
repeatedly had locked themselves in their own bedroom . Third, in April 2017, a school-
van driver reported that T.M.E., who then was five years old, was underdressed and
unsupervised. Fourth, in June 2017, a passerby called police after finding that K.L.H., who
then was two years old, was wandering alone in the middle of an intersection.
In response to these incidents, Carver County filed a petition in August 2017 to
adjudicate the children as being in need of protection and services. Carver County also
brought an ex parte motion for immediate custody. The district court granted the motion,
and the children were removed from J.A.J. and A.J.H.’s care. Shortly thereafter, both J.A.J.
and A.J.H. tested positive for methamphetamine. J.A.J. completed a chemical-dependency
assessment, which did not result in a finding of chemical dependency or abuse but led to a

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recommendation that she abstain from non -prescribed controlled substances and comply
with her child -protection case plan. In October 2017 , an independent clinical social
worker, Deena McMahon, completed a court -ordered parenting assessment of J.A.J.
McMahon recommended that J.A.J. work with a therapist to address her mental-health and
chemical-use issues as well as her parenting skills.
J.A.J. successfully completed her case plan, and the Carver County CHIPS case was
closed by agreement of the parties in August 2018. J.A.J. and A.J.H. moved to McLeod
County with K.L.H. T.R.E. and T.M.E. began living with their father , J.A.J.’s former
husband, on a full-time basis.
B. McLeod County CHIPS Case
In late 2018, McLeod County ( hereinafter “the county”) received two reports of
child neglect by J.A.J. First, on December 4, 2018, it was reported that K.L.H. had caused
a bathtub to overflow while J.A.J. slept and while T.M.E. and T.R.E. were present. A
social worker and a police officer spoke with J.A.J. and the older children and determined
that J.A.J. had slept through breakfast and lunch on th at day. Second, on December 26,
2018, it was reported that J.A.J. and A.J.H. were using and selling methamphetamine. A
social worker and a police officer visited J.A.J.’s home two days later, at which time J.A.J.
agreed to submit to a urinalysis. On January 4, 2019, the urinalysis indicated a positive
result for methamphetami ne. The county placed all three children on an emergency
72-hour hold. T.M.E. and T.R.E. were placed with their father. J.A.J. absconded with
K.L.H. The county tracked J.A.J.’s cellphone to a motel in Sibley County, where a police

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officer found J.A.J. and K.L.H. K.L.H. was returned to McLeod Count y and placed in a
foster home.
On January 7, 2019, the county filed a petition to adjudicate the three children as
being in need of protection and services. On the same date, the county filed a motion for
emergency protective care. The district court granted the motion and ordered that K.L.H.
be placed in foster care.
On January 28, 2019, a county social worker conducted a chemical -dependency
assessment, concluded that J.A.J. met the criteria for a mild alcohol -use disorder , and
recommended, among other things, that J.A.J. attend an inpatient treatment program at
Wellcome Manor and abstain from all mood-altering chemicals, including alcohol. J.A.J.
entered inpatient treatment at Wellcome Manor on February 11, 2019, and tested positive
for methamphetamine at intake. It appears from the record that Wellcome Manor was
selected as a treatment provider because the facility would allow K.L.H. to live with J.A.J.
there. J.A.J. expected K.L.H. to join her at Wellcome Manor and repeatedly asked the
county when she would be placed at the facility. But the county did not place K.L.H. with
J.A.J. at Wellcome Manor . The record does not indicate whether J.A.J. ever asked the
district court to order such a placement. While at Wellcome Manor, J.A.J. was diagnosed
with severe alcohol -use disorder. She remained at Wellcome Manor until she was
discharged on June 25, 2019, more than four months after intake, with a recommendation
that she complete int ensive outpatient chemical -dependency treatment and continu e to
attend individual therapy.

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The district court conducted a review hearing on February 19, 2019, and a settlement
conference on March 11, 2019. At the latter hearing, J.A.J. admitted the allegations of the
CHIPS petition. On March 15, 2019, the district court adjudicated K.L.H. and her two
siblings as children in need of protection or services.
J.A.J.’s first out-of-home placement plan is dated March 19, 2019, and was signed
by J.A.J. on the following day. Th is case plan was filed with the district court
approximately one month later, on April 17, 2019. The county filed five additional case
plans with the district court on September 18, 2019. It appears that the district court never
expressly approved any of the case plans. Only two of the five case plans are in the
appellate record, and neither was signed by K.L.H.’s guardian ad litem.
On April 5, 2019, McMahon, who had assessed J.A.J’s parenting skills in Carver
County, completed a new court-ordered parenting assessment of J.A.J. McMahon’s written
report notes that J.A.J. hoped to have K.L.H. join her at Wellcome Manor. But the report
states that McMahon and J.A.J. “discussed that the transient population at Wellcome
Manor would be confusing to [K.L.H.] and that she could struggle as people transitioned
in and out of the program.” McMahon also noted that J.A.J. “seemed to understand that
constantly having so many other women around full -time would not be in [K.L.H.’s] best
interests, given her age.” McMahon’s report concludes that “very little has changed since
J.A.J.’s October 2017 parenting assessment” and that “[t]he behavior patterns she exhibited
during this current case are completely consistent with [J.A.J.]’s prior child protection
case.” McMahon perceived that J.A.J. had not accepted the results of her chemical -
dependency assessment. McMahon’s report also states, “ [J.A.J.] does not demonstrate

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much improvement in her parenting skills,” “has very little ins ight into how her parenting
impacts her daughter,” and “is not an attuned or insightful parent.” McMahon’s report
further observed, “In [J.A.J.’s] October 2017 assessment, the recommendations reflected
hopefulness that she would be able to make and sustai n the necessary changes to become
a safe and stable mother ” but that “[o] ffering the same recommendations to address the
very same deficits just 19 months later seems futile.” McMahon recommended that
“[p]ermanency for [K.L.H.] should be established outsi de of [J.A.J.]’s custody as soon as
possible,” that J.A.J.’s visits with K.L.H. at Wellcome Manor should be supervised, and
that J.A.J. should continue to work on her chemical-dependency and mental-health issues.
McMahon also recommended that, after “permanency for [K.L.H.] is established,” J.A.J.’s
contact with K.L.H. should be “at the discretion of [ K.L.H.’s] adoptive parents” and only
so long as J.A.J. remains sober.
C. McLeod County TPR Case
On June 17, 2019, the county petitioned to terminate J.A.J.’s and A.J.H.’s parental
rights on three grounds: (1) that J.A.J. and A.J.H. substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with their parental duties; (2) that J.A.J. and A.J.H. are
palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship; and (3) that reasonable efforts
have failed to correct the conditions leading to K.L.H.’s out-of-home placement. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5) (2018).
The district court conducted a review hearing in the CHIPS case the following day.
In an order filed after the review hearing, the district court found that the county “has made
reasonable efforts to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for removal” and that the

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county “has exercised due diligence in providing appropriate and available services to meet
the needs of the children and the family.”
The district court conducted two additional review hearings in July and August of
2019. In an order filed after the July review hearing, the district court found that J.A.J. “is
compliant with her case plan.” At the July review hearing, J.A.J. requested a second
parenting assessment by a different evaluator. T wo weeks later, on July 31, 2019, t he
district court filed an order in which it denied J.A.J.’s request but ordered an updated
assessment by McMahon.
McMahon completed an updated parenting assessment of J.A.J. on September 10,
2019. This assessment was based on McMahon’s observations of K.L.H. with J.A.J. and
K.L.H. with her foster mother, interviews of J.A.J. and K.L.H.’s foster mother, and a
review of reports prepared by a pediatric therapist. McMahon noted that K.L.H. engaged
in numerous regressive behaviors before, during, and after visits with J.A.J. McMahon
determined that J.A.J.’s parenting skills have improved, that her lifestyle is more stable,
that she is “sincere in her desire to remain sober and to be a full -time parent to her
daughter,” and that she has “ successfully completed her case plan.” But McMahon
concluded that K.L.H. “has negative and traumatic embedded memories of her mother and
of their life together” and that “[r]eturning [ K.L.H.] to [J.A.J.]’s custody would force
[K.L.H.] to live in a situation where she would be almost constantly emotionally
dysregulated,” which “would undermine every aspect of her development” and “impair her
ability to attach to [J.A.J.].” McMahon noted, “Timelines for permanency have already
exceeded statute. Adding another six months to the out of home case plan would not be in

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[K.L.H.’s] best interest.” McMahon recommended that K.L.H. “be allowed to remain in
her current home for adoption,” that she “work with therapeutic supports on a regular basis
to address past trauma and the impact it has had on her life.” McMahon also recommended
that a “closure session” between K.L.H. and J.A.J. be “therapeutically guided” and that
“[a]ny future contact between [J.A.J.] and [K.L.H.] needs be based on what is in [K.L.H.]’s
best interests.”
On September 16, 2019, J.A.J.’s outpatient chemical -dependency treatment
provider wrote a letter to the district court, stating that J.A.J. had “demonstrated significant
internal motivation for change,” “regularly attended recovery -based self -help support
groups and [met] with her sponsor,” and consistently passed randomized drug tests. The
provider also reported that J.A.J. had attended individual therapy sessions and
demonstrated “insight and meaningful change . . . beyond that of the ability of most
individuals served at this agency.”
At the next review hearing on September 17, 2019, the county requested that J.A.J.’s
supervised visits with K.L.H. be suspended on the ground that K.L.H. “continues to suffer
from significant emotional and behavioral issues as a result of contact with” J.A.J. In an
order filed aft er the review hearing, t he district court granted the county’s request and
suspended J.A.J.’s visits “until further order of the Court.”
The permanency case was tried on three days in October 2019. The district court
heard testimony from nine witnesses. On November 13, 2019, the district court filed a 26-
page order in which it found that the county had proved all three of the alleged grounds.
The district court also found that the county had made reasonable efforts to reunite J.A.J.

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with K.L.H. and that terminating J.A.J.’s parental rights is in K.L.H.’s best interests. The
district court also terminated the parental rights of A.J.H., who had failed to appear for trial
after lunch on the first day of trial. J.A.J. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
J.A.J. argues that the district court erred by granting the county’s petition to
terminate her parental rights . Specifically, J.A.J. argues that the district court erred by
finding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite her with K.L.H.
After a CHIPS adjudication, a county social services agency must make “reasonable
efforts . . . to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for removal and to reunite the
child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018).
Reasonable efforts “are always required,” subject to a few exceptions. Id. For example,
reasonable efforts are not required if they would be “futile and therefore unreasonable
under the circumstances.” Id. (a)(7). In determining whether a county has made reasonable
efforts, a district court shall consider whether the services offered by the county were
“(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Id. (h). “Reasonable efforts at
rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real,
genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App.
2007) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007).
Unless an exception exists, a district court may not terminate parental rights without
finding that the county made reasonable efforts to “finalize the permanency plan to reunify”

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the family and without making “individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature
and extent” of the county’s efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8; see also In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn.
2005). This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district court’s finding that
a county made reasonable efforts at reunification. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. ,
744 N.W.2d 381, 385, 387 (Minn. 2008).
J.A.J.’s appellate brief identifies three specific issues. We construe her statement
of the legal issues as a three-part argument. We address each argument in turn.
A.
J.A.J. first argues that she should have been given the opportunity to engage in
parent-child therapy with K.L.H., which she asserts would have been reasonable even
though the statutory permanency timelines had passed. J.A.J. states that McMahon “opined
that parent -child therapy could perhaps address the disco nnect between mother and
daughter, but it would take extensive work and require many months, at a minimum.” She
also states that she requested the opportunity to engage in parent-child therapy but that the
district court denied the request.
As an initial matter, it is important to be precise in describing McMahon’s position
with respect to parent-child therapy between J.A.J. and K.L.H. McMahon’s written report
concludes with eight enumerated “findings and recommendations,” the fifth of which
states: “[K.L.H.] should work with therapeutic supports on a regular basis to address past
trauma and the impact it has had on her life. Her foster parents should participate, as
recommended. This could include play therapy, trauma -focused occupational

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therapy/sensory work, or some form of parent/child therapy.” The seventh
recommendation is for a “closure session” between K.L.H. and J.A.J. And the eighth
recommendation is that “[a]ny future contact between [J.A.J.] and [K.L.H.] needs to be
based on what is in [K.L.H.]’s best interests.”
When the fifth recommendation is considered in light of the other recommendations
and the report as a whole, McMahon’s reference to parent-child therapy does not appear to
be a recommendation clearly in favor of parent-child therapy. The record does not indicate
whether J.A.J. ever asked the county to allow parent -child therapy after McMahon
completed her report on September 10, 2019, approximately one month before trial. At
that time, both the county and the district court were inclined to allow less contact between
J.A.J. and K.L.H., not more. At the September 17, 2019 review hearing, the district court
considered the county’s request to discontinue J.A.J.’s supervised visits with K.L.H., and
the district court ultimately granted that request. At trial, McMahon elaborated on the issue
of parent-child therapy by testifying that such sessions were possible, but would need to
“start in very small doses” because an hour-long session would be “intolerable” for K.L.H.
In her oral closing argumen t, J.A.J. asked the district court to not terminate her parental
rights so that she could engage in parent-child therapy.
In its termination order, t he district court generally credited the evidence provided
by McMahon. The district court recited and quoted excerpts from McMahon’s written
report following her last parenting assessment. The district court also recited portions of
McMahon’s trial testimony. Specifically, the district court stated, “McMahon testified that,
at a minimum, six months is necessary to ‘undo’ K.L.H.’s opinions of Mother before work

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could start to develop new opinions and impressions of Mother.” With respect to the
subject of parent-child therapy, the district court stated, “McMahon was not recommending
parent-child therapy as K.L.H cannot tolerate it.” In its conclusions of law, the district
court referred to “[t]he uncertainty that parent-child interaction therapy between Mother
and K.L.H. will be successful o r [whether] K.L.H. can tolerate reuni fication therapy with
Mother.”
In light of the evidentiary record, the district court did not err by not giving J.A.J.
an opportunity to engage in parent -child therapy with K.L.H. before terminating J.A.J.’s
parental rights. The district court made findings on the issue of reasonable efforts that are
supported by substantial evidence in the record, especially the report and testimony of
McMahon. It must be remembered that a county is not required to pursu e every possible
means of reunification; rather, a county is required only to make efforts that are reasonable.
See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). In addition, “In determining reasonable efforts to be made
with respect to a child and in making those reasonabl e efforts, the child’s best interests,
health, and safety must be of paramount concern .” Id. (a) (emphasis added). Here, the
district court focused on K.L.H.’s best interests, as did McMahon. Thus, the evidentiary
record provided the district court with ample grounds to determine that K.L.H.’s best
interests were served by not ordering parent-child therapy.
The district court’s decision also must be understood in the context of the statutory
permanency deadlines. The legislature has determined that a di strict court must hold an
admit-deny hearing in a permanency case no later than one year after the child is placed in
foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.503, subd. 1(a) (2018). Time spent in foster care in a prior

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CHIPS proceeding is included in this calculation. Id., subd. 3(b)(2); see also Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 27.02, subd. 1(a)(3). A district court must start a trial within 60 days of the admit-
deny hearing , complete the trial within 30 days, and issue a decision within 15 days
thereafter. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 52.02, subd s. 4, 5. In this case, the permanency trial
began more than 60 days after the admit -deny hearing, at which time K.L.H. had been in
foster care for 523 days. J.A.J.’s argument that the county should have allowed more time
for parent-child therapy, or that the district court should have ordered it instead of ordering
termination, is in tension with the statutory permanency deadlines.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the county made reasonable
efforts a t reunification without giving J.A.J. an opportunity to engage in parent -child
therapy before terminating her parental rights.
B.
J.A.J. next argues that she should have been given an opportunity to demonstrate
her ability to be a parent to K.L.H. J.A.J. states, “Sporadic supervised visits are insufficient
to allow a respondent parent to demonstrate her ability to parent over night or without
supervision.”
J.A.J.’s parenting ability naturally was a subject of McMahon’s last parenting
assessment. McMahon summarized her written report by stating that J.A.J.’s “parenting
skills have improved,” that her lifestyle “appears to be more stable and consistent,” that
she “has housing and newfound employment,” that she “has a support group that is sober
and reports she is not in a relationship with [A.J.H.],” and that she is “sincere in her desire
to remain sober and to be a fulltime parent to her daughter.” But McMahon’s assessment

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of J.A.J.’s improvements was outweighed by McMahon’s concern about K.L.H.’s best
interests. As described above, McMahon’s summary, findings, and recommendations were
predominantly influenced by the difficulties experienced by K.L.H. after her visits with
J.A.J. At trial, McMahon elaborated on the issue of J.A.J.’s parenting ability by testifying
that J.A.J. appeared “overwhelmed” during supervised visits and that she “had a hard time
understanding what her children were experiencing emotionally” and correctly addressing
their behavior. In oral closing argument, J.A.J. asked the district court to not terminate her
parental rights so that she could demonstrate her improved parenting abilities.
In its findings of fact, the district court found that, in late 2017, in the Carver County
CHIPS case, McMahon initially was inclined to recommend that J.A.J.’s parental rights be
terminated but ultimately recommended that additional services be provided to J.A.J.
because of her “sincere desire to change, love for her children and [her] motivation to work
the case plan.” The district court also foun d that, in early 2019, in the McLeod County
CHIPS case, “ McMahon noted in her assessment that very little had changed since
[J.A.J.’s] October 2017 parenting assessment” and that “[t]he same deficits that were noted
19 months earlier continued to remain.” The district court further found that, in
McMahon’s last assessment, “McMahon noted that [J.A.J.] has made significant progress
and demonstrated improved parenting skills.” But the district court then made findings
that focused on McMahon’s observations of the impact of J.A.J.’s parenting on K.L.H. and
on K.L.H.’s best interests. The district court found that there is “no doubt th at [J.A.J.]
loves K.L.H. and wants to parent her” but that “supervised visits with [ J.A.J.] are harmful
to K.L.H. due to the lack of attachment causing K.L.H.’s dysregulation.”

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It is true that J.A.J. did not have much of an opportunity to demonstrate her parenting
skills during the pendency of the McLeod County CHIPS and permanency proceedings.
J.A.J. was in inpatient treatment at Wellcome Manor from February until June 2019, during
which time she was allowed only supervised visits with K.L.H. The record does not
indicate whether, in the early stages of the CHIPS proceeding, J.A.J. sought an order from
the district court to have K.L.H. placed with her at Wellcome Manor. The fact that J.A.J.
had limited contact with K.L.H. during her relatively long residency at Wellcome Manor
surely made it more difficult for J.A.J. to obtain increased contact at a later date. Within a
month after J.A.J. completed her inpatient treatment at Wellcome Manor, the district court
granted the county’s request to suspend J.A.J.’s supervised visits with K.L.H. The district
court did recognize in its termination order that J.A.J.’s parenting skills had improved. But
that fact alone could not ensure that J.A.J. would successfully parent K.L.H. in the
foreseeable future because of the extensive history of neglect and its effect on K.L.H.
Again, in determining whether reasonable efforts have been made , “ the child’s best
interests, health, and safety must be of paramount concern.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a). The
district court’s decision to terminate J.A.J.’s parental rights without allowing her an
additional opportunity to demonstrate her parenting skills is appropriately based on this
statutory principle and on the evidence provided by McMahon.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the county had made
reasonable efforts at reunification without giving J.A.J. an opportunity to demonstrate her
ability to be a parent to K.L.H.

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C.
J.A.J. last argues that the county did not ma ke reasonable efforts at reunification
because the county did not comply with the statutory requirements governing case plans.
A county’s obligation to make r easonable efforts at reunification includes the
preparation of a case plan. Whenever a county removes a child from a parent’s care, the
county must “prepare an out -of-home placement plan addressing the conditions that [the]
parent must meet before the child can be in that parent’s day -to-day care.” In re Welfare
of A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d 894, 8 97 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.219(a)(2)(i)). An “out -of-home placement plan” is a document prepared “jointly
with the parent or parents or guardian of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(b)
(2018). “The plan ‘shall be’ signed by the parent, submitted to the court for approval, and
explained to all persons involved in its implementation.” A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 897
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(b)). The case plan must describe “the specific
reasons for the placement of the child in foster care, and when reunification is the plan, a
description of the problems or conditions in the home of the parent or parents which
necessitated removal of the child from home and the changes the parent or parents must
make for the child to safely return home,” as well as the “services offered and provided to
prevent removal of the child from the home and to reunify the family.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.212, subd. 1(c)(2)-(3).
J.A.J. contends that the county failed to comply with the applicab le statutory
requirements in four ways: (1) by not preparing the plan within 30 days of K.L.H.’s court-
ordered placement in foster care, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(a); (2) by not

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submitting the case plan to the district court within 30 days of K.L.H.’s court -ordered
placement in foster care, see id., subd. 1(b)(1), .178, subd. 7(a) (2018); (3) by not obtaining
the district court’s approval of a case plan, Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(b)(2); and
(4) by not obtaining the guardian ad litem ’s signature on the case plan, see id.,
subd. 1(b)(3).
In response, the county essentially concedes that it did not comply with the statute
but contends that its non-compliance was immaterial. The county states that case plans
were developed with J.A.J. and that J.A.J. agreed to them and signed them. The county
acknowledges that it failed to file multiple case plans with the district court until September
2019, only one month before trial. The county states that, although it did not obtain the
district court’s approval of a case plan, the terms of the case plans are consistent with the
orders issued by the district court throughout the pendency of the CHIPS and permanency
cases. The county does not respond to J.A.J.’s argument that the guardian ad litem did not
sign any of the case plans. The county contends that this case is distinguishable from
A.R.B., in which no written case plan was prepared. See 906 N.W.2d at 897.
It is true that the county’s failure to comply with the statute in this case is less
flagrant tha n the failure in A.R.B. Nonetheless, the question remains whether J.A.J. is
entitled to an appellate remedy for the county’s failures to comply with the statute. The
county cites In re Welfare of S.R.A., 527 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. App. 1995) (implicitly
overruled on other grounds by In re Welfare of D.D.G. , 558 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn.
1997)), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1995), for the proposition that the failure to timely
file a case plan does not necessarily require reversal of a termination of parental rights. In

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S.R.A., the county failed to file multiple case plans with the district court when required,
but this court reasoned that the county’s non -compliance should be balanced against the
child’s best interests, and we concluded that the best interests of the child in that case
outweighed the county’s “technical violation.” 527 N.W.2d at 839.
In this case, it does not appear that the county’s non -compliance with the statutory
requirements had a significant or material negative effect on the county’s reunification
efforts. J.A.J. signed the first case plan in March 2019. Thereafter she appeared for review
hearings, with counsel, in June, July, August, and September of 2019. This court has not
been provided with transcripts of the review hearings, but the district court’s order
following the July review hearing indicates that the terms of the case plans were known to
all parties and their counsel. Indeed, the district court’s finding that J.A.J. complied with
her case plan indicates that she was not prejudiced by the county’s non -compliance with
the statutory requirements. Accordingly, we conclude that the county’s technical violations
are outweighed by K.L.H.’s best interests, which played a prominent part in the district
court’s termination order. See S.R.A., 527 N.W.2d at 839.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the county had made
reasonable efforts at reunification even though the county did not comply with the statutory
requirements governing case plans.
In sum, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts at reunification and, thus, did not err by granting the county’s
termination petition and terminating J.A.J.’s parental rights to K.L.H.
Affirmed.