State of Minnesota,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1902

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: December 29, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Quanteze Damar Morgan,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota ; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. Because a reduction of appellant’s criminal history score could support a
shorter sentence on remand, his challenge to his criminal history score is not moot .
2. The phrase “convicted of a violation of this chapter” in Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 4(a) (2020), includes a petty misdemeanor violation of chapter 152.
Affirmed.
2
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
This case involves the sentence that appellant Quanteze Damar Morgan received for
a 2019 domestic assault conviction. Morgan asks us to determine whether the district court
used the proper criminal history score in sentencing. Morgan’s criminal history includes a
2005 petty misdemeanor for possession of marijuana and a 2007 fifth -degree controlled
substance conviction. The precise issue presented on appeal is whether Morgan’s 2007
conviction should be counted as a gross misdemeano r or as a felony when calculating his
criminal history score. Convictions for possession of certain controlled substances are
gross misdemeanors if , among other things, the defendant “has not been previously
convicted of a violation of” chapter 152, the c hapter covering controlled substance
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a) (2020). Morgan argues that his 2005 petty
misdemeanor is not a previous conviction of a violation of chapter 152. Accordingly, he
argues that his 2007 fifth-degree controlled substance conviction should be classified as a
gross misdemeanor in his criminal history score , rather than a felony. The district court
disagreed, concluding that Morgan’s petty misdemeanor was a prior conviction under the
statute and so his 2007 conviction was properly counted as a felony in his criminal history
score. The court of appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that Morgan’s 2005 pe tty
misdemeanor qualifies as a prior conviction under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), w e
affirm.
3
FACTS
This case arises in the context of Morgan’s sentencing for felony domestic assault
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2020), an offense to which Morgan pleaded
guilty in 2019. Prior to the domestic assault matter, Morgan had two relevant drug
offenses. First, in 2005, the State charged Morgan with misdemeanor possession of
marijuana in a motor vehicle under Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 3 (2020). Under a plea
agreement, Morgan pleaded guilty to an amended charge of petty misdemeanor possession
of a small amount of marijuana under Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 4(a). Second, in 2007,
Morgan was convicted of fifth-degree possession of cocaine under Minn. Stat. § 152.025,
subd. 2(1) (2020) . Morgan now disputes how the prior drug offenses are counted in
determining the criminal history score for sentencing on the current domestic assault
charge.
As part of the sentencing process for the domestic assault, the district court ordered
a presentence investigation report, which included a sentencing worksheet. The probation
officer calculated Morgan’s criminal history score as 4.5 under the sentencing gu idelines,
which included one -half of a felony point for Morgan’s 2007 conviction of fifth -degree
possession of cocaine. Morgan challenged the calculation, arguing that the 2007
conviction should not be classified as a felony for sentencing purposes, because his guilty
plea to the 2005 petty misdemeanor did not bar the 2007 conviction from being classified
4
as a gross misdemeanor.1 Morgan relied on section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), as amended
by the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act , which classifies a fifth-degree drug offense as
a gross misdemeanor rather than a felony if, among other things, the offender “has not been
previously convicted of a violation of this chapte r or a similar offense in another
jurisdiction.” He argued that the statute uses the terms “conviction,” “violation,” and
“offense” interchangeably, and he contended that petty misdemeanors are not offenses.
Because a petty misdemeanor is not an “offense,” Morgan argued , it cannot be a
“conviction.”
The district court denied Morgan’s motion to re duce his criminal history score,
concluding that his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine was properly
classified as a felony . The court reasoned that section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), does not
limit previous convictions to crimes; it includes any violation of chapter 152, and a petty
misdemeanor for possessing a small amount of marijuana is a violation of chapter 152.
The court sentenced Morgan to 24 months in prison based on a criminal history score of 4 ,
which was “middle of the box .”2

1 For criminal history score purposes, prior offenses are classified as felonies, gross
misdemeanors, misdemeanors, or petty misdemeanors using the law in effect at the time of
sentencing on the current offense, not the law in effect when the prior offense w as
committed. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.7.a; see State v. Strobel , 932 N.W.2d 303, 304,
308–10 (Minn. 2019) (interpreting Minnesota Sentencing Guideline 2.B.7.a and affirming
“that the classification of a prior offense is determined by reference to the s tatute setting
forth the elements of the crime”).

2 Presumptive sentences under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are determined
by offense severity and a defendant’s criminal history score. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2. A
fractional criminal history score is rounded down to the nearest whole point. Minn. Sent.

5
Morgan appealed, and t he court of appeals affirmed. State v. Morgan, 953 N.W.2d
729, 735 (Minn. App. 2020). The court concluded that section 152.025, subd ivision 4(a),
is unambiguous. Id. at 733. It rejected Morgan’s dictionary-based argument that a person
may only be “convicted” of a “crime.” Id. The court instead looked to the statutory
definition of “conviction” in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2020 ). Morgan, 953 N.W.2d
at 733. Because Morgan pleaded guilty to a petty misdemeanor violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.027, subd. 4(a), the court held that he was “ ‘previously convicted of a violation ’ of
chapter 152 .” Id. at 734. Therefore, his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of
cocaine was not a first-time possession offense that qualified for classification as a gross
misdemeanor under section 152.025, subdivision 4(a). Id.
We granted Morgan’s petition for review on the issue of whether the phrase
“convicted of a violation of this chapter” in Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), includes a
petty misdemeanor.

Guidelines 2.B.1.i. Morgan’s criminal history score was calculated as 4.5 points, which
included one-half of a point for the offense at issue here. Because of the rounding -down
rule, the district court determined his presumptive sentence using a cr iminal history score
of 4 points.
Each box in the Sentencing Guidelines grid contains a presumptive range and a
presumptive duration. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.13.b –c. The longest and shortest terms
in the presumptive range are commonly called the “top of the box” and the “bottom of the
box.” See Rushton v. State , 889 N.W.2d 561, 565 n.2 (Minn. 2017). The presumptive
duration is often referred to as the “middle of the box.” Id. The applicable presumptive
disposition for Morgan’s domestic assault conv iction with a criminal history score of 4 is
a commitment to state imprisonment for 21 –28 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A.
6
ANALYSIS
Morgan argues that, for purposes of determining his criminal history for sentencing,
his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine should be classified as a gross
misdemeanor, not a felony, under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), because his 2005 petty
misdemeanor did not qualify as a previous conviction of a violation of chapter 152 . The
State argues , as a threshold matter, that Morgan’s appeal must be dismissed as moot
because even if Morgan prevails , his criminal history scor e will stay the same . On the
merits, the State argues that the phrase “previously convicted of a violation of this chapter”
unambiguously includes a petty misdemeanor. Before addressing the statutory
interpretation issue, we must first resolve the justiciability issue.
I.
The State argues that this matter is moot because even if Morgan prevails, his
criminal history score for sentencing purposes will not change. The district court
concluded that Morgan’s criminal history score was 4.5 , which the court rounded down to
4 for sentencing purposes . See Minn. Sent. Gu ideline 2.B.1.i (“If the sum of the [felony
point total] results in a pa rtial point, the point value must be rounded down to the nearest
whole number.”). If Morgan prevails in this appeal, his criminal history score will be
reduced from 4.5 to 4. Accordingly, the applicable presumptive sentencing range will not
change even if Morgan prevails, and so, the State argues, this appeal is moot.3

3 The court of appeals did not address this issue because Morgan also challenged two
other felony convictions (each valued a t one-half of a point) on a different ground. If the
court had held that those convictions should not be classified as felonies, his criminal

7
An appeal is moot if “a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of
effective relief is no longer possible.” State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652, 662
(Minn. 2021). But “[t]he standard for finding that the issues involved in a criminal appeal
are moot is very stringent. ” State ex rel. Djonne v. Schoen , 217 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn.
1974).
That “stringent” standard is not met here. Id. If, after deciding the merits, we were
to remand Morgan’s case to the district court for resentencing, the district court could
consider M organ’s criminal history —including the nu mber of prior felony -level
offenses—and impose a sentence that is less than Morgan’s initial middle-of-the-box
sentence. Therefore, Morgan could —in theory —obtain some relief. See Young ,
956 N.W.2d at 662 . The possibility of a shorter sentence in the present case is sufficient
for us to conclude that Morgan’s appeal is not moot. See Djonne, 217 N.W.2d at 510.
Accordingly, we will decide the merits of Morgan’s appeal.
II.
Morgan argues that his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine should
be classified as a gross misdemeanor when calculating his criminal history score. Fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance is a felony, but if the defendant “has not been
previously convicted of a violation of this chapter [chapter 152] or a similar offense in
another jurisdiction,” and other requirements are met, the fifth -degree offense is a gross

history score would have been reduced to 3.5 points, and (because of the rounding -down
rule) the presumptive disposition would have been a 21-month stayed sentence. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 4.A. But those two other convictions are not before us in this appeal.
8
misdemeanor.4 Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a). The part ies disagree about whether
Morgan, because of his 2005 petty misdemeanor, has been “previously convicted of a
violation” of chapter 152. This statutory interpretation issue is one of first impression, and
one that we review de novo. State v. Serbus, 957 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2021).
When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2020); Serbus, 957 N.W.2d at 87. We first determine whether the statutory
language is ambiguous, that is, whether the statute is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation. Serbus, 957 N.W.2d at 88. If a word is defined in a statute, that
definition controls. State v. Sanschagrin, 9 52 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Minn. 2020). But if no
statutory definition resolves the question, we will look to ordinary meaning or technical
and special usage of words to determine if the statutory language is ambiguous. See Minn.
Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020) (“[W]ords and phrases are construed according to rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and
phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning . . . are construed according to
such special meaning . . . .”). If the statute is not ambiguous, the inquiry stops there, and
we apply the plain meaning of the statute. Serbus, 957 N.W.2d at 87.
Here, chapter 152 does not define the operative terms —“convicted” and
“violation.” But the Legislature has defined those terms elsewhere, and those definitions

4 This statutory distinction was created by the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act;
before the change, all fifth-degree drug offenses were felonies. See Act of May 22, 2016,
ch. 160, § 7, 2016 Minn. Laws 576 ; Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2014). To receive a gross
misdemeanor rather than a felony, the weight of the drugs must also be under certain
thresholds. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a). The weight of the drugs is not at issue on
appeal.
9
apply to chapter 152. Minnesota Statutes § 609.02 defines “conviction” as “any of the
following accepted and recorded by the court: (1) a plea of guilty; or (2) a verdict of guilty
by a jury or a finding of guilty by the court.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5. 5 And Minn.
Stat. § 609.015, subd. 2 (2020), provides that the definitions in section 609.02 “apply to
crimes created by statute other than in this chapter [chapter 609],” unless otherwise stated.
Because chapter 152 does not expressly state otherwise, the section 609.02 definition of
“conviction” applies to the crimes defined in chapter 152, which includes section 152.025,
the statute at issue here.
Minnesota Statutes § 645.44, subd. 17 (2020) , defines “violate” as “failure to
comply with.” This statute also makes clear that when the terms defined in this section are
“used in Minnesota Statutes . . . [those terms] shall have the meanings given them in this
section, unless another intention clearly appears. ” Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 1 (2020).
Guided by the definitions provided by the Legislature, we conclude that “convicted
of a violation of this chapter,” as used in Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), unambiguously
includes Morgan’s 2005 petty misdemeanor. Morgan was convicted because he pleaded
guilty to the petty misdemeanor and the district court accepted and recorded the plea. And,
in his guilty plea , Morgan admitted to violating chapter 152. Thus, Morgan’s 2007

5 Our case law is in accord with this definitio n. We have recognized that “a
conviction ‘requires that a district court both accept and record the guilty plea’ ” and have
held that a guilty plea is “recorded” when the court accepts a guilty plea and adjudicates
the defendant guilty on the record. See State v. Martinez -Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 6
(Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Thompson, 754 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn. 2008)). A clerk’s
entry of judgment is also sufficient, though not necessary, for a plea to be considered
recorded. See id.; State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2002).
10
conviction for fifth-degree possession of cocaine is a felony offense when calculating his
criminal history score for sentencing on the current domestic assault charge.
But, Morgan argues, petty misdemeanors are not crimes and therefore cannot result
in convictions. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 4a (2020) ( defining “petty misde meanor”
as “a petty offense which is prohibited by statute, which does not constitute a crime ”
(emphasis added)); State v. Varnado , 582 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1998) (“A petty
misdemeanor does not constitute a crime.” ). But the statutory definitions of “conviction”
and “violate” do not distinguish between criminal and non -criminal offenses; neither
definition includes the word “criminal” or “crime,” or carve s out petty misdemea nors as
an exception. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd. 5 (defining “conviction”), 645.44, subd. 17
(defining “violate”).6

6 In urging us to reverse, Morgan relies on dictionary definitions. But that reliance is
misplaced because the Legislature has defined the words “conviction” and “violate,” and
so there is no room for dictionary definit ions to interpret the statute at issue here. See
Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d at 625; see also State v. Alarcon , 932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn.
2019) (“ In the absence of statutory definitions , we may consider dictionary
definitions . . . .” (emphasis added)). Morgan also argues that “violation” is synonymous
with “offense” because both words are used in the phrase “a violation of this chapter or a
similar offense” in section 152.025, subdivision 4(a). And he asserts that the dictionary
definition of “offense” encompasses crimes. Therefore, he argues, the word “violation” in
the statute means “crime.” Morgan’s contention that a “violation” is limited to a “crime”
is unavailing. As noted, dictionary definitions do not control here because the Legislature
has defi ned the operative terms. But even if we looked to the dictionary definition that
Morgan cites, it would not lead us to a different result. Although the dictionary definition
of “offense” includes crimes, it is not limited to only crimes. See Offense, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “offense” as “[a] violation of the law; a crime, often
a minor one”). Morgan’s petty misdemeanor is plainly a “violation of the law.”

11
Morgan also argues that a petty misdemeanor violation of chapter 152 is not a
“conviction” because a defendant may plead guilty to a petty misdemeanor without
appearing in court .7 Morgan cites State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.
2011), as defining the point at which a conviction occurs , that is, when the court accepts a
guilty plea and adjudicates the defendant guilty on the record. But Martinez-Mendoza does
not limit convictions to only those that occur on the record; in that case we did not address
offenses that are resolved by payment without an appearance. And the Rules of Criminal
Procedure explicitly allow petty misdemeanor pleas to be made off the record. See Minn.
R. Crim. P. 23.03, subd. 3 (allowing fine payment, which “constitutes a plea of guilty”).
So even though a petty misdemeanor plea may be made off the record , it still results in a
conviction.
In sum, Morgan’s interpretation is unreasonable because it misreads our case law
and relies on dictionary definitions when statutory definitions govern.8 The sole reasonable

7 Here, though, Morgan was represented by counsel, appeared in court, and pleaded
guilty to the petty misdemeanor in person and on the record. But Morgan’s argument is
that because some petty misdemeanor pleas may be made off the record, petty misdemeanor
offenses categorically cannot result in convictions.

8 Morgan argues in the alternative that the statute is ambiguous and urges us to
consider the Drug Sentencing Reform Act’s legislative history, points to alleged absurd
and unjust results, and asks us t o read section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), in pari materia
with another section in the chapter, Minn. Stat. § 152.18 (2020). Because we conclude that
the language of the statute is unambiguous, we do not reach these arguments. See State v.
Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 924 (Minn. 2019) (considering legislative history only after
finding the statute ambiguous); State v. Altepeter , 946 N.W.2d 871, 877 (Minn. 2020)
(noting that an “illogical” result is only considered if the statute is ambiguous); State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the canon of in pari materia
“applies only to ambiguous statutes”).
12
interpretation of the phrase “previously convicted of a violation ,” as used in Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 4(a), includes a petty misdemeanor violation of chapter 152.
Because Morgan has been “previously convicted of a violation” of chapter 152 due
to his 2005 petty misdemeanor violation of chapter 152, we hold that the district court
properly classified Morgan’s 2007 conviction of fifth -degree possession of cocaine as a
felony when calculating his criminal history score .
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.