State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1983

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Okuch Odiel,
Appellant.

Filed November 30, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-18-4820

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M ., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant John Okuch Odiel challenges his conviction for domestic assault—fear,
arguing that respondent State of Minnesota fa iled to prove his requisite intent beyond a

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reasonable doubt. Examining the circumstan ces proved by the state, and drawing all
reasonable inferences from those circumstances, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient
to sustain Odiel’s conviction, and we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were established at tria l. Odiel was at the home of his ex-wife
A.O. to celebrate Thanksgiving when Odiel a nd A.O. got into an argument. During the
argument, Odiel pushed A.O.’s head. After be ing pushed, A.O. told Odiel, “[D]on’t hit
me,” while one of their sons said, “[D]on’ t put your hand on my mom.” Following this,
Odiel’s brother K.O., who was present at the dinner, removed Odiel from the house. In
response, Odiel called 911 and kicked the front door of the house, trying to get back inside.
O.B., a friend who was also in attendance at the dinner, testified that, during this time, A.O.
said that she and her child did not want Odiel in the house anymore.
When officers arrived, they found A.O. “frantic.” Odiel was also outside the home,
yelling loudly, and appeared angry when office rs arrived. Police arrested Odiel, and the
state charged him with three misdemeanors: (1) domestic assault—harm, (2) domestic
assault—fear, and (3) disorderly conduct.
At trial, the state called K.O., O.B., and three of the respondi ng police officers to
testify. Odiel testified in his own defens e. The jury found Od iel guilty of domestic
assault—fear and disorderly conduct.
Odiel appeals, challenging only his conviction for domestic assault—fear.

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D E C I S I O N
Odiel challenges his conviction for domestic assault—fear on the ground that there
is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the intent to
cause A.O. fear of immediate bodily harm or death.
Domestic assault—fear is a specific-intent crime. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303,
308-09 (Minn. 2012). To be gu ilty of the offense, Odiel mu st have intended through his
actions to cause A.O. fear of immediate bodily harm or death. Id.; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 1(1). A.O. need not actually have been harmed for Odiel to be found
guilty. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308.
The state proved Odiel’s in tent with circumstantial ev idence. Intent is usually
established through circumstan tial evidence by drawing infe rences from the defendant’s
words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime. State
v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Fo r a conviction to be upheld based on
circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of
the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond
a reasonable doubt, any r easonable inference other than that of guilt.” State v. Reed, 737
N.W.2d 572, 581 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
In reviewing whether circumstantial eviden ce is sufficient to sustain a conviction,
we apply a two-step inquiry. First, we identify the circumstances proved. State v. Harris,
895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). In doing so, we only co nsider those circumstances
consistent with the verdict. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013); see also
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.

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683, 684 (1928)) (stating that the court only looks at those “circumstances as the jury finds
proved by the evidence”). Conflicting evidence is construed in the light “most favorable to
the verdict,” and we assume “that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved
the defense witnesses.” Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858.
Second, we independently “determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, not
simply whether the inferences th at point to guilt are reasonable.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
at 599 (quotation omitted). Here, we give no de ference to the jury’s choice between any
reasonable inferences. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. If ther e is any rational hypothesis
pointing to innocence, then th e evidence was insufficient an d the convictio n should be
overturned. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010).
We address each step in turn.
Circumstances Proved
There are six circumstances proved that bear on Odiel’s intent. First, Odiel pushed
A.O.’s head while they were arguing in her kitchen. Second, before K.O. forced Odiel from
the home, A.O. told Odiel, “[ D]on’t hit me,” and one of thei r children said, “[D]on’t put
your hand on my mom.” Third, after seeing Odiel push A.O., K.O. forced Odiel from the
home. Fourth, after being removed from the home, Odiel kicked the front door until police
arrived about ten minutes later. Fifth, while Odiel was kicking the door, according to O.B.,
A.O. said that she and her child did not wa nt Odiel in the house anymore. Finally, A.O.
appeared “frantic” and Odiel appeared angry when police arrived.

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Reasonable Inferences
Odiel argues that the circumstances proved do not permit the reasonable inference
that he intended to inflict fear of immediate harm or death upon A.O.
Intent is generally established by draw ing inferences “from a person’s words or
actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8,
11 (Minn. 1996). Relevant circumstances may include “events occurring before and after
the crime,” Davis v. State , 595 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Minn. 1 999), as well as the victim’s
reaction to a threat, State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975).
Here, an unfriendly argument occurred between Odiel and A.O. Odiel pushed A.O.
in the head—a particularly sensitive part of the body. Other witnesses interpreted Odiel’s
actions as hostile. Both A.O. and the parties’ son said to Odiel to stop hitting A.O., and
K.O. reacted to what had ha ppened by forcibly removing Odiel from the house. Odiel’s
friend O.B. testified that A.O. said that she and her child did not wa nt Odiel in the house
anymore. Once removed from the house, Odiel kicked the door for several minutes, seeking
to get back into the house even though A.O. told him he was no longer welcome at her
home. Further, Odiel appeared angry and A.O. appeared fra ntic when police arrived.
Together, these circumstances support the r easonable inference that Odiel intended to
cause A.O. fear of immediate bodily harm.
Odiel argues that the evidence is insufficient because the state did not call A.O. to
testify and other evidence—such as evidence of past abuse, a weapon, or threatening
words—was not present. But the absence of that evidence does not undermine the presence
of the other sufficient evidence of Odiel’s intent based on the circumstances proved.

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Odiel also argues that the circumstances proved show only that he intended to push
A.O.’s head but not to cause her to fear harm as a result. He compares this case to State v.
Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 2016). In Dorn, the supreme court upheld the defendant’s
conviction for first-degree assault—harm when she pushed a man who, as a result, fell into
a bonfire and suffered significant burns. 887 N.W. 2d at 833. Dorn argued that she lacked
the requisite intent because she only intended to push the victim, not to cause him serious
injuries. Id. at 828-29. The supreme court rejected that argument, reasoning that assault—
harm is a general-intent crime that is proved by the defendant’s intent to engage in the
prohibited conduct, not an intent to cause a particular result. Id. at 831. Odiel argues that
Dorn shows that an intended act can be indepe ndent of any intended consequences and
that, here, the only intent proved was his inte nt to push A.O.’s head and not to cause the
consequence of fear.
But Dorn was an assault—harm case, not an assault—fear case. Id. at 830. Dorn
does not preclude an a ssault—fear conviction when the totality of circumstances, even
including a physical pushing, demonstrate the specific intent to cause fear. The context
leading to Odiel pushing A.O.’s head, the reactions of A.O. and the child, K.O.’s response
of removing Odiel from the home, Odiel’s aggr essive kicking the door to re-enter the
house, and Odiel’s anger and A.O.’s frantic appearance when police arrived together lead
to the reasonable inference that Odiel intended to cause A.O. to fear imminent bodily harm.
Odiel makes no other argument that the evidence permits a particular alternative reasonable
inference consistent with i nnocence, and we conclude that, on this record, the
circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.

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The circumstantial evidence is therefore sufficient to support Odiel’s conviction for
domestic assault—fear.
Affirmed.