Maine Heights LLC, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1930

Maine Heights LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Mohammed Hayat,
Appellant,

John Doe, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-19-7247

Melanie J. Leth, Timothy A. Woessner, Weber, Leth & Woessner, PLC, Dodge Center,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Mohammed F. Hayat, Rochester, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
In this eviction action, appellant-tenant challenges the district court’s entry of
judgment in favor of respondent -landlord for several reasons. First, appellant argues that

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the district court erred in denying his habitability defense. Because respondent attempted
to cure the alleged defect within a reasonable time, and because this remedy was effective,
we conclude that the district court properly denied appellant’s habitability defense.
Second, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his retaliation defense
under Minnesota Statutes sections 504B.441 (2018) and 504B.285, subdivision 2 (2018).
Because appellant did not complain to any government entity and is not a tenant at will,
we conclude that neither retaliation defense applies . We decline to address appellant’s
remaining theories for relief, concluding that appellant forfeited the se arguments. We
affirm the district court’s judgment.
FACTS
On June 5, 2019, appellant Mohammed Hayat signed a one-year lease with
respondent Maine Heights L.L.C. On October 17, 2019, Main e Heights filed an eviction
complaint, alleging that Hayat violated the terms of the lease by failing to pay rent and that
Hayat remained in possession of the premises despite notice to vacate. Hayat raised t wo
defenses to the eviction action: (1) that Maine Heights violated the covenant of habitability
by allowing excessive noise in common areas ; and (2) that Maine Heights evicted him in
retaliation for Hayat’s decision to escrow rent.
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and received evidence
establishing the following facts. Hayat signed a lease for t he period of June 1, 2019 ,
through May 31, 2020 , and paid a portion of the $300 security deposit due upon signing.
The lease required Hayat to pay $1,875 in rent due on the first of each month, a $150 late
fee for rent not paid by the fifth of each month, and a $25 fee for each returned check or

3
rejected electronic payment. The lease also required Hayat to pay for electric, water, sewer,
and trash. On June 29, 2019, Hayat emailed the property manager complaining about loud
noise in the common area outside his bedroom window late at night. The manager
informed Hayat that she would email all residents to remind them of the community rules,
including quiet hours. The manager also informed Hayat that, if a noise disturbance is
affecting his peace and he has asked the people making the noise to be quiet, he is free to
contact law enforcement. On July 3, 2019, the manager emailed all residents addressing
community rules, including quiet hou rs and local noise ordinances. Hayat made no other
noise complaint and the parties had no further communication regarding noise issues until
October 7, 2019.
From July through September , Hayat failed to pay timely rent and his utility fees.
Maine Heights charged Hayat the $150 late fee each month and the $25 fee for a returned
check in the month of July. By October, Hayat had paid his base $1,875 rent for each of
the previous three months, but had not paid any of the fees, utilities, or the remainder of
the security deposit. Hayat again failed t o pay timely rent and utilities in October, and
Maine Heights again charged Hayat the $150 late fee.
On October 7, 2019, at 1:46 a.m., Hayat emailed the property manager, complaining
about a group of men in the common area outside his apartment who were being loud and
woke him up. Hayat stated that if he did not hear from management within one day, then
he would send “a letter of Default based upon Minnesota Habitability Laws and escrow
this month’s rent.” The manager apologized, stated she would look int o the complaint
further, and reminded Hayat that he may ask resident s to be quieter or contact law

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enforcement.1 Twenty minutes later , before the manager could look into the complaint
further, Hayat emailed the manager a “notice of default.”
That same day, Maine Heights posted a termination-of-lease notice on Hayat’s door.
The reason for termination included nonpayment of rent, constituting material
noncompliance with the terms of the lease. The notice stated that Hayat’s lease would
terminate in thre e days unless he redeemed his tenancy by paying the amount due. The
notice also informed Hayat that if he did not vacate the premises or redeem his tenancy,
Maine Heights would bring an eviction action against him. Hayat then mailed a “notice of
default” to the corporate offices, alleging th at th e continued noise issues violated the
covenant of habitability under Minn esota Statutes section 504B.161 (201 8) and the
covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Hayat’s outstanding
balance included October rent, four late fees, the returned-check fee, and the utility fees. 2
The district court also found that Maine Heights acted to remedy the noise issue by
emailing all residents to address the community rules re garding noise ordinances and
suggesting that Hayat ask the resident to be quiet and contact law enforcement if necessary.
The district court denied Hayat’s habitability defense, concluding that the covenant of
habitability does not impose liability when t he landlord cures or attempts to cure a defect
within a reasonable period of time. The district court also denied Hayat’s retaliation

1 There is nothing in the record to show that Hayat ever attempted either of these remedies.
2 Hayat’s balance also included a fee for removal of moldy furniture from the garage. This
fee is not an issue on appeal.

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defense, concluding that Hayat did not prove the defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. The district court entered judgment in favor of Maine Heights and stayed the
writ of recovery and notice to vacate for six days. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Covenant of Habitability
Hayat first argues that the district court erred when it denied his habitability defense.
Because Maine Heights attempted to cure the alleged defect within a reasonable time by
using an effective method , we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its
findings and properly denied Hayat’s habitability defense.
Section 504B.161, subdivision 1(a), “establishes several covenants, known as the
covenants of habitability, which are implied in every residential lease. ” Wise v.
Stonebridge Cmtys., LLC , 927 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. App. 2019). “The covenants
provide, in relevant part, that the landlord promises that the common areas will be fit for
the tenant’s intended use, to keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the
lease, and to maintain the premises in compliance with applicable health and safety laws.”
Id. at 776 (citing Minn. Stat. § 504B.161, subd. 1(a)(1)-(2), (4)). “ The tenant may assert
breach of the covenan ts as a defense to the landlord’ s unlawful detainer action for
nonpayment of rent.” Id. (quoting Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn. 1973)).
This court previously examined the requirement in section 504B.161, subdivision
1(a)(1), that landlords ensure the premises are “fit for the use intended by the parties.”
Rush v. Westwood Vill. P’ship, 887 N.W.2d 701, 708-09 (Minn. App. 2016), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 14, 2017). We recognized that when a landlord had notice, but took no action,

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the tenant can assert that the landlord breached the covenant of habitability as a defense in
an eviction action. Id. at 709 (citing Fritz, 213 N.W.2d at 340; Delamater v. Foreman, 239
N.W. 148, 148 -49 (Minn. 1931)). We concluded that section 504B.161, subdivision
1(a)(1), does not impose strict liability on landlords and imposes no liability on landlords
who cure or attempt to cure a defect within a reasonable time using an effective method:
The protections in section 504B.161 were devised to
“assure adequate and tenantable housing within the state.”
Meyer v. Parkin , 350 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App. 1984)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984).
However, the landlord’s covenants to keep leased premises in
reasonable repair and fit for intended use do not impose strict
liability upon a landlord or expand the landlord’s liability
beyond that previously articulated in caselaw. Id. The district
court correctly concluded that Minn. Stat. § 504B.161, subd.
1(a)(1), does not impose liability where the landlord cures or
attempts to cure a defect within a reasonable time using an
effective method of repair, even when the tenant prefers a
different repair m ethod or is inconvenienced by the chosen
method.

Rush, 887 N.W.2d at 709.
On appeal from an eviction judgment, we determine whether the evidence sustains
the findings of fact and whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Minneapolis
Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Greene , 463 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Minn. App. 1990). “We review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error.” Rolling Meadows Coop., Inc. v. MacAtee,
904 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. App. 2017). We review a district court’s decision on a purely
legal issue de novo. Rush, 887 N.W.2d at 706.
In this case, Hayat does not contest the district court’s findings that Maine Heights
attempted to remedy the noise complaint within a reasonable time. Instead, Hayat argues

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that the district court erred because it did not require Maine Heights to take additional
actions to remedy the initial noise complaint in June 2019, such as relocating Hayat to a
different apartment, posting notices in the common area outsi de his bedroom, and
restricting access to the common area. We are not persuaded for two reasons. First , we
disagree that the law obligates Maine Heights to accept and initiate Hayat’s preferred
remedies. This court has previously acknowledged that there could be more t han one
method to cure a defect. Rush, 887 N.W.2d at 709. A landlord avoids liability by
attempting to cure the defect using any effective method, “even when the tenant prefers a
different repair method or is inconvenienced by the chosen method.” Id. Here, Hayat
argues that Maine Heights should have accepted his preferred methods of addressing the
loud noise, including relocating him to a different apartment and restricting access to the
common areas. While these actions might also have been effective, we do not consider
them. Id. Instead, we consider whether Maine Heights chose an effective response and
whether those actions occurred within a reasonable time of the initial complaint. Id.
Second, the evidence supports the district cou rt’s findings that Maine Heights
responded within a reasonable time and used an effective method. Within just a few days
of receiving the initial complaint on June 29, 2019, Maine Heights emailed all residents on
July 3, 2019, reminding them of the applic able community rules regarding noise. In
addition, the record—including Hayat’s own testimony —established that Hayat made no
further communication to Maine Heights regarding noise levels after Maine Heights sent

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the communication to all tenants.3 We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
finding that the chosen method of response was both effective and timely. While the
remedial method Maine Heights chose to use was not Hayat’s preferred method, it was
sufficient to preclude Hayat’s habitability defense.
II. Retaliation
Hayat argues that the district court erred in denying his retaliation defense under
Minnesota Statutes sections 504B.441 and 504B.285, subd ivision 2. Because Hayat did
not complain to any government entity and is not a tenant at will, we conclude that neither
retaliation defense applies.
Minnesota statutes establish two retaliation defenses in eviction actions. 4 First,
section 504B.441 “prohibits retaliation for a residential tenant’s complaint of a violation to
a governm ent entity, such as a housing inspector, or commencement of a formal legal
proceeding. But it does not provide a defense to retaliation based on an expression of

3 On October 7, 2019, Hayat made a second noise complaint. Before Maine Heights could
take any further action, Hayat email ed a “notice of default” to Maine Heights and Maine
Heights terminated Hayat’s lease for nonpayment of rent. We do not know whether or how
Maine Heights might have responded to the October 7, 2019, email. In addition, more than
three months had lapsed since the June 29, 2019, noise complaint. Therefore, we conclude
that despite the loud noise reported by Hayat on October 7, 2019, the district court did not
clearly err in finding that Maine Heights responded effectively to Hayat’s initial complaint.
4 The supreme court has recognized that “tenants have a common-law defense to landlord
evictions in retaliation for tenant complaints about material violations by the landlord of
state or local law, resid ential covenants, or the lease.” Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson,
929 N.W.2d 398, 409 (Minn. 2019). In his reply brief, Hayat argues for the first time that
this common-law defense applies. We decline to address this argument because issues not
raised or argued in an appellant’s principal brief cannot be rai sed in a reply brief.
Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010); McIntire v. State,
458 N.W.2d 714, 717 n.2 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990).

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dissatisfaction to the landlord.” Cent. Hous. Assocs., 929 N.W.2d at 408. “Section
504B.285, subdivision 2, makes a retaliation defense available ‘following the alleged
termination of a tenancy by notice to quit’ if the tenant, in good faith, has sought to secure
or enforce the tenant’s rights or if the tenant has made a good faith report to a government
authority.” Id. at 402. “We do not defer to the district court’s decision on a purely legal
issue, and we review the construction of a statute de novo .” Rush, 887 N.W .2d at 706
(citations omitted).
In this case, nothing in the record suggests that Hayat ever complained to a
government entity. Thus, we conclude that section 504B.411 does not apply. As to section
504B.285, subdivision 2, this defense only applies to eviction actions under Minnesota
Statutes section 504B.285, subdivision 1(a)(3) (2018), “ which a ddresses the right to
remove a ‘tenant at will’ who is holding over after the landlord issued a ‘notice to quit’ the
tenancy.” Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson, 910 N.W.2d 485, 488-89 (Minn. App. 2018)
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 1(a)(3)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 929 N.W.2d
398 (Minn. 2019) .5 Maine Heights did not bring this eviction action under section
504B.285, subdivision 1(a)(3). In addition, Hayat signed a lease with a fixed ending date,
so he is not a tenant at will, as defined by Minnesota Statute s section 504B.001,
subdivision 13 (2018). Thus, we conclude that section 504B.285, subdivision 2, is also
inapplicable. Because neither statutory defense is available to Hayat, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Hayat’s retaliation defense.

5 The supreme court did not review this aspect of the court of a ppeals decision because
Olson did not appeal that determination. See Cent. Hous. Assocs., 929 N.W.2d at 402.

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III. Remaining Arguments
Hayat also makes four other arguments that were inadequately briefed and not raised
before the district court. We decline to address the merits of these arguments.
First, Hayat challenge s the validity of the complaint, arguing that his outstanding
fees cannot be included in an eviction action. Hayat makes this argument for the first time
on appeal. We decline to address this argument because “litigants are bound [on appeal]
by the theory or theories, however erroneous or improvident, upon which the action was
actually tried below[,]” Annis v. Annis, 84 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1957), and an appellate
court generally will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
Second, Hayat argues the district court erred by refusing to allow him to redeem his
tenancy. This argument is contrary to the district court’s decision because the district court
stayed the writ of recovery and permitted Hayat to “ redeem his tenancy by paying his
balance in full .” We decline to consider this matter, however, because Hayat fails to
explain how this decision was in error. See State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issue not adequately
briefed); Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 46 4-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error
is never presumed. It must be made t o appear affirmatively before there can be reversal
. . . . [T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”).
Third, Hayat argues that the district court erred by failing to consider injunctive
relief or rent abatement. Hayat cites no authority for this contention. “An assignment of
error on mere assertion, unsupported by argument or authority, is forfeited and need not be

11
considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection. ” Scheffler v. City of
Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 26, 2017); Ganguli v. Univ . of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994)
(stating court of appeals decline s to address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or
citation). We decline to review this portion of the district court’s decision.
Last, Hayat argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the covenant
of quiet enjoyment is inapplicable and only pertains to title claims. Hayat fails to cite any
binding legal authority to support this argument, fails to explain how the district court erred
in this determination , and fails to assert any claim to title or ownership .6 We decline to
reach this issue in the absence of adequate briefing. See State Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,
558 N.W.2d at 480; Scheffler, 890 N.W.2d at 451.
Affirmed.

6 Hayat cites a series of Texas cases. But decisions from foreign jurisdictions are not
binding authority. Minneapolis Grand, LLC v. Galt Funding LLC, 791 N.W.2d 549, 556
(Minn. App. 2010); Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co. , 344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984).
“Minnesota courts have discussed the covenant of quiet enjoyment, describing a breach of
the covenant as ‘when an outstanding superior title is asserted in hostility to the title of the
covenantee.’” Rasmussen v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 712 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn.
App. 2006) (quoting Efta v. Swanson , 132 N.W. 335, 336 ( Minn. 1911), review denied
(Minn. July 19, 2006). Hayat develops no argument for us to depart from this established
precedent.