State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1981

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Orville Huhnerkoch,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-19-59

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant Redwood County Attorney, Slayton, M innesota (for
respondent)

Steven P. Groschen, David A. Samb, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions fo r driving while impaired (DWI), asserting
that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. We affirm.
FACTS
At about 8:00 p.m. on January 9, 2019, appellant Robert Orville Huhnerkoch’s Ford
pickup came to the attention of a Minnesota State Trooper because it “appeared to be
stopped . . . in the lane of traffic” on County Road 7, a two -lane highway in Redwood
County. The trooper was stopped at an intersection about a quarter mile from the truck. It
was completely dark outside, and the trooper saw the truck’s cargo lights were on,
suggesting that a door was open. And he observed that the truck did not “appear to be
advancing down the roadway.” As the trooper approached the truck, he saw the c argo
lights go off and the brake lights briefly flashed on . The truck did not veer or signal as it
began to drive down the highway. As he passed the spot where the truck had stopped, the
trooper observed a large wet mark on the center line; the highway was otherwise dry.
The trooper pulled the truck over for “stopping in the roadway.” After Huhnerkoch
identified himself, the trooper asked if he had stopped to urinate “in the middle of the road.”
Huhnerkoch replied that he had.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Huhnerkoch with two counts of fourth -
degree DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2018). Huhnerkoch moved to
suppress all evidence obtained during the traffic stop on the ground that the stop was illegal.

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The district court denied the motion . Following a stipulated -facts trial, the district court
found Huhnerkoch guilty on both counts. Huhnerkoch appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions pro tect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U. S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Temporary
detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a
brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ . . . .” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
But an officer may stop a vehicle if he has reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. State v. Munson , 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999). “[I]f an officer
observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective
basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). Such
stops must be based on more than “whim, caprice, or idle cur iosity.” State v. Pike , 551
N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996) . We review a district court’s legal conclusion regarding
the existence of reasonable suspicion de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. State
v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016).
The trooper stopped Huhnerkoch’s truck for stopping in the middle of the highway.
Minn. Stat. § 169.32(a) (2018) governs the stopping and parking of vehicles on a public
highway. The traffic statute provides:
Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district
no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle,
whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved
or main -traveled part of the highway when it is practical to
stop, park, or s o leave such vehicle off such part of said

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highway, but in every event a clear and unobstructed width of
at least 20 feet of such part of the highway opposite such
standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other
vehicles and a clear view of su ch stopped vehicle be available
from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon such
highway.

Minn. Stat. § 169.32(a).

Huhnerkoch does not challenge the district court’s findings of fact. Rather, he
contends that the trooper did not reasonably susp ect that he violated the traffic statute
because (1) the highway shoulder was “too narrow to safely park a vehicle off the highway”
and (2) the evidence does not establish how much of his truck was parked on the highway
and whether it was “positioned more or less than 20 feet from the opposite end of the
highway.” We are not persuaded for two reasons.
First, Huhnerkoch suggests a standard for investigative stops that would require an
actual violation of a traffic law rather than an officer’s reasonable belief that a violation
occurred. The law requires only reasonable suspicion of a violation. Pike, 551 N.W.2d at
921 (stating that reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop does not require an “actual
violation” of a traffic law). Indeed, t he Supreme Court recently reiterated that “[t]he
reasonable suspicion inquiry falls considerably short of 51% accuracy,” and stated that
“[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020)
(alteration in original) (quotations omitted).

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Second, the district court’s unchallenged findings of fact establish that t he trooper
had reasonable suspicion to stop Huhnerkoch’s truck. The trooper saw a truck parked in
its lane of traffic on a highway. The cargo lights were on, suggesting that it was parked or
at least stopped. As the trooper approached the truck, he saw the brake lights flash and the
truck began moving down the road. And as he passed the location where the truck had
stopped, the trooper saw a wet mark on the road. Under these circumstances, we are
satisfied that the trooper’s suspicion that the driver had violated the traffic statute by
parking on the highway is reasonable.
This court considered similar circumstances in Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
where a law-enforcement officer stopped a vehicle that was parked on a county road at
night with its lights off. 388 N.W.2d 759, 759 (Minn. App. 1986). The driver had parked
in the middle of his lane , and the shoulder area was no more than a foot wide because of
snow. Id. The driver began to pull away as the officer approached. Id. Because the
driver’s behavior was “unusual” and “could have been in violation of section 169.32,” we
upheld the traffic stop. Id. at 760. And we observed that the stop was not “the product of
mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Id. at 761. This case likewise involves a nighttime
stop of a vehicle that was stopped or parked in the middle of a road with little shoulder area
as a police car approached . As in Johnson, we conclude the trooper did not stop
Huhnerkoch’s truck based on idle curiosity; he stopped the truck because he reasonably

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believed the driver violated the traffic statute. Accordingly, we affirm Huhnerkoch’s
conviction.1
Affirmed.

1 Huhnerkoch also suggests that the trooper’s testimony that the truck “appeared stopped”
calls into question whether it was actually stopped. This language -based argument is
unavailing. In State v. Poehler, the supreme court rejected the driver’s contention that the
arresting officer’s “phrasing that ‘it appeared’ [the driver] was not wearing a seat belt [was]
too equivocal to conclude that the officer actually saw [the driver] without a seat belt on,”
concluding that the language was “clear enough” to in dicate that the officer had actually
made the observation. 935 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn. 2019). Likewise here, the “appeared”
language is merely a passive form of speech, not an equivocal observation.