In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of E. F. O. and J. A. D., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1977

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of
E. F. O. and J. A. D., Parents.

Filed May 26, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-19-4911

James McGeeney, Doda McGeeney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant mother E.F.O.)

Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent father J.A.D.)

Mark Ostrem, Olmsted County Atto rney, Michelle A.S. Barnes, Associate County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing &
Human Services)

Vicki Duncan, Rochester, Minnesota (Guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant E.F.O. challenges the district court’s involuntary termination of parental
rights (TPR) to her child. E.F.O. asserts that the district court (1) made clearly erroneous
findings that a statutory basis exists to terminate her parental rights and (2) abused its
discretion by finding that termination of E.F.O.’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests. Because the district court did not make clearly erroneous findings or abuse its

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discretion by concluding that termination of E.F.O.’s parental rights is the best interests of
the child, we affirm.
FACTS
E.F.O. is the mother and J.A.D. is the father to C.F.D., a nine -year-old girl at the
time of trial. J.A.D. voluntarily terminated his parental rights to C.F.D. before the start of
the TPR trial. The only issue on appeal relates to the district court’s involuntary
termination of E.F.O.’s parental rights.
Beginning in April 2010, the Olmsted County Health, Housing, and Human
Services (the count y) started working with E.F.O. and J.A.D. after receiving a truancy
report about a separate child of E.F.O. who is now an adult. C.F.D. was a baby during the
county’s initial contact with the family. The county stopped providing voluntary services
to the family based on E.F.O.’s assertion that the family would be m oving to the Twin
Cities area.
In July 2018, the county received a report of potential child maltreatment of C.F.D.
“related to threatened sexual abuse.” The report alleged that from 2015 to 2016, E.F.O.
sent pictures of C.F.D. sleeping with her underwear exposed to a man E.F.O. met online.
The county investigated the allegations. E.F.O. admitted sending pictures of C.F.D. to the
man but denied any of the pictures were inappropriate. E.F.O. did acknowledge that she
stayed at the man’s house at least once with C.F.D. Additionally, E.F.O. admitted that the
male stayed late at night at E.F.O.’s residence several times as well. The child-protection
workers never saw the pictures descri bed by the reporter. Based on the investigation, the
county provided ongoing case-management services to the family.

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On October 24, 2018, C.F.D. was placed in foster care due to E.F.O.’s voluntary
agreement. In December 2018, the county filed a child-protection petition, and the district
court, following admissions by the parents, adjudicated the child in need of protection or
services.
The county developed an out-of-home placement plan that E.F.O. accepted and the
district court approved. The plan identified E.F.O.’s need to demonstrate that, among other
things: (1) the child would reside in an environment without any sexual exploitation or
threats of harm; (2) the child would “remain in a safe, stable, and consistent environment;”
and (3) E.F.O. would develop a safety plan with the county for the child to be safe . The
safety plan required that “[c]aregivers for [C.F.D.] must be . . . relatives and all others must
be preapproved by [the county].” The county anticipated that the case could close when
there is a “safety network of people” connected to C. F.D. that were “aware of reported
concerns to ensure [C.F. D.] ha[d] consistent and safe caregivers .” Specific services
provided to E.F.O. included referrals for low -income housing options, employment
agencies, mental -health services, and family -group conferencing. These services were
designed to develop E.F.O.’s ability to identify safe people for C.F.D. to be with and to
increase E.F.O.’s awareness for proper supervision of C.F.D.
After four months and a purported lack of progress related to the case plan, the
county petitioned to terminate E.F.O.’s parental rights involuntarily alleging, in part, that
her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2)
(2018). Following a trial, the district court terminated E.F.O’s parental rights pursuant to
that statute after finding that E.F.O. failed to complete the court-ordered case plan designed

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to reunite E.F.O. with C.F.D., that the county provided services necessary for E.F.O. to
correct the conditions leading to C .F.D.’s placement , and that further services to
rehabilitate and reunify the family would be futile and therefore unreasonable under the
circumstances. The district court found that C.F.D.’s best interests supported termination
of E.F.O.’s parental rights based on C.F.D. experiencing “both harsh and unsafe living
conditions while in [E.F.O.’s] care,” and that C.F.D. was “thriving in the current
placement,” where C.F.D. “can develop physical ly and mentally in a safe environment.”
E.F.O. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The record supports the district court’s findings by clear and convincing
evidence that a statutory basis exists to terminate E.F.O.’s parental rights
involuntarily.

Appellate courts “review the [involuntary] termination of parental rights to
determine whether the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether
the district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.” See In re Welfare of the Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 ( Minn.
2008). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of the
Children of S.R.K. , 911 N.W.2d 821, 830 ( Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Appellate
courts “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was
clear and convincing.” See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 835. If the district court’s findings of
fact are not clearly erroneous, appellate courts review the district court’s determination of
whether the statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists for an abuse of discretion. In

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re Welfare of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan.
17, 2012).
A district court’s decision to terminate parental rights involuntarily must be
supported by one of the statutory grounds listed in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)
(2018). “[W]e need only one properly supported statutory ground in order to affirm a
termination order.” In re Welfare of the Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App.
2012). Because the district court needs only one statutory basis to terminate parental rights
involuntarily, we focus our analysis on the district court’s finding pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
A district court may terminate parental rights if it finds “that the parent has
substantially, continuously, or repea tedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2). Parental duties include, but are not limited to, “providing the child with
necessary food, clothin g, shelter, education and other care and control necessary for the
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Id. In making this finding,
the district court must consider “if the parent is physically and financially able, and either
reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the conditions that
formed the basis of the petition or reasona ble efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable.” Id. “Failure to satisfy requirements of a court -ordered case plan provides
evidence of a parent’s noncompliance with the duties and responsibilities under section
260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2).” In re Welfare of the Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656,
666 (Minn. App. 2012).

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E.F.O. argues that the district court’s findings related to this statutory ground to
terminate her parental rights are clearly erroneous. E.F.O. specifically asserts the dist rict
court made clearly erroneous findings that (1) E.F.O. placed the child at risk by having an
unapproved caregiver take care of C.F.D. over a particular weekend; (2) E.F.O. failed to
acknowledge that the topic of sexual abuse was important and E.F.O.’s failures put C.F.D.
at risk; and (3) E.F.O. struggled to obtain stable housing for C.F.D. We address E.F.O.’s
first two arguments together because the issues are closely related. We separately address
her third argument.
Violating Safety Plan for C.F.D.

E.F.O. argues that the district court erred by findings that she left C.F.D. “with an
unapproved caregiver during the long MEA weekend.” The district court did not make
such a finding in its termination order. However, the district court made findings which
are supported by the record that E.F.O. failed to comply with an agreed -upon safety plan
designed to ensure C.F.D.’s safety and, further, that E.F.O. failed to recognize the safety
concerns.
The record supports the district court’s finding that the county made a safety plan
with E.F.O. in October 2018. The safety plan directed that C.F.D. be cared for only by
relatives and individuals first approved by the county. The district court found—consistent
with the record—that E.F.O. left C.F.D. alone with truck drivers whom E.F.O. transported
as part of her employment for periods of time . The district court received testimony that
this placed C.F.D. at risk because she “is a young child and it is the responsibility of the
parent to decide what adults are safe to be around their children. [ C.F.D.’s] development

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[was] not where it need[ed] to be . . . to make those kinds of decisions.” The district court
determined that it was not appropriate for E.F.O. to leave C.F.D. in these situations based
on her age. The district court’s findings that E.F.O. left C.F.D. alone with individuals
contrary to the safety plan is supported by the record.
E.F.O. also contends on appeal there was no evidence C.F.D. had been sexually
abused or exploited, so she “had no reasons to believe this was a safety concern and the
district court’s finding that these facts contributed to her failing to comply with her [out-
of-home placement plan] are clearly erroneous. ” The district court found that the county
created its safety plan so that C.F.D. would be surrounded by “safe adults and receiving
proper supervision.” As noted above, the district court determined that E.F.O. contravened
the safety plan by leaving the child with men not approved by the county. The district
court did not clearly err in finding E.F.O. had not successfully completed the out-of-home
placement plan ’s requirement to set boundaries to protec t C.F.D. from risky contact.
E.F.O. left the child alone with persons assuming C.F.D. could determine whether she was
safe. The district court’s findings that E.F.O. left the child without proper supervision and
that E.F.O. failed to ensure safe caregivers for C.F.D. are not clearly erroneous.
Necessary Shelter
E.F.O. also asserts the district court made a clearly erroneous finding that she failed
to obtain stable housing as part of the statutory basis to support termination. The district
court found that E.F.O. has struggled with providing secure housing. The district court
found that E.F.O resisted disclosing her residence to the county despite the requirement to
do so under the out-of-home placement plan. E.F.O. acknowledged living in her car, in a

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trailer home with J.A.D., or living with various friends. The district court noted that in the
child-in-need-of-protection-or-services matter, E.F.O. admitted the housing she shared
with J.A.D. was in poor condition. T he district court found that the residence had
“cockroaches, holes in the flooring, chemicals that would be within reach of the child, dog
feces, and a large amount of clutter everywhere.” Additionally, the trailer home had “boxes
stacked up to the ceiling in places.” The district c ourt noted that E.F.O. disclosed to the
county—one month before trial —that she was living with a friend and sleeping on the
couch. Yet E.F.O. continued to maintain a current mailing address at J.A.D.’s residence
and did not want to change that. This left the district court unsure of where E.F.O. planned
to reside. The district court found that, although E.F.O. was staying at a friend’s residence,
she failed “to establish stable long-term housing since this case opened over a year ago.”
Based on the recor d, the district court’s finding s that E.F.O. lacked stable housing and
continues to lack stable long-term housing for C.F.D. are not clearly erroneous.
The findings supporting the statutory basis for termination are not clearly erroneous.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by invoking that
statutory basis to terminate E.F.O.’s parental rights, and affirm the district court’s
determination that the county met its burden to establish a statutory basis pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), to terminate E.F.O.’s parental rights.
II. The record supports the district court’s finding that termination of E.F.O.’s
parental rights is in C.F.D.’s best interests.
Even if a district court properly finds a statutory ground to terminate parental rights
involuntarily, the district court must also find that termination of parental rights is in the

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best interests of the child. In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 ( Minn.
2004). “[D]etermination of a child’s best interests ‘is generally not susceptible to an
appellate court’s global review of a record,’ and . . . ‘an appellate court’s combing through
the record to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility
determinations.’” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App.
2009) (quoting In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003)).
A district court addresses the best interests of the child by considering three factors:
“(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B ., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). A child’s “[c]ompeting interests include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4.
A district court “shall make a specific finding that termination is in the best interests of the
child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). A district court’s determination of whether
its findings on these factors show that termination is in the child’s best interests is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
E.F.O. argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding termination was
in the best interests of C.F.D. Specifically, E.F.O. asserts that the district court improperly
weighed C.F.D.’s claim that she liked her foster-care placement over E.F.O.’s interest in
maintaining the parent -child relationship. E.F.O. also contends that the distr ict court
improperly considered J.A.D.’s voluntary termination against E.F.O. ’s interest in
maintaining the parent -child relationship. Finally, E.F.O. argues that the district court

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improperly found that E.F.O. exposed C.F.D. to unsafe conditions. Based on the district
court’s consideration of the best-interest factors relevant in these types of proceedings, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
The district court considered the three best -interests factors in addressing whether
to terminate E.F.O.’s parental rights. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). First, the
district court found that C.F.D. misses her mother but C.F.D. “has expressed happiness and
excitement for the current foster care placement.” Second, the district court considered
E.F.O.’s interests in maintaining the relationship. The district court noted that E.F.O. loved
C.F.D., missed C.F.D., and wanted C.F.D. returned to her care. Third, the district court
considered competing interests of C.F.D. The district court found that C.F.D. “experienced
both harsh and unsafe living conditions while in [E.F.O.’s] care.” Moreover, it considered
that C.F.D. is in a placement where she “can develop physically and mentally in a safe
environment.” These findings follow the necessary considerations that a district court must
weigh in deciding a child’s best interests in the context of terminating parental rights.
Contrary to E.F.O.’s claims on appeal, the findings do not show that the district
court improperly weighed J.A.D.’s voluntary termination against E.F.O.’s request for
reunification. The district court made specific best-interest determinations about each
parent, providing reason s why C.F.D.’s best interest supported terminating E.F.O.’s
parental rights . In addressing C.F.D.’s competing interest justifying termination of
E.F.O.’s rights, the district court specifically addressed C.F.D.’s interest in a stable
environment established through her foster placement as overcoming E.F.O.’s interest in
maintaining the relationship . Because th e district court considered the required best-

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interest factors and made specific findings addressing those factors that are supported by
the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that terminatio n is in
C.F.D.’s best interests. We therefore affirm the termination of E.F.O.’s parental rights.
Affirmed.