Sandra May Schumann, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1955

Sandra May Schumann,
Respondent,

vs.

Dana Scott Wiberg,
Appellant.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19WS-CV-19-1007

Sandra May Schumann, Eagan, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Dana Scott Wiberg, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Sandra Schumann obtained a 50-year harass ment restraining order for herself and a
one-year harassment restraining order for her daughter against Dana Wiberg, her
daughter’s father. Wiberg appeals the decision on two primary grounds, arguing that there

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was insufficient evidence to ju stify the harassment restraini ng orders and that the court
impermissibly denied the admission of certain evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2018, respondent Sandra Schumann file d for a two-year harassment restraining
order (HRO) against appellant, Dana Wiberg, on behalf of their daughter and a 50-year
HRO against Wiberg for herself.1 The district court held a hearing on the petition, during
which it received testimony from both parties and admitted four exhibits into evidence.
At the hearing, Schumann testified that a two-year HRO for daughter was necessary
because Wiberg posted—and continued to post—about daughter’s mental health on social
media. The posts were made in violation of Dakota County Social Services’ instructions
and a family court order prohibiting Wiberg from doing so. Schumann testified that the
HRO was also necessary because of inappropriate texts Wiberg sent to daughter.
According to Schuman, the texts told daughter “that she is not going to make it and that
she’s never going to become anything in her life.”
Schumann believed her own 50-year HRO ag ainst Wiberg was necessary primarily
because of Wiberg’s violations of a previous restraining order. The first violation occurred
when Wiberg called Schumann’s workplace, claiming that she was a drug addict and had
been convicted of felonies. Subsequent violations occurred when Wiberg repeatedly called
Schumann’s family members to talk about Schumann. Wibe rg also made disparaging
comments about Schumann to both her family members and to community members. For

1 These facts are a summary of the parties’ testimony at the HRO hearing.

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example, Schumann testified that Wiberg “tells people that I’m a snitch. That I’m—well,
working with the cops. That I’m a drug addict. I’m a drug dealer. I’m taking his daughter
away from him. . . . He thinks I have people ou t to murder him; that I’ve hired people to
murder him.”
Wiberg generally denied Schumann’s alle gations, but at times contradicted his own
testimony. For example, Wiberg stated that he had never called Schumann’s workplace,
but later admitted that he did call the corporate office once during the previous restraining
order. After initially denying that he had contacted Schumann’s family members, Wiberg
confirmed that he had spoken w ith her stepfather once. Later, he said that he had texted
Schumann’s stepfather twice. Wiberg also consistently de nied posting about daughter’s
mental health on social media, but acknowledged that he had posted about his experiences
with Dakota County Social Services.
In observing the parties’ conduct at th e hearing, the court found that Schumann
provided credible testimony, while Wiberg did not. This assessment was informed by
Wiberg’s “aggressive state” and the contradict ory statements he made while testifying.
The district court then granted a 50-year HRO for Schumann and a one-year HRO on behalf
of daughter.
2
Wiberg appeals.

2 Schumann did not file a brief, so we proceed pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 142.03.

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D E C I S I O N
We review the grant of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Peterson v. Johnson,
755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). So long as the district court’s findings are
supported by the evidence and the court properly applied the law, this court will not set
aside the ruling. Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen, 767 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. App. 2009),
review granted (Minn. Sept. 29, 2009) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb. 1, 2010).
A court may grant a petition for an HRO if it finds that there are “reasonable
grounds” to believe harassment has occurred. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b) (2018).
Harassment is defined to include “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words,
or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on the safety, security, or pr ivacy or another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 1(a)(1) (2018). Whether specific conduct rises to the level of harassment is objective.
Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006) (“[S]ection 609.748 requires
both objectively unreasonable conduct or inte nt on the part of the harasser and an
objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing conduct.”). The
court’s findings of fact regarding whethe r harassment occurred must be based on the
parties’ testimony and the exhibits prop erly before the district court. Kush v. Mathison ,
683 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. App. 2004).
Using the abuse-of-discretion standard as our guide, we first address Wiberg’s claim
that there was insufficient evidence to support the petition for an HRO against him. Then

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we move to Wiberg’s second argument, that the district court improperly denied the
admission of evidence at the hearing.3
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the HROs.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the eviden ce, we first turn to the 50-year HRO in
which Schumann is the protected party. Here, following an evidentiary hearing, the district
court found that Schumann had a previous HR O against Wiberg. While the HRO was in
effect, Wiberg called Schumann’s workplace, the business’s corporate office, and her
family members in violation of that order. And after initially denying that he had called
Schumann’s work or her family members, Wiberg conceded that he had called the
corporate office and had called Schumann’s stepfather once or texted him twice.
In testimony that the court found cr edible, Schumann further explained how
Wiberg’s actions affected her safety, secur ity, and privacy. The statements Wiberg was
alleged to have made about Schumann being a “snitch” and a drug addict have “destroyed”
her reputation. In addition, Wiberg’s acti ons make Schumann feel “on guard” wherever

3 Wiberg also argues that the judge was biased against him, that Schumann perjured herself
at the hearing, and that the district court and Dakota County were guilty of conspiracy,
depriving Wiberg of his parental rights, misconduct of a public official or employee, and
criminal defamation. We initially note that Dakota County is not a party to this appeal,
and is not a party to these proceedings. Further, Wiberg provides only a cursory recitation
of these claims and does so without adequately briefing these arguments. As such, even if
Dakota County were a party to these proceed ings, we would not reach these issues on
appeal. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any
argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on
appeal.”).

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she goes and that she must “constantly defend [herself]” during arguments with family and
community members about “if [she] is right or if he’s right.”
Next we turn to the suffi ciency of the evidence with regard to the HRO against
Wiberg on behalf of daughter. The district court found that Wiberg had posted daughter’s
private medical information on social medi a with the intent to harm daughter and
Schumann. The court determined that the postings were made in direct violation of a report
from Dakota County Social Services which pr ohibited Wiberg from “talk[ing] about his
child’s mental health or well- being on social media,” and in structed him to take down
existing posts or be found in contempt of court.
As with her testimony re garding her own HRO, the court again found Schumann’s
testimony about the impact Wiberg’s postings had on daughter’s safety, security, and
privacy to be credible. Not only did Wibe rg’s posts about daughter’s health make
otherwise private information public, the posts also harmed her reputation. Furthermore,
Schumann testified that the posts contributed to daughter’s declining mental health, to the
point that daughter has been hospitalized.
When reviewed as a whole, the record supports the dist rict court’s decision. Not
only did Wiberg repeatedly commit intrusiv e or unwanted acts by repeatedly calling
Schumann’s workplace and family members and posting about daughter’s mental health
issues, his actions also had a substantial ef fect on the safety, secu rity, and privacy of
Schumann and daughter. Based on these findings, there was sufficient evidence to support
the district court’s decision to grant the HROs.

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II. The district court properly de nied the admission of evidence.
During the hearing, Wiberg attempted to introduce evidence of Schumann’s prior
felony convictions in North Dakota, text messages purporting to show Schumann making
fraudulent statements to obtain welfare mone y, and daughter’s medical records. The
district court declined to admit these pieces of evidence, finding the information irrelevant
to whether Wiberg’s conduct rose to the level of harassment.
The district court has broad discretion when determining whether to admit evidence.
Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. , 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Min n. 1997). If the court
determines that the eviden ce is irrelevant, it will not be admitted, even if it could be
admitted under another rule. Mi nn. R. Evid. 407 1997 comm. cmt. As such, we review
the district court’s decision to exclude the evidence of Schumann’s past and daughter’s
medical records as irrelevant for an abuse of discretion.
Here, the issue before the court was whet her Wiberg repeatedly committed intrusive
and unwanted acts against Schum ann and daughter that did or were intended to have
adverse effects. Neither Schumann’s past nor daughter’s medical history are related to that
issue. Therefore, we conclude that the district court acted within its broad discretion when
it excluded as irrelevant evidence of Schum ann’s prior history and daughter’s medical
records.
To attempt to persuade us otherwise, Wiberg argues that the texts and prior
convictions should have been admitted because Minnesota Rules of Evidence 608 and 609
allow the court to admit evidence of a witness’s prior convictions and character. Minn. R.
Evid. 608, 609. But while rules 608 and 60 9 do allow the admission of evidence relating

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to the truthfulness, character, or conduct of a witness, the threshold question for
admissibility of evidence is relevance. Minn. R. Evid. 401 1977 comm. cmt. Because the
submissions at issue were not relevant to whether Wiberg repeatedly committed intrusive
and unwanted acts against Schumann and daughter, the district court was within its broad
discretion to exclude this otherwise admissible evidence. Wiberg further contends that the
district court should have adm itted daughter’s medical records into evidence. He cites
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 8 03(4), claiming that medical records are admissible under
the hearsay exemption. But again, the threshold issue is one of relevance. Minn. R. Evid.
401.
In sum, both the record and the relevant law support the district court’s decision to
grant the HROs. There was sufficient evidence to support the finding that Wiberg harassed
both Schumann and daughter when he repeatedly called Schumann’s employer and family
members in violation of a previous restrain ing order, disparaged Schumann, and posted
about daughter’s mental health issues on social media. Furt hermore, the district court
properly applied the law when it denied Wiberg’s request to introduce irrelevant evidence
at the hearing. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.