Annikki Lee Hockert, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1904

Annikki Lee Hockert,
Respondent,

vs.

Andrew John Towle,
Appellant.

Filed June 22, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-19-6315

Annikki L. Hockert, Blaine, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Francis H. White, III, Francis White Law, PLLC, Woodbury, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to grant respondent’s petition for
a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that (1) the record does not support the
district court’s determination that appellant engaged in more than one instance of intrusive

2
or unwanted conduct , and (2) the district court improperly relied on hearsay evidence
stricken from the record. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Andrew John Towle and respondent Annikki Lee Hockert were in a two-
year romantic relationship, which ended in 2008. After the relationship ended, Hockert
petitioned for an HRO against Towle. The district court granted the HRO in May 2008
ordering Towle to “have no direct[,] indirect, or [third] party contact with [Hockert] which
includes mail, telephone, internet and text messaging.” The HRO was effective for six
months and expired in December 2008.
About one or two years ago, Hockert saw Towle at a Walmart store. Hockert
believed that Towle followed her around the store.1 Hockert testified that it “appeared that
[Towle] was looking for [her].” Hockert hid in the clothing department and ran out of the
store when Towle’s back was turned.
In November 2019, Hockert h osted a benefit to ra ise money for her medical
expenses. Hockert posted information about the benefit on her social media account. She
did not invite Towle or any of his family members to attend the benefit. Towle’s sister
arrived at the benefit, despite not having been invited. Hockert told Towle’s sister to leave
the event and also stated that she did not want Towle to come to the benefit. Towle’s sister
left about five minutes after she arrived. Around an hour and a half later, Towle arrived
uninvited to Hockert’s benefit. Hockert ran into another room to avoid Towle, and asked

1 These facts are based on testimony taken at the contested HRO hearing.

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a friend to tell her father to instruct Towle to leave. Hockert also called the police. The
police arrived and spoke with Towle in the parking lot for about half an hour.
Towle testified that he learned about the benefit after searching for Hockert on her
social media accounts. Towle stated that he went to the benefit to “be there in support” of
Hockert and did not speak with her at the event. Towle acknowledged that neither Hockert,
nor any of her friends or family members, invited him to the event. Towle left a
handwritten note for Hockert in a guest book, along with a flash drive containing pictures
and videos of Towle and Hockert during their relationship. Towle stated in his note that
he was “praying for [her]” in his Bible -study group at his church. Hockert testified that
she was alarmed by Towle’s reference to the church, because she also attends one of the
church campuses and does not feel safe going to the same church. Towle testified that he
had never seen Hockert at church but that, if he had seen her, he “would’ve left.”
After the benefit , Hockert filed a petition seeking a 50 -year HRO against Towle.
The district court held a hearing at which both parties testified. The parties did not call any
witnesses. Following the hearing, the district court determined that Hockert was entitled
to a two-year HRO against Towle. The district court determined that there were reasonable
grounds to believe that Towle engaged in harassment of Hockert because he attempted to
contact her in a store and attended a benefit to which he had no t been invited. Towle
appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s issuance of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Peterson
v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). We will not disturb a district court’s
factual findings underlying an HRO unless they are clearly erroneous, and w e defer to the
district court’s discretion in determining whether the facts establish reasonable grounds to
believe the respondent engaged in harassment. Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 -
44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). We also give “due regard”
to the “district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. Questions of
law are reviewed de novo. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing an HRO.
A district court may issue an HRO if it determines “that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). “Harassment” includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted
acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a
substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the
relationship between the actor and the intended target.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2018).
“[S]ection 609.748 requires both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of
the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to
harassing conduct.” Dunham v. Roer , 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Min n. App. 2006), review
denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).

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The district court determined that there were two incidents of harassing conduct by
Towle. The district court found that Towle harassed Hockert by following her in a store
and “requiring [her] to hide fr om him before sneaking out.” The district court also
determined that Towle attended a benefit for Hockert, despite not having been invited, and
that Hockert had to “hid[e] in a bathroom . . . until the police arrived.” Hockert testified
that Towle’s acti ons caused her to suffer from “severe PTSD,” and that she has “gone
through a lot of therapy over the years due to everything that [Towle] had caused [her].”
Based on the evidence in the record and the testimony presented at the hearing, the district
court determined that “[t]he harassment has or is intended to have a substantial adverse
effect on [Hockert’s] safety, security, or privacy,” and that Towle’s actions had “a
substantial adverse effect on [Hockert’s] safety, security, or privacy.” The record supports
the district court’s determination that Towle’s appearance at the store and at the benefit
qualify as incidents of harassment under Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a).
a. There were repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts.
Towle argues that the evidence does not support the district court’s determination
that there were repeated incidents of harassing conduct. A single incident of “intrusive or
unwanted acts, words, or gestures” does not satisfy the statutory definition of harassment.
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1); see also Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 766 (“One incident
of an intrusive or unwanted act is insufficient to prove harassment if there is no infliction
of bodily harm or attempt to inflict bodily harm.” ). Two or more instances of harassing
conduct constitute “repeated incidents.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844.

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Towle argues that there were not multiple incidents of harassing conduct because
he did not see Hockert at Walmart one to two years ago, and he did not harass Hockert by
showing up uninvited to her benefit. Towle argued that he believed Hockert would
“welcome conta ct with him.” Towle testified that Hockert sent a message to Towle’s
mother in 2015, stating that she forgave Towle for his earlier actions and would have
contacted Towle directly if she could locate him. Towle interpreted this message to mean
that Hocke rt “would not regard additional communication as unw elcome, much less
harassing.”
The district court was presented with the petition, testimony from both Hockert and
Towle, and other evidence concerning harassing conduct, and found Hockert’s testimony
of u nwanted contact to be more credible and persuasive than Towle’s testimony. The
district court did not find Towle’s statements credible. The district court credited Hockert’s
statement that Towle was “looking for [her]” in a Walmart store, and that she hi d in a
clothing department to avoid him. The district court also noted that Towle attended a
benefit for Hockert, that “she did not want him there,” and that the court “found [Hockert’s]
testimony credible regarding this incident.” And it is not the role of this court to find facts
on appeal or to reweigh the evidence presented by the parties. See Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v.
State of Wisc. Inv. Bd., 677 N.W.2d 443, 452 (Minn. App. 2004) (“The role of the court of
appeals is to correct errors, not to find facts.”); see also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203,
210 (Minn. 1988) (cautioning that reviewing court exceeds its scope of review if it
“usurp[s] the role of the [district] court by reweighing the evi dence and finding its own
facts”). We also give “ due regard . . . to the district court’ s opportunity to determine the

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credibility of witnesses .” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 845. Given the district court’s
determination that Towle engaged in harassment on two separate occasions , and giving
“due regard” to the district court’s credibility assessments, we hold that the record supports
a determination that Towle engaged in repeated incidents of har assing conduct toward
Hockert.
b. The district court’s implicit findings are supported by the record.
Towle argues that the district court erred by relying on inadmissible hearsay
evidence. Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn.
R. Evid. 801(c). The rules of evidence bar the admission of hearsay evidence unless an
exception to the rule against hearsay applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
Hockert and Towle both testified at the hearing. They called no other witnesses.
Hockert testified that Towle attended her benefit after being notified that his presence was
unwanted, and that he refused to leave until the police arrived. Hockert testified that she
told Towle’s sister that she did not want Towle to attend the ben efit. After he arrived,
Hockert told her friends to tell her father to instruct Towle to leave. Hockert tried to testify
about what Towle’s sister, Hockert’s friends, and Hockert’s father said to Hockert in
response. Towle objected to these statements o n hearsay grounds and the district cou rt
sustained these objections.
On appeal, Towle argues that the district court relied on these statements in
determining that Towle harassed Hockert, even though it sustained his hearsay objections.
We do not agree. Nonhearsay evidence in the record supports the district court’s inference

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that Towle knew he was not welcome at the event. The record shows that Towle has a
history of harassing behavior toward Hockert, including behavior resulting in a previous
HRO. Hockert testified that she did not invite Towle or any members of his family to
attend the event. Towle acknowledged that he had not been invited to the benefit, and
testified that he learned about it only because he sought out informatio n about Hockert on
her social media accounts. Hockert testified that she told Towle’s sister to tell Towle not
to come. Towle stated that he did not try to speak to Hockert at the benefit, and intended
to leave without speaking to her. Towle’s own testi mony further acknowledges that he
knew Hockert did not want to communicate with him. As an example, Towle testified that
he attends the same church that Hockert attends. Towle stated that he has never seen
Hockert at the church campus he attends. When asked what he would have done if he saw
her at church, Towle stated, “I would’ve left.”
The district court made a reasonable inference from the evidence that Towle arrived
at the benefit knowing that his presence was unwelcome. Towle conceded that no one
invited him to the event , and he only learned about it by seeking out information about
Hockert on her social media account . The district court reasonably inferred that Towle
knew his presence was unwelcome —particularly because of the earlier HRO —and
attended the benefit anyway. From this evidence, the district court found that Towle’s
actions were “intrusive or unwanted,” constituting harassment. Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subds. 1(a)(1), 5(b)(3) . We will not reweigh this evidence on appeal. See Fogarty v .
Martin Hotel Co ., 101 N.W.2d 601, 605 ( Minn. 1960) (“Where reasonable minds might
reach different conclusions based upon inferences which may reasonably be drawn from

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the evidence, the determination of the factfinder is conclusive.”). The district court did not
erroneously rely on hearsay in making its determination that Towle engaged in harassment.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the requirements for an HRO were satisfied.
Affirmed.