State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1910

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kim Dale Thompson,
Appellant.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-16-1907

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Christopher B. Sailors, SailorsAllen Law, Milaca, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the
district court erred by admitting relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018),

2
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing arguments, the district court erred by
admitting eviden ce of his religious beliefs, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions, and the cumulative errors deprived him of the right to a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Kim Dale Thompson with four
counts of criminal sexual conduct. The complaint alleged that Thompson sexually abused
his daughter, R.T., between 2003 and 2009, when she was a minor. R.T. first reported
Thompson’s conduct to the police in September 2016.
Before the trial, Thompson filed a motion in limine raising numerous evidentiary
issues. As is relevant here, Thompson asked the court to exclude evidence regarding his
physical abuse of his other children, his domestic violence against R.T., and his religious
beliefs. The district court denied that request but did not expressly rule on the admissibility
of evidence of domestic violence against R.T.
The case was tried to a jury over the course of four days. The evidence established
that R.T. has seven siblings: three older brothers, three younger brothers, and one younger
sister. She also has an older half -sister, J.M.T. R.T. testified that Thompson was
“controlling” and that he rarely allowed her to go anywhere with her friends and did not
allow her to have a boyfriend. R.T. testified that Thompson disciplined her by hitting her
and spanking her, sometimes with a horse crop. R.T. also testified that Thompson was
religious and that he told her that he was a prophet and that “God gives him messages and
he brings them to churches and leaders in the churches and gives them messages from
God.”

3
R.T. described Thompson’s sexual abuse, which began when she was 14 or 15.
Thompson would enter the bathroom while R.T. was taking a bath and tell her that she had
a “very beautiful body” and was “very sexy.” He also watched her dress while hiding
inside her closet or standing outside her window. Thompson used to “wrestle” with R.T.
and pin her down on her back. While doing so, he pulled up her clothes, touched her bare
breasts, and commented that grabbing her stomach would make her “boobs jiggle.”
R.T. explained other instances of sexual abuse that occurred while she was sleeping.
She sometimes woke up to find Thompson “hitting [her] cheek” with his penis or “rubbing
it across [her] mouth.” Thompson would pull up R.T.’s shirt and rub her breasts. He also
rubbed her vagina with his fingers, and he twice stuck his fingers inside her vagina. On
one occasion, R.T. woke up to find Thompson “sucking” on he r breasts while she was on
the couch in the sunroom. Aside from that incident in the sunroom, the sexual abuse that
occurred while R.T. was sleeping occurred in R.T.’s bedroom. R.T. shared the bedroom
with her younger sister J.T., who slept in a separate bed. Initially, R.T. pretended to sleep
through the sexual abuse. As she grew older, she told Thompson to get away from her
when he attempted to abuse her . But she did not scream or yell because she did not want
to wake J.T.
R.T. testified that s hortly after she turned 18, she started dating M.T., her current
husband. Thompson was upset when he learned of the relationship. On one occasion,
Thompson saw R.T. and M.T. together in public. He yelled at M.T. to stay away from R.T.
and ordered R.T. to go home. Once at home, Thompson yelled at R.T. and called her a
“bitch,” “slut,” and “whore.” That night, he grabbed R.T. by the hair and dragged h er out

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of bed. Thompson hit her in the face, kicked her in the ribs, and said that he wanted to
break her nose so that she would not be attract ive. Afterward, Thompson forced R.T. to
stay in a car for three days and then confined her to the sunroom for one month. R.T.
acknowledged that she could have left the car or the sunroom at any point, but she testified
that she did not do so because she was frightened and had nowhere to go. The following
year, R.T. attended college for the spring semester. Shortly after the semester ended, when
the rest of her family was not home, she loaded her belongings into M.T.’s vehicle and left
home.
R.T. did not tell anyone about the sexual abuse when it occurred because she was
“scared and embarrassed.” As the years passed, she eventually told M.T., her mother, and
her oldest brother K.T. R.T. finally reported the sexual abuse to the police in September
2016, approximately seven years after she left home. Before contacting the police, R.T.
spoke with a prosecutor from the county attorney’s office and asked about the statute of
limitations. The prosecutor encouraged R.T. to report the abuse to the police. Additionally,
R.T. told a social worker about the abuse and asked if her mother could lose her job as the
Director of Public Health and Human Services for Kanabec County if Thompson were
convicted.
R.T. gave a statement to an investigator from the sheriff’s office. During the
subsequent investigation, the police discovered that R.T.’s half -sister, J.M.T., had made
similar allegations against Thompson in 2001. The police arrested Thompson a couple
days later. On the day of his arrest, t he investigator had another law enforcement officer
pick up R.T.’s mother at work and bring her to the family’s home so that the police could

5
talk with her and the children together. R.T. went to the home to participate in the p olice
meeting with her family.
R.T.’s oldest brother, K.T., testified that Thompson physically disciplined him with
spankings, using sticks or belts, and that Thompson once or twice used his fist in response
to “something severe.” K.T. conceded, however, that society’s views on parental discipline
have changed in recent years. K.T. testified that in 2013, R.T. informed him that she had
been molested and kept in a car at home while growing up, but she did not go into detail.
R.T.’s half-sister, J.M.T., also testified. J.M.T. is Thompson’s daughter from his
first marriage. She is 12 years older than R.T. J.M.T. described numerous instances of
physical and sexual abuse by Thompson that occurred when she was 14. At the time, she
lived with Thompson, her stepmother (R.T.’s mother), and her half -siblings, including
R.T., who was an infant. Thompson usually disciplined J.M.T. with spankings, but he
sometimes became more violent and punched, kicked, and hit her , using horse crops and
croquet mallets. He also wrestled her and pinned her down to demonstrate his “dominance
and control,” and he commented on the size of her breasts while doing so. In addition,
Thompson spied on J.M.T. when she was taking a shower in the bathroom and changing
clothes in her bedroom. J.M.T. testified that Thompson used to climb into her bed at night
and touch her breasts. Sometimes he pulled on J.M.T.’s waistband and looked down her
pants. Thompson never put his hands down J.M.T.’s pants or penetrated her.
J.M.T. testified that she did not report the abuse to the police when it occurred
because she wanted to continue seeing her siblings. At the end of the school year during
which the abuse occurred, she left Thompson’s home to live with her biological mother.

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J.M.T. reported the abuse to the police in 2001, eight years after she moved out of
Thompson’s home. Nothing happened as a result of her allegations. J.M.T. and R.T.
testified that they were unaware of each other’s accusations before R.T. contacted the
police in 2016, and they insisted that they had never discussed the abuse.
The state introduced exp ert testimony from a program director and forensic
interviewer for a child -advocacy center , who testified regarding why children delay
reporting sexual abuse. She explained that o ne major reason is that they have a close
relationship with the perpetrator. Most children “don’t go against an authoritative person.”
She further explained that many children “still feel love and affection towards an abuser”
and therefore are afraid of what will happen to the abuser if they report the abuse. The
forensic interviewer also noted that religious and cultural beliefs can affect whether a child
reports sexual abuse. And she stated that children who are sexually abused are much more
likely to experience physical abuse or other violence in the home as well.
Several of Thompson’s family members testified in his defense. R.T.’s younger
sister, J.T., testified that she shared a bedroom with R.T. J.T. testified that she was a light
sleeper and that she never saw Thompson come into the bedroom at night, crawl into R.T.’s
bed, or inappropriately touch R.T. One of R.T.’s older brothers, S.T., testified that he never
saw any unusual or inappropriate behavior between Thompson and R.T. R.T.’s mother,
W.T., testified that she was shocked when she learned of R.T.’s allegations and did not
observe anything in the home suggesting that Thompson was sexually abusing R.T. For
example, she never noticed Thompson leave their bed in the middle of the night. J.T., S.T.,

7
and W.T. testified that R.T. and J.M.T. had a reputation for dishonesty. Two of R.T.’s
younger brothers also testified that R.T. had a reputation for dishonesty.
The jury found Thompson guilty of all four counts of criminal sexual conduct. The
district court entered judgments of conviction for second- and third-degree criminal sexual
conduct and sentenced Thompson to serve 90 months in prison. Thompson appeals.
DECISION
I.
Thompson contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing J.M.T.,
K.T., and R.T. to testify regarding Thompson’s use of physical discipline. Thompson filed
a motion in limine request ing, in part, that the district court exclude such evidence. The
district court issued a written order indicating that it would allow evidence regarding
physical discipline of J.M.T. and K.T. for the purposes described in Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
The order did not address Thompson’s request to exclude evidence regarding Thompson’s
physical discipline of R.T.
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is a rule of evidence that allows evidence of domestic conduct
by the defendant against the victim or other family or household members. State v. Fraga,
864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015). It provides, “Evidence of domestic conduct by the
accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household
members, is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. “Domestic conduct” includes,
among other things, “evidence of domestic abuse.” Id. “Domestic abuse” includes
“physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” when committed against a family or house hold

8
member. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) (1) (2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 634.20
(incorporating that definition of domestic abuse). “[T]he rationale for admitting
relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the relationship between the
defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime in the context of that
relationship.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 allows for the admission of evi dence of domestic conduct by
the defendant not only against the victim, but also against other members of the defendant’s
family. Id. “[E]vidence showing how a defendant treats his family or household members
. . . sheds light on how the defendant intera cts with those close to him, which in turn
suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim.” Id.
A district court’s evidentiary ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 906 -07 (Minn. 1997). A defendant challenging the admission of
evidence must show that the district court abused its discretion and that he was prejudiced
as a result. Id. at 907. When the alleged error does not implicate a constitutional right, the
defendant must prove “there is a reasonabl e possibility that the wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Matthews , 800 N.W.2d 629, 633
(Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted).
Testimony of J.M.T. and K.T. Regarding Physical Discipline
Thompson argues that the distri ct court erred by allowing evidence regarding his
physical discipline of J.M.T. and K.T. because the probative value of that evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Relationship evidence under

9
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 involving a family or household member has a high probative value
because it demonstrates how the defendant interacts with people close to him. State v.
Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729-30 (Minn. App. 2014). Such evidence is admissible “unless
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the d anger of unfair prejudice.” Minn.
Stat. § 634.20. “[U]nfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely
damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate
means, giv ing one party an unfair advantage.” Ware, 856 N.W.2d at 729 (quotation
omitted). The danger of unfair prejudice is low when the district court provides a limiting
instruction to the jury. Id. at 730.
Before J.M.T. testified that Thompson physically dis ciplined her by spanking or
punching her, the district court instructed the jury that her testimony was “offered for the
limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship between the
defendant and other household members.” The dis trict court reiterated that instruction at
the end of the trial, emphasizing that the jury could not punish Thompson for any conduct
he committed du ring the 1990s. T he district court did not provide a similar limiting
instruction before K.T. testified that Thompson physically disciplined him by spanking him
with sticks o r belts and that he once or twice used his fist in response to “something
severe.”1 But K.T.’s testimony was brief, and K.T. conceded that societal views regarding
parental discipline have changed in recent years.

1 At oral argument, Thompson acknowledged that he did not object to the lack of a limiting
instruction and that he made a strategic decision not to request a limiting instruction.

10
Given the recognized p robative value of relationship evidence regarding how a
defendant interacts with his family members, the district court’s provision of a limiting
instruction regarding J.M.T.’s testimony, the brevity of K.T.’s testimony, and the context
provided by K.T.’s concession regarding changing societal views of physical discipline,
we conclude that the evidence did not persuade by illegitimate means. Thus, the district
court did not err by admitting evidence regarding Thompson’s physical discipline of J.M.T.
and K.T.
Testimony of R.T. Regarding Physical Discipline
Thompson argues that the district court erred by allowing evidence that Thompson
disciplined R.T. by spanking he r, sometimes with a horse crop, and that Thompson once
hit her because he was angry that she had a boyfriend. Thompson asserts that the evidence
was “highly prejudicial.” Again, such evidence is admissible under section 634.20 unless
“the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn.
Stat. § 634.20.
R.T.’s testimony was generally probative because it shed light on R.T.’s relationship
with Thompson. More specifically, R.T.’s testimony regarding p hysical discipline
provided context for her sexual-abuse allegations and was consistent with the expert
testimony of the forensic interviewer that children who experience sexual abuse at home
are significantly more likely to experience physical abuse as well. It also helped to explain
why R.T. did not report the abuse when it occurred. Although that evidence was damaging,
it did not persuade by illegitimate means . See Valentine , 787 N.W.2d at 637 (“[T]he
rationale for admitting relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the

11
relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime in
the context of that relationship.”).
Thompson also argues that the district court erred because it did not document its
balancing of the evidence’s probative value and prej udicial impact or adequately explain
why it allowed the evidence . This court has rejected the contention that a district court
must make express findings regarding the probative value and prejudicial impact of
evidence offered under section 634.20. State v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. App.
2008). Moreover, at the hearing on Thompson’s motion in limine, the district court
acknowledged that when applying section 634.20, it had to balance the probative value and
potential prejudice of each proffered form of relationship evidence. The district court was
not required to further explain its decision on the record.2
In sum, the district court did not err by admitting evidence of Thompson’s physical
discipline of R.T.
II.
Thompson contends that the prose cutor engaged in misconduct during cl osing
arguments. The standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct depends on whether the
defendant objected at trial. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 104 (Minn. 2009). When the
defendant objected, we apply a two -tiered harmless -error analysis. Id. For cases that

2 Nonetheless, we observe that a more thorough explanation is the better practice because
it shows proper application of the governing rule of law. See In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007) (stating that a district court abuses its d iscretion by
“improperly applying the law”).

12
involve “unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct,” we determine whether the
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. For less serious misconduct, we
determine whether the misconduct “likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury
to convict.” Id.
If the defendant did not object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial, we apply
a modified plain-error test. Id. (citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)).
Under that test, the defendant must demonstra te that there was an error and that it was
plain. Id. An error is plain if it is “‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ which is typically established ‘if
the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of cond uct.’” State v. Webster , 894
N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302). If a plain error is
shown, then the state has the burden to demonstrate that the error did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 104. If the state does not meet its
burden, then this court determines whether to address the error “to ensure fairness and the
integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We consider a closing argument as a whole when evaluating al leged prosecutorial
misconduct. State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d 900, 911 (Minn. 2009).
Vouching for Witness Credibility
Thompson argues that the prosecutor impermissibly endorsed R.T.’s credibility. “A
prosecutor may not personally endorse the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Swanson, 707
N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006). The prosecutor may, however, argue that particular
witnesses were or were not credible. State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Minn. 2007).
Here, the prosecutor made the challenged statement when describing R.T.’s testimony that

13
Thompson kept her in a car and sunroom. He noted that R.T. probably could have escaped
those situations physically, but he th en said, “Where was she going to go? She’s very
honest about that.” Defense counsel objected to that statement as impermissible vouching
and requested that it be stricken from the record. The prosecutor agreed, and the district
court told the jury to disregard the comment.
Because the district court sustained Thompson’s objection, we focus on whether the
challenged statement was prejudicial or harmless, without reviewing the ruling itself. The
supreme court has indicated that impermissible vouching is harmless when the jury is
instructed to disregard those statements. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 107. Because the district
court told the jury to disregard the challenged statement, any error was harmless.
Belittling the Defense
Thompson argues that the prose cutor impermissibly disparaged and belittled his
defense strategy. Prosecutors may argue that a specific defense raised by the defendant
has no merit, but they may not “belittle either the defendant or a particular defense in the
abstract.” State v. Matt hews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 552 (Minn. 2010). For example, a
prosecutor may not suggest that the defendant raised a particular defense because it was
the only defense that “might work.” State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn. 1994).
Here, the challenged statements occurred when the prosecutor discuss ed defense
counsel’s criticism of law enforcement’s investigation of R.T.’s allegations. The
prosecutor stated, “It’s the defense counsel’s job to try to poke holes in the investigation.
It is. So a defense might come up here and argue that this was an improper way to
investigate the case. But we haven’t heard that from anybody except the defense counsel.”

14
Defense counsel objected to that statement as belittling the defense, but the district court
allowed it and instructed the prosecutor to keep it in “fair terms.”
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the prosecutor did not improperly
belittle the defense. The prosecutor did not discuss any defense in the abstract; he argued
that Thompson’s specific inadequate -investigation defense had no merit. Moreover, t he
prosecutor’s statement was not disparaging or demeaning. Indeed, the statement arguably
suggested that defense counsel’s approach was proper.
Thompson also challenges some of the prosecutor’s statements during rebutta l
argument. The prosecutor began that argument as follows:
I’ll never say anything is the stupidest thing I’ve ever
heard, because that’s not my job as an attorney. It’s to present
facts. I try to call your attention to what was said, not insert
my own opinion about whether something is the stupidest thing
I’ve ever heard. He ’s a defense attorney. He’s defending his
client. Of course it’s going to be the stupidest things he’s ever
heard.
Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was belittling the defense, and the
prosecutor said he would move on. The prosecutor reiterat ed his argument later in the
rebuttal saying, “Ladies and gentlemen, I can’t tell you who I believe. A, I’m not allowed
to do that. B, that’s your job. I -- I’m on one side. The defense attorney’s on the other
side. Of course defense attorney’s going to say it’s the stupidest thing he’s ever heard.”
The prosecutor’s comments were a direct response to the defense’s closing
argument that J.T. would have known about any sexual abuse because she shared a room
with R.T. Defense counsel argued that “to say that [J.T.] wouldn’t wake up during that,
oh, my gosh, that is insane. That’s the stupidest thing I’ve ever heard. ” Although the

15
prosecutor criticized defense counsel for opining that a certain assertion was the “stupidest
thing” that defense counsel had ever heard , the prosecutor did not impermissibly belittle
Thompson or any of his defenses in the abstract.
Shifting the Burden of Proof
Thompson argues that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof by indicating that
he had to disprove the state’s evi dence. The state has the burden of proving all elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor cannot shift the burden of proof
to the defendant to prove his innocence. State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Minn. 1993).
A prosecutor does not shift the burden of proof if he merely argues that there is no evidence
to support the defense’s theory of the case. Id.
Thompson once again points to the prosecutor’s argument that “[i]t’s the defense
counsel’s job to try to poke holes in the investigation. It is. So a defense might come up
here and argue that this was an improper way to investigate the case. But we haven’t heard
that from anybody except the defense counsel.”
One o f Thompson’s theories was that the police improperly investigated R.T.’s
allegations. As to that defense, the prosecutor did not suggest that Thompson had to prove
his innocence or disprove the state’s evidence. The prosecutor argued that the record did
not support Thompson’s defense theory. Moreover, a prosecutor’s comments, taken as a
whole, do not shift the burden of proof when the prosecutor also explains that the state has
the burden of proof. State v. Tate , 682 N.W.2d 169, 178 -79 (Minn. App. 2004), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2004) . Here, the prosecutor told the jury during his closing

16
argument that the state bore the burden of proving guilt. In sum, the record does not support
Thompson’s assertion that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof.
Arguing Relationship Evidence as Propensity Evidence
Thompson argues that the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to consider evidence
that he abused J.M.T. during the 1990s as propensity evidence. That evidence was
admitted as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
The supreme court has indicated that evidence admitted under Minn. Stat. § 634.20
can assist the jury “by providing a context with which it could better judge the credibility
of the principals in the relationship.” State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004).
And evidence of the defendant’s conduct toward his other family or household members
“sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests
how the defendant may interact with the victim.” Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637.
Here, the prosecutor observed the similarities between R.T.’s 2016 allegations
against Thompson and J.M.T.’s 2001 allegations against Thompson . He noted that the
“same things were happen ing” to J.M.T. in the early 1990s as happened to R.T., and he
called the similarities “a heck of a coincidence.” The prosecutor also explained the purpose
for which the jury could use J.M.T.’s testimony:
Now, you were instructed that you cannot convict th e
defendant for what he did to [J.M.T.] back in the early ‘90s.
That’s correct. You cannot convict him of those instances that
[J.M.T.] testified about. That would result in unfair double
punishment.
You can only consider about what the defendant did to
[R.T.] between 2003 and 2008. But what you can consider
from [J.M.T.’s] testimony is whether what happened to

17
[J.M.T.], based on her testimony -- and how that relates to what
may have happened to [R.T.] between 2003 and 2008.
The prosecutor’s argument that J.M.T.’s allegations buttressed R.T.’s allegations
because they were so similar was within the recognized purpose of evidence admitted under
Minn. Stat. § 634.20. See id.; see also McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161. There was no
misconduct here.
Misrepresenting the Evidence
Thompson argues that the prosecutor misrepresented testimony from R.T.’s mother,
W.T. A prosecutor may not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury
regarding the inferences that may be drawn from it. State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 805
(Minn. 2016).
During the cross -examination of W.T., the prosecutor mentioned that W.T. was
suing Mille Lacs and Kanabec County, and he suggested that she had a “financial and
professional incentive for [R.T.] to be considered a liar.” W.T. denied the prosecutor’s
contention that Kanabec County had fired her for failing to report abuse that she knew was
occurring in her household. She explained, “They terminated me because Mille Lacs
County provided information that they should not have to Kanabec County.” The
prosecutor asked whether that information related to “these allegations in this proceeding,”
and W.T. answered, “Yes.” W.T. added that her lawsuit involved “Data Practices Act
violations.”
In the closing argument, the prosecutor argued that W.T. was not credible because
she had a motiv e to refute the allegations against Thompson. The prosecutor first stated

18
that W.T. “got fired from her job and is suing the County, this County, because she was
fired because of allegations that surfaced.” Defense counsel objected that those facts were
not in evidence, and the district court sustained the objection. The prosecutor then said
that W.T. “was fired from Kanabec County because of an investigation that occurred in
Mille Lacs County.” Defense counsel again objected that those facts were not in evidence
and stated that “data practices” was the reason for W.T.’s termination from her job. The
district court agreed. The prosecutor finally stated that a “[d]ata practices violation that led
to [W.T.] being fired, the data practices violation that, according to the lawsuit, Mille Lacs
County violated. You know that’s where [W.T.’s] coming from when she’s testifying.”
W.T. testified that the reason for her terminatio n was related to the allegations
against Thompson, but she denied that those allegations caused her to lose her job with the
county. Thus, the prosecutor appears to have initially misstated W.T.’s testimony during
the closing argument, but only slightly. Moreover, the district court sustained Thompson’s
objection to the statements. And, we cannot overlook the damage to W.T.’s credibility that
likely resulted from her testimony that even though she was a mandated reporter , she did
not report R.T.’s allegations because she did not believe them. That testimony was much
more damaging to W.T.’s credibility than the brief and somewhat confusing line of
questioning regarding W.T.’s lawsuit against Kanabec and Mille Lacs County.
This court has indicated that statements misrepresenting evidence are harmless if
the district court instructed the jury to disregard statements that differ from its recollection
of the evidence. In re Welfare of D.D.R., 713 N.W.2d 891, 901 (Minn. App. 2006). Before
closing argument, the district court instructed the jury that if the attorneys were to make

19
any statement that differs from its recollection of the evidence, the jurors should “disregard
the statement and rely solely on [their] own memory.” We therefore conclude that the
prosecutor’s inaccurate statements regarding W.T.’s testimony, to which objection was
sustained, did not “likely play [] a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict ,”
Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 104, and that the error was harmless.
III.
Thompson contends that the district court erred by admitting evidence regarding his
religious beliefs. Thompson moved the district court to exclude testimony about his
religious beliefs, arguing that such testimony “would have no relevance” and would be
introduced “with the anticipated effect to paint with the untrue allegation that [he] is a cult
leader.” The district court ruled that testimony regarding Thompson’s religious beliefs
would be allowed “so long as it is offered for the purpose of providing context to his alleged
actions.” We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Nunn,
561 N.W.2d at 906-07.
R.T. testified about Thompson’s religious beliefs as follows:
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Is your father religious?
R.T.: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Can you talk about his religious beliefs?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I would object to this
line of questioning at this point.
DISTRICT COURT: On what basis?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: First Amendment. Freedom of
religion. Can we approach?
DISTRICT COURT: You may.
(A Bench discussion was held off the record.)
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: Did your father ever tell you that he was a
profit [sic]?

20
R.T.: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: What did he say about that?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection; hearsay.
DISTRICT COURT: Again, it doesn’t go to prove the matter
asserted. It’s allowable.
R.T.: He says that God gives him messages and he brings them
to churches and leaders in the churches and gives them
messages from God.

Thompson argues that R.T.’s testimony about his religious beliefs was irrelevant,
and that even if it was relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the
potential for prejudice. Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of th e action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401.
Irrelevant evidence is inad missible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence may be
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the da nger of unfair
prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. And “[e]vidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness
on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their
nature the witness’ credibility is impaired or enhanced.” Minn. R. Evid. 610.
Thompson argues that the evidence regarding his religious beliefs was irrelevant
because the state failed to “tie the evidence to the commission of the charged offense.” He
insists that the evidence “painted [him] in a negative light by associating him with violent
and zealot like religious beliefs.” The state counters that evidence regarding Thompson’s
religious beliefs “was relevant to help explain why R.T. did not report the abuse sooner, as
well as why she maintained contact with [Thompson] despite the abuse.”

21
At trial, d efense counsel emphasized R.T.’s delay in reporting. During closing
argument, the prosecutor argued that Thompson was R.T.’s “religious leader.” Thompson
asserts that such an argument was meant to vilify his r eligious beliefs. We are not
persuaded. The record demonstrates that the prosecutor referenced Thompson’s religious
beliefs to explain why R.T. did not leave her home despite the sexual abuse or report the
abuse earlier. The prosecutor described Thompso n as “the man that [R.T.] put her faith
into; her f ather, her teacher, her protecto r, her religious guide, her everything.” He then
argued that R.T. “didn’t tell any body because he was her protecto r, because he was her
religious leader, because he was her teacher, her everything.” Later in the closing
argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that R.T. could have left her home at any time but
argued that she did not do so because “she had nowhere else to go. She’s a scared teenager
when her father, her protector, her religious guide, her teacher, her person that cares for her
tells her: You can’t go.”
We note that Thompson entered a journal into evidence that R.T. wrote during a
family road trip when she was 18 years old, in which she noted that Thompson had talked
about the Bible with a waitress at a restaurant. In response to defense counsel’s questions
about the journal, R.T. said, “I think it’s good to talk about the Bible,” suggesting that R.T.
agreed with Thompson’s religious views to some extent. The forensic interviewer testified
that religious and cultural beliefs can impact whether children report sexual abuse. Thus,
evidence regarding Thompson’s religious beliefs and R.T.’s agreement with those beliefs
tended to explain why R.T. did not report the abuse sooner. Moreover, the evidence did

22
not vilify Thompson. Instead, it showed t hat religion was a component of Thompson’s
relationship with R.T., which may have affected her unwillingness to report the abuse.
In sum, given the defense’s challen ge to R.T.’s credibility based on her delay ed
report, as well as the expert testimony that religious beliefs may impact whether a child
reports sexual abuse, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by allowing
limited evidence regarding Thompson’s religious beliefs to provide context for R.T.’s
allegations.
IV.
Thompson contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction s.
He concedes that R.T.’s testimony —if believed —established that he committed the
offenses. But Thompson argues that there were significant reasons to question R.T.’s
credibility and that there was no corroborating evidence.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the evidence to
determine whether the facts in the record and t he legitimate inferences drawn from them
would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Al -Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). We will uphold the jury’s verdict if
the jury reasonably could have found the defendant guilty, consistent with the presumption
of innocence and the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the
fact-finder did not believe any testimony that conflicts with the verdict. State v. Palmer,
803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). It is the duty of the jury, not appellate courts, to weigh

23
the credibility of witnesses. State v. Reichenberger, 182 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1970).
In cases involving criminal sexual conduct, the jury weighs the credibility of a victim who
gives conflicting stories, and the absence of a ph ysical examination does not prevent the
jury from finding the defendant guilty. Id. In fact, a conviction can rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness. State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536,
539 (Minn. 2004).
Thompson recognizes those principles , but he attempts to circumvent them by
relying on State v. Huss , 506 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1993). In Huss, the defendant was
convicted of criminal sexual conduct against his three -year-old daughter. 506 N.W.2d at
290. The only direct evidence of sexual abuse came from the child’s testimony. Id. at 291-
92. The child’s testimony was “troublesome” in the following ways: (1) the child was on
the stand for almost an hour before she made any accusation of abuse, (2) the child claimed
that both her mother and father had touched her inappropriately, and (3) the child was
unable to identify her father in the courtroom. Id. at 292. Most importantly, the child’s
mother had exposed her to a “highly suggestive book” about sexual abuse for five months,
when the mother and father were engaged in a visitation dispute, before the child made any
accusation of sexual abuse. Id. at 292-93, 293 n.3. Because those “unusual facts” raised
questions about the validity of the accusations, the supreme court reversed the defendant’s
conviction. Id. at 293.
Thompson argues that this case is comparable to Huss because there are reasons to
question R.T.’s credibility, and R.T. was the only witness who provided direct evidence of
sexual abuse. He points to R.T.’s actions when reporting the sexual abuse, which included

24
asking a prosecutor about the statute of limitations, asking a social worker whether her
mother would lose her job if Thompson were convicted, and being present when the police
interviewed her family after Thompson’s arrest.
R.T.’s credibility issues are not comparable to those in Huss. R.T. was not a toddler
when the sexual abuse occurred; she was a teenager. And she was 28 when she testified at
trial. Although there were some inconsistencies in R.T.’s testimony, none gives rise to the
level of concern that justified reversal in Huss.
Thompson identifies several other flaws in the state’s case including that R.T. could
not remember specific details about the sexual abuse ; no one else in her house of nine
people recalled seeing anything inappropriate between R.T. and Thompson, including J.T.,
who slept in the same room as R.T.; there was no circumstantial evidence to support R.T.’s
allegations; and R.T.’s testimony was incons istent. Thompson also asserts that R.T.’s
actions demonstrate that she was seeking “vengeance” against him. Thompson’s
arguments to the jury addressed those circumstances . The jury nonetheless believed R.T.
and found Thompson guilty. Moreover, even though corroboration is not necessary, there
was some corroborating evidence. K.T. testified that R.T. told him about the sexual abuse
in 2013, and W.T. said that R.T. mentioned it six months before R.T. reported the abuse to
the police in 2016. See State v. Gamez, 494 N.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Minn. App. 1992) (stating
that victim’s testimony of sexual assaults is corroborated when victim was consistent when
telling other people of the assaults), review denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 1993).

25
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury reasonably
could have found Thompson guilty, consistent with the presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore do not disturb the verdict.
V.
Thompson contends that a new trial is warranted because the assigned errors
cumulatively deprived him of his right to a fair trial. A criminal defendant may be entitled
to a new trial if “the cumulative effect of [the] errors was [not] harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt,” even though “the impact of any one of [the] errors, standing alone, may
not have affected the verdict.” State v. Penkaty , 708 N.W.2d 185, 206 (Minn. 2006).
Appellate courts have reversed for that reason only “in rare cases.” State v. Davis , 820
N.W.2d 525, 538 (Minn. 2012). For example, the supreme court reversed a conviction
based on two evidentiary errors and at least ten specific instances of pro secutorial
misconduct, which constituted a “pervasive force at trial.” State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d
776, 791-92 (Minn. 2006).
We have identified only two errors in this case: the prosecutor’s statement vouching
for R.T.’s credibility and the prosecutor’s initial misrepresentation of W.T.’s testimony
during the closing argument . The district court sustaine d Thompson’s objections to each
of those errors. The district court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s statement
that R.T. was “very honest.” And the district court instructed the jurors to disregard any
statements of the attorneys that di ffered from their recollection of the evidence. Because
the prosecutorial errors were limited and the district court minimized any prejudice with

26
its jury instructions, t his is not a rare case in which a new trial is warranted based on
cumulative error.
Affirmed.