In re the Estate of Vernon G. Engelkes, Deceased.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1950

In re the Estate of Vernon G. Engelkes, Deceased.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-PR-17-976

William J. Wetering, Hedeen, Hughes, & Wetering, Worthington, Minnesota (for appellant
Mark Engelkes)

Paul M. Malone, Malone & Mailander, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent Dorene Chapa)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this will contest, appellant-objector seeks review of the final judgment entered in
favor of respondent-beneficiary following a bench trial. During district court proceedings,
appellant claimed that the testator, his father, who was 80 years old when he executed the
2014 will, lacked testamentary capacity or acted under undue influence when he named a
friend and bank teller as the sole beneficiary of his estate. In a detailed decision, the district
court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment rejected appellant’s
claims. On appeal, appellant no longer challenges the testator’s capacity when he executed
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the will. Appellant contends, however, that the district court erred in failing to determine
that respondent exercised undue influence over the testator when he executed the will
because the district court found th at respondent had a confidential relationship with the
testator, had an opportunity to exercise undue influence over the testator, and was the sole
beneficiary of the will, which excluded the testator’s four adult children, including
appellant. Because the district court’s findings of fact are supported by rec ord evidence,
and we discern no legal error in the district court’s determination that appellant failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent unduly influenced the testator in
making the 2014 will, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summari zes the district court’s findings of fact and the evidence
received at trial.
Testator, his family, and the 2014 will
The testator is Vernon G. Engelkes (“Vernon”); 1 he married Beverly Engelkes in
1962. Vernon, along with other members of his family, including his two brothers, owned
cattle and farmland in Nobles County. Vernon and Beverly dissolved their marriage after
more than 50 years. The district court found that their relationship was “acrimonious,” their
divorce was “difficult,” and their adult children “aligned themselves” with Beverly after
the dissolution . They had four children: Barbara Edmundson, Theresa Engelkes , Paul
Engelkes, and appellant Mark Engelkes.

1 For ease and clarity, this opinion refers to each member of the Engelkes family by their
first name.
3
After the divorce became final, Ve rnon executed a will in April 2014, in the
presence of his attorney, who drafted the will, and two witnesses. T he will nominated
Vernon’s brother Stanley , as personal representative , and Stanley’s wife , petitioner
LaDonn Gruis, as alternate. Stanley and Gruis were also present at the execution of
Vernon’s will.
The will “gave, devised, and bequeathed” all of Vernon’s property to his “friend,
[respondent] Dorene K. Chapa, absolutely and forever, if she survives me.” If Chapa did
not survive him, the will provided that his estate would pass to her two teen age daughters
in equal shares. The will stated that Vernon intentionally omitted his children, naming each
of them, and explaining that he omitted them “not because of my lack of love or affection
for them, but because I have provided for them in other ways during my lifetime.” When
Vernon executed his will, and when he died three years later, Chapa worked as a teller at
Vernon’s bank in Ellsworth.
Testator’s death and discovery of 2014 will
Vernon died on Sunday, October 1, 2017. The next day, the Ellsworth bank manger
allowed two of Vernon’s children, Paul and Theresa , to access Vernon’s safety deposit
box, where they found the 2014 will. Paul remained in the bank to read the will and asked
the manager, “Who is Dorene Chapa?” The bank manager, whom the district court found
“credible in all respects,” “had no idea why Paul was asking that” and also testified that
Paul appeared to find the will “unsettling.”
Paul later returned to the bank and met with the bank manager and Chapa .
According to the district court, Paul asked Chapa if she knew that she was in the will and
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“had been left everything.” The bank manager, according to the district court, said that
Chapa “looked totally surprised.” The district court found that “[t]he situation was tense,”
with Chapa “in tears, stating that she did nothing wrong and [had] no pre-knowledge of
this situation.”
The district court also found that the bank has a policy that “prohibits an employee
from receiving a gift from a customer valued at more than $100. Employees such as
[Chapa] are required to sign off on bank policies as part of their employment.”
Probate proceedings for the 2014 will
Gruis petitioned for formal probate of Vernon’s will and requested appointment as
personal representative because Stanley was unable to serve. Paul, later joined by Theresa
and Barbara, objected to the will, alleging that Vernon lacked testamentary capacity when
he executed the will and that Chapa unduly influenced him when he named her and her
daughters as will beneficiaries. Mark also objected for the same reasons. During mediation,
Paul, Theresa, and Barbara reached a settlement with Chapa, thus, Mark was the sole
objector during the three-day bench trial.2
At the May 2019 trial, Mark offered testimony from the bank manager and a loan
assistant from the bank; the attorney from Luverne who prepared the 2014 will; Mark’s
siblings, Barbara, Paul, and Theresa; his mother Beverly; and Chapa. Chapa call ed her
husband, Gruis, M ark, Paul, and a neighboring farmer who worked with Vernon. The

2 Mark objected to the settlement, which was filed with the district court. The settlement
agreement provided that Paul, Theresa, and Barbara assign ed their individual interests in
Vernon’s estate to Chapa in exchange for $125,000 each, $100,000 of which depended on
the settling children prevailing in their legal dispute with Vernon’s brother, Stanley.
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testimony established the facts summarized above as well as provided evidence about
Vernon’s disputes with his family, Vernon’s relationship with Chapa, the events preceding
the 2014 will, and Vernon’s health.
Testator’s disputes with his family
In June 2012, Vernon’s brother Lloyd passed away. Based on evidence received at
trial, the district court found that Vernon, Lloyd, and their brother Stanley, had a “last man
standing” agreement providing that “they would not sell the land and that the family
property would stay with the last of them to survi ve.” After Lloyd died, according to the
district court, “there was significant turmoil” about a proposal to sell Lloyd’s land. Vernon
asked his wife Beverly to sign a document agreeing to the sale and she refused. The district
court found this “result[ed] in significant animosity” between them.
In December 2012, Beverly obtained a harassment restraining order (HRO) against
Vernon. According to the district court, Beverly’s petition “cited decades of alleged
harassment against her” by Vernon. The district court took judicial notice of the petition,
affidavit, and HRO. According to the district court, the HRO “ordered [Vernon] out of the
house where he had lived with Beverly for decades.” Under the HRO, Vernon was allowed
to “complete farm chore s as long as he had no contact with Beverly.” B everly filed for
divorce in May 2013. During divorce proceedings, Vernon lived with his brother Stanley
and Gruis.
Meanwhile, the probate of Lloyd’s estate continued and Mark brought a legal claim
against Vern on. The district court found that Mark claimed Vernon had “improperly
6
retained” Lloyd’s “grain drill and snow blower .” The probate court ultimately ruled for
Vernon in October 2013.
Vernon and Beverly completed their divorce in January 2014. Beverly remained in
the farmhouse “for several months” afterwards. Beverly ultimately moved to Rushmore
and Vernon returned to the farm. Gruis “credibly testified” that she cleaned the farmhouse
for Vernon when he moved back and helped him when his health later declined. Gruis also
testified that Vernon’s children “never” helped Vernon and that his children did not visit
him after his separation from their mother.
All four of Vernon’s children testified at the trial. The district court found Barbara
“largely credible, but biased at times in the favor of [Mark’s] position.” The district court
also found that Barbara “was not around” Vernon when he executed the 2014 will;
therefore, she had “very limited personal knowledge about [Vernon’s] condition at that
time.” The district court found Theresa “lacked credibility in a number of areas” and found
Theresa and Vernon had “a long period of estrangement and anger.” The district court also
found that Theresa had no contact with Vernon for several years , from 2012 until 2016.
The district court also received evidence that Vernon cosigned loans for Mark.3
Testator’s relationship with Chapa
Testifying about the period a fter the divorce, the bank manager said that Vernon
came to the bank at least once a week and talked to Chapa for 10-15 minutes at a time. The

3 The bank manager testified that he w as a loan officer for Vernon, who had “three large
loans with the bank.” The bank manager also testified that Vernon told him he had cosigned
loans for Ma rk through a different bank. T he bank manager testified that he never saw
Vernon with his children and that Vernon “express[ed] dissatisfaction” about his children.
7
district court found that the evidence showed they “developed a friendship” that made other
employees “uncomfortable,” causing the bank manager to “become involved.” At one
point, another bank employee asked the bank manager if Chapa “could reduce the amount
of time with [Vernon] if there were other customers in the bank.”
Vernon also met with the bank manager, sometimes for up to an hour. The bank
manager, according to the district court, “tolerated ” Vernon’s visits with him and with
Chapa “in an effort to be kind to [Vernon] for the benefit of both the Bank and [Vernon].”
The bank manager testified that Vernon sometimes would ask Chapa to write out checks
for him. The bank manager explained that he allow s bank tellers to assist customers, as
found by the district court, “with writing out loan payments and signing checks.”4
Chapa testified that she first met Vernon at the Ellsworth bank. Besides talking with
Vernon at the teller windows, which the district court found were “2-3 feet apart within the
Bank lobby,” Chapa testified that she met Vernon a “couple times” in the bank conference
room, when he asked to speak in private about his divorce. Chapa explained that Vernon
“just needed someone to listen.” The bank manager testified that Chapa had the ability to
access Vernon’s account information. But no record evidence establishes that Chapa did
so.
Chapa testified that she met Vernon outside the bank at his farm three times . First,
Vernon offered to show Chapa’s teenage d aughters his cattle, as part of their 4H

4 The district court also found that Vernon would visit a Worthington attorney who “kept
office hours” at the bank “with the permission” of the bank manager. The district court
found that it was not “clear if [the Worthington attorney] was representing [Vernon] or was
just a sounding board.”
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experience; second, Vernon invited Chapa, Chapa’s husband, and their daughters to visit
the farm together; and third, Vernon’s neighbor asked Chapa to deliver some food to
Vernon after he returned home from a hospitalization. Chapa sat with Vernon as he ate in
his kitchen. Chapa did not recall the date of the first and second visits; she testified that the
third visit happened in 2016, after Vernon executed the will.
At some point before Vernon executed the will, he told Chapa that he planned to
disinherit his children and make her a beneficiary of his will. Chapa testified that Vernon
told her he “did not want to leave . . . anything to his kids and he wanted to leave it to me.”
Chapa testified she told Vernon that “he needed to do what he wanted to do. I did not try
to persuade him anyway at all.” Chapa testified that she never saw the 2014 will and did
not discuss what Vernon had said with anyone, including her husband. She believed
Vernon could change his will at any time.
Before working as a teller at the Ellsworth bank, Chapa had worked as a legal
secretary for two law firms, sometimes preparing probate documents. Before moving to
the Ellsworth bank, Chapa worked for the same bank at its Luverne branch, starting in
2007.
Events preceding execution of 2014 will
After his divorce, Vernon asked Chapa to recommend a lawyer to prepare his will.
Chapa recommended an attorney in Luverne who had advised her brother on his estate
plan. The Luverne attorney testified about her three meetings with Vernon, ending with the
execution of the 2014 will. The district court stated that it “relie[d] strongly on [the Luverne
attorney’s] testimony.”
9
Less than one month after Vernon’s divorce was resolved, in February 2014,
Vernon met, for the first time, with the Luverne attorney that Chapa recommended. At
Vernon’s request, Chapa made the appointment and accompanied Vernon to the meeting.
Based on the attorney’s testimony, according to the district court, Vernon told the attorney
at their first meeting that he wanted to “do a will, as he had just been through a divorce.”
The meeting “lasted about 30 minutes” and the attorney gave Vernon a worksheet and
asked him to complete it.
Vernon met with the Luverne attorney again in March 2014. Chapa did not attend
this meeting. The district court found that the attorney went over the completed worksheet
“line by line” with Vernon. The worksheet, which the district court received as a trial
exhibit, stated that Chapa was Vernon’s first choice for disposition of his property, with
her two daughters as second choice. Vernon named Stanley as his first choice for personal
representative and Gruis as second choice.
The district court found that, during this meeti ng, Vernon “expressly asked for his
four children to b e omitted from the will. ” The attorney asked why he did not want his
children listed in the will. The district court found Vernon responded that he “didn’t really
have a relationship with his children, they never visited him, they sided with his wife during
the divorce, and they historically only contacted him when they wanted money or things.”
Vernon told the attorney that Chapa was his “ friend” and that “she listened to him and
cared about him more than his children.”5

5 Gruis testified to having a similar conversation wit h Vernon about his relationship with
his children and why he decided to omit them from his will.
10
Vernon met with the Luverne attorney for a third time in April 2014. Chapa also did
not attend this meeting, but Stanley and Gruis were present. The attorney read the will out
loud and Vernon executed the will with two witnesses present. Along with reviewing and
signing the will, Vernon signed a health -care directive that appointed Stanley as his
health-care agent, and a power of attorney naming Stanley and Gruis as co -attorneys in
fact.
The Luverne attorney testified that “it did not seem unusual to her” that Vernon was
disinheriting his children and “giving everything to a friend because of what he explained
about the divorce.” In her experience, “it was no t common for a parent to disinherit
children, but it was not unusual either.”
Testator’s health
The Luverne attorney testified that “during the three meeting s she had with
[Vernon],” she “saw no indications in her professional opinion that [Vernon] was
incompetent or not understanding what his assets were and who his children were.” The
district court also found that the attorney “saw no evidence of undue influence or that
[Vernon] was being pressured to make a will in the manner that he did.”
A neighboring farmer who had a “business arrangement” with Vernon to raise stock
cattle and bulls also “credibly testified,” according to the district court, that Vernon was
“actively engaged” in farming in 2014 and “showed no indication of dementia or reduced
mental capacity.” The neighboring farmer testified that, during the last year and a half of
Vernon’s life, he showed “decreased mental activity.”
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The district court received and reviewed Vernon’s medical records. According to
the district court, the medical records show ed “no report of any mental problems
whatsoever in April of 2014,” based on records dated two days after Vernon executed the
will. The district court found the “first indication” of mental slowness was 13 months after
execution of the will, in May 2015. In September 2016, Vernon complained, according to
the district court, of “being bitten by a black widow spider.” The district court found that,
in 2016, Vernon’s doctor diagnosed Lewy body dementia “which ha[d] likely been going
on for some time.” The district court also found that before “the summer of 2016, [Vernon]
was reasonably competent.”
The district court’s decision
The district court denied Mark’s objection to the 2014 will in a 29 -page written
decision with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a memorandum. The district court
described the litigation as “a bitterly contested will contest” and determined that Mark did
not sustain his burden to prove Vernon’s lack of testamentary capacity , by clear and
convincing evidence, when he executed his will in April 2014. The court found that, at the
time of execution , Vernon was competent and he knowingly and intelligently made
decisions based on his own interests.
The district court described “[t]he issue of undue influence” as “admittedly a closer
question,” but determined that Mark did not sustain his burden to pr ove undue influence,
by clear and convincing evidence, in the making of Vernon’s 2014 will. The district court
explained in its memorandum:
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While the optics of [Vernon’s] decision . . . to disinherit his
children in the favor of a favorite teller at his ba nk who had a
confidential relationship and who paid attention to him are
concerning and do raise significant questions, the existence of
a confidential relationship by itself does not imply that undue
influence was exercised by that person. Considering the totality
of the facts in this sad case, [Chapa] has shown that the chaos
and dysfunction in [Vernon’s] family created a factual
narrative whereby [Vernon’s] decision to disinherit [Mark] can
be shown to have a basis in fact other than any influence by
[Chapa.] The Court’s obligation in a case such as this is to
affirm [Vernon’s] testamentary decisions . . . absent a showing
of undue influence, coercion, or duress.

While the district court found that Chapa had the opportunity to exercise influence over
Vernon and was in a confidential relationship with him, it also found that “other factors do
not favor” Mark’s position. The district court reasoned that the existence of a confidential
relationship between Vernon and Chapa “does not establish anything more than a suspicion
in that regard. The evidence establishes, unfortunately, that decedent chose to disown and
write his children out of the [w]ill purposefully due to his disagreement s with them and
their decision to largely abandon him in fa vor of their mother.” As a result, t he district
court granted the petition for formal probate of the 2014 will.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Mark raises one issue on appeal . He argues that the dist rict court clearly erred
because it failed to find that Chapa exercised undue influence over Vernon in the execution
of the 2014 will. Mark contends that the district court erred by its “strong reliance” on the
Luverne attorney’s testimony, which “should not be given the weight,” and the district
court ignored the factors supporting an inference of Chapa’s undue influence over Vernon.
13
Chapa responds that the record evidence supports the district court’s det ermination that
Mark did not sustain his burden of proving undue influence in the making of the 2014 will.
A party who contests a will as the product of undue influence has the burden of
proof by clear and con vincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-407 (2018); see also In re
Estate of Rechtzigel, 385 N.W.2d 827, 832-34 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming district court’s
determination that no undue influence occurred). “Clear and convincing” evidence means
that “the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” Rechtzigel, 385 N.W.2d at 832.
Undue influence is “of such a degree exerted upon the testator by another that it destroys
or overcomes the testator’s free agency and substitutes the will of the person exercising the
influence for that of the testator.” Teschendorf v. Strangeway ( In re Wilson’s Estate ),
27 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1947) (affirming district court’s determination that undue
influence affected testator’s will); see also In re Estate of Torgersen, 711 N.W.2d 545, 550
(Minn. App. 2006) (holding that, to invalidate a will for undue influence, will contestant
must show another person exercised influence over the testator when the will was executed
“to the degree that the will reflects the other person’s intent instead of the testator’s intent”)
(citing York v. Reay (In re Estate of Reay), 81 N.W.2d 277, 280 ( Minn. 1957)), review
denied (Minn. June 20, 2006).
Whether undue influence exists is a question of fact . Reay, 81 N.W.2d at 282. On
appeal, we do not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ.
P. 52.01. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous “only if the reviewing court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. If there is reasonable evidence
14
to support the district court’s findings of fact, a reviewing court should not disturb those
findings.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999).
When evidence conflicts on undue influence, the district court’s findings are “final
on appeal, even though the appellate court if it had the power to try the questions de novo,
might determine otherwise upon reading of the record .” Olson v. Mork (In re Olson ’s
Estate), 35 N.W.2d 439, 444 (Minn. 1948). On review, this court gives due regard to the
district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
We do not second -guess the district court’s weighing of evidence or disturb the district
court’s credibility determinations. In re Salkin , 430 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. App. 1988)
(appellate court does not reweigh evidence), review denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 1988); Sefkow
v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (appellate court defers to district court’s
credibility determinations).
As with other facts, direct or circumstantial eviden ce may prove undue influence .
“Direct evidence of undue influence is not required and is usually unobtainable because
the influence is rarely exercised openly in the presence of others. Therefore, the
circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to indicate undue influence.” In re Estate of
Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. App. 1985) (citation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 19, 1986).
When evaluating the evidence to determine undue influence, a district court
considers several factors: (1) the influencing party’s opportunity to exert influence over the
testator; (2) the influencing party’s active participati on in the will preparation; (3) a
confidential relationship between the influencing party and the testator; (4) disinheritance
15
of parties who “probably would have been remembered”; (5) singularity of the provisions
of the will; and (6) the exercise of influence or persuasion to induce the testator to make
the will. Wilson’s Estate, 27 N.W.2d at 432. A district court determines t he existence of
undue influence by considering “all the surrounding circumstances.” Id.
Mark argues that the district court erred in its findings on the factors outlined in
Wilson’s Estate, 27 N.W.2d at 432. Mark first argues that the district court correctly found
that Chapa had the opportunity to influence Vernon in making the 2014 will and that Chapa
and Vernon had a confidential relati onship. Mark then argues that the district court erred
by failing to find the other four factors. We will consider Mark’s arguments on each factor,
discussing them in the order listed in Wilson’s Estate.6
1. Opportunity to exert influence over the testator

The district court found that Chapa had the opportunity to influence Vernon. Mark
contends, and we agree, that t his finding has support in the record evidence. Vernon and
Chapa met while she was his teller at the bank and they had frequent conversations; some

6 In her brief to this court, Chapa asks that we take judicial notice of Mark’s claims filed in
his bankruptcy proceeding. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, Chapa did not file a
motion. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 127 (application for relief on appeal shall be made by
written motion). Second, Chapa’s brief on this issue makes no argument and cites no
caselaw. We generally decline to consider issues that are unsupported by argument or legal
authority. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971);
see Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn. , 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (court of
appeals declined to address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or citation). A court
need not automatically grant a request to take judicial notice of a fact; the fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute because it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial district of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Minn. R. Evid. 201(b);
see In re Block , 727 N.W.2d 166, 177 (Minn. App. 2007) (granting motion to strike
reference to documents not in the record and declining to take judicial notice).
16
conversations were long, particularly around the time of his divorce, which was difficult.
Chapa and Vernon became friends. While they mostly talked at the bank, Chapa also
visited Vernon on his farm, although the timing is unclear. She visited, first, with her two
teenage daughters and, second, with her husband, and their daughters.
Shortly aft er his long marriage ended in divorce, Vernon asked Chapa to
recommend an attorney to prepare his will and Chapa referred him to an attorney in
Luverne who had advised her brother on his estate . At Vernon’s request, Chapa arranged
the appointment and rode with Vernon to the first meeti ng with the Luverne attorney.
Chapa acknowledged that it was possible she helped Vernon complete a worksheet for the
Luverne attorney. Finally, Chapa testified that, at some point, Vernon told her that he
planned to disinherit his children and leave his estate to her.
2. Active participation in the will

Mark argues that the district court found that Chapa “selected the attorney, set the
appointment, accompanied Vernon, and filled out” the worksheet used to prepare his new
will. Based on these findings, Mark contends that the district court erred because it failed
to also find that Chapa actively participated in the 2014 will. Mark also argues that Chapa’s
decision to recommend the Luverne attorney was “ peculiar” because neither she nor
Vernon were acquainted with the Luverne attorney.
It is true that the district court found Chapa recommended an attorney to Vernon,
arranged the appointment for Vernon, and accompanied Vernon to the first office visit in
Luverne. But Mark does not fully characterize the district court’s findings or the evidence.
The record evidence shows that Vernon asked Chapa for assistance, not that Chapa told
17
Vernon what to do . Vernon asked Chapa to recommend an attorney and asked her to
arrange his first appointment and to accompany him to the first meeting . Although Mark
infers a sinister influence because Chapa recommended an attorney who was new to
Vernon, Chapa had a logical reason for the referral . She suggested the attorney who had
prepared her brother’s estate plan. The district court generally rejected Mark’s inference
about the Luverne attorney as mere suspicion, stating that “[a] suspicion of undue influence
doesn’t evidence proof of it.” Additionally, Mark’s brief to this court overlooks that Chapa
was not present at Vernon’s second and third meetings with the Luverne attorney and that,
during the second meeting, Vernon told the Luverne attorney that he wanted to name Chapa
as his will beneficiary and explained why he had chosen to disinherit his children.
Mark contends that Chapa “admitted” she filled out the worksheet used to prepare
Vernon’s will. The record is not so clear. The district court did not find that Chapa filled
out the worksheet. Chapa testified that she did not recall filling out the worksheet and did
not know if the handwriting on the worksheet was Vernon’s , but agreed that the
handwriting “could be” hers. Chapa, however, routinely helped Vernon write checks, and
other bank tellers provided similar assistance to other customers. So assisting Vernon with
a form tracks other requests Vernon made of Chapa as well as requests made by other bank
customers of other tellers.
Chapa testified that Vernon told her that he “did not want to leave anything to his
kids and he wanted to leave it to [her],” but she also testified that he “didn’t go into detail,”
she never saw his will before he died, and she knew that he could change his will at any
18
time. After Vernon died, Chapa reacted with surprise when Paul told her she was the
beneficiary, according to the bank manager.
Mark argues that Chapa “feigned surprise .” The district court did not find that
Chapa’s surprise was feigned. The district court found the bank manager credible and the
bank manager described Chapa as “totally surprised.” Mark’s view of this incident, at
bottom, challenges Chapa’s credibility. While the evidence may have supported Mark’s
inference, it also supports the district court’s finding that Chapa was surprised to learn of
the will’s contents. We do not make credibility determinations on appeal and instead defer
to the district court’s credibility determinations. Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d 86, 89
(Minn. App. 2009) (“When evidence relevant to a factual issue consists of conflicting
testimony, the district court's decision is necessarily based on a determination of witness
credibility, which we accord great deference on appeal.”); see also Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at
210 (stating that appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations);
Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting “[t]hat the
record might support findings other than those made by the trial court does not show that
the [trial] court’s findings are defective”). Thus, Mark has not shown that the district court
clearly erred in its findings on Chapa’s participation in the 2014 will.
3. Confidential relationship between the beneficiary and the testator
The district court found that Vernon and Chapa had a confidential relationship.
Mark contends, and we agree, that the record supports this finding. Chapa was Vernon’s
bank teller and friend. She had access to Vernon’s financial information and his trust as a
friend. The district court found that these facts “are concerning and do raise significant
19
questions, [but] the existence of a confidential relationship by itself does not imply that
undue influence was exercised by that person.” Mark argues that under Norlander v. Cronk,
“when a confidential relationship exists between the parties the [ Wilson Estate] factors
slacken in favor of the objector.” See Norlander v. Cronk, 221 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1974).
We disagree with Mark’s view of Norlander, which involved a warranty deed and
not a will. Norlander was the 74 -year-old grantor of a warranty deed to his farm; he was
inexperienced in business and financial matters, had relied on his two older brothers to help
him farm and handle finances, and was shocked and confused following the death of his
two brothers. Id. at 110. Norlander turned to his neighbor, Cronk, for business advice and
for assistance on his farm. Id.
Norlander conveyed the farm to Cronk by warranty deed, reserving a life estate for
himself. Id. Norland later sued Cronk to rescind the warranty deed. Id . at 111. Norlander
testified that he thought they visited Cronk’s lawyer to sign a rental agreement for the farm.
Id. at 110. The district court found that Cronk had exerted undue influence to obtain the
conveyance and invalidated the warranty deed. Id. at 111. On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed the district court’s finding that a confidential relationship existed and upheld the
evidence as sufficient to sustain the district court’s finding of undue influence by Cronk in
execution of the warranty deed. Id. at 112-13.
Rather than say ing that existence of a confidential relationship “slackens” the
Wilson Estate factors in favor of undue influence, as Mark contends, the supreme court in
Norlander commented that the existence of a confidential relationship made the burden of
proof “somewhat simpler.” Id. at 112. Norlander teaches that , while a confidential
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relationship simplifies the burden to prove undue influence , the Wilson factors are still
relevant, because, as Norlander explained,
a showing of an opportunity to exercise undue influence, an
inclination to do so, and a resulting disposition of property
which ignores the natural recipients is usually sufficient to
establish undue influence. Participation by the [alleged
influencer] in the transaction of transfer and the physical and
mental state of the grantor are also factors to be considered.

Id. (citations omitted).
Mark similarly argues that Olson’s Estate provides that an objector is “entitled to
an inference of undue influence” upon a finding of a confidential relationship between the
testator and the alleged influencer, combined with the other Wilson Estate factors. Olson’s
Estate reversed and remanded a district court’s determination of undue influence in the
making of a will based on an evidentiary error. Olson’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 447-48. The
opinion strongly implied that other evidence , including a confidential relationship, was
sufficient to support the challenger’s claim that the testator was unduly influenced to
bequeath his estate to one of two grandchildren, even though both grandchildren had lived
with and cared for the testator. Id. at 445 (“Under well-settled rules, the finding of undue
influence here should be sustained. There was evidence showing as independent facts both
undue influence and its effect upon testator’s mind.”).
But Olson’s Estate did not alter the relevance of all six factors recognized in
Wilson’s Estate. Olson’s Estate recognized the significance of a confidential relationship,
but also held that “opportunity to exercise undue influence or the existence of a confidential
relation between the testator and a beneficiary are not , standing alon e, proof of undue
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influence . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Like Norlander, Olson’s Estate referred to the other
Wilson Estate factors. Id. (stating that, when confidential relationship is shown along with
bequests to one held in confidence, active participation in the will preparation,
disinheritance of relatives, singularity of the will provisions, and acts of evasion, then “an
inference of undue influence is permissible”).
We conclude that the district court’s analysis of the confidential relationship
between Vernon and Chapa follows Norlander and Olson’s Estate. The district court
correctly evaluated Chapa’s confidential relationship with Vernon as one of six factors
before determining whether Chapa unduly influence Vernon in preparation of the 2014
will.
4. Disinheritance of parties that the testator probably would have remembered

Mark argues that the district court clearly erred because it failed to find that Vernon
disinherited his children, w ho Vernon probably would have remembered. We disagree.
First, the district court did not overlook this finding and, in fact, noted that Vernon’s 2014
will disinherited his c hildren, that Vernon did so intentionally, and that Vernon gave a
reason for doing so in the will. The district court also found that Vernon expressed his
intent to disinherit his children to Chapa, the Luverne attorney, and Gruis.
Second, the district court found Vernon had reason to disinherit his children. T he
district court found that this was a “sad case” where the evidence as a whole showed “chaos
and dysfunction” in the family because of an “acrimonious” relationship and a “difficult”
divorce, followed by a “serious rift” between Vernon and his children, who aligned
themselves with their mother.
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Vernon did not see his children for years, relied on Stanley and Gruis for assistance,
and developed a friendship with Chapa. The district court found that the children’s contrary
testimony was not credible. For example, the district court found evidence of a “long period
of estrangement and anger” between Theresa and Vernon starting in 2012 and continuing
until at least 2016. Similarly , the district court found that Mark and Vernon were on
opposite sides of a probate dispute where Mark accused Vernon of wrongly possessing
Lloyd’s personal property.
Caselaw suggests that, if the record had established a close and loving relationship
between Vernon and his children , then it may have been reasonable for Vernon to
remember them in his will. See In re Estate of Larson, 394 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Minn. App.
1986) ( affirming finding of undue influence where record established that disinherited
children had a close a nd loving relation ship with testator and there was “no evidence of
family rancor sufficient to cause” the testator to favor sole beneficiary to the exclusion of
the disinherited children), review denied (Minn. Dec. 12, 1986). But the record does not
establish a close and loving relationship between Vernon and his children.
In sum, while Vernon disinherited his children , evidence of family acrimony
supports the district court’s finding that Vernon chose not to remember them . See, e.g.,
Marsden v. Puck (In re Marsden’s Estate), 13 N.W.2d 765, 771 (Minn. 1944) (reversing
undue influence finding and holding “nothing unnatural” about testator preferring
granddaughter over children “who had shown but little interest in her welfare except to
preserve her estate for themselves.”).
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5. Singularity of the will
Mark argues that because Chapa is the sole beneficiary under the will, the district
court erred in failing to find that the will was singular. We note that caselaw does not define
what it means for a will to be “singular.” Mark appears to construe this factor to mean that
the alleged influencer is also the single focus of the will. If so, we agree with Mark that the
record supports a finding of singularity. But we see no error because the district court
recognized this factor when it found that Chapa was the sole beneficiary of Vernon’s will.
Chapa responds that, when Vernon prepared his 2014 will naming her as the sole
beneficiary, he also executed other important documents that showed his affection and trust
for others—bu t he did not nominate his children for any role. The record supports Chapa’s
point. Vernon nominated his brother Stanley as power of attorney, personal representative,
and health -care agent. He nominated Gruis as the alternate for these roles . Vernon’s
decisions in April 2014 thus reflect the rift between Vernon and his children, as well as the
support Vernon received from Chapa, Stanley, and Gruis. All three helped Vernon after
the bitter divorce, not his children. Thus, while Vernon ’s 2014 will named Chapa as his
sole beneficiary, it also named Stanley and Gruis for trusted roles.
6. Exercise of influence or persuasion to make the will

Mark argues that Chapa exercised undue influence over Vernon to benefit herself
in his 2014 will , pointing to he r prior work experience as a secretary at two law firms,
including some probate experience, her position as a teller at Vernon’s bank, her role in
recommending the Luverne attorney who prepared Vernon’s will, the trust Vernon placed
in Chapa, and Chapa’s failure to disclose to the bank the terms of Vernon’s will, an alleged
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violation of the gift policy. Based on this evidence, Mark contends the district court clearly
erred in finding Chapa did not exercise undue influence.
Mark emphasizes Chapa’s alleged violation of the bank ’s gift policy , which
prohibited employees from receiving gifts from customers valued over $100. Mark
highlights that the bank manager testified he was unaware that Chapa was a beneficiary of
Vernon’s will. Mark claims that Olson ’s Estate “establishes that where the beneficiary
seeks to evade detection of their influence an inference of undue influence is created.”
Mark is correct that Olson’s Estate states that “acts of evasion on the part of the
beneficiary,” along with other factors, permit an inference of undue influence. 35 N.W.2d
at 445. But even if we assume that Chapa evaded the bank’s gift policy, Olson’s Estate
does not suggest that acts of evasion, even if combined with a confidential relationship,
require an inference of undue influence.
Here, the district court did not find that Chapa violated the bank’s gift policy. Chapa
testified that she did not violate the bank’s gift policy by being a beneficiary of Vernon’s
will because “there was no money trading hands.” While reasonable minds could disagree
with Chapa’s view of the bank’s gift policy, the district court was in the best position to
weigh her credibility. While Chapa testified that Vernon told her he intended to leave her
his estate, Chapa also testified that she never saw Vernon’s will until after he died, and she
understood Vernon could change his mind at any time.
Mark argues that the district court erred when it relied on the Luverne attorney’s
testimony. It is true that the district court stated that it “strongly” relied on the Luverne
attorney’s testimony. In essence, Mark ’s argument asks this court to reweigh or
25
second-guess the district court’s credibility determinations, which we will not do . Salkin,
430 N.W.2d at 16. We observe, however, that the distri ct court did not rely only on the
Luverne attorney’s testimony. Rather, the district court considered the evidence as a whole
and found Vernon “chose to disown and write his children out of the [ w]ill purposefully
due to his disagreement with them and their decision to largely abandon him in favor of
their mother.”
In sum, while the district court found the presence of four of the Wilson Estate
factors, it did not find that Chapa actively participated in or actually exercised undue
influence over Vernon in the 2014 will. Precedent establishes that evidence of undue
influence must show “not only that the influence was in fact exerted, but that it was so
dominant and controlling of the testator’s mind that, in making the will, he ceased to act of
his own f ree volition and became a mere puppet of the wielder of that influence.” Reay ,
81 N.W.2d at 280.
Thus, our review of the record does not leave us “with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Fletcher, 589 N.W.2d at 101. Because the record
evidence supports the district court’s detailed findings of fact, we will not disturb those
findings. Id. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by
finding that Mark failed to prove by clear and convincing eviden ce that Chapa unduly
influenced Vernon in preparing his 2014 will.
Affirmed.