Ronnie Bila Shaka, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1942

Ronnie Bila Shaka, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Ross, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-16-3656

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Peter J. Orput, Washington County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota; and

Joseph Van Thomme, Special Assistant County Attorney, Eckberg Lammers, P.C.,
Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Appellant Ronnie Shaka pleaded guilty after contacting his wife in violation of a
domestic-abuse no-contact order. He filed a postconviction petition challenging the
validity of his plea, arguing among other things that his attorney was ineffective for having
failed to investigate in order to challenge the stop that led to his arrest. The district court
summarily denied his petition. Because the facts alleged in Shaka’s affidavit warranted an
evidentiary hearing, we reverse and remand for the district court to conduct a hearing.
FACTS
Woodbury police officers were patrolling in a motel parking lot in September 2016
when they saw a car and ran a check on its license plates. They learned that the car’s
registered owner was restricted by a domestic-abuse no-contact order. Then they saw a
man who appeared to be the owner—Ronnie Shaka—speaking with a woman who matched
the description of the person whom the order prohibited Shaka from contacting —Shaka’s
wife. The officers approached the couple and identified the woman as the one in the order.
They arrested Shaka, and the state charged him with one count of gross- misdemeanor
violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order.
The criminal complaint erroneously identified Shaka as the registered owner of the
car that police encountered at the motel. Shaka waived any challenge to the legality of the
officer’s stop after the error became apparent, and he pleaded guilty as charged. The district
court accepted Shaka’s plea, adjudicated him guilty, and imposed a one-year jail sentence
that was suspended on probationary conditions.
3
Shaka petitioned for postconviction relief in March 2019, maintaining among other
things that his trial counsel was ineffective for having advised him that he could not rely
on the complaint’s error to challenge the validity of the stop. In an affidavit accompanying
the petition, Shaka avowed that he had informed his trial attorney of the error and asked
whether it could provide a basis to challenge the stop. Shaka also asserted that his attorney
incorrectly informed him that he could not obtain the information necessary to challenge
the stop. Shaka said that, but for his counsel’s misadvice about the potential challenge, he
would not have pleaded guilty.
The district court denied Shaka’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. It
reasoned that trial counsel’s decision not to challenge the stop was trial strategy and
therefore unreviewable. Shaka appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Shaka challenges the district court’s decision to deny his postconviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion. Reed v.
State, 925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). Postconviction courts must hold an evidentiary
hearing on a petition for postconviction relief “[u]nless the petition and the files and records
of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). This means that a district court must conduct a hearing on a
postconviction petition to resolve issues raised on the merits if disputed material facts exist.
Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. 2002). The record informs us that, under
this standard, Shaka was entitled to a hearing.
4
Shaka’s affidavit asserts the facts in play here. Taken as true, the affidavit implies
that his trial attorney rejected his request to investigate the state’s database to see whether
the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and question him or whether, instead,
officers only falsely asserted that their vehicle-registration check and computer search led
them to suspect that Shaka and his companion were the subjects of the no-contact order.
The district court summarily rejected Shaka’s postconviction claim arising from the alleged
failure to investigate without affording him a hearing. The district court concluded that the
attorney’s decision not to investigate was merely a strategic litigation decision. The
conclusion is flawed.
The flaw in the distric t court’s litigation-strategy conclusion is that, at least as it
regards the preliminary question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the affidavit
establishes that the attorney did not choose to forego an investigation based on strategy. A
district court considering a postconviction petition must assume the facts alleged in the
affidavit are true and construe them in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Andersen
v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Minn. 2018). The district court speculated that Sh aka’s
attorney might have considered as a matter of strategy that further investigation might have
delayed proceedings so as to put Shaka at risk of being detained in pretrial custody for a
longer period. The affidavit undermines this speculation. Taking the affidavit as true and
drawing all inferences in its favor, the attorney failed to investigate instead because he
erroneously believed (or falsely informed Shaka) that it was impossible for defense counsel
to acquire the police-database information necessary to investigate the basis for the stop.
5
By rejecting the primary assertion in the affidavit, the district court refused an evidentiary
hearing based on the wrong factual premise.
We have no difficulty concluding that Shaka’s affidavit provided a factual basis
sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction petition claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel. To receive an evidentiary hearing on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must allege facts that, if proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient
performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687– 88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984); State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Minn. 2013). Regarding the first prong of the
Strickland test, a petitioner may establish that counsel acted unreasonably when counsel’s
conduct suggests that the failure to investigate resulted from inattention, not reasoned,
strategic judgments. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 , 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2003).
An evidentiary hearing could establish whether Shaka’s attorney in fact failed to
investigate and, if so, whether the failure resulted from a valid strategic judgment.
Regarding the second prong, a petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Shaka’s
affidavit asserts that, but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty. The
district court must accept that assertion as true when deciding whether to hold a hearing.
We hold that Shaka was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
6
We add separately that Shaka’s petition also maintains that his attorney’s
performance was deficient in that he incorrectly advised Shaka that he could not challenge
the legality of the officers’ stop. An attorney’s conduct falls below an objectively
reasonable standard if he provides inaccurate or misleading advice that affects a
defendant’s decision to accept or reject a plea offer, Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 540
(Minn. 2007), or if he provides advice “that is so substandard that it prevents [the
defendant] from making a knowing and understanding decision regarding” a plea,
Anderson v. State, 746 N.W.2d 901, 909 (Minn. App. 2008). This theory too provides a
basis for a hearing.
For these reasons, we hold that the district court acted outside its discretion by
denying Shaka’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. We reverse the decision and
remand to the district court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.