State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1908

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Tiffany Renee Browder,
Respondent.

Filed June 15, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-6366

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul D. Baertschi, Tallen & Ba ertschi, Assistant Maple Grove Prosecuting Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Chief Public Defender, David W. Merchant, Assistant
Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
The state seeks review of a pre trial order granting the de fendant’s motion to
suppress certain evidence on the ground that it was obtained by an unreasonable

2
warrantless search. The state contends that the district court only considered one exception
to the warrant requirement and that the relevant caselaw indic ates that the search was
permissible under another rationale. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In the late evening of March 17, 2019, Maple Grove police officer Brandon Gross
stopped a vehicle driven by respondent Tiffany Browder after learning that the driv ing
privileges of the registered owner who turned out to be a passenger in the vehicle had been
revoked. When Officer Gross approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, he noted the
odor of marijuana. After Browder produced a temporary driver’s license, Officer Gross
conducted a computerized check and learned that her driving privileges had been
suspended. Officer Gross called for the assistance of another officer.
After arresting Browder and having the passenger exit the vehicle, Officer Gross
searched the vehicle and found two small containers of marijuana in a purse. Browder was
then transported to the Maple Grove Police Department, where a further search of her purse
revealed a prescription bottle containing, in relevant part, a substance that teste d positive
for .18 grams of Ecstasy. Browder was charged with driving after cancellation-inimical to
public safety, possession of a small amount of marijuana, and fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance.
Browder moved to suppress the marijuana and Ecstasy as evidence on the grounds
that they were unlawfully seized. The district court granted Browder’s motion, finding that
the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement did

3
not apply and that the search of the purse inside the vehicle was therefore unlawful . The
state sought review of the district court’s order.
D E C I S I O N
“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s factual findings under our clearly erroneous standard . . . [and w]e review the district
court’s legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.” State
v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted).
Both the United States and Minnesota Cons titutions guarantee “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantless
search is unreasonable unless an officer conducts it pursuant to an exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Licari , 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003 ). The state bears the
burden of proving such an exception. Id.
Here, the state argues not that the district court erred in its analysi s of the search -
incident-to-arrest exception, but that it erred in only cons idering that exception when
(1) this case does not pose a search -incident-to-arrest question and (2) an analysis of the
proper issue —the automobile exception —reveals that Officer Gross’s search was
constitutionally justified. Specifically, the state contends that the issue presented by
Browder’s motion is whether the odor of marijuana from a vehicle supplies probable cause
to search the passenger compartment and cont ainers therein for evidence of a crime. We
agree with the state’s assessment of the issue. The officer’s testimony makes clear that he
conducted the search because he smelled the odor of an illegal substance—not because he

4
had placed Browder under arrest. The relevant exception to the warrant requirement, then,
is the “automobile” or “motor-vehicle” exception. See State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128,
135 (Minn. 1999) (“ Under this ‘motor vehicle exception, ’ the police may search an
automobile without a warrant if they have ‘probable cause for believing that [the] vehicles
are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. ’” (quoting Carroll v. United States , 267
U.S. 132, 154, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285 (1925))).
The motor-vehicle exception permits a police officer to s earch a n automobile if
there is “probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or
contraband.” State v. Lester , 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Assessing probable cause to search requires an objective consideration of the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the facts would be sufficient to justify a person “of
reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in
the place searched. State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998). Stated another way,
an officer has probable cause to search when there is a “fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265,
268 (Minn. 1985). “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search.” United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173 (1982);
accord Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 138.
“It has long been held that the detection of odors alone, which trained police officers
can identify as being illicit, constitutes probable cause to search automobiles for further
evidence of crime.” State v. Pierce , 347 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 1984 ) (citing

5
St. Paul v. Moody, 224 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1976)) . Odor, including that of marijuana,
has been held to supply sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle. Id. (“It has long been
held that the detection of odor s alone, which trained police officers can identify as being
illicit, constitutes probable cause to search automobiles for further evidence of crime .”);
State v. Hodgman, 257 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Minn. 1977) (marijuana); Moody, 224 N.W.2d
at 44 (paint fumes) . Here, the district court held that the initial stop and request for
Browder’s driver’s license was legitimate and found that “Officer Gross immediately
observed that the interior of the [vehicle] smelled of marijuana” upon approaching. We
conclude that the immediate odor of an illegal substance was sufficient to supply Officer
Gross with independent probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained e vidence of
criminal activity and that the subsequent search therefore did not violate Browder’s Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. We therefore reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.