In re the Marriage of: Dia Eldin Jubara, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1916

In re the Marriage of: Dia Eldin Jubara, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Nihad Salah Awad Hamed,
Appellant.

Filed October 19, 2020
Affirmed in part and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-17-8036

Maury D. Beaulier, Beaulier Law Office, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for respondent)

Nahid Abuelhasssan, Abuelhassan Law, P.L.L.C., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
In this marital dissolution dispute, appellant challenges the district court’s judgment
and decree for three reasons. First, appellant argues that the district court erred in dividing
the marital estate. Because the division of the estate is equitable under the circumstances,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Second, appellant argues

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that the district court erred in denying her request for spousal maintenance. Because the
district court’s findings are insufficient to permit review, we remand for further
proceedings. Third, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying her request for
both conduct- and need-based attorney fees. Because we conclude that appellant forfeited
these arguments, we decline to review that portion of the district court’s decision.
FACTS
In 2014, appellant Nihad Salah Awad Hamed (wife) married respondent Dia Eldin
Jubara (husband) in Sudan. In September 2016, wife moved to the United States to live
with husband. The couple lived together until they separated on September 27, 2017. In
November 2017, the district court granted wife’s petition for an order for protection (OFP)
against husband . In that order, the district court also awarded wife temporary spousal
maintenance in the amount of $1,100 per month. Shortly after the district court issued the
OFP, husband filed for divorce. In July 2018, the district court incorporated the temporary
spousal maintenance obligation into the dissolution matter, noting that husband’s
obligation to pay $1,100 per month would “continue until trial where the permanent
amount of spousal maintenance will be determined.”
The district court scheduled the matter for a one -day trial on November 15, 2018,
regarding property division and spousal maintenance . One day was not enough time, and
at the close of the first day of trial, the district court scheduled a second day of trial to occur
on March 4, 2019. Also after the first day of trial, the district court requested additional
written arguments regarding whether to terminate husband’s temporary spousal
maintenance obligation. Both parties submitted written letter briefs, and on January 29,

3
2019, the district court issued an order terminatin g husband’s temporary spousal
maintenance. Trial resumed on March 4, 2019. After trial, t he district court entered the
judgment and decree . Given the issues raised on appeal, we discuss the facts relating to
the division of property, the district court’s decision not to order spousal maintenance, and
the requested attorney fees.
A. Property Division
First, the district court unequally divided the marital estate. The district court found
that the parties have the following marital assets: a Bank of America checking account
(with a balance of $1,850), a Wells Fargo savings account (with a balance of $662.04), a
Wells Fargo business checking account (with a balance of $43 .65), two separate Wells
Fargo personal checking accounts (one with a balance of $1,619.12 and the second with a
balance of $1,260.30),1 a Think Mutual Bank (Think Bank) account with an unknown
balance,2 husband’s 401K (valued at $2,437.66), and a Honda CRV (CRV).3

1 Wife testified that the account had a balance of $1,260. The account statement was
admitted without objection, but not made part of the record before this court.
2 Husband testified regarding the ba lance of three Think Bank accounts before and after
the valuation date. Statements for the three Think Bank accounts were admitted without
objection, but not made part of the record before this court. Husband testified that he
withdrew almost all of the money from the Think Bank accounts in September 2017,
leaving a balanc e of $0.14 in each of the accounts. Husband also testified that he then
deposited the withdrawn funds from Think Bank into one of the Wells Fargo accounts that
the district court ultimately included as a marital bank account.
3 The district court found that the CRV is encumbered by a loan in the amount of $33,023,
but also found that the balance on this loan totaled $32,021. Under the table heading “Debt
if encumbered,” the district court included the number $27,274. The record includes
documentary evidence that the trade -in value for the CRV is $27,274. Neither party
contests the value of the CRV. For the purposes of this opinion, we construe the district
court’s findings to establish that the value of the CRV is $27,274 and that the vehicle is

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The district court also found that the parties have the following marital debts: a
$4,424.74 Wells Fargo credit card, a $3,736.90 Capital One credit card, a $288.76 Chase
credit card, a $2,568 Synchrony credit card, $53,874.35 in student loans, a $32,021 auto
loan against the CRV, a $19,493.95 Burgan bank loan, and $431.39 in medical bills. 4
These amounts total $116,839.09.
Although the district court did not explicitly itemize each potential asset or liability
as marital or nonmarital, the langu age used by the district court and the distinctions made
by the district court indicate that the district court classified certain property as nonmarital.
This includes husband’s joint savings and joint checking account with a nonjoint child and
three bank accounts belonging to husband’s mother .5 Husband offered several exhibits
showing that the three accounts were in his mother’s name and that he had power of
attorney, allowing him to access these accounts on his mother’s behalf. The district court

encumbered by a car loan in the amount of $32,021. The net value of the CRV is negative
$4,747.
4 In its findings of fact, the district court inc luded a list of the parties’ debts, without
distinguishing which, if any, of these debts is nonmarital. In its conclusion s of law, the
district court includes an identical list of debts under the heading “Marital Debts.” Because
the parties do not challenge this characterization of the listed debts as marital debts, for
purposes of this appeal, we treat all of the debts lis ted in the conclusions of law as marital
debts, even where there may have been evidence to the contrary admitted at trial.
5 Before trial, wife sought to introduce bank statements relating to husband’s mother’s three
bank accounts to show that husband used his mother’s accounts to dissipate marital assets.
The district court ruled that the bank statements before the valuation date were inadmissible
as substantive evidence to show dissipation, but that wife may use bank statements prior to
the valuation for impeachment purposes. The district court also ruled that the bank
statements after the valuation date were admissible to show dis sipation. At trial, wife did
not attempt to offer any of these bank statements into evidence either substantively or for
impeachment. In its judgment and decree, the district court found that wife “provided the
Court with insufficient evidence of the alleged dissipation.”

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separated these bank accounts from those that it labeled “marital accounts.” By
distinguishing the marital accounts from husband’s joint accounts and husband’s mother’s
accounts, the district court excluded these accounts from the marital estate.
In addition, two other items were awarded to wife: wedding jewelry given to wife
by husband (valued at $6,000 ) and a special perfume given to wife by her mother as a
wedding gift (valued at approximately $15,000). The district court awarded both to wife,
but it did not make clear findings regarding the property’s marital or nonmarital character.
Specifically, the district court included two sentences regarding the jewelry in its findings
of fact: “ [Wife] has $6,000 of gold jewelry in her possession that was purchased by
[husband] for [wife]. The Court finds this jewelry should be awarded to [wife].” Its
conclusions of law reiterate this decision: “[W ife] is awarded the jewelry, approximately
$6,000 in value, in her possession given to her by [husband].” Regarding the perfume, the
district court included two sentences in its findings of fact: “[Wife] claims that she has a
nonmarital interest in home -made perfume given to her by her Mother as a wedding gift.
She claims the value of this perfume is approximately $15,0 00.” The district court’s
conclusions of law awarded the perfume to wife: “[Wife] is awarded the containers of the
home-made perfume. [Husband] shall return the home -made perfume to [wife] within
two (2) weeks from the entry of Judgment.” For purposes of this appeal, we construe the
district court’s order awarding the jewelry and the perfume to wife as a decision to award
wife these nonmarital gifts and to exclude them from division of the marital estate.6

6 Neither party contests the decision to award these gifts to wife. Likewise, none of the
arguments on appeal directly concern the marital or nonmarital character of these items.

6
In the judgment and decree, t he district court awarded husband various bank
accounts totaling $3,512.77, his 401K retirement account, and the CRV. The district court
also awarded 100% of the marital debt to husband, requiring him to bear sole responsibility
for paying debts totaling $116,839 .09. The district court awarded wife the Think Mutual
Bank account with an unknown balance, her $662.04 Wells Fargo savings account, her
$1,260.30 Wells Fargo checking account, and no marital debt. In total, by our calculation,
the district court awarded to wife marital assets totaling $1,922.34. The district court
awarded to husband marital debts and assets totaling negative $83,614.66.
B. Spousal Maintenance
Second, t he district court denied wife’s request for spousal maintenance. The
district court found that husband earns an annual gross employment income of $123,000,
and after various deductions, earns a monthly net income of $5,903. The district court also
found that wife is a full -time student who works part-time at Wendy’s, but is capable of
working full-time while going to school. In addition, the district court found that wife
earns a gross monthly income of $667,7 and has $2,166.99 in monthly expenses.
In its judgment and decree, the district court concluded that neither of the two factors
under Minn esota Statutes section 518.552, subdivision 1 (2018), supported a spousal
maintenance award. The district court determined that wife “does not lack sufficient
marital property” because “none was acquired during the parties’ marriage” and the parties

Wife’s argument that the district court inequitably divided the marital estate is strengthened
by our decision to construe the award of wife’s gifts as an award of nonmarital property.
7 The district court did not specify wife’s net monthly income.

7
“lived beyond their means, to the point that they incurred a significant amount of debt.”
Considering the amount of debt incurred during the marriage, the district court found that
wife is capable of supporting herself in a manner similar to what she was accu stomed to
during the marriage. The district court did not specifically analyze or apply the factors in
Minnesota Statutes section 518.552, subdivision 2 (2018).
C. Attorney Fees
Third, the district court denied wife’s request for conduct- and need-based attorney
fees. Because the district court found that both parties contributed to the length and
expense of the litigation, it denied wife’s request for conduct -based attorney fees. The
district court also denied wife’s request for need-based attorney fees, finding that because
wife could be employed on a full-time basis, she has the means to pay her own attorney
fees.
Both parties moved for amended findings. The district court characterized wife’s
motion for amended findings as an improper motion for reconsideration and procedurally
deficient. The district court denied both parties’ motions. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Property Division
Wife argues that the district court erred in its division of the marital estate in the
following three ways: (1) the district court did not include husband’s mother’s accounts in
the marital estate;8 (2) the district court awarded wife assets that do not exist ; and (3) the

8 Wife also made a variety of other arguments, including a challenge to the district court’s
evidentiary ruling regarding the admission of bank statements, a request to offset husband’s

8
district court did not accurately weigh the disparity in the parties’ financial circumstances
when it divided their marital property. We address each in turn and affirm the division of
property.
Our statutes define “marital property” as: “property, real or personal . . . acquired
by the parties, or either of them, to a dissolution . . . at any time during the existence of the
marriage relation between them . . . but prior to the date of valuation . . . .” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.003, subd. 3b ( 2018). “All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the
marriage and before the valuation date is presumed to be marital property regardless of
whether title is held individually or by the spouses . . . . ” Id. “Upon a dissolution of a
marriage . . . the [district] court shall make a just and equitable division of the marital
property of the parties” after considering all relevant factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd.
1 (2018). These factors include “the length of the marriage, any prior marriage of a party,
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities, needs, opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets,
and income of each party.” Id.

property award based on allegations that he used marital property to pay his attorney fees,
and a request to recover a portion of a t ax refund that was diverted to husband’s student
loan debt during the marriage. We decline to address these arguments as wife did not
clearly identify error, did not ad equately brief the argument, or did not properly raise the
issue in a timely motion for a new trial. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04; State Dep’t of
Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address issue not adequately briefed); Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461,
464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“On appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon
the one who relies upon it.”).

9
Because w ife contests the district c ourt’s factual findings regarding whether the
parties acquired a particular asset, the district court’s factual findings regarding the
existence of particular assets, and the district court’s ultimate division of marital property,
wife’s arguments involve two standards of review. We review the factual determinations
regarding the acquisition and existence of assets for clear error. See also Minn. R. Civ. P.
52.01; LaValle v. Kulkay, 277 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 1979) (reviewing for clear error a
district court’s finding that a plan existed to develop certain property); Peterson v. Holiday
Recreational Indus., Inc. , 726 N.W.2d 499, 507 (Minn. App. 2007) (reviewing a di strict
court’s finding regarding the existence of a constructive trust for clear error), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 28, 2007); State v. Hines, 458 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 1990) (reviewing
a district court’s determination of the existence of a conspiracy for clear error), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990); Southwell v. Southwell, 413 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. App.
1987) (instructing the district court to make findings regarding the disputed existence of an
asset).
“When determining whether findings are clearly erroneous, the appellate court
views the record in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings,” Vangsness v.
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000), and defers to the district court’s
credibility determinations, Gada v. Dedefo , 684 N.W. 2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004)
(citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)). “[I]f we are ‘left with the
definite and firm convictio n that a mistake has been made,’ we may find the trial court’s
decision to be clearly erroneous, notwithstanding the existence of evidence to support such

10
findings.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997) (quoting In re Trust Known
as Great N. Iron Ore Props., 243 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1976)).
We review the district court’s decision to unequally divide the marital assets and
liabilities for an abuse of discretion. “A [district] court has broad discretion in evaluating
and dividing property in a marital dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse
of discretion.” Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). “[An appellate court]
will affirm the [district] court’s division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and
principle even though we might have taken a different approach.” Id. A district court
abuses its discretion in dividing property if it resolves the matter in a manner “that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
First, wife argues that the district court erred when it decided not to include
husband’s mother’s bank accounts in the marital estate. We are not persuaded. The bank
statements admitted into evidence as well as husband’s accompanying testimony show that
husband had power of attorney to access his mother’s accounts on her behalf. Based on
this evidence, the district court determined that the accounts belonged to husband’s mother.
Wife cites to no authority treating power of attorney as an asset or supporting the
proposition that an agent acquires a property interest in the principal’s property. 9 We
conclude that, viewing th e evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s

9 “[I]n a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty
and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” Danielson v. Danielson, 721 N.W.2d
335, 339 (Minn. App. 2006) ; see also Fraser v. Fraser, 642 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn. App.
2002) (noting that section 518.58 “does not authorize th e district court to adjudicate t he
interests of third parties”).

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findings, we are not left with the conviction that a mistake has been made. The district
court did not clearly err in finding that because husband acquired only power of attorney,
neither party acquired a property interest in those accounts during the marriage.
Second, wife argues that the district court awarded her two marital assets that she
believes no longer exist: the Think Bank accounts and wife’s Wells Fargo checking
account.10 We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the items
existed. Husband testified regarding the balance of the Think Bank accounts before and
after the valuation date, and a bank statement was admitted without objection for the se
accounts. Similarly, both parties testified that wife’s Wells Fargo checking account had a
balance of $1,260, and a bank statement was admitted without objection regarding this
account. The district court did not clearly err in identifying these accounts as marital assets.
Third, wife argues that the district court did not equitably divide the parties’ marital
property. We disagree and conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when
it divided the marital estate. We begin by noting the importance of considering the division
of marital debt when deciding whether a district cou rt abused its discretion and unequally
allocated marital property. See e.g., Korf v. Korf, 553 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn. App. 1996)
(“In dissolution proceedings, debts are apportioned as part of the property settlement and

10 Wife also argues that the wedding perfume and the wedding jewelry no longer exist. In
its judgment and decree, the district court awarded the jewelry and the perfume to wife. In
addition, the district court ordered husband to return the perfume to wife within two weeks
of the entry of judgment. Given the decision to construe the district court’s award of both
the perfume and the jewelry as wife’s nonmarital property, and given the languag e in the
district court’s judgment regarding return of the perfume, we need not address this
argument. The existence of these nonmarital items awarded to wife does not impact our
review of the issues before us.

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are treated in the same manner as t he division of assets. ”). In this case, the district court
apportioned all of the marital debt, including the CRV loan, to husband. This debt totaled
$116,839.09. The district court also awarded husband his pension (valued at $2,437.66),
the CRV (with a fair market value of $27,274), and various marital bank accounts (valued
at $3,512.77), for a total of $33,224.43. Thus, husband received property worth negative
$83,614.66. In contrast, the district court awarded marital bank accounts worth $1,922.34
to wife and none of the marital debt. Given the overall negative value of the marital estate
and given the great disparity in the division of marital debt, we cannot agree that the district
court treated wife unfairly or otherwise abused its discretion in dividing the marital debts
and assets. We affirm the district court’s division of property.
II. Spousal Maintenance
Wife argues that the district court committed reversible error by denying her request
for an award of ongoing spousal maintenance. 11 Because the district court’s findings are
insufficient to permit review, we remand for further proceedings.
Spousal maintenance is “an award in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding of
payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for th e support and

11 Wife also appears to challenge the district court’s order terminating husband’s temporary
spousal maintenance obligation. We do not address this issue as temporary orders are
generally not appealable and are only reviewable to the extent that they directly affect the
judgment. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03; Rigwald v. Rigwald, 423 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Minn.
App. 1988) (noting that temporary relief orders in dissolution cases are not final appealable
orders); see also, e.g., Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015) (“An appeal
should be dis missed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an
award of effective relief is no longer possible.”); In re Paternity of B.J.H, 573 N.W.2d 99,
104-05 (Minn. App. 1998) (stating that a challenge to a temporary parenting time schedule
was moot because it had since expired).

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maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2020). A district court ma y
grant a spousal maintenance award if it makes specific findings regarding the spouse
seeking maintenance:
[T]he court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if
it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of
the spouse considering the standard of living established
during the marriage, especially, but not limited to, a period of
training or education, or
(b) is unable to provide adequate self -support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1. If application of one factor enumerated in subdivision 1
indicates that a maintenance award is appropriate , the district court shall consider several
additional factors to set the amount and duration of spousal maintenance, including the
following: the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance; that par ty’s ability to
meet needs independently; the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; the probability,
given the party’s age and skills, of completing education or t raining and becoming self -
supporting; the standard of living established during the marriage; the duration of the
marriage; the length of absence from employment for the party seeking maintenance; the
extent to which that party’s earning capacity has become permanently diminished; the age,
and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; the ability of
the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet needs while meeting those of the

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spouse seeking maintenance; and the contributi ons of each party to the marital estate,
including contributions of a spouse as a homemaker. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2.
We review factual challenges regarding spousal maintenance for clear error. Minn.
R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous”); Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992) (“Findings of
fact concerning spousal maintenance must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.”).
In addition, we review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a request for spousal
maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Curtis v. Curtis , 887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn.
2016). “Even where the record supports the [district] court’s decision, the failure to make
specific findings compels a remand.” Stevens v. Stevens , 501 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn.
App. 1993); see also Kremer v. Kremer, 889 N.W.2d 41, 55 (Minn. App. 2017) (remanding
for failure to make specific findings under Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1), aff’d, 912
N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 2018).
In this case, the district court denied spousal maintenance under the two factors in
subdivision 1. Specifically, the district court found that because “the parties’ marital estate
primarily existed of debt ,” wife “does not lack a sufficient apportionment of property to
provide for her reasonable needs,” and wife “can reasonably provide a standard of living
for herself similar to that that she was accustomed to during the parties’ marriage.” We
have previously determined that when the parties’ standard of living is maintained by debt
financing, the parties cannot expect the same lifestyle after their dissolution. Chamberlain
v. Chamberlain, 615 N.W.2d 405, 409 -10 (Minn. App. 2000). A low standard of living,
however, does not dispose of the district court’s obligation to make particular findings

15
regarding wife’s reasonable needs. Here, the district court made no such findings regarding
the marital standard of living , regarding what w ould constitute adequate self -support, or
regarding wife’s ability to provide for her reasonable needs given her marital and
nonmarital assets , and considering her current “period of training or education.” In
addition, the district court did not make spe cific findings in support of its conclusion that
wife is currently underemployed and did not make any findings r egarding wife’s
anticipated income if fully employed . Given wife’s gross monthly income of $667, or
approximately $8,000 annually, and husband’ s gross annual income of $123,000,
additional findings are necessary to justify the denial of wife’s spousal maintenance request
under the factors listed in subdivision 1. On remand, the district court shall make additional
findings regarding the factors in subdivision 1. In addition, if applicable, the district court
shall make findings regarding the factors listed in subdivision 2. The district court may
reopen the record at its discretion.
III. Attorney Fees
Wife argues that the district court erred by denying her requ est for both conduct-
based and need -based attorney fees. Because we conclude that wife forfeited appellate
review of these issues, we decline to review that portion of the district court’s decision.
A. Conduct-Based Fees
The district court may impose c onduct-based attorney fees “against a party who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1 (2018). Conduct-based attorney fees may be “based on the impact a party’s
behavior has had on the costs of the litigation regardless of the relative financial resources

16
of the parties.” Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991). The
requesting party bears the burden of establishing that the other party’s conduct
unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding. Geske v. Marcolina,
624 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. App. 2001).
In this case, wife argues that the district court abused its d iscretion in denying her
conduct-based attorney fees because husband dissipated marital assets. Specifically, wife
sought to introduce bank statements relating to husband’s mother’s three bank accounts to
show that husband used his mother’s accounts to dissipate marital assets. Before trial, the
district court ruled that the bank statements prior to the valuation date were inadmissible
as substantive evidence to show dissipation, but that wife may use bank statements prior to
the valuation for impeachme nt purposes. The district court also ruled that the bank
statements after the valuation date were admissible to show dissipation. At trial, wife did
not attempt to offer any of these bank statements into evidence either substantively or for
impeachment. In its judgment and decree, the district court found that wife “provided the
Court with insufficient evidence of the alleged dissipation.” Wife now challenges th e
district court’s evidentiary ruling regarding the admissibility of the bank statements and
argues that conduct-based fees are appropriate.
We conclude that wife has forfeited this argument for three reasons. First, wife has
cited no legal authority to support the argument and has not explained how the district
court’s evidentiary ruling was err oneous. We generally decline to address inadequately
briefed legal arguments like this one. See State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. , 558 N.W.2d at
480. Second, wife did not bring a motion for new trial regarding what she now identifies

17
as an error in the dist rict court’s evidentiary rulings regarding dissipation evidence. See
Sauter v. Wasemiller , 389 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1986) (“[T]he general rule [is] that
matters such as trial procedure, evidentiary rulings and jury instructions are subject to
appellate review only if there has been a motion for a new trial in which such matters have
been assigned as error.”); Frank v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn.
1983) (concluding that when a district court’s failure to address an issue is not raised in a
new trial motion, there is no ruling for an appellate court to review). Third, wife did not
seek to introduce bank statements at trial for these accounts as impeachment evidence or
as substantive evidence as the district court’s ruling would have allowed. Accordingly, we
decline to review the district court’s decision to deny wife’s request for conduct -base
attorney fees.
B. Needs-Based Fees
Wife also forfeited appellate review of her request fo r an a ward of need-based
attorney fees. We decline to review the denial of this request as well.
A party requesting need -based attorney fees must establish the following three
elements:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith
assertion of the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.

18
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. The party seeking need-based attorney fees has the burden
of establishing these elements. See In re Marriage of Sammons , 642 N.W.2d 450, 458
(Minn. App. 2 002) (refusing to award need -based attorney fees when party failed to
establish the existence of elements required by section 518.14). A lack of specific findings
on the statutory factors “is not fatal to an a ward where review of the order ‘ reasonably
implies’ that the district court considered the relevant factor s and where the district court
‘was familiar with the history of the case’ and ‘had access to the parties’ financial records.’”
Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 817 (quoting Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 825-26 (Minn. 1999)).
In this case, the district court denied wife’s request for need -based attorney fees
because it found that wife, if employed on a full-time basis, has the means to pay her own
fees. On appeal, wife does not discuss any legal authority to support her position. Nor
does wife explain how the district court abused its discretion in concluding that wife cannot
establish the necessary statutory factors, especially when the district court allotted husband
all of the party’s marital debts and analyzed wife’s needs in light her ability to work full -
time. As noted above, a party forfeits appellate review through the absence of adequate
legal analysis. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. , 558 N.W.2d at 480. We decline to
review the district court’s decision to deny wife’s request for need-based attorney fees.
Affirmed in part and remanded.