Thomas Purmort, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1913

Thomas Purmort,
Respondent,

vs.

Kaydee Lanahan,
Appellant.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-19-5777

Steven J. Lodge, Lodge Law Office, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kaydee Lanahan, Blaine, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Br atvold, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by not granting her
continuance request, and (2) violated her procedural due-process rights by proceeding with

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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an eviction hearing in her absence after sh e notified the district court that she was
discharged from the emergency room of a hospital hours earlier. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Thomas Purmort filed an eviction complaint against appellant Kaydee
Lanahan concerning a Blaine property that she was renting from hi m. The complaint
alleged that Lanahan missed her $1,395 monthly payments fo r the previous five months
and ignored multiple written notices to vacate.
Both parties appeared for an initial hearing on November 13, 2019, and the district
court scheduled the eviction hearing for Novemb er 20, 2019, at 9:00 a.m. At 10:20 a.m.
on that date, the district court called the case and Lanahan was not present. Lanahan had
called the district court earlier that morning to say that she was in the emergency room of
a hospital. The district court also received a faxed “Work/School Excuse and Restrictions”
letter stating that Lanahan was discharged at 7:03 a.m. and “is unable to return to work
until 11/22/19.” The district court stated on the record that the fax “provides me no further
information as to why she was in the hospital, what happened, what her physical condition
is now.” The district court then asked Purm ort if he wanted to continue in Lanahan’s
absence or agree to a short continuance. Purmort’s property manager accompanied him at
the hearing, and she stated that Lanahan’s absence “doesn’t su rprise us.” She elaborated
by stating, “We’ve been dealing with this since August. We’ve given her three letters and
opportunities to make this right. . . . We couldn’ t get service to her, so we actually gave
another extension so that we could properly serve her just because of the background with

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her and her family.” Purmort stated that he wanted to go forward with the hearing because
he was losing money.
The district court entered default judgment against Lanahan, stating that “tenant did
not appear. Medical excuse. The unpaid rent was clearly demonstrated by evidence
presented.” The district court ordered en try of judgment for Purmort and calculated
Lanahan’s redemption amount as $7,093 for unpaid rent and court fees. See Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.291, subd. 1(a) (2018) (allowing tenant in nonpayme nt-of-rent eviction action to
redeem tenancy “at any time before possession has been delivered”). The district court
stayed issuance of the writ of recovery for six days, giving Lanahan almost a week to
redeem the tenancy. Lanahan did not redeem. She later appealed.
DECISION
Continuance request
The first issue is whether the district c ourt abused its discre tion by not granting
Lanahan’s informal request for a continuance after she notified the court that she was in
the emergency room on the morning of the hearing.
“The granting of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and
its ruling will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” Dunshee v.
Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn. 1977). Refu sal to grant a continuance is usually
reversible error if uncontradicted evidence shows that the party’s presence was precluded
by medical incapacity. Chahla v. City of St. Paul, 507 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn. App. 1993),
review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1993). The district court “should base its decision on the

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facts and circumstances surrounding the request.” Hamilton v. Hamilton, 396 N.W.2d 91,
94 (Minn. App. 1986).
Lanahan did not provide the district court with any information other than the fact
that she was released from the emergency room of a hospital two hours before the
scheduled start of the hearing, and that sh e had a two-day medical excuse from work.
Lanahan did not disclose any specific medical information to the district court. The district
court also heard statements from Purmort’s property manager that Lanahan was evasive
when they tried to se rve her and that that difficulty had postponed the eviction process.
Considering these facts and circumstances surrounding Lanahan’s requested continuance,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Due process
Lanahan next argues that the district court violated her procedural due-process rights
by continuing with the hearing in her absence despite her medical excuse.
Whether a person’s procedural due-process rights have been violated is a question
of law that appellate courts review de novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627,
632 (Minn. 2012). Both the Minnesota and United States C onstitutions provide that the
government cannot deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property w ithout due process of
law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. “[T]he due process protection
provided under the Minnesota Constitution is identical to the due process guaranteed under
the U.S. Constitution.” In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig. , 806 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Minn.
2011). To satisfy due-process, procedures “must provide an individual with notice and an

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opportunity to be heard at a meaningf ul time and in a meaningful manner.” Sawh, 823
N.W.2d at 632 (quotation omitted).
There is no question that the district court gave Lanahan notice. She argues that she
was not given an opportunity to be heard because of her medical situation. In State v.
Batchelor, we suggested in dicta th at holding a hearing despite an individual’s medical
emergency may deprive that indi vidual of his opportunity to be heard. 786 N.W.2d 319,
323 (Minn. App. 2010). The appellant argued that it would be unfair to proceed with a
hearing in the hypothetical s cenario in which a defendant missed his hearing because he
was unconscious in a hospital after a car accident. Id. a t 3 2 3 . W e s t a t e d t h a t t h e
hypothetical scenario “would clearly be a very different cas e than the one with which we
are presented, and by our op inion today we do not imply th at a defendant who fails to
appear at his sentencing hear ing because he is incapac itated should be bound by an
agreement to appear.” Id. at 323. But unlike the hypothetical scenario in Batchelor,
Lanahan did not show that she was incapacitated at the time of the hearing. Lanahan only
showed that she was discharged from the emergency room two hours before her scheduled
hearing. The district court knew nothing about the reason she was in the emergency room
or her condition upon being discharged. Lana han has not sh own how the district court
violated her due-process rights by proceeding with the hearing in her absence.
Affirmed.