In re the Marriage of: Oliver Wilfred Cass, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1903

In re the Marriage of:
Oliver Wilfred Cass, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

YeYing Cen,
Appellant.

Filed February 1, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-17-2558

Jane Binder, Binder Law Offices, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kathryn A. Graves, Jaime Dr iggs, Henson & Efron, P.A ., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Sm ith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
On appeal from a judgment and decree based on an oral stipulation, appellant-wife
argues that the district court denied her du e process by entering the judgment and decree

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without (1) addressing her motion challengi ng the validity of the stipulation and
(2) adhering to Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 307(b). We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In 2017, respondent-husba nd Oliver Wilfred Cass filed a petition to dissolve his
marriage to appellant-wife YeYing Cen. The district court appointed a guardian ad litem
(GAL) to wife pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 17.02 to represent wife’s best interests, to
“advise the [c]ourt” as to what accommodations were needed to assist wife in defending
the action, and to assist the court in addressing issues involving spousal maintenance, asset
division, and allocation of debt.
Trial occurred over July 23 and 24, 2019. On the second day of trial, the parties
reached a stipulated settlement agreement. Wife’s attorney described the stipulation on the
record. Wife agreed that sh e would waive spousal maintena nce. But as her attorney
discussed the terms of the stipulation, wife expressed concern that the stipulation would
not leave her with enough money to pay off the mortgage on a house she would be awarded.
The GAL spoke with wife off the record. Back on the record, the GAL informed the district
court that she showed wife that wife would have sufficient funds to pay off the mortgage,
and that wife wanted to enter into the stipulation. But wife then expressed concern that she
would not have enough funds to pay property taxes after she paid off the mortgage. Wife’s
attorney interrupted wife and asked whether wife wanted to enter into the stipulation. Wife
confirmed that she wanted to enter into the stipulation.
The district court approved the stipulation. Husband’s attorney agreed to draft the
proposed judgment and decree based on the oral stipulation and send it to wife’s attorney.

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On July 26, two days after entering into th e stipulation, wife filed a letter directed
to the district court expressing dissatisfacti on with the stipulation and alleging that her
attorneys pressured her into agreeing to it. On July 29, wife filed a second letter addressed
to the district court, claiming that she was un able to clearly reject the stipulation on the
record because she wa s suffering from acute gadolinium po isoning at the time of trial. 1
After wife filed these letters, her attorneys withdrew from the case.
On August 1, wife moved the district court to add a provision to the stipulation that
would grant her monthly spousal maintenance for several years. In a supporting affidavit,
wife claimed that due to her gadolinium pois oning, she “failed to express clearly” that,
although she wanted to settle the case, she did not agree to the terms of the stipulation that
she ultimately agreed to. A motion hearing was scheduled for October 1.
On August 21, husband subm itted a proposed judgment and decree based on the
oral stipulation. Wife’s GAL signed the document, agreeing that it accurately reflected the
agreement of the parties and that it was in wife’s best intere sts. Husband did not file a
transcript of the oral stipulation pursuant to Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 307(b). Shortly thereafter,
the district court rescheduled the motion heari ng to November 6. But on October 2, the
district court adopted husband’s proposed judgment and decree. On October 3, 2019, the
judgment and decree that included the oral stipulation was entered. This appeal follows.

1 Wife’s attorney informed the district court on the first day of trial that wife was having a
“reaction” from gadolinium.

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DECISION
Wife argues that the district court denied her the right to due process by entering the
judgment and decree. 2 The United States and Minnesota Constituti ons “provide that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Rew v.
Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 7). We review whether the district court denied a litigant due process de
novo. Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 785.

2 As an initial matter, we observe that wife’s due-process challenge is arguably not properly
before us. “A reviewing court must generally consider only those i ssues that the record
shows were presented and considered by the [dis trict] court in deciding the matter before
it.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988 ) (quotation omitted). “Nor may a
party obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different
theory.” Id. Wife never argued to the district c ourt that it denied her due process by
entering the judgment and decree under these ci rcumstances. Nor did wife ever assert—
before or after the district court entered the judgment and decree—that husband had failed
to file a transcript with the proposed judgment and decree as required by rule 307(b).

Nevertheless, we conclude that we may review wife’s due-process argument. Wife raised
a general objection to the district court entering judgment based on the oral stipulation by
filing a motion challenging the terms of the s tipulation and asserting that she failed to
clearly reject the stipulation in a supporting affidavit. See Clark v. Clark, 642 N.W.2d 459,
464 n.1 (Minn. App. 2002) (observing that party sufficiently raised a challenge under rule
307(b) by filing a letter objecting to entry of the proposed judgment). Moreover, because
the district court is required to wait 14 days after both the transcript and the proposed
judgment and decree have been filed before adopting the judgment and decree, wife
arguably lacked notice that the district c ourt would take action on husband’s proposed
judgment and decree. See id. at 464 (indicating that 14-day deferment period under rule
307(b) begins when both the proposed judgment and decree and the tr anscript have been
filed). Under these circumst ances, we conclude that th e interests of justice and
fundamental fairness permit us to review wife’s due-process argument. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.04 (indicating that an appellate court may review matters “as the interest of
justice may require”).

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We employ a two-step analysis in revi ewing a procedural-due-process claim. Id.
“First, we identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life,
liberty, or property interest.” Id. If we answer in the affirmative, “the second step requires
us to determine whether the procedures followed by the government were constitutionally
sufficient.” Id. (quotation omitted). This inquiry “requires a weighing of the particular
interests involved in order to determine what process is due.” Humenansky v. Minn. B. of
Med. Exam’rs, 525 N.W.2d 559, 566 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14,
1995). “At a minimum the due process clause requires that depriv ation of property be
preceded by notice and an opportunity fo r a hearing appropriate to the case.” Contos v.
Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn. 1979).
Wife argues that the district court denied her due process by entering the judgment
and decree (1) before addressing her motion challenging the oral stipulation and (2) despite
husband’s failure to file a transcript as required by rule 307(b). We address each argument
in turn.
Motion challenging oral stipulation
Wife first contends that the district cour t denied her due process by depriving her of
the opportunity to challenge the stipulation on the grounds identified in her letters and her
motion.3

3 Wife’s letters and motion, filed before the district court entered judgment, challenged the
stipulation itself, not the district court’s decision to enter judgment based on the stipulation,
which had not yet occurred.

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Before judgment is entered on an oral stipulation, a party may challenge a proposed
judgment in two ways. Clark, 642 N.W.2d at 463. “First, the party can seek to withdraw
from or vacate the stipulation upon whic h the proposed judgment is based.” Id. (citing
Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521-22 (Minn. 1997)). “[A] district court may relieve a
party from the terms of a dissolution stipula tion if, before entry of a judgment based
thereon, it is determined that the stipulati on was ‘improvidently made and in equity and
good conscience ought not to stand.’” Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn.
App. 2000) (quoting Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522). “Stipulations based on fraud or duress
and which prejudice the defrauded or coerced party are improvidently made and in equity
and good conscience ought not to stand.” Id. “Second, the party can attack the proposed
judgment, alleging that [it] does not accurately reflect the parties’ stipulation.” Clark, 642
N.W.2d at 463 (citing Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 307(b)).
But “when a judgment and decree is entere d based upon a stipulation, . . . the
stipulation is merged into the judgment and decree and the stipulation cannot thereafter be
the target of attack by a party seekin g relief from the judgment and decree.” Shirk, 561
N.W.2d at 522. Instead, the “sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting the
requirements of Minn. Stat . § 518.145, subd. 2.” Id. Section 518.145, subdivision 2
(2018), allows the district court to “relieve a party from a judgment and decree” if one of
five reasons exists:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence wh ich by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59.03;

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(3) fraud, whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment and decree or order upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment and decree or order should have
prospective application.

Thus, after the district court enters a judgme nt and decree based on a stipulation, any
challenge to the stipulation not expressly liste d in section 518.145, subdivision 2, is not
available to a party seeking relief from the stipulation. See Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522.
Turning to the first step of our due-process analysis, we conclude that the district
court, in entering the judgment and decree, de prived wife of a prot ected interest in two
ways—it deprived wife of her interest in the property affected by the judgment and decree,
and her liberty interest in presenting her cl aim from relief from the oral stipulation.
Husband argues that the district court did not deprive wife of a protected interest because
wife did not take advantage of later opport unities to present her cl aim. But husband’s
argument overlooks the fact that, because th e district court entered the judgment and
decree, the district court thereafter lacked the discretion to grant wife relief on grounds not
specifically identified by Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. See id. Thus, any opportunity to
be heard on those challenges after the distri ct court entered the judgment and decree was
meaningless.
4

4 At oral argument, husband asserted that the district court may have had the discretion to
grant wife relief from the oral stipulation ev en after it entered the judgment and decree
because wife filed her motion before the distri ct court entered the judgment and decree.
He attempts to distinguish Shirk because, in Shirk, the challenge to the oral stipulation came
after the district court entered the judgment and decree. See 561 N.W.2d at 520-21. We

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The second step in evaluating wife’s proced ural-due-process claim is to determine
whether the district court afforded constituti onally sufficient procedure to wife before
depriving her of her protected interest. See Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 785. Husband, again,
argues that wife failed to take advantage of opportunities to present her motion to the
district court. But we are not persuaded. The effect of the district court’s decision to enter
the judgment and decree was to preclude wife from seeking relief on grounds not identified
by Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. Any later effort to attack the oral stipulation, as opposed
to the judgment entered on that stipulation, was futile. See Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522. Thus,
the district court did not afford wife th e minimum requirement of due process—an
“opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the case.” See Contos, 278 N.W.2d at 742. We
conclude that the district court failed to a fford wife due process by entering the judgment
and decree without first addressing wife’s pending motion that attacked the oral stipulation.
Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 307(b)
Wife also argues that the district cour t denied her due process by entering the
judgment and decree without requiring husband to file a transcript of the oral stipulation as
required by Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 307(b). Rule 307(b) provides:
Where a stipulation has been en tered orally upon the record,
the lawyer directed to prepare the decree shall submit it to the
court with a copy to each party. Unless a written, fully
executed stipulation is filed or unless the decree contains the

agree that Shirk is factually distinguishable from th is case, but disagree with husband’s
argument that the distinction is material to wife’s due-process challenge. We cannot ignore
the supreme court’s holding that “ when a judgment and decree is entered based upon a
stipulation, . . . the stipulation is merged in to the judgment and decree and the stipulation
cannot thereafter be the target of attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and
decree.” Id. at 522 (emphasis added).

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written approval of the other party or their legal representative,
a transcript of the oral stipula tion shall be filed by the lawyer
directed to prepare the decree. . . . Entry of the decree shall be
deferred for 14 days to allow fo r objections unless the decree
contains the written approval of the lawyer for each party, or
the other party if he or she is self-represented.

We review the interpretation and appli cation of procedural rules de novo. Clark, 642
N.W.2d at 464.
Wife argues that the district court failed to adhere to rule 307(b) because she did not
give written approval of the proposed judgment and husband did not file a transcript of the
oral stipulation. Husband asserts that the transcript requirement did not apply because
wife’s GAL qualified as her “legal repres entative,” and the GA L’s written approval
relieved him of the obligation to file a transcript.
We conclude that husband was required to file a transcript of the oral stipulation.
Wife’s GAL was not her “legal representative,” as contem plated by rule 307(b). The
district court appointed the GAL to represent “the best intere sts” of wife and to “assist”
and “advise” the district court on accommodatin g wife and in matters relating to wife’s
best interests. The district court did not grant the GAL the author ity to assent to the
proposed judgment and decree on wife’s behalf.
We also, consequently, conclude that the district court denied wife due process by
entering the judgment and decree without the bene fit of a transcript in violation of rule
307(b). Rule 307(b) contemplates that:
(1) The lawyer who prepares the proposed judgment shall
submit it to the court, with copi es to each party; (2) The same
lawyer shall file with the court a transcript of the stipulation;
(3) Before entering judgment, the court shall wait 14 days from

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the date the transcript is file d and the proposed judgment is
served and filed (and if they are filed separately, from the date
the later is filed) to allow for objections; (4) If no objection is
received with[in] 14 days, the court is free to enter the proposed
judgment as the judgment of th e court. If any objections are
made, the court is obliged to examine the objections and
transcript to decide on the appropriate procedure before
entering the decree.

Clark, 642 N.W.2d at 464 (emphasis added). By entering the judgment and decree before
husband filed a transcript—and therefore befo re the 14-day objection period began—the
district court eliminated the time period that wife should have had to object to the proposed
judgment.5
Prejudice
To be entitled to relief on appeal on a due-p rocess claim, the appellant must also
demonstrate that she suffered prejudi ce from the due-process violation. In re Welfare of
Child of B.J.-M. , 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008 ). We conclude that wife has
sufficiently demonstrated prejudice.
First, by entering the judgment and decree before addressing wife’s motion, the
district court deprived wife of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on her challenge to the
oral stipulation.
Second, wife identifies terms in the judgm ent and decree that were not discussed
when the parties placed the oral stipulation on the record. Specifically, the judgment and
decree awards each party the household good s, furniture, and fu rnishings in their

5 We also observe that by en tering the judgment and decree before the 14-day objection
period began, the district court failed to affo rd wife sufficient notic e that it would act on
the proposed judgment.

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possession. It includes a provision that the parties discharge each other from claims arising
out of the marriage relationshi p. And it provides that a pa rty who prevails in seeking
enforcement of the judgment and decree is entitled to attorney fees in connection with the
enforcement action. These terms were not expressly placed on the record. At a minimum,
the district court’s failure to adhere to rule 307(b) deprived wife of notice that she must
bring her objections to the proposed judgment and decree within the 14-day objection
period. The fact that the judgment and decr ee contains terms that were outside the scope
of the oral stipulation is sufficient to demonstrate prejudice.6
Because the district court denied wife due process by entering the judgment and
decree under these circumstances, and becaus e wife has demonstrated that she was
prejudiced by the district court’s action, we reverse the entry of the judgment and decree.
We remand to the district court to allow wife an opportunity to be heard on her motion
attacking the validity of the oral stipulation.
Reversed and remanded.

6 Husband asserted at oral argument that these terms were merely “boilerplate” terms that
would be included in any stip ulated settlement agreement. But regardless of whether the
terms are boilerplate, they were not discussed when the par ties placed the stipulation on
the record.