In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1905

In re the Marriage of:

Jill Nicole Prokop, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Jon Prokop,
Appellant.

Filed September 28, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-18-1928

Jenna K. Monson, Linda S.S. de Beer, de Beer & Associates, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Matthew J. Gilbert, Gilbert Alden Barbosa, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appe llant-husband challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion for a new trial. He al so contests certain aspects of the original
judgment and decree including th e district court’s findings rega rding the best interests of

2
the parties’ minor child and the requirement that he pay the property-equalizer from his
share of the marital-home sale proceeds. Fina lly, appellant argues that the district court
erred by failing to consider the tax treatment of his traditional IRA account. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Christopher Prokop (husband) and respondent Jill Prokop (wife) separated
in July 2018, after 20 years of marriage. At a temporary hearing on October 15, 2018 (the
hearing), the parties stipulated that wife would have sole legal and physical custody of the
parties’ minor child,1 and that husband would pay temporary child support. The parties also
agreed that husband could request modification of the custody arrangement if husband made
the request prior to January 1, 2020, and if the child’s therapist supported the proposed
modification. In addition to the child-custody issues, the parties stipulated that if husband
sold the marital homestead, the parties would “share equally” in the net proceeds from the
sale. The parties also outlined a process for resolving spousal maintenance. Specifically, the
parties agreed to “waive their rights to trial, and submit the issue of spousal maintenance” to
the district court. And, during the hearing, the parties discussed that if an equalizer payment
was not agreed upon, the parties would submit that issue to the district court for resolution.
The schedule established by th e district court contemplated filings related to spousal
maintenance by November 5, and filings relating to the property equalizer by November 12,
if that issue was not resolved by the parties. The schedule was designed to meet the parties’

1 The parties also have a second child, but that child had reached the age of majority before
the hearing.

3
goal that the district court enter a judgment and decree prior to the end of the year—when
certain relevant tax-law changes became effective.
The parties did not reach an agreement on either spousal maintenance or the property
equalizer. Instead, the parties made filings as contemplated by the district court’s schedule.
By a letter dated October 31 , 2018, husband’s counsel made a filing related to spousal
maintenance and specifically noted that the parties agreed that the district court was to decide
“only the spousal-maintenance issue.” But in a subsequent filing dated November 8, 2018,
husband filed property-equalizer related information including a summary of husband’s assets
and supporting documentation. And, in that filing, hus band’s counsel stated that he was
providing the property-equalizer related information “[i]n accordance with our agreement”
but then went on to state that the “only” issue that the c ourt was to deci de was spousal
maintenance.
Wife’s counsel filed her s ubmissions on November 5, and November 12, 2018. In her
submission on November 5, related to the issue of spousal maintenance, wife’s counsel stated:
The parties stipulated that the issues not agreed upon
would be reserved and determin ed by the [district court]
following written submissions . Specifically, spousal
maintenance . . . would be determined pursuant to November 5,
2018 written submissions and, if not stipulated to, property
division and attorney fees would be determined pursuant to
November 12, 2018 written submissions.

Wife’s November 12, 2018 filing included written submissions related to the issue of property
division, as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On November 27, 2018, the di strict court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of
law, order for judgment and judgment and decr ee, dissolving the part ies’ marriage. The

4
district court ordere d husband to pay wife $2,200 pe r month in permanent spousal
maintenance. The district court also divide d the parties’ marital property, and ordered
husband to pay wife a cash equa lizer payment of $92,768. And the district court ordered
husband to make this payment out of his share of the home sale proceeds. Finally, the district
court ordered husband to pay wife $5,000 in need-based attorney fees.
Husband filed a motion for amended findings and/ or a “new trial” on
December 26, 2018, requesting that the judgment and decree be reopened and a “new trial”
be granted “on all issues due to . . . the parties’ mutual mistake/failure to have a meeting
of the minds relating to the issues they ha d agreed upon and/or th e issues that would
be submitted before the [district court] in lieu of trial.” The district court denied the motion,
concluding that the “record shows that there was a meeting of the minds as to the issues that
had been resolved and the process by whic h the outstanding issues would be resolved.”
Although the district court entered an amended judgment and decree, the amended judgment
and decree corrected only clerical errors.
Husband filed his notice of appeal on May 1, 2019, but thereafter requested leave to
bring a motion in district court to correct clerical errors re lated to the pr operty-equalizer
payment established in the judgment and decree. This court granted husband’s motion and
dismissed the appeal without prejudice. Husband subsequently filed a motion requesting that
the district court, among other things (1) modify legal custody of the parties’ minor child;
(2) adjust the equalizer payment; (3) recalculate the value of his IRA; and (4) correct the value
of the parties’ vehicles.

5
In a written order dated Oc tober 1, 2019, the district court granted husband’s motion
to adjust the equalizer payment to accurately reflect the value of the parties’ vehicles and to
avoid double counting of one of husband’s financial accounts. But the district court denied
husband’s request to adjust the equalizer payment related to husband’s traditional IRA. And,
after making detailed findings on the best-interest factors, the district court denied husband’s
motion to modify legal custody. The district court then entered a second amended judgment
and decree. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in denying husband’s motion for
a new trial related to the property division and attorney fees.

Husband challenges the district court’s deni al of his motion for a new trial related
to the division of property, the property equalizer payment, and attorney fees. An appellate
court generally defers to the district court’s broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a
new trial. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Min n. App. 2000). Prejudice
is the primary considerati on in determining whether to grant a new trial. Wild v. Rarig,
234 N.W.2d 775, 786 (Minn. 1975).
The rules of civil procedure provide that a new trial may be granted for irregularity
in the proceedings that deprived the moving party of a fair trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(a).
“An irregularity is a failure to adhere to a prescribed rule or method of procedure not
amounting to an error in a ruling on a matter of law.” Boschee v. Duevel, 530 N.W.2d 834,
840 (Minn. App. 1995) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. June 14, 1995). To

6
receive a new trial based on an irregularity in the proceedings, a party must establish both
that an irregularity occurred and that he or she was deprived of a fair trial. Id.
A. Property Division
Husband argues that the district court ab used its discretion in denying his motion
for a new trial because the part ies did not agree, in their wr itten stipulations or at the
hearing, to allow the district court to decide unresolved issues regarding the parties’ marital
property. Husband contends that, as a result, he was denied his due process right to a trial
on the issues of property division and the property equalizer.
Stipulations are a favored means of simplifying dissolution litigation and are treated
as binding contracts. Shirk v. Shirk , 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). The rules of
contract construction a pply when construing such stipulations. Blonigen v. Blonigen ,
621 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001). “[T]he
existence and terms of a contract are questions for the fact finder.” Morrisette v. Harrison
Int’l Corp., 486 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1992).
This court will “set aside a district court’ s findings of fact only if clearly erroneous,
giving deference to the distri ct court’s opportunity to ev aluate witness credibility.”
Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). “Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous where an appellate court is left w ith the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When determining whether findings
are clearly erroneous, the appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the
[district] court’s findings.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472. When there are facts in the
record that support the district court’s findi ngs, those findings are not clearly erroneous,

7
even if the district court also could have reached a different conclusion. Stiff v. Associated
Sewing Supply Co., 436 N.W.2d 777, 779-80 (Minn. 1989).
In its order denying husband’s motion for a new trial, the district court found that,
at the hearing, the parties in formed the court that they ha d “resolved issues relating to
custody, parenting time, the minor child, and the homestead and had reduced those
agreements to written stipulations signed by the parties.” The district court also noted that
the parties agreed that the issue of spousal maintenance would be submitted to the district
court through filings made no later than November 5, 2018. In addition, the district court
found that, at the time of the hearing, there were remainin g assets that the parties needed
to equalize, including bank accounts, investme nts, and IRAs, and that the parties were
waiting on discovery to determine the equalizer payment. But the district court found that
because the parties wanted the judgment and decree entered by the end of the year, “they
agreed to submit these issues to the Court by November 12, 2018 if no agreements were
reached by November 5, 2018.” Thus, the district court conc luded that the record shows
that the parties had “a meeting of the minds as to the issues that had been resolved and the
process by which the outstanding issues would be resolved.”
Husband argues that the parties’ written s tipulations provided that “the only issues
that would be submitted to the [district] court based upon written submissions were spousal
maintenance, its duration and amount, as well as child support.” Husband acknowledges
that counsel had additional discussions on the record regarding other submissions beyond
those listed in the written stipul ations. But he contends that “[e]ven if discussions were
made on the record with counsel regarding making written submissions on other issues, the

8
record at best, is confusing as to whether an agreement was reached by counsel.” On this
basis, husband argues that the district court e rred when it found that the parties agreed to
submit unresolved issues relate d to the property-equalizer to the district court if no
agreement was reached. We are not persuaded.
When the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings,
as is required on appellate review, the record supports the findings regarding the scope of
the parties’ agreement. The record reflects that at the hearing, the parties provided the
court with written stipulations that resolved many issues including custody, temporary
child support, and the sale of the parties’ home. One of the writte n stipulations provided
that the “parties agree to waiv e their rights to a trial, and submit the issue of spousal
maintenance, its duration and amount, as well as child support” to the district court.
(Emphasis added.) The parties further ag reed in the written stipulation to make
supplemental filings related to spousal ma intenance and child su pport no later than
November 5, 2018. The written stipulations , however, were silent on the issue of the
property equalizer.
After discussing the details of the stipul ations on the record , the parties had an
exchange about the role of the district court in addressing unresolved issues. Counsel for
husband stated “I want to make sure . . . the only involvement the [district court] has in the
future is to determine spousal maintenance, duration, length, and amount. That’s all we’re
asking the court to do.” Counsel for wife responded by noting th at, because discovery
regarding the parties’ property was not yet complete, the property equalizer payment was
not finalized. She then stated that “we can bind ourselves to the process and dates by which

9
to get it done. It’s a simple case.” Later in the hearing, counsel for wife explained that the
parties had agreed to division of much of the parties’ property including husband’s
pensions as well as personal property. She stated that the remaining assets that needed to
be equalized were bank accounts, investments, and IRAs and again noted that they were
“awaiting exchange of formal discovery” re garding those assets. The parties then
discussed submitting proposals for the remaining property-equalization division issues to
the district court by December 5, if they were unable to resolve them.
The district court raised concerns about the December 5 date and whether that date
would allow the judgement and decree to be entered before the end of the year. The
following exchange then occurred on the record:
THE COURT: If we push to the 11/5 date, and then you could
have submissions after that. At least use the 11/5 to agree upon
the equalizer. At that point you’re going to know you’re going
to need to submit something.
WIFE’S COUNSEL: Yes agreed.
THE COURT: Does that work, [counsel for husband]?
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: Yes, sir. I just want to make it
clear that the only thing we’re submitting to the Court.
THE COURT: Is May. [sic]
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: Yes. We’re equalizing bank
accounts and the retirement plans and things like that—
THE COURT: Right.
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: —which is just a paper thing to
do.
THE COURT: Right. But if there are outstanding issues, then
you’ve defeated the purpose of your efficiencies if you don’t get
this Judgment and Decree completed before the end of the
year.
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: That’s correct.
COUNSEL FOR WIFE: I’m hopefu l we’ll get it done, Your
Honor, but there’s no guarantee.
. . . .

10
COUNSEL FOR WIFE: Your Honor, I would propose if we’re
unable to reach our equalizer agreement by November 5th,
that we submit it along with everything else. Because if it is
just bank accounts, there’s a lot of them. There’s probably 15
of them or so, but it should be simple enough. It should be also
straightforward and document-intensive rather than
testimony-intensive. Even t hough it is cumbersome to the
Court to ask for an expedited review of something like that, it
should be simple enough to pres ent to the Court in affidavit
format.
THE COURT: All right. [Counsel for husband], any
disagreement with that; what is your position?
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: My client has three bank
accounts and four pensions. We ’ve talked about what we’re
going to do with the pensions, so I don’t know what the
problem would be.
THE COURT: Okay.
. . . .
THE COURT: Once you get the discover y in, we should be
able to nail down all of that in formation. So, we’ll use that
November 5th, dates then. And then obviously that’s when
those submissions are due and the maintenance. I probably
could give you another week, then, on the issue of the accounts.
COUNSEL FOR WIFE: That would be helpful, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So that would be the November 12th, and then
we’ll just include that all in the Court’s decision.
COUNSEL FOR WIFE: That would be helpful, Your Honor.

(Emphasis added.)
After this discussion, husband had a brie f conversation with his attorney. The
following exchange then occurred on the record between husband and his attorney:
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: [Hus band], you know what
happened this morning; you know what’s going on?
HUSBAND: Yes.
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: All right. Do you have any
questions for the judge or myself or [wife’s counsel] about the
settlements we made today?
HUSBAND: No.
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: Chiefly, do you understand the
only thing we’re going to leave in the Judge’s hands at some

11
point would be the spousal ma intenance; do you understand
that?
HUSBAND: Yes.
COUNSEL FOR HUSBAND: Now, when [counsel for wife]
and I can come to an agreement, before we submit that to the
judge, we could do that also; do you understand?
HUSBAND: Yes.

The following exchange also occurred on the record between wife and her counsel:
COUNSEL FOR WIFE: So our settlement related to the
property division are based upon a process of how to do that
rather than an exact number; do you understand that?
WIFE: Yes.
COUNSEL FOR WIFE: But we have a process in place and
we are hopeful we’ll be able to figure out an equalizer number
and the marital property awards. But if we don’t do that by
November 5th, then by November 12th we’re going to submit
to this Court a proposed mar ital property settlement; do you
understand that?
WIFE: Yes.

And wife’s attorney later noted:
Your Honor, would you like to set a date by which you want a
proposed decree, so if the portions we’ve agreed to, if for
whatever reason we can’t agree to a joint draft on that, that we
submit our proposed decree with blanks or reserved areas for
the 11/5 and 11/12 submissions.

The district court responded: “Okay. That would make some sense.” When asked by the
district court if there was “anything else” to address, husband’s attorney responded: “No,
sir.” The parties concluded th e hearing by striking the Nove mber 15 pretrial date as
unnecessary.
The record of the hearing demonstrates th at the parties were confident that they
would be able to resolve the outstanding i ssues related to the property division and the
equalizer payment. But the record of the hear ing also reflects that the parties agreed to a

12
process to resolve the outstanding issues if they were unable to reach an agreement. Under
the agreement, the parties would file written submissions by (1) November 5, 2018, related
to the amount and duration of spousal maintenance; and (2) November 12, 2018, related to
any remaining issues involving property divisi on and the equalizer payment. The clarity
of the parties’ agreement is supported by the fact that the parties agreed to strike the pretrial
date. And, although correspondence filed by husband after the hearing expressed his desire
that the district court only de cide the issue of spousal maintenance, he also submitted
documents related to the property-equalizer issue, indicating that he understood that if no
agreement was in place with resp ect to property division an d an equalizer payment, the
district court would decide those issues.
We acknowledge that the record of the pa rties’ agreement related to the submission
of the equalizer payment and related property division issues to the district court could
have been clearer. But taken as a whole, the record reflects that husband and his attorney
understood that the equalizer payment would be submitted to the district court on written
submissions if an agreement was not in place. And it is not improper for the district court to
rely solely on written submissions in family-law matters. See Christenson v. Christenson,
490 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Minn. App. 1992) (stating that in family-court matters, “[i]t is within
the [district] court’s discretion to restrict presentation of evidence to nonoral testimony”),
review granted (Minn. Jan. 15, 1993), review dismissed (Minn. Feb. 16, 1993); see also
Minn. R. Gen. Prac., 303.03(d)(1) (stating that family-law motions are generally decided
on written submissions). Given the extremely deferential standard of review, we cannot
conclude that the district court’s finding that the parties had “a me eting of the minds” in

13
relation to the “issues that had been resolved and the pr ocess by which the outstanding
issues would be resolved,” is clearly erroneous. And because the parties had a meeting of
the minds in relation to the property-division issues, husband’s due-process rights were not
violated. See Master Blaster, Inc. v. Dammann , 781 N.W.2d 19, 34 (Minn. App. 2010)
(concluding that no due-process violation occurred where appellant had both notice and an
opportunity to be heard), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010).
B. Attorney Fees
Husband also argues that the written-subm ission schedule did not afford him with
an opportunity to respond to wife’s request fo r attorney fees. We disagree. The record
reflects that wife’s November 5, 2018 submission indicated her intent to seek attorney fees.
Husband then responded on Nove mber 8, 2018, requesting that the judgment and decree
include “[a] statement merely in the Findi ngs and Conclusions that each pay their
respective attorney fees.” And husband submitted a second correspondence on
November 8, 2018, in which he acknowledg ed wife’s request fo r attorney fees.
Consequently, the record reflects that husband knew of wife’s reque st for attorney fees,
had full opportunity to respond, and did so twice.
Moreover, a district court “shall award attorney fees” in a marriage-dissolution
action if the court finds:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the
party’s rights in the proceeding and will not contribute to the
length and expense of the proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and disbursements are
sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees , costs, and disbursements are
awarded does not have the means to pay them.

14
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2018). Thus, the district court’s decision to award attorney
fees was not dependent upon an agreement by the parties.
Here, husband makes no argument that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding wife attorney fees; rather he challenges the award solely on the basis that he did
not have the opportunity to respond to wife’s request for attorney fees. Because the record
reflects that husband had a full opportunity to respond to wife’s request for attorney fees,
husband is unable to show that the district c ourt’s award of need-based attorney fees to
wife was improper.
II. Husband’s challenge con cerning the best interests’ finding in the original
judgment and decree is moot.

Husband challenges the district court’s fi nding in the original judgment and decree
related to the child’s best interests. The finding states that “[t]he parties stipulated that the
best interests and welfare of the minor chil d will be served by gr anting permanent sole
legal custody and permanent sole physical custody to [wife].” Husband argues that the
finding is clearly erroneous because neither pa rty stipulated that the custody arrangement
agreed to by the parties was in the best interests of the child. Wife responds that the issue
is moot because a subsequent order of the district court e xpressly addressed the statutory
factors and determined that the custody arrangement in the original judgement and decree
is in the child’s best interests. We agree with wife.
An issue is moot when a determination of that issue “would make no difference in
respect to the controversy on the merits.” Obermoller v. Fed. La nd Bank of St. Paul ,
409 N.W.2d 229, 230-31 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.

15
Sept. 18, 1987). Here, the original judgment and decree provided that husband could seek
modification of the legal custody designation prior to January 1, 2020, if modification was
supported by the child’s therapist. The record reflects that husband made such a motion in
September 2019. Specifically, husband sought an order, “[c]onsistent with the presumption
under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, awarding the parties’ joint legal custody” of the parties’ minor
child. The district court denied husband’s motion in an order dated October 1, 2019. In that
order, the district court expressly addressed each of the factors in Minn. Stat. § 518.17 and
concluded that modification of legal custody was not in the child’s best interests. By denying
husband’s September 2019 motion to modify the custody arrangement because it would not
be in the best interests of the child, any initial flaw in the parties’ custody stipulation related
to best interests is moot. See Obermoller, 409 N.W.2d at 230-31 (defining an issue as moot
when a determination of the issue “would make no difference in respect of the controversy
on the merits” (quotation omitte d)). And husband has not ch allenged the denial of his
motion to modify the custody arrangement. Instead, his argument on appeal with respect
to the custody arrangement focuses on the original judgment and decree.
In his reply brief, husband argues that the di strict court’s best-interests findings in
the October 1, 2019 order are insufficient to resolve his best-interests challenge related to
the original judgment and decree because the district court applied an endangerment
standard to husband’s motion to modify custody. But generally, parties forfeit any issues
that they do not argue in their principal brief. Balder v. Haley , 399 N.W.2d 77, 80
(Minn. 1987). And this court may deem forfe ited issues that are argued for the first time
in a reply brief. Lund ex rel. Revocable Tr. of Kim. A. Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 284

16
(Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2019). Because husband failed to make
this argument in his principal brief, we decline to address the argument.
III. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by ordering husband to pay the
property-equalizer payment from his share of the marital-home sale proceeds.

Husband challenges the district court’s decision in the original judgment and decree
to require husband to pay the property-equalizer payment as a lump sum from his 50%
share of the marital-home sale proceeds. “Upon a dissolution of a marriage . . . the [district]
court shall make a just and equitable division of the marital property of the parties without
regard to marital misconduct, after making findings regarding the division of the property.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2018). The district court has broad discretion in evaluating
and dividing property, and its determinations will not be overturned except for abuse of
discretion. Antone v. Antone , 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 20 02). If the district court’s
division of property has an acceptable basis in fact and principle, we will affirm.
Servin v. Servin, 345 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Minn. 1984).
Dissolution-related stipulations are treated as contracts. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 521.
The district court is “a third party to dissolu tion actions” and, as a third party, has a duty
“to protect the interests of both parties” and “to ensure that the s tipulation is fair and
reasonable to all.” Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted).
“Thus, because dissolution stipulations are tr eated as contracts and because the district
court must ensure that dissolu tion stipulations are fair, a di ssolution stipulation must be
both contractually sound and othe rwise fair and reasonable.” Kielley v. Kielley ,
674 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Minn. App. 2004). But “while a district court may reject all or part

17
of a stipulation, generally, it cannot, by judici al fiat, impose conditions on the parties to
which they did not stipulate and thereby depriv e the parties of their ‘day in court.’”
Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 639 n.1 (Minn. App. 2000).
Husband argues that by ordering him to pay the property-equalizer payment from
his 50% share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, the district court
unilaterally modified the parties’ written sti pulation that hus band be awarded half of the
proceeds from the sale of the marital home. Thus, husband argues that the district court
“denied [husband] his day in court and denied him the benefit of [his] bargain.” We are
not persuaded.
As husband correctly points out, the par ties’ written stipulation provides that the
“parties shall share equally in home proceeds if the property is sold after expenses of sale.”
The district court incorporated this stipula tion into the judgment and decree, concluding
that “[p]ursuant to the partie s’ stipulation,” the “parties sh all equally share in the net
proceeds” from the sale of the parties’ marital home. The district court then ordered
husband to pay wife “a cash equalizer payment of $92,768” in order to “equalize the marital
property division.” The district court also ordered that husband pa y this sum out of his
share of the marital-home sale proceeds.
Husband takes issue with the district court’s decision to order him to pay the
equalizer payment from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home. But as addressed
above, the parties agreed that if the parties could not reach an agreement on an equalizer
payment after a division of the marital assets, the district court would decide the amount
of the equalizer payment. As wife points out, there “were no carve-outs or caveats to this

18
stipulation,” and “[u]pon receipt of the property information from both parties, the district
court proceeded to do exactly what the parties asked of it—namely to arrive at an equalizer
amount.” The judgment and decree is consistent with the parties’ stipulation. Thus, despite
husband’s argument to the contrary, the dist rict court did not modify the parties’
stipulation.
Husband contends that “[e] ven if a property settlement was due and owing to [wife],
the property settlement could have been s ubject to payments over time or from the
disposition of other assets such as [husband’s] retirement accounts.” Indeed, with respect
to property settlements, “[p]ayments over a peri od of time are ordinarily favored, absent
reasons warranting immediate payment.” Kennedy v. Kennedy , 376 N.W.2d 702, 705
(Minn. App. 1985); see Bollenbach v. Bollenbach , 175 N.W.2d 148, 161 (Minn. 1970)
(ordering immediate payment of a property settlement because of a risk that the ex-spouse
might squander assets). But there is no indica tion that husband made a request that the
property settlement be subject to payments over time. See Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk,
668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003) (sta ting that a party cannot complain about a
district court’s failure to rule in her favor when she did not submit the evidence that would
allow it to do so), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). An d aside from asserting that
“[c]ash is king,” an assertion that would apply equally to wife, husband makes no argument
demonstrating why a lump-sum equalizer payment was an abuse of discretion. Moreover,
husband does not quibble with the amount of the equalizer payment. Husband, therefore,
is unable to demonstrate that the district court’s equalizer payment was an abuse of
discretion. See Swanstrom v. Swanstrom, 359 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating

19
that an abuse of discretion will be found only if there is a “conclusion that is against logic
and the facts on record”).
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider the tax
treatment of appellant’s traditional IRA account.

Finally, husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
consider the tax consequences related to his traditional IRA in the or iginal judgment and
decree. Husband contends that, as a result, th e district court arbitrarily treated husband’s
traditional IRA as an after-tax non-retirement asset.
Under Minnesota law, “it is within the [d istrict] court’s discretion to consider the
tax consequences of its [marital property] award.” Mauer v. Mauer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 607
(Minn. 2001) (quoting Aaron v. Aaron , 281 N.W.2d 150, 153 (M inn. 1979)). But, the
supreme court has “repeatedly stated that the [district] court should not speculate about
possible tax consequences.” Miller v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Minn. 1984); Aaron,
281 N.W.2d at 153. “The court must have sufficient information that the actual tax liability
resulting from the property division can be ca lculated with a reasonable degree of
certainty.” Miller, 352 N.W.2d at 744.
The original judgment an d decree awarded husband his traditional IRA “with a
value . . . as of September 28, 2018.” Husb and subsequently requested that the district
court correct the equalizer payment to reflect that his traditional IRA is a pre-tax retirement
asset. The district court denied husband’s request, finding:
Husband failed to provide the Court with any evidence or
argument regarding the tax cons equences associated with
his . . . [traditional] IRA. His proposed property submission
included the pre-tax value of his . . . [traditional] IRA, but it

20
did not include a proposed allocati on or division of this asset.
As a result, [h]usband’s . . . [t raditional] IRA was treated as a
post-tax retirement account and included in the Court’s
calculation of the equalizer payment.

Husband argues that when co mpared to the district court’s treatment of a different
retirement account, which was divided equally pursuant to a retirement-equalizer payment,
the district court acted “arbitrarily” by treati ng his traditional IRA as an after-tax asset as
opposed to a pre-tax retirement asset. Hu sband contends that because traditional IRA
accounts are subject to income taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(1) (2018), it was “wholly
inequitable and an abuse of discretion for the [district] court to arbitrarily consider the tax
ramifications of [his other retirement] account but not his [t]raditional IRA.”
We are not persuaded. The United States Code provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this subsection, any amount paid or distributed out of an individual retirement
plan shall be included in gross income by the payee or distributee.” 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(1).
While section 408(d)(1) indicates that hu sband’s traditional IRA is subject to tax
consequences, husband failed to provide the district court with any evidence of specific tax
consequences concerning this asset. Husban d did not propose an estimated tax-affected
value of the traditional IRA. Instead, husba nd merely submitted a proposed value of the
traditional IRA, which was consistent with th e stated value set fo rth in the accounting
statement provided by husband after the hearing. Without any evidence pertaining to the
tax consequences of the traditional IRA, the district court would have been forced to
speculate if it were to consider the tax conse quences related to the traditional IRA. Such
speculation would have been impermissible. See Miller, 352 N.W.2d at 744 (stating that

21
the district court should not speculate about possible tax consequences). Accordingly, it
was within the district court’s discretion not to consider the tax c onsequences related to
husband’s traditional IRA. See Fick v. Fick , 375 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Minn. App. 1985)
(concluding that where no evidence was presented at trial on the occurrence or
consequences of a taxable event, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining
to consider the tax consequences of the pr operty division because such consideration
“would have been pure speculation”).
Affirmed.