Gary Allen Jensen, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1927

Gary Allen Jensen,
Appellant,

vs.

1985 Ferrari - plt 391-957 - VIN# ZFFUA12A9F0057043,
Respondent.

Filed August 31, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-18-3660

James M. Ventura, Wayzata, Minnesota (for appellant)

David S. Kendall, Alina Schwartz, Cam pbell Knutson P.A., Eagan, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Wo rke, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A driver participating in the ignition-in terlock program under Minnesota Statutes
section 171.306 (2018) must be enrolled in the program with the vehicle that is the subject
of the forfeiture proceedings in order to st ay forfeiture of that vehicle under Minnesota
Statutes section 169A.63, subdivision 13 (Supp. 2019).

2
O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After being convicted of driving his 1985 red Ferrari while in toxicated, appellant
Gary Allen Jensen contests its judicial forfeiture on three grounds. First, he contends that
his participation in the ignition-interlock program entitled him to stay his Ferrari’s
forfeiture. He also argues that he did not commit a designated offense justifying forfeiture.
Finally, according to Jensen, forfeiture of his Ferrari violated his constitutional rights to be
free from excessive fines and to procedural due process. Because Jensen did not meet the
requirements for the statutory stay, but he did commit a designated offense, and because
his constitutional rights were not violated, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2018, a state patrol officer responded to a report about a stalled car
blocking an intersection in Burnsville, Minneso ta. Upon arrival, the officer observed a
1985 red Ferrari stopped in a traffic lane. The officer approached the driver, later identified
as appellant Gary Allen Jensen. Jensen was slurring his speech and mumbling, smelled
like alcohol, and was unable to explain why his car had been stopped in the traffic lane.
Believing that Jensen was intoxicated, the officer put him in the back of a squad car.
A second officer arrived on the scene to a ssist the first officer. That officer spoke
with Jensen and observed that his speech was slurred, he had watery eyes, and he smelled
strongly of alcohol. Officers also realized th at Jensen was subject to a driver’s license
restriction that invalidated his license if Jensen consumed any alcohol. After administering
field sobriety tests and a preliminary breat h test to Jensen—which he failed—officers

3
arrested him. Jensen submitted to a br eath test and his alcohol concentration
measured 0.20.
The state charged Jensen with four crimin al offenses: third-degree driving while
impaired (DWI), second-degree DWI, driving af ter consuming alcohol with a restricted
license, and careless driving. Jensen pl eaded guilty to third-degree DWI (a gross
misdemeanor), and the remaining counts were dismissed. Th e court sentenced Jensen to
about a year in jail stay ed for two years, with supervised probation, 60 days of electronic
home monitoring, a $900 fine, and various other conditions.
When he was arrested, police impounded Jensen’s Ferrari and provided him a notice
of seizure and intent to forfeit the car. Jensen challenged the forfeiture, and the district
court held a bench trial.
At trial, the respondent Minnesota Stat e Patrol presented testimony from the two
officers involved with Jensen’s arrest, as well as various e xhibits, including evidence of
the estimated value of the Ferrari, Jensen’s driving and criminal records, and his
participation in the ignition- interlock program. This valu ation evidence—based on an
internet search—estimated a value between $44,900 to $92, 300. In response, Jensen
testified that he believed his Ferrari was wort h $75,000, although likely in need of some
repair. He described the Ferrari’s typical maintenance needs and what repairs he would
expect it might need after being in law-en forcement custody for nearly a year. For
example, Jensen noted that he would replace the fluids and some belts in the engine, and
that he would want to have the Ferrari detailed and, depe nding on its condition, possibly

4
repainted. Jensen estimated the Ferrari would need about $4,000 or $5,000 in maintenance
if he got it back.1
Jensen also testified that he had previous ly participated in the ignition-interlock
program beginning in 2012. At the time of this DWI, however, he had completed the
program and no longer had interlock devices on his vehicles. But two months after the
DWI from which this case stems, Jensen was arrested for another impaired driving offense
in a rental car. After that incident, in October 2018, Jensen again enrolled in the
ignition-interlock program with one of his other vehicles, his Range Rover. Jensen
provided no evidence that he installed or attempted to install interlock devices on his other
two vehicles, including the Ferrari.
In its order following the trial, the district court ordered the Ferrari forfeited to the
Minnesota State Patrol. It concluded that Jensen had committed an offense in the Ferrari,
which subjected the car to forfeiture (a “des ignated offense”), and that Jensen did not
qualify for the statutory stay for participants in the ignition-interlock program. The court
also reasoned that forfeiture did not offend Jensen’s rights to procedural due process or to
be free from excessive fines.
Jensen appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did Jensen’s participation in the ignition-interlock program with a different vehicle
stay the forfeiture of his Ferrari?

II. Did Jensen commit a designated offense justifying forfeiture?

1 Jensen did not testify that the Ferrari was inoperable or unable to be driven.

5
III. Was the forfeiture of Jensen ’s Ferrari an excessive fine?

IV. Did the forfeiture process violate Jens en’s right to procedural due process?

ANALYSIS
To place the entangled legal issues before us in context, we begin with a broad
overview of forfeiture law. Civil forfeiture is a process by which a law enforcement agency
(like the Minnesota State Patrol here), obta ins legal title to property connected with
criminal activity. This practice predates the founding of the United States. Early forfeiture
opinions, for example, involved ownership of pirate ships. See Leonard v. Texas ,
137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (recalling that th e first United States Congress passed laws
permitting the forfeiture of pirate ships); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave. ,
507 U.S. 111, 119, 113 S. Ct . 1126, 1132 (1993) (d escribing historic forfeiture of pirate
ships).
But whether a pirate ship or a car driven by a repeat drunk dr iver, the taking of a
person’s private property by the government —while protecting the public—raises the
specter of overzealous abuse.
2 In constitutional terms, those concerns most often translate

2 Minnesota courts have recognized the im portance of protecting personal property. See
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus , 924 N.W.2d 594, 601 (Minn. 2019) (noting that due-process
protections in forfeiture proceedings exist to protect the public from erroneous or arbitrary
deprivation of property). Certainly, criticism of civil forfeiture exists, particularly when
the process is abused. See, e.g., Vanita Saleema Snow, From the Dark Tower: Unbridled
Civil Asset Forfeiture, 10 Drexel L. Rev. 69, 122-23 (2017) (referring to national attention
paid to civil forfeiture, including critical “HBO specials and newspaper articles”); Michael
van den Berg, Proposing a Transactional Approach to Civil Forfeiture Reform, 163 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 867, 906 (2015) (discussing widesp read “perverse” profit incentives for law
enforcement to use and abuse civil forfeiture); see also United States v. James Daniel Good

6
into claims of due-process violations and imposition of excessive fines. See U.S. Const.
amends. V, VIII, XIV. To balance these indi vidual rights against the overarching goal of
protecting the public from impaired drivers, the legislature adopted Minnesota Statutes
section 169A.63 (2018 & Supp. 2019) (the Act).3
The DWI-forfeiture process designed by the Act typically begins when law
enforcement arrests an individual for violating Minnesota’s DWI laws.4 If that individual
is arrested for a “designate d offense”—including first-degree or second-degree DWI, or
any level of DWI if committed by a person whose driving pr ivileges were cancelled or
whose license is restricted when the person consumes alcohol—the vehicle may be seized
as part of the arrest process. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subds. 1(e) (defining “[d]esignated
offense”), 2(b)(1). Seizure is also permitted if the vehicle is “used in conduct resulting in
a designated license revocation.” See id. , subds. 1(d) (defini ng “[d]esignated license
revocation”), 6(a).
Once a vehicle is seized, law enforcement must notify a driver5 of its intent to seek
forfeiture based on one of the two circumstances described above: a “designated offense”

Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 81, 114 S. Ct. 492, 515 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I am disturbed by the breadth of new civil forfeiture statutes.”).
3 Minnesota law permits forfeiture for a number of non-DWI offenses as well. See, e.g.,
Minn. Stat. §§ 84.89 (snowmobiles used in burgl ary), 97A.225 (motor vehicles or boats
used to illegally fish or illegally transport animals or minnows), 609. 531, subds. 1, 6a
(controlled substances, weapons, and contraband), 609.762 (gambling devices, prizes, and
proceeds) (2018).
4 If the driver’s vehicle is not seized at the time of an arrest, law enforcement may seize it
later. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 2(a)-(b).
5 If the driver of the vehicle is not its owner, the owner must also be notified. See Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(b). Generally, the notice of seizure and intent to seek forfeiture

7
or “designated license revocation.” Id., subd. 8(a)-(d). To cha llenge the forfeiture, the
driver may file a demand for judicial determination. 6 Id., subd. 8(e). This “judicial
determination” is, in legal parlance, a civil lawsuit against the vehicle itself.7 Id., subd. 8(f).
Regarding the timing of this judicial determination, the Act both grants—and
removes—certainty. It mandates that the n ecessary hearing take place no later than
180 days following a driver’s demand for a judicial determination. Id., subd. 9(d). Yet, it
bars a judicial hearing on the forfeiture until any criminal proceedings against the driver
have concluded. Id.; see also Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 924 N.W.2d 594, 11 (Minn. 2019).
During this interim period between an initial seizure and the final judicial
determination, the legislature established four provisions aimed at alleviating hardship.
First, a vehicle owner may have the vehicl e returned if the owner posts a bond of
appropriate value or provides security in exchange for the vehicle. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63,
subd. 4. Second, an owner may file a reque st for remission or mitigation, which the

must be provided within 60 days or a reas onable time after law enforcement seized the
vehicle. Id.
6 If the driver does not contest the forfeiture, the administrative forfeiture of the vehicle is
complete and ownership of the vehicle is automatically transferred to the authorities. Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(c)(3).
7 Statutory forfeiture is a civil in rem cause of action, and the pr operty being forfeited is
treated as though it were a guilty offender. Lukkason v. 1993 Chevrolet, 590 N.W.2d 803,
806 n.2 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1999). Accordingly, consistent
with this legal fiction, forfeiture actions are directed against the “guilty property,” and not
the offender. Id. In reality, the party pursuing forfe iture in DWI cases is often a law
enforcement agency—here, the Minnesota State Patrol. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd.
1(b) (defining “[a]ppropriate agency”).

8
prosecuting authority has sole discretion to grant, according to statutory factors. 8 Id.,
subd. 5a. Third, if the owner of the vehicle was not the driver who committed the DWI in
the vehicle, the owner may assert the “so-calle d innocent owner defense” to retrieve the
vehicle. Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 599; see Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d). None of these
first three provisions is at issue in this case.
The fourth protection, which is central here, is a new addition to the DWI-forfeiture
scheme. In 2019, the Minnesota legislature enacted an exception to the DWI-forfeiture
process to promote participation in the st ate’s ignition-interlock program. Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13; see generally Minn. Stat. § 171.306 (describing the ignition-
interlock-device program). Under this excep tion, if the driver becomes a program
participant before the driver’s vehicle is ordered forfeited, forfeiture is stayed and the
vehicle is returned pending the driver’s su ccessful completion of the program. Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(a). But to become a program participant in the ignition-interlock
program, a device—which measures the driver’s breath for the presence of alcohol–must
be installed in every vehicle the person intends to drive. Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 3(d).
And, for the duration of the program, the participant must abide by several program
requirements, as outlined in statute, or the vehicle may be taken again by law enforcement.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.63, subd. 13(b), (c), (f), 171.306, subds. 3, 5.

8 We acknowledge that the supreme court has described the first two protections as “largely
illusory forms of hardship relief.” Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 614. But we include them here
to illustrate the statutory procedures available to drivers facing forfeiture.

9
These four hardship provisions—applicable to the interim period following seizure
of the vehicle—end with a hear ing and a judicial determinati on. In that decision, the
district court determines whether the vehicl e is subject to forfeiture under the statutory
circumstances or whether the driver is entitle d to the return of the vehicle. Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9.
Overall, the DWI-forfeiture process set fort h in the Act reflects the legislature’s
intent to balance protection of the public from impaired drivers while appropriately
safeguarding vehicle owners’ personal interests in their private property. Recognizing this
delicate balance, the Minnesota Supreme C ourt has upheld the DWI-forfeiture process
embodied in the Act (prior to its most recent amendment), concluding that it does not
violate procedural due process on its face. 9 Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 608; see Miller v. One
2001 Pontiac Aztek, 669 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Minn. 2003) (“[L]arge discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to impose penaltie s sufficient to preven t the commission of an
offense.” (quotation omitted)).
With this precedent and statutory framework in mind, we turn to Jensen’s case. We
consider first whether Jensen’s participati on in the ignition-interlock program with a
different vehicle entitled him to stay the forfe iture of his Ferrari. Second, we determine
whether Jensen committed a desi gnated offense authorizing forfeiture. Next, we analyze

9 The supreme court continued to analyze this portion of the Act to determine if it was
unconstitutional as applied to the driver and the vehicle owner. Olson, 924 N.W.2d at
611-12, 615-16. The c ourt concluded that the statute wa s constitutional as applied to the
driver but unconstitutional as applied to the owner. Id. at 612, 616.

10
whether, as he asserts, forfeitu re of his Ferrari constitutes an excessive fine. Finally, we
assess Jensen’s procedural-due-process claim.
I. Jensen’s participation in the igniti on-interlock program with a different
vehicle did not stay the forfeiture of his Ferrari.

We begin with the central issue before us : whether Jensen’s participation in the
ignition-interlock program insulated him from forfeiture of his Ferrari. The district court
concluded it did not. 10 Because this issue involves statutory interpretation, our review is
de novo. Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 433 (Minn. 2009).
The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and accomplish the legislature’s
intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). When interpreting statutes, we give words and phrases
their plain and ordinary meanings. Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 821 N.W.2d 810, 813
(Minn. 2012). If the language of the statute is free of ambiguities, our role is to apply the
language of the statute. Minn. Stat. § 645.16. But if the language is ambiguous—
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation—then we may look beyond the plain
language to determine the legislative intent. Id.
We begin with the plain language of the statute. It states:
If the driver who committed a designated offense or
whose conduct resulted in a designated license revocation
becomes a program participan t in the ignition interlock
program under section 171.306 at any time before the motor

10 The Minnesota State Patrol argued in its brie f that this issue is not properly before us
because Jensen failed to raise this claim to the district court. See Thiele v. Stich ,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). However, the district court’s orde r concluded
that the statutory stay did not apply. And during oral argument, counsel for the state patrol
conceded that the district court did address this issue in its order. Accordingly, we address
the substance of Jensen’s argument regarding the statutory stay.

11
vehicle is forfeited, the forfeiture proceeding is stayed and the
vehicle must be returned.

Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(a) (emphasis added).
Here, Jensen’s Ferrari was taken by law enforcement, but not yet forfeited, between
August 2018 and November 2019. The record establishes that, after a subsequent DWI,
Jensen began participation in the ign ition-interlock program with one of his other
vehicles—a Range Rover—from October 2018 through the time of trial. Consequently,
the key question is whether the statute requires Jensen to be participating in the program
with the to-be-forfeited car, as opposed to any car.
This statutory section does not de fine the key phrase—“the vehicle.” 11
Consequently, to determine its plain meaning, we read the entire forfeiture section and
construe it as a whole, interpreting each word in the context of the whole statute to give
effect to all of its parts. See In re Civil Commitment of Breault, 942 N.W.2d 368, 375-76
(Minn. App. 2020).
Under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63, subdivision 6(a), “[a] motor vehicle is
subject to forfeiture” when it is used to commit a designated offense or when its use results
in a designated license revocation. (Empha sis added.) Subdivision 13(b) describes the
consequences if an interlock- program participant fails to ab ide by the program rules. In
that instance, “the vehicle whose forfeiture was stayed . . . may be seized and the forfeiture
action may proceed.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(b) (emphasis added). And the

11 The statute only defines the terms “motor vehicle” and “vehicle” in the negative, noting
that they “do not include a vehicle which is stolen or taken in violation of the law.” Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(g).

12
subsequent provisions of subdi vision 13—all enacted at the same time—repeatedly refer
to the vehicle being forfeited as “the vehicle.” See id., subd. 13(g)-(i).
We acknowledge that when reading this section—which pertains to driving while
impaired—an earlier provision defines “vehic le” more generally, as any device that
transports people or pr operty on a highway. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.011, subd. 92,
169A.03, subd. 25 (2018). Bu t in the provision at issue here, the statute refers to “ the
vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(a ). The rules of common usage and grammar
tell us that “the” denotes “a definite artic le that refers to a particular noun.” Patino,
821 N.W.2d at 816. Accord ingly, “the vehicle” means a particular vehicle, not any
vehicle. Applying this reasoning to the stat ute as a whole, we conclude that the plain
meaning of Minnesota Statutes section 169A .63, subdivision 13, generally requires the
driver to be participating in the program with “the vehicle” that is to be forfeited, not just
any vehicle.12
To attempt to persuade us otherwise, Jens en argues that the exception to forfeiture
attaches to the driver, rather than to the to-be-forfeited vehicle. He points to the statutory
language which states that, “[i]f the driver . . . becomes a program participant in the

12 We recognize that there might be rare situations where the vehicle involved in the DWI
was totally inoperable but the driver wa s nonetheless able to meet the program-
participation requirements set out in secti ons 169A.63, subdivision 13, and 171.306,
subdivision 3, which would call for additional analysis. But here, no one testified that the
Ferrari was completely inoperable. Jensen speculated that it may need certain routine
maintenance based on the length of time that it had not been driven, but because the vehicle
was in law-enforcement custody for nearly a year, he would not have personal knowledge
of its actual physical condition. In any event, that situation is not before us.

13
ignition-interlock program under section 171.306 at any time before the motor vehicle is
forfeited, the forfeiture proceedi ng is stayed and the vehicle must be returned.” Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(a). But even if we read this isolated phrase outside the context
of the overall forfeiture statute, the most it introduces is statutory ambiguity.
And in the presence of any ambiguity, we lo ok to the legislative history to inform
our interpretation. Minn. Stat. § 645.16. Here, one sentence captures that history.13 When
summarizing the to-be-enacted ex ception to forfeiture on the sena te floor just before its
passage, the bill’s author described the langua ge as prohibiting “forfeiture of a vehicle if
the person installs [an] ign ition interlock system in it. ” S. Floor Deb. on S.F. No. 8
(May 24, 2019) (statement of Sen. Limmer). 14 Although the legislative history is limited
due to this bill’s swift passa ge, Senator Limmer’s descriptio n of this exception confirms
that our reading of the statute—as attaching to the to-be-forfeited vehicle—is correct.
Imagine if we were to adopt Jensen’s interpretation. A person with several vehicles
could commit multiple impaired driving offenses in multiple vehicles without risk of
forfeiture. Such an interpretation would result in a boon to those who can afford multiple

13 The bill that would later be codified (in part) as subdivision 13 was introduced on the
floor of the Minnesota Senate during the 2019 spring special legislative session. S.F. 8,
2019 1st Spec. Sess., art. 6, § 4. It did no t go through the typical committee process, but
was included as part of an omnibus budget bill concerning the judiciary and public safety.
State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, 91st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 12-13, 17-18 (May 24,
2019).
14 After the bill unanimously passed the Minnesota Senate, the Minnesota House
considered and adopted the senate ’s bill. State of Minnesota, Journal of the House , 91st
Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. 34 (May 24, 2019). It passed in the house and the governor signed it
into law just a few days later. State of Minnesota, Journal of the House , 91st Leg., 1st
Spec. Sess. 42 (May 24, 2019); 2019 Minn. Laws ch. 5, art. 7, § 17 at 76.

14
cars. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2018) (establishing that reviewing courts presume the
legislature favors the public interest over any private interest and does not intend a result
that is absurd or unreasonable). And that, as Senator Limmer’s description illustrates, was
not the legislature’s intent.
Having established that the Act require s a driver to be enrolled in the
ignition-interlock program with the to-be-forfeited vehicle, we turn to the facts involving
Jensen’s Ferrari. The record contains no ev idence that Jensen a ttempted to install an
ignition-interlock device on his Ferrari.15 Nor does the record establish that Jensen did not
intend to drive the Ferrari. And as we discussed earlier, ignition-interlock participants must
install “an ignition interlock device on every motor vehicle that the participant operates or
intends to operate.” Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 3(d) (emphasis added).
In sum, a driver participating in the ign ition-interlock program must be enrolled in
the program with the vehicle th at is the subject of the forfe iture proceedings in order to
stay forfeiture of that vehicle under Minnesota Statutes section 169A .63, subdivision 13.
Jensen did not meet this requirement. As a result, the district court did not err by
concluding that the forfeiture of Jensen’s Fe rrari did not qualify for the statutory stay of
the forfeiture proceeding.

15 We note that even though the Ferrari was in the possession of the Minnesota State Patrol,
the statute permits installation. It requires that the entity holding the vehicle—the impound
or storage-lot-operator—permit access to a vehicle for installation of an ignition-interlock-
device. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(e). And the owner seeking to reclaim their vehicle
must pay the costs—for example, of towing and storage—before their vehicle will be
released under this exception. Id., subd. 13(f). There is no ev idence that Jensen did any
of the above to try to reclaim his Ferrari and invoke this exception.

15
II. Jensen committed a designated offense justifying forfeiture.

Second, Jensen argues that because he pleaded guilty to third-degree DWI, instead
of first or second degree, he was not convicted of a “designated offense” and the forfeiture
of his Ferrari was therefore contrary to statut e. This issue also requires this court to
interpret a statute, which presents legal questions that we consider de novo. See City of
New Hope v. 1986 Mazda, 546 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Minn. App. 1996).
As noted earlier, when used to commit a “designated offense,” a vehicle is subject
to forfeiture. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 6(a). A “[d]esigna ted offense” includes
first-degree and second-degree DWI, or any level of DWI if the offense is committed by a
person with a driver’s license restrict ed when the person consumes alcohol . Id.,
subd. 1(e)(2)(ii).
Here, it is undisputed that Jensen plea ded guilty to third-de gree DWI and that
Jensen’s driver’s license was s ubject to an alcohol restriction at the time of the incident.
See Minn. Stat. § 171.09 (2018); see also State v. Rhode , 628 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Minn.
App. 2001) (explaining that a “B card” license restriction “invalidates a driver’s license if
the holder of the license uses alcohol or drug s”). Therefore, Jensen’s conduct meets the
statutory definition of a “designated offense” under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63,
subdivision 1(e)(2)(ii).
Jensen acknowledges that he was charged with, but not convicted of, driving after
consuming alcohol with a restricted license. But he argues that the lack of a conviction on
this count prevents his viola tion of his restricted license from supporting forfeiture. Our
plain reading of the statute reveals otherwise. No conviction for driving in violation of a

16
restricted license is necessary. All that is required is a DWI violation by someone who has
an alcohol-related restriction on his or her license. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63,
subd. 1(e)(2)(ii).16
Because he was convicted of third-degree DWI while he was subject to a restricted
license, Jensen’s conduct falls squarely u nder subdivision 1(e)(2)(ii). Thus, Jensen
committed a “designated offense” that justified forfeiture, and the district court did not err.
III. The forfeiture of Jensen’s Ferrari did not constitute an excessive fine.

Next, Jensen contends that forfeiture of his Ferrari constitutes an excessive fine.
Both the United States and Minnesota C onstitutions prohibit the government from
imposing excessive fines. See U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 5; see
also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (“The Excessive Fines Clause is therefore
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). This prohibition
applies to the vehicle-forfeiture statute. See City of New Brighton v. 2000 Ford Excursion,
622 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2011). We review
this question of constitutional interpretation de novo. Fedziuk v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
696 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 2005); see also State v. Rewitzer , 617 N.W.2d 407, 412
(Minn. 2000).
For nearly 20 years, Minnesota courts have applied the same standard for evaluating
the constitutionality of a fine under the Exce ssive Fines Clause: the standard of “gross

16 To support his argument, Jensen relies on Patino, 821 N.W.2d at 817. But Patino is
easily distinguished because, while the driver there was also convicted of third-degree
DWI, the driver in Patino did not have a restricted license. 821 N.W.2d at 811.

17
disproportionality.”17 New Brighton, 622 N.W.2d at 370-71 (quotation omitted). To assess
proportionality, courts use three factors:
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty;

(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and

(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.

Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3011 (1983) . These factors were
adapted to apply in an excessive -fine context in Minnesota in Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at
414.
18 We consider each factor in turn.
Gravity of the Offense Compared to the Severity of the Fine
First, we consider the gravity of Jensen’s offense with the severity of the fine.
Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at 414. Impaired drivers undoubtedly pose a dangerous risk to
public safety. Lukkason v. 1993 Chevrolet, 590 N.W.2d 803, 806, 808 (Minn. App. 1999),

17 The United States Supreme Court fi rst articulated this standard in Solem v. Helm ,
463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3009 (1983), holding that a crim inal sentence is
unconstitutionally excessive if it is disproportionate to the gr avity of the offense. While
the issue in Solem was whether a criminal sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court a pplied the same test to excessive fines in
United States v. Bajakajian , 524 U.S. 321, 336, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2037 (1998). And the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the so-called Solem factors in Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at
414. A few years later, the court applied Solem to a DWI forfeiture that was alleged to be
an unconstitutional excessive fine. Miller, 669 N.W.2d at 896-97.
18 While we refer to th is framework as the “ Solem factors,” the specific wording we
subsequently apply in this opinion is the language articulated in Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at
414, because that language was specifically adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, and
it was adapted from the punishment context in Solem to the excessive-fine context
applicable here.

18
review denied (Minn. May 18, 1999). Jensen was discovered in his car, stalled in the left
lane on a highway, with a 0.20 alcohol con centration. This was his third DWI offense
within ten years—and his fifth total. Jensen’s history of DWI offenses demonstrates that
he is an example of the type of offender the legislature sought to deter when enacting these
laws.
On the other hand, this fine is admittedly severe. Jensen testified that he believed
his Ferrari was worth $75,000, and the Minn esota State Patrol su bmitted evidence of a
value ranging from $44,900 to $92,300. In shor t: the value of the Fe rrari far exceeds the
maximum fine for a gross misdemeanor. 19 But Minnesota courts have declined to adopt
any per se measure of disproportionality. “Und er prior cases, forfeitures have not been
deemed excessive simply because the value of the car fo rfeited was higher than the fines
authorized for similarly ranked offenses.” New Brighton, 622 N.W.2d at 371.
Comparison with other Minnesota Fines
Second, we compare the contested fine here with fines imposed for the commission
of other crimes in th e same jurisdiction. Miller, 669 N.W.2d at 897. Minnesota cases
compare fines based on the severity level of the offenses. See, e.g., id. at 898. But here,
the offense is a gross misdemeanor, and only felonies are categorized by severity level. In
similar situations, however, courts have compar ed the fines to other offenses at the same
and higher levels. See New Brighton, 622 N.W.2d at 371 (comparing the forfeiture value
to felony fines in a gross misdemeanor DWI case ). Accordingly, we observe that a gross

19 Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.0341, subdivision 1 (2018), the maximum
fine is $3,000.

19
misdemeanor has a maximum fine for the crimin al penalty set by statute at $3,000, but
other felony offenses in Minnesota pe rmit fines as high as $50,000. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.0341, subds. 1-2 (2018). And Minnesota courts have considered the maximum
felony fine even when assessing the proportionality of a fine in gross-misdemeanor cases.
See New Brighton, 622 N.W.2d at 371.
Comparison with Fines in other Jurisdictions
Third, we consider the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.20 Id. These comparisons have been “extensively analyzed” in previous cases.
Miller, 669 N.W.2d at 898. In this analysis, Mi nnesota courts have determined that other
states also subject a person’s vehicle to forf eiture when he or sh e has committed several
impaired-driving offenses. Id. A s i n M i n n e s o t a , o t h e r jurisdictions do not place a
monetary limit on vehicles subject to forfeiture. New Brighton, 622 N.W.2d at 372.
When considering all three factors togethe r, we conclude that they weigh in favor
of forfeiture. The standard is not one of mere harshness, but gross disproportionality. And
no one factor is dispositive in this analysis. State v. Kujak, 639 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Minn.
App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 2002). When considering the gravity of
Jensen’s conduct, comparing this fine with others in Minnesota and surrounding areas, and

20 In other cases, courts have compared the severity level of the relevant crime to severity
levels assigned in federal and other states’ sentencing guidelines. See Borgen v. 418 Eglon
Ave., 712 N.W.2d 809, 814-15 (Minn. App. 2006); State v. Kujak, 639 N.W.2d 878, 885
(Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 2002). B ecause this offense is not
assigned a severity level, this comparison is not possible.

20
while taking into account the ha rshness of this penalty, we conc lude that the forfeiture of
Jensen’s Ferrari was not grossly disproportionate.
In an attempt to persuade us otherwis e, Jensen urges us to not apply the Solem
factors but, instead, to rely on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687. But we read Timbs as consistent with existing Minnesota
precedent on this matter. Timbs decided that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause is an “incorporated” protection applic able to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 686-87, 689. This incorporation was already in practice in Minnesota
and does not alter our precedent.21
In sum, it requires “an extreme case to warrant” a conclusion that a fine is
unconstitutionally excessive. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at 412 (quotation omitted). We
acknowledge that the forfeiture of a vehicle valued at a minimum of $44,900 is many times
more than the maximum $3,000 gross-misdemeanor fine. But we have previously affirmed

21 Jensen further attempts to persuade this court to “be guided” by Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), instead of Solem. But in Austin, the Supreme Court
explicitly declined to establish a test to determine whether a forfeiture was excessive under
the Eighth Amendment, instead leaving it up to each state to decide. 509 U.S. at 622-23,
113 S. Ct. at 2812 (“Prudence dictates that we allow the lo wer courts to consider that
question in the first instance.”). Jensen al so correctly points ou t that the Court in Austin
did not adopt or apply the Solem factors, and it could have. But, a few years later, the
Supreme Court did adopt a grossly disproportional standard in the excessive fine context,
relying on Solem. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37, 118 S. Ct. at 2037-38. Ultimately,
contrary to Jensen’s assertion, the Solem factors are good law in Minnesota.
Jensen also comments that Minnesota cour ts have been misapplying United States
Supreme Court precedent and improperly using the Solem factors in analyzing this issue.
We note that, as an error-correcting court, we apply existing precedent. Lake George Park,
L.L.C. v. IBM Mid-Am. Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 576 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn. App. 1998)
(stating that “[t]his court, as an error correc ting court, is without au thority to change the
law”), review denied (Minn. June 17, 1998).

21
the forfeiture of a $40,000 vehicle following a gross-misdemeanor DWI. See New
Brighton, 622 N.W.2d at 367, 371. The value of Jensen’s Ferra ri is not much different
from this or other vehicles. See Miller , 669 N.W.2d at 898 (comparing the value of
appellant’s vehicle with the va lue of other vehicles and othe r fines for crimes of similar
severity). Considering this c ontext, we cannot conclude th at the forfeiture of Jensen’s
Ferrari is significantly more severe than others we have affirmed in the past. While these
facts may present a close case, the forfeiture of Jensen’s Ferrari under these circumstances
does not present us with an extreme case. This forfeit ure was not an unconstitutionally
excessive fine.
IV. The forfeiture process did not violate Jensen’s right to procedural due process.

Finally, Jensen points to the 14-month time lapse between when he filed his
complaint and when his Ferrari was forfeited, arguing that this lengthy delay violated his
right to procedural due process. Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions
provide that a person shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Mi nn. Const. art. I, § 7. When considering a
procedural-due-process challenge, this court mu st first “identify whether the government
has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest,” and if so,
“whether the procedures followed . . . were constitutionally sufficient.” Sawh v. City of
Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Here, it is undisputed
that Jensen was deprived of hi s property interest in his Fe rrari. Accordingly, we must
determine whether the procedures followed were sufficient. We consider this question
de novo. Id.

22
To do so, we begin with the rece nt Minnesota Supreme Court case: Olson v. One
1999 Lexus, 924 N.W.2d at 608. There, the supr eme court affirmed the constitutionality
of the DWI-forfeiture statutory scheme, on its face, following a due-process challenge.
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 608. It did conclude, however, that various as-applied challenges
might succeed based on their indi vidual facts and circumstances. See id. at 608, 611-16.
To assess these claims, the court applied the three-factor test arti culated by the United
States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976).
Under this test, courts must consider the following:
First, the private interest t h a t w i l l b e a f f e c t e d b y t h e
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the proc edures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and ad ministrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903 (em phasis added). Because Jensen’s claim is
that he was not given proper procedural due process, which is an as-applied challenge,
following the supreme court’s lead in Olson, we assess his claim under the Mathews test.
We turn first to Jensen’s private interest affected by the forfeiture. Id. Here, Jensen
undoubtedly has a strong private interest. See Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 604 (“[A] person’s
interest in possessing and driving his or her vehicle is a significant, although not necessarily
paramount, private interest.”). Jensen owned the Ferrari for nearly thirty years and testified
that he hoped to sell it to support himself or possibly use it as collateral for a loan. See id.
at 605 (“The economic value of a vehicle as prop erty that can be sold, loaned, or used as
collateral must also be cons idered.”). We observe, howeve r, that Jensen does own two

23
other vehicles—a Range Rover and an Austin Healy—so the Ferrari is not his only means
of transportation.
When considering this first factor, we also “weigh (1) the duration of the
[deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of
prompt postrevocation review.” Id. at 602 (quotation omitted). Here, Jensen was deprived
of his Ferrari for approximately 14 months before it was ultimately forfeited. The reason
for that significant wait, how ever, was due to the delay in the resolution of Jensen’s
criminal matter, not any misf easance by the state. See id. at 611-12 (concluding that an
18-month delay in a judicial forfeiture proceeding was not unconstitutional when the delay
was attributable to the related criminal matter).
Second, returning to the Mathews test, we weigh “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation” of Jensen’s property “through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903.
Here, Jensen first availed himself of due process in his rela ted criminal matter, where the
state was required to prove beyond a reason able doubt that he committed the alleged
offenses. Minnesota courts have acknowledged that the risk of erroneous deprivation under
the DWI statute is lessened due to the protections necessary in the corresponding criminal
matters. See Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 610. Jensen also had a forfeiture trial with counsel and
an impartial decision-maker. He presented ev idence and challenged the state’s evidence.
In short, Jensen had a meaningful opportunity to be heard on this issue.
Finally, we turn to the government’s interest, including “the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute pr ocedural requirement would

24
entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903. The government has a strong interest
in vehicle forfeiture in DWI cases because “d runken drivers pose a se vere threat to the
health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota.” Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
727 N.W.2d 410, 416-17 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). And the administrative burden
would be enormous if the gove rnment held immediate trials for every vehicle seized in
relation to a DWI proceeding. See Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 609 (“If courts were required to
hold a prompt hearing shortly after a vehicle is seized in every single case of DWI
forfeiture, it would add substan tially to the cost and admini strative burden of courts and
prosecutors.”). Accordingly, the government’s interest here is strong.
When weighing all three factors, we conclude that Jensen was not unconstitutionally
deprived of his procedural due-process rights. While his interest in his Ferrari is admittedly
great, so too is the government’s interest in protecting the public. Much of the delay was
due to Jensen’s related criminal proceeding. And when considering that proceeding, we
note that Jensen was sentenced in late May 2019 and his forfeiture trial took place about
two months later. Ultimately, this case does not present us with fa cts that demonstrate
there was an unreasonable delay in resolving the forfeiture proceedings.
In sum, Jensen’s right to procedural-due -process was adequately protected in this
matter. The procedure here was not unconstitu tional as applied to Jensen. Just as the
supreme court concluded in Olson that an 18-month delay in a judicial forfeiture

25
proceeding—attributable to a related crimin al matter—did not violate due process,
924 N.W.2d at 611-12, neither does the 14-month delay here.22
D E C I S I O N
Our conclusion here is simple: Jensen’s 1985 red Ferrari was properly forfeited.
While Jensen was participating in the ignition-interlock program with his Range Rover, he
was not participating with his Ferrari, which was the vehicle subject to forfeiture. And a
driver participating in the ignition-interlock program must be enrolled in the program with
the vehicle that is the subject of the forfeiture proceedings in order to stay forfeiture of that
vehicle under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63, subdivision 13. Because Jensen did not
meet the requirements for the statutory stay, th e district court did not err by determining
his vehicle was subject to forfeiture. In a ddition, because Jensen committed a designated
offense and his constitutional rights were not violated, the forfeiture of his Ferrari was not
erroneous.
Affirmed.

22 Jensen also argues that his due-process righ ts were violated when the state failed to
provide him notice of the basis for its forfeitur e claim. But this ar gument is unavailing.
“To satisfy due process, notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections.” Van Note v. 2007 Pontiac , 787 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Minn.
App. 2010) (quotation omitted). Jensen was notified that the forfeiture claim was broadly
based in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63. And he argued before the trial began that
his restricted license could not be the basis for forfeiture, indicating that he was aware of
the state’s argument. Ultimat ely, Jensen had sufficient no tice of the state’s arguments
under section 169A.63.