State of Minnesota, Respondent

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1970

State of Minnesota,
Respondent

vs.

Shunzhong Li,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2020
Reversed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-VB-19-177010

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Roger N. Knutson, Plymouth City Attorney, Alina Schwartz, Assistant City Attorney,
Campbell Knutson, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Shunzhong Li, St. Michael, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.*
S Y L L A B U S
The offense of failing to yield to an emergency vehicle under Minnesota Statutes
section 169.20, subdivision 5(a) (2018), requires proof that the emergency -vehicle driver
gave an audible signal by siren, except in the case of an emergency vehicle escorting an
oversize or overweight vehicle.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
A police officer saw a van fail to slow or stop for an ambulance approaching with
its emergency lights activated. The district court received testimony and video evidence of
the officer’s observation but no direct evidence about the ambulance’s siren. It found the
driver guilty of failing to signal a turn and failing to yield for an emergency vehicle. We
reverse the failure-to-yield conviction because the state produced insufficient evidence that
the ambulance driver gave an “audible signal by siren,” a prerequisite to a failure-to-yield
conviction under Minnesota Statutes section 169.20, subdivision 5(a) (2018).
FACTS
The district court presiding over a bench trial on two petty -misdemeanor charges
heard Plymouth Police Officer Scott Kroeger testify about a traffic incident occurring on
June 6, 2019. Officer Kroeger said that he was driving his squad car when he saw a van in
front of him turn left, westbound onto County Road 6, without signaling. The officer
testified that he then saw “an ambulance coming eastbound on County Road 6 with its
flashing emergency lights on.” Officer Kroeger and two other vehicles slowed and pulled
over to let the ambulance pass, but the van did not. Officer Kroeger stopped the van and
spoke with its driver, appellant Shunzhong Li, who claimed not to have noticed the
ambulance. The officer cited Li for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle and failing to
signal his turn. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.19, subd. 5, .20, subd. 5(a), (e) (2018). The district
court also received into evidence the squad- car video footage, which corroborated the
officer’s testimony.
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Li testified in his own defense. He said that he signaled his turn and that he yielded
to the ambulance.
The district court believed Officer Kroeger and disbelieved Li, finding Li guilty of
both traffic offenses and fining him accordingly. Li appeals, challenging only his
conviction of failing to yield to an emergency vehicle.
ISSUES
I. What are the elements of failing to yield to an emergency vehicle under
Minnesota Statutes section 169.20, subdivision 5(a)?
II. Is Li’s conviction supported by sufficient evidence?
ANALYSIS
Li challenges his failure-to- yield conviction, claiming as a matter of law that the
evidence does not show that the ambulance emitted an audible siren as required by statute
and claiming alternatively as a matter of fact that he did yield to the ambulance. We decide
this appeal addressing only his first argument.
I
Li argues that one of the essential elements of a failure-to-yield conviction is proof
that the ambulance had activated its siren, citing Minnesota Statutes section 169.20,
subdivision 5(a). Li’ s ultimate sufficiency -of-the-evidence challenge requires us to
consider the meaning of the statute. See State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017).
We analyze the meaning de novo, see id., and we easily conclude that the statute readily
supports Li’s premise.
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The statutory requirement to yield to emergency vehicles includes unambiguous
terms:
Upon the immediate approach of an authorized
emergency vehicle equipped with at least one lighted lamp
exhibiting red light visible under normal atmospheric
conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the front of the vehicle
and, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), when the
driver is giving audible signal by siren, the driver of each other
vehicle shall yield the right-of -way and shall immediately
drive to a position parallel to and as close as possible to the
right-hand edge or curb of the highway clear of any
intersection, and shall stop and remain in this position until the
authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when
otherwise directed by a police officer. The driver of another
vehicle on a one-way roadway shall drive to the closest edge
or curb and stop.
Minn. Stat. § 169.20, subd. 5(a). The exception “in paragraph (b)” occurs when an
emergency vehicle is “escorting the movement of an oversize or overweight vehicle or
load,” in which case the emergency vehicle’s driver must activate a red light but “need not
sound an audible signal by siren.” Id., subd. 5(b) (2018). The statute is clear. It plainly
defines when a driver must yield (when approached by “an authorized emergency vehicle”
that is “equipped with at least one lighted [red] lamp” and the emergency-vehicle “driver
is giving audible signal by siren”) and plainly directs what the driver must then do
(“yield the right-of -way . . . immediately drive to . . . the right -hand edge or curb of the
highway . . . and . . . stop and remain . . . until the authorized emergency vehicle has
passed”). Id., subd. 5(a). A driver who disobeys his duty to yield commits a petty
misdemeanor. Id., subd. 5(e).
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Applying the statute in this case, the state bore the burden of proving these elements
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Li was immediately approached by an au thorized
emergency vehicle; (2) the emergency vehicle displayed a visible red light; (3) the
emergency vehicle emitted a siren; and (4) Li failed to yield the right-of-way, stop near the
right-hand c urb, and remain there until the emergency vehicle passed. Having clarified
these elements, we consider whether the state’s evidence supports the conviction.
II
The district court never expressly found that the ambulance was emitting a siren,
but because the statute includes the siren element and the district court found Li guilty, we
deem the finding as having been implicitly made. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(e).
As Li argues, however, for the following reasons we see no sufficient evidence supporting
the finding, and the deficiency undermines Li’s conviction.
We first must determine the appropriate standard of review for Li’s sufficiency
argument. Which standard applies depends on whether the district court reached its finding
based on direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.
2018). Direct evidence rests on personal observation or knowledge and stands on its own,
needing no additional inference or presumption to prove an elemental fact, while
circumstantial evidence needs some additional inference or presumption. State v. Harris,
895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017). If the state proves an element with direct evidence,
we consider whether the evidence viewed in the light favorable to the conviction was
sufficient to permit the district court to reach the guilty verdict. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d
24, 39–40 (Minn. 2016). But if the state relies instead on circumstantial evidence to prove
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an element, we first identify the circumstances proved by the state while deferring to the
district court’s acceptance of the state’s evidence, and we consider second whether those
circumstances are consistent only with guilt—precluding any other rational hypothesis.
Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
The state offered no direct evidence that the ambulance was emitting an audible
siren. Officer Kroeger testified only that he “saw an ambulance coming . . . with its
flashing emergency lights on.” (Emphasis added.) He did not mention any siren. And the
video recording is not direct evidence of an activated siren, because the recording is silent
at the time the ambulance approached Li. Because the state prese nted no direct evidence
on the siren element, we will consider whether the state offered circumstantial evidence to
prove the element. We see very little. The evidence presented by the state and accepted by
the district court establishes that Officer Kroeger followed Li through a left turn, that an
ambulance approached from the opposite direction, that the ambulance’s emergency lights
were activated, and that Officer Kroeger and two other drivers stopped while Li continued
on without slowing or applying his brakes. These circumstances are insufficient to prove
that the ambulance was emitting a siren. One could rationally infer that the officer and
other drivers stopped only because they saw the ambulance’s activated emergency lights
and that its siren was not activated.
The state argues that there is “plenty of relevant evidence to infer that the driver of
the ambulance gave [an] audible signal by siren.” The state’s cited circumstances fall far
short. It reasons vaguely from the negative, maintaining that Li’s failure to disclaim having
heard the ambulance is “telling.” The state essentially invites us to presume that, because
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Li failed to claim that he heard no audible siren, the siren must have been audible. This
reasoning has two flaws, both fatal. First, it progresses like one of those impossible-object
optical illusions, which appear s plausible only at a glance but proves unworkable under
minor scrutiny. Second, to the extent the state is commenting about Li’s trial testimony
rather than his on-scene claims, the reasoning ignores the fact that the state bore the burden
of proving the disputed element, see State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Minn. 2015),
and that Li bore no burden to disprove the element. The state also cites the fact that the
ambulance’s emergency lights were activated, suggesting a likelihood that its siren was
also activated. The state offered no evidence that the audible and visible signaling devices
of emergency vehicles generally, or ambulances specifically, are activated at once rather
than separately, and we think the implication is almost certainly false. And if the two
devices operate separately, the record includes no evidence from which a fact-finder could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the ambulance driver in this case turned both on
at once. We hold that the state presented no evidence sufficient to prove that the
ambulance’s siren was activated as it approached Li.
D E C I S I O N
Because neither the direct nor circumstantial evidence proved that the ambulance’s
siren was activated, we reverse Li’s conviction for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle.
Reversed.