State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1940

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Anthony Kudla,
Appellant.

Filed August 3, 2020
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-18-6291

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas N. Kelly, Wright County Attorney, Shane E. Simonds, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment, appellant claims that his conviction for
refusing to submit to chemical testing must be reversed because the district court erred

2
when it denied his motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle stop. Appellant argues that
the traffic stop of his vehicle was unconsti tutional because it was not supported by
reasonable, articulable suspicion. We affirm.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of November 13, 2018, Wright County Sheriff’s Deputy
Brandon Wenande stopped a tr uck driven by appellant Ju stin Anthony Kudla after
observing two alleged traffic violations. Deputy Wenande testified that, after approaching
the truck, he observed that Kudla had “impaired motor movements, bloodshot, watery eyes,
slurred speech, and a faint odor of alcohol on his breath.” Kudla failed several field
sobriety tests and did not respond to repeated requests to pr ovide a breath sample. After
being taken into custody, Kudla declined to take a chemical test.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ku dla with operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and refusal to submit to a chemical test. Following his arrest,
Kudla sought to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the deputy
lacked sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the stop.
At the omnibus hearing on Kudla’s motion to suppress, the stat e claimed that the
stop was justified because Kudla violated two di fferent traffic laws, a City of Albertville
ordinance, Albertville, Minn., Code of Ordinances ch. 1, § 7-1-1 (2018), that prohibits
unreasonable acceleration and erratic driving a nd a state traffic law that requires vehicles
to “be driven as nearly as pr acticable entirely within a single lane,” Minn. Stat. § 169.18,
subd. 7(a) (2018).

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Deputy Wenande testified at the omnibus hearing that, on the night of November 13,
he was traveling in a marked squad car on a coun ty road in Albertville. He stated that he
observed a Dodge pickup truck stopped at an intersection. When the light at the
intersection turned green, the truck accelerated rapidly into the intersection, with its tires
squealing. Deputy Wenande testified that he believed this conduct constituted erratic
driving and/or unreasonable acceleration in violation of the Albertville ordinance.
Deputy Wenande testified th at he continued to follow th e truck, which was in the
left-hand northbound lane of the road. He testified that he observed the truck move to the
right so that approximately half the width of the truck was over the lane line, in the right-
hand northbound lane, before correcting back in to the left lane. The deputy testified that
he believed this violated Minn. Stat. § 169. 18, subd. 7(a). Deputy Wenande’s squad-car
video of this incident was admitted into evidence, but the deputy testified that the violation
was difficult to discern on the video because it was the middle of the night.
Kudla argued that Deputy Wenande’s testimony was not credible, claiming that the
deputy had loud music playing in the squad ca r so he could never have heard any tires
squealing and that the squad-car video unde rmined Kudla’s testimony about the lane
violation. The district court, however, credited Deputy Wenande’s testimony and denied
the motion to suppress.
Kudla then agreed to stipul ate to the state’s case pursuant to Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, and waived his right to a jury trial. The district
court found Kudla guilty and sentenced him to 365 days in jail. Kudla appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
When reviewing a pretrial order on a mo tion to suppress evidence, we independently
review the facts and determine as a matter of law whether the district court erred in denying
the motion. State v. Harris , 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999 ). We review the district
court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, but we review legal
determinations de novo. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006).
The United States and Minnesota Cons titutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Temporary
detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a
brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure . . . .” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
Law enforcement must have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity in
order to justify an investigative stop of a vehicle. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136
(Minn. 1999). This standard is “less de manding than probable cause or a preponderance
of the evidence,” and is satisfied “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the
officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may
be afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted);
see Kansas v. Glover , 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) ( noting that reasonable-suspicion
standard requires less proof than probable-cause standard). But the stop must be based on
more than “whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.
1996).

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In determining whether reasonable, articula ble suspicion exists to justify a stop,
Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained
law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deduc tions that would be
beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson , 622 N.W.2d 823,
825 (Minn. 2001); see also State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012) (“The
court may consider the officer’s experien ce, general knowledge, and observations;
background information, includ ing the nature of the offens e suspected and the time and
location of the seizure; and anything else that is relevant.”). “The factual basis required to
justify an investigative seizure is minimal.” Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 691.
“[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant . . . ,
that observation forms the requisite particul arized and objective basis for conducting a
traffic stop.” State v. Anderson , 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004); see, e.g., State v.
Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn. 2019) (upholding traffic stop when driver failed to
wear a seatbelt); Kruse v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 906 N.W.2d 554, 560-61 (Minn. App.
2018) (upholding traffic stop when driver violated traffic law by driving on the fog line);
State v. McCabe , 890 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Minn. App. 2017) (upholding traffic stop for
driver’s failure to illuminate headlights in the rain), review denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017).
We turn first to the alleged violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169.18,
subdivision 7(a), which states that, when any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes of traffic, a “vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be move d from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” We have previously determined

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that “observing a motor vehicle weaving within its own lane in an erratic manner can justify
an officer stopping a driver.” Richardson, 622 N.W.2d at 826. But a single swerve by a
vehicle within its own lane of traffic does not establish an adequate basis to stop the vehicle.
State v. Dalos, 635 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Minn. App. 2001).
Kudla claims that the district court erred by crediting Deputy Wenande’s testimony
because it is contradicted by the squad-car video. We conclude, however, that the squad-
car video is at most inconclusive and, thus, does not contradi ct Deputy Wenande’s
testimony. The district court credited the deputy’s testimony and, as an appellate court, we
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Kruse, 906 N.W.2d at 557. Thus,
the district court did not err in crediting the deputy’s testimony.
Kudla also argues, however, that a swerve into another lane of traffic does not
constitute a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a). Kudla relies on two cases of this
court, State v. Brechler, 412 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. App. 1987), and Birkland v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 940 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. App. 2020), as his authority. Neither case, however,
supports his claim. The Brechler case involved a car that sw erved slightly, but never
crossed a lane line and stayed within a single lane of traffic. 412 N.W.2d at 368. And this
court’s recent decision in Birkland deals with lane changes while making a left turn. 940
N.W.2d at 825-26. Here, De puty Wenande testified that K udla’s truck crossed over the
lane line into the right-hand lane and the alleged lane violation here did not involve a turn.
This court’s opinion in Kruse provides ample precedent in support of the district
court’s conclusion. In Kruse, the officer stopped a vehicle after observing the vehicle cross
onto the right-hand fog line and then return to the center of the lane of travel. 906 N.W.2d

7
at 557. This court held th at crossing over from the lane of travel onto the fog line
constitutes a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a), and thus supports a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of unlawful ac tivity to justify a vehicle stop. Id. at 559-61. Here,
Kudla’s driving arguably created a greater public safety risk by crossing over not just onto
a fog line, but crossing ove r into the right-hand lane of traffic. Under Kruse, this alleged
swerve into another lane clearly constitutes a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a)
and supports the district court’s conclusion that Deputy Wenande had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of unlawfu l activity sufficient to justify the traffic stop of Kudla’s
vehicle.1
Accordingly, we conclude that the distri ct court did not err by denying the motion
to suppress.
Affirmed.

1 Because the lane violation provided Deputy We nande with the requisite reasonable,
articulable suspicion to sustain the traffic stop, we need not determine whether the alleged
violation of the City of Albertville ordinance also provided a basis for the stop.