State of Minnesota,

1

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1921

Court of Appeals Anderson, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,
Filed: March 31, 2021
vs. Office of Appellate Courts

Kevin Russel Serbus,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota;

David Torgelson, Renville County Attorney, Olivia, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Drake D. Metzger, Metzger Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
A driver of a motor vehicle on a public highway is in a “public place” for the purpose
of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142 (2020).
Affirmed.

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O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
Minnesota Statutes section 624.7142, subdivision 1 (4) (2020), prohibits a person
who is under the influence of alcohol from carrying a pistol in a public place. Here we are
asked to determine whether a driver of a motor vehicle is in a public place for the purpose
of that statute when the vehicle is on a public highway. The district court determined that
the interior of a private motor vehicle is not a public place when it is not regularly held
open to the public and, accordingly, dismissed the count charging appellant Kevin Serbus
with a violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd. 1(4). The court of appeals reversed,
concluding that the proper subject of analysis is the highway on which Serbus was driving,
and reinstated the charge. Because we conclude that the Legislature intended to prohibit
an impaired person from carrying a pistol on public streets even when that person is inside
a motor vehicle, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. On July 26, 2019, a deputy Renville County sheriff
stopped Serbus after watching the vehicle Serbus was driving swerve across the center lane
of the highway. The deputy conducted a field sobriety test after noting the smell of alcohol
coming from the vehicle and that Serbus had bloodshot and watery eyes. A preliminary
breath test showed that Serbus had an alcohol concentration of .09. The deputy arreste d
Serbus and placed him in the back of the squad car.
The deputy asked Serbus whether there were any items that Serbus wanted from his
vehicle. Serbus replied that he wanted his keys, wallet, and phone. Serbus notified the

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deputy that his phone was in t he center console next to his firearm , a Ruger .45 caliber
pistol. The deputy retrieved the items for Serbus and transported him to the Renville
County Jail. At the time of the stop, Serbus had a vali d permit to possess a pistol. There
is no evidence in the record that Serbus possessed the pistol any where outside of his
vehicle.
Serbus was charged with four crimes, including Count 4, carrying a pistol in a public
place while under the influence of a lcohol, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd.
1(4). Serbus moved to dismiss the charges. After holding a contested omnibus hearing,
the district court dismissed Count 4 for lack of probable cause. The district court relied on
the definition of “public place” in Minn. Stat. § 624.7181 (2020), a statute under which
Serbus was not charged. That statute prohibits the carrying of rifles and shotguns in a
“public place,” which it defines as including “private property that is regularly and
frequently open to or made available for use by the public.” Id., subd. 1(c). The court
observed that “a private motor vehicle is not a public place” and that there was no indication
that Serbus “frequently makes his vehicle available for use by the public.” Therefore, the
court concluded, there was no probable cause that Serbus carried the pistol in a public place
while under the influence of alcohol.
On the State’s pretrial appeal, the court of appeals reversed. State v. Serbus , 947
N.W.2d 690 (Minn. App. 2020) . The court of appeals looked to its holding in State v.
Gradishar, 765 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. App. 2009), in which it had defined public place for
the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142—the section under which Serbus is charged —as
follows: “ ‘[G]enerally an indoor or outdoor area, whether privately or publicly owned, to

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which the public have access by right or by invitation, expressed or implied, whether by
payment of money or not.’ ” Serbus, 947 N.W.2d at 692 (quoting Gradishar, 765 N.W.2d
at 903). Applying that definition here, the court concluded that the meaning of public place
was nonetheless ambiguous because the relevant subject could be either the interior of
Serbus’s car or the highway on which he drove. Id. Employing several canons of
construction, the court determined that the “proper subject of analysis is the public highway
on which Serbus drove his vehicle ,” which it further concluded was a public place. Id.
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Count 4 and remanded to the
district court. Id. at 693.
Serbus filed a petition for review, which we granted.
ANALYSIS
In this pretrial appeal, we are asked to decide whether a person driving a vehicle on
a public highway is in a “public place” for the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd. 1.
“When the State appeals a pre trial order, it must show clearly and unequivocally (1) that
the district court’s ruling was erroneous and (2) that the ruling will have a ‘critical impact’
on the State’s ability to prosecute the case.” State v. Underdahl , 767 N.W.2d 677, 683
(Minn. 2009); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2(2). Because the district court dismissed
the charge, critical impact is met. See Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 684 (stating that dismissal
of a charge has a critical impact on the prosecution’s case even if other charge s remain).
Thus, we need consider only whether the district court ’s interpretation of the statute was
erroneous.

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The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Larson
v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010). The object of all statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). “If the
Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we
interpret the statute a ccording to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of
statutory construction.” State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 284–85 (Minn. 2015) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) . But if “ a statute is susceptible to more than
one reaso nable interpretation , then the statute is ambiguous” and we may consider the
canons of statutory construction. State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2013).
A.
We first determine whether the meaning of public place is ambiguous. The statute
provides: “A person may not carry a pistol on or about the person’s clothes or person in a
public place . . . (4) when the person is under the influence of alcohol.” Minn. Stat.
§ 624.7142, subd. 1. The statute does not define “public place.” Neither does the relevant
definitions section in the same chapter. See Minn. Stat. § 624.712 (2020) (providing
definitions for Minn. Stat. § § 624.711–.717 (2020)). Because the statute does not define
public place, we may “look to dictionary definitions of those words and a pply them in the
context of the statute” to determine whether public place has a plain and unambiguous
meaning. State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016).
Dictionaries offer a variety of definitions for both “public” and “place.” One
meaning of public is “accessible to or shared by all members of the community.” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1836 (2002) . Another meaning is

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“supported by or for the benefit of the people as a whole.” Id. Still another is “exposed to
general view: conspicuous, open.” Id. In the context of the statute, which regulates where
an intoxicated person may carry a pistol, all of these meanings are reasonable. See
Haywood, 886 N.W.2d at 488 (stating that we consider dictionary definitions in l ight of
the context of the statute when determining whether there is a plain meaning of a word).
Similarly, there are a variety of definitions of place, even after excluding meanings
not related to location, such as those involving sequence, rank, or employment. Place can
mean “[a]n area with definite or indefinite boundaries; a portion of space.” The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1345 (5th ed. 2011); cf. Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary Unabridged 1727 ( defining place as “a physical environment:
space”). It can also mean “[a] building or an area set aside for a specified purpose .” The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1345; cf. Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary Unabridged 1727 (defining place as “a building or locality used
for a special purpose”). Still other meanings include a “dwelling”; a “business
establishment or office”; a “locality, such as a town or city”; or a “ public square or street
with houses in a town.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1345.
Thus, as relevant here, place can be used in either a geographical sense, such as one’s
presence on a highway, or in a spatial sense, such as one’s presence inside a car, bus, or
other vehicle.
Taken together , “public place” could reasonably mean a geographical or spa tial
location that is accessible to, supported by or for the benefit of, or visible to , people as a
whole. Because there is more than one reasonable meaning of “public place,” we conclude

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that the statute is ambiguous. See Hayes , 826 N.W.2d at 804 (stating that a statute is
ambiguous when it “is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”).
Consequently, we cannot dete rmine from the face of the statute whether the driver of a
motor vehicle on a highway is in a public place.
Although Serbus admits that the statute is ambiguous, he asserts that the interior of
his car is unambiguously not a public place under the definition formulated by the court of
appeals in Gradishar, 765 N.W.2d at 903. There, the court defined public place for the
purpose of section 624.7142 as “generally an indoor or outdoor area, whether privately or
publicly owned, to which the public have access by right or by invitation, expressed or
implied, whether by payment of money or not.” Id. Of course, the interpretation of the
court of appeals is not binding on us. State v. Borg, 806 N.W.2d 535, 546 n.4 (Minn. 2011).
As we have determined, the language of the statute itself is ambiguous.1
B.
When a statute is ambiguous, we may consider additional canons of construction to
determine the intent of the Legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16. As relevant here, the parties
consider three statutory canons: the “mischief to be remedied,” the “object to be attained”
by the legislation, and the “consequences of a particular interpretation.” Id. In addition,
Serbus relies on a decision of the court of appeals that held that the interior of a car is not

1 Even if the Gradishar definition were the relevant inquiry, we do not escape the
ambiguity. The Gradishar definition substitutes “place” with “an indoor or outdoor area.”
But like “place,” the word “area” can be used in either a geographical or spatial sense. See
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 115 (defining area as “a
definitely bounded piece of ground set aside for a specific use or purpose” or “any
particular extent of space or surface” (emphasis added)).

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a public place in the context of a prostitution statute. See State v. White, 692 N.W.2d 749,
753 (Minn. App. 2005), superseded by statute, Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 17, § 23,
2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1134 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 609.321 (2020)), appeal
dismissed (Minn. June 14, 2005). He also invokes the rule of lenity. We consider each of
these arguments in turn.
1.
We turn first to the mischief to be remedied by section 624.7142. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(3). In this instance, the m ischief is plain from the face of the statute. See State
v. Decker , 916 N.W.2d 385, 387 –88 (Minn. 2018) (determining the mischief to be
remedied from the face of the statute). The statute prohibits any person from carrying a
pistol on or about the person’s clothes or person in a public place while under the influence
of certain substances , including alcohol and controlled substances, that impact how the
body functions. Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd. 1. Therefore, the relevant mischief is the
carrying of a pistol in public while impaired, which endangers others.
This danger is present even when an impaired person is inside a vehicle. Vehicles
are inherently mobile and can be driven to or past places where members of the public are
frequently present, including parks, sidewalks, restaurants, stores, and parking lots. There
are also other people inside of other vehicles traveling on public roads. As a result, there
is a significant risk that a person who is under the influence of an impairing substance and
who discharges a pistol —intentionally or accidently —in a place frequented by members
of the community could injure someone, even if the impaired person is inside a car.

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Consequently, this consideration weighs in favor of interpreting the statute to include the
driver of a vehicle on a highway.
2.
We next consider the object to be attained by the statute, which is closely related to
the identified mischief. Minn. Stat. § 645.16(4). Here, the plain goal of the statute is to
reduce the risk of in jury to people from the discharge of a pistol in place s where people
generally have a right to be present.
According to the State, because the ultimate goal is public safety, the object of the
statute is to “minimize the locations” where a person may carry a firearm while impaired.
Serbus claims that this formulation of the object is too broad. We agree. If the purpose of
the statute were solely to minimize the locations where people could be endangered, the
Legislature would have omitted the phrase “in a public place.” But the presence of the
phrase establishes that the Legislature chose to single out the danger posed in one set of
locations, namely, public places, over another set of locations, namely, nonpublic places.
See State v. Lopez , 908 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. 2018) (Lillehaug, J., concurring)
(observing that the burglary statute “singles out” the burglary of dwellings for a higher
penalty than the burglary of other buildings). Our formulation of the object accounts for
this distinction, giving meaning to the Legislature’s inclusion of the phrase “in a public
place.” See State v. Riggs , 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015) (“ [W]e construe a statute
as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to all of its provisions.”).
Nevertheless, even our narrow interpretation of the goal favors the State’s position.
Because a vehicle is mobile and may be driven in close proximity to people who are in

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public places, prohibiting an impaired driver from carrying a pistol on a highway would
promote the protective purpose of the statute. But excluding an impaired driver from the
reach of the ban would expose members of the public to greater danger.2
3.
Next, we turn to the constitutional, doctrinal, and practical consequences of the
parties’ positions. Mi nn. Stat. § 645.16(6). As to constitutional implications, Serbus

2 While analyzing the object to be attained, the parties briefly discuss the relationship
between Minn. Stat. §§ 624.714 (the permit-to-carry statute) and 624.7142 (the carrying -
while-impaired statute). Section 624.714 incorporates a de finition of public place from
section 624.7181, which includes “private property that is regularly and frequently open to
or made available for use by the public.” Minn. Stat. § 624.7181, subd. 1(c) (2020) ; see
Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a ( incorporating the definition for public place in section
624.7181, subdivision 1(c)).
We do not find the incorporation of section 624.7181’s definition in to section
624.714 instructive because the canons of construction that would permit us to look to that
section do not apply. Under our whole-statute canon, we read statutes “as a whole so as to
harmonize and give effect to all its parts.” Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683 (citation omitted).
This canon may apply even when the statute in question is unambiguous. Id. A second
canon, in pari materia, “allows two statutes with common purposes and subject matter to
be construed together to determine the meaning of amb iguous statutory language.” State
v. Lucas, 589 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 1999). This canon is applied only after a determination
of ambiguity. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017).
Here, the same bill that enacted section 624.7142 substant ially amended section
624.714, including by adding the definition of public place quoted above. See Act of Apr.
28, 2003, ch. 28, art. 2, §§ 4-28, 34, 2003 Minn. Laws 265, 274 (codified as amended at
Minn. Stat. § 624.714 (2020)). Even so, neither canon applies because, as we have
previously held, sections 624.714 and 624.7142 regulate “significantly different categories
of people and conduct” and therefore “do not sufficiently speak to the same subject matter.”
State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn . 2018) (declining to rely on section 624.714
under the whole-statute canon when interpreting the phrase “on or about” one’s person or
clothes for the purpose of section 624.7142). Specifically, section 624.714 applies to pistol
owners who do not have a permit to carry and applies whether or not they are impaired.
See id. But section 624.7142 applies only to impaired pistol owners and applies whether
or not they have a permit. Id. Accordingly, we are not guided by the definition of public
place in section 624.714.

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argues that treating a private vehicle as a public place opens the door to “warrantless
vehicle searches.” He explains that, during a traffic stop, a police officer could ask a
passenger to show the passenger’s permit to carry and identification. If the passenger
appears intoxicated, the officer could then search those parts of the v ehicle that are within
arm’s reach of the passenger.
The hypothetical is not of great concern for several reasons. First, as to this appeal,
Serbus does not challenge the constitutionality of the search. In fact, Serbus admits that he
gave the deputy permission to open the center console and informed the deputy that the
pistol was there. Second, and more generally, under current law, the holder of a permit to
carry is already required to display a permit card and identification “upon l awful demand
by a peace officer.” Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1b(a). This requirement is unaffected by
our holding. Third, constitutional limitations on a police officer’s authority to search a
person or vehicle without a warrant still apply. Under our constitution, a police officer
cannot expand the scope of a traffic stop beyond the original purpose of the stop without
“at least a reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d
346, 350 (Minn. 2012); see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting unreasonable
searches); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004) (holding that “Article I,
Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution requires that each incremental intrusion during a
traffic stop be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate
purpose of the stop, (2) independent probab le cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined
in Terry” v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Thus, if the police officer were conducting an
ordinary traffic stop, the officer would not be permitted to ask whether the passenger has a

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firearm or permit to carry without sufficient justification, such as a reasonable suspicion
that the passenger was carrying a pistol. See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn.
2003) (holding that a police officer impermissibly expanded the scope of a routine traffic
stop, in violation of the Minnesota Constitution, by asking the passenger about weapons
and drugs without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic offense).
Finally, our holding today is limited to the meaning of publ ic place for the purpose of
section 624.7142 and does not affect the meaning of publ ic place in other statutes.
Consequently, our holding here is narrow and does not open the door to warrantless vehicle
searches.
As to doctrinal implications, the rule proposed by S erbus is pr oblematic when
applied to other modes of transportation . The rationale underlying his position is that the
public do not “need protection from the interior of a private motor vehicle.” Even if we
agreed that a n impaired motor vehicle driver with a pistol does not pose a threat to the
public, this rationale raises serious questions about modes of transportation that are less
enclosed. For example, would the driver of a convertible with the top down on a public
street be in a public place? What about a tractor? A motorcycle and sidecar? A n electric
bicycle or scooter? However we chose to answer those questions in future cases would
inevitably be disconnected from the goal o f the statute in protecting passersby from
impaired people with pistols.
Finally, as to practical considerations, applying section 624.7142 to impaired drivers
on public roads protects the public while imposing only a minimal burden on lawful permit
holders. To avoid liability under this statute, permit holders need only stow the pistol out

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of arm’s reach, such as in the trunk of the vehicle, if they want to take their gun with them
in a car on a public road after they have been drinking.3 See State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d
635, 640 (Minn. 2018) (holding that a person carries a pistol on or about their clothes or
person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.71 42, subd. 1, “if there is either a physical nexus
between the person and the pistol or if the pistol is carried within arm’s reach of the
person”). This burden is minimal and it promotes public safety related to the risks caused
by an impaired person carry ing a pistol in public . By contrast, u nder Serbus’s
interpretation, an impaired driver (or passenger) could hold a loaded pistol in a vehicle with
the windows down while on a busy street without liability under section 624.7142. In fact,
the driver could even wave or point the pistol in an arguably threatening manner without
liability under that section.
Consequently, because a public highway is a geographical location that is accessible
to the general community, these statutory canons support a determination that the
Legislature intended to prohibit the driver of a motor vehicle from carrying a pistol on a
public highway while impaired.
4.
Serbus’s remaining arguments do not change our analysis. Serbus cites to State v.
White, in which the court of appeals held that, in the context of a statute regulating
prostitution, the meaning of public place does not include the inside of a motor vehicle on

3 Obviously, a person who is impaired by alcohol or other substances is criminally
liable for driving while impaired, regardless of whether they are carrying a pistol on or
about their person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142, subd. 1.

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a public street. 692 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Minn. App. 2005), appeal dismissed (Minn. June
14, 2005). In light of White, Serbus urges us to similarly determine that the driver of a
motor vehicle, when operating the vehicle on a public street or highway, is not in a public
place for the purpose of section 624.7142. We are not persuaded by this contention. White
is not good law because its interpretation of public place was superseded by statute. See
Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 17, § 23, 2005 Minn. Laws 90 1, 1134 (codified as
amended at Minn. Stat. § 609.321 (2020)). Further, the rationale in White in fact
undermines Serbus’s position. The court of appeals considered that the harm to be
remedied was from the “publicly visible” nature of prostitution activity, which it concluded
is lessened when a person is in a vehicle. White, 692 N.W.2d at 751. This reasoning cuts
against Serbus’s argument because the relevant danger here—the risk of physical harm
from the discharge of a pistol—is present even when the gun is not visible to people outside
of a vehicle. Consequently, White does not support Serbus’s position.
Next, Serbus asks us to apply the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in his favor.
Although the rule of lenity directs courts to “favor a more lenient interpretation of a
criminal statute,” we recently clarified that the rule of lenity is a canon of “last resort” that
applies “only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are
left with an ambiguous statute.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn. 2017)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the ambiguity here can be
resolved by resorting to the canons provided by Minn. Stat. § 645.16, the rule of lenity does
not apply.

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In s um, w e conclude that the meaning of public place in section 624.7142 is
ambiguous. Applying the relevant canons of statutory construction, we determine that the
Legislature intended to prohibit an impaired driver from carrying a pistol on a highway in
a vehicle. Accordingly, we hold that the driver of a motor vehicle on a public highway is
in a “public place” for the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Affirmed.