State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1988

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Matthew Henry Peterson,
Appellant.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed; motion granted in part and denied in part
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-18-2384

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Anth ony J. Weigel, Assist ant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Matthew Henry Peterson challe nges his conviction for possession of
burglary tools, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove the requisite intent.

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Alternatively, Peterson argues that the dist rict court erred under Minn. Stat. § 609.035
(2018) by imposing sentences for both posse ssion of burglary tools and misdemeanor
receiving stolen property because the offenses arose from a single behavioral incident.
Peterson asserts several additional arguments in his pro se supplemental brief; respondent
State of Minnesota seeks to strike the supplemen tal brief in its entire ty. We grant in part
and deny in part the state’s motion to strike the supplemental brief. And we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are drawn from Peterson’ s jury trial. On June 14, 2018, law
enforcement officers in Moor head responded to a report of a man who appeared
unresponsive in a car outside of an apartment building. The o fficers spoke with the man,
who ultimately identified himself as Peterson. Peterson said that he was there to see his
child, who he said lived in th e apartment building with the child’s mother. Peterson told
law enforcement that he was living out of his car.
The officers searched Peterson’s car at the scene. They found several items that they
found suspicious, such as a sc rewdriver with a broken tip and another hand tool with a
broken tip, roughly eight cellphones, and a locked briefcase containing multiple items that
included sensitive information belonging to other individuals. These items included Social
Security cards, bank statemen ts, vehicle titles, prescription bottles, checks, and driver’s
licenses. Among these items were a student identification card from Minnesota State
University Moorhead and a checkbook, both be longing to T.L., as we ll as a check that
appeared to be signed by T.L. and made out to another person.

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T.L. is a former Minnesota State Univers ity Moorhead student. Six months before
the officers encountered Peterson in his car, T.L.’s garage in Fargo, North Dakota, was
burglarized. T.L. reported the burglary at the time, and the resulti ng police report stated
that T.L.’s car was in a locked detached garage and that the ca r’s front window was
smashed. The police report observed that a flashlight and car charger had been taken from
the car.
Based on events with Peterson on June 14, 2018, Peterson was charged by complaint
with possession of burglary tools, in viol ation of Minn. Stat. § 609.59 (2016), and
misdemeanor receiving stolen property, in violation of Minn. St at. § 609.53, subd. 1
(2016). Peterson was not charged with the burglary of T.L.’s garage.
At the trial, two of the responding office rs and T.L. testified—Peterson did not.
Officer Valerie Kellen described what officer s had found in Peterson’s car. She testified
that, based on her experience, she consider ed the broken screwdriver and hand tool
“suspicious” because flathead tools are items that are used to pry open vehicles, doors, or
compartments. T.L. testified regarding the burglary of her garage. She said that, while she
had reported to the police only the two items missing from her car, the garage had also held
plastic containers and cardboard boxes containing items from her time at Minnesota State
University Moorhead. T.L. said that she did not remember throwing away her college ID
card or checkbook and that she would have been unlikely to have thrown them away
because she generally burns se nsitive documents. T.L. testifie d that she did not sign the
check found in Peterson’s car. She further testified that she did not know Peterson and did
not know why he would have had her checkbook and student ID card in his possession.

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The jury found Peterson gu ilty on both counts, and th e district court imposed
sentences for both. For possession of burglary tools, the district court granted a downward
dispositional departure and se ntenced Peterson to 30 months in prison with execution
stayed, placing him on probation for four years. For receiving stolen property, the district
court sentenced Peterson to 90 days in jail.
This appeal follows. Peterson filed a pro se supplemental brief with this court. The
state moved to strike the supplemental brief in its entirety.
D E C I S I O N
Peterson urges us to reverse his conviction for possession of burglary tools because
the evidence is insuffici ent to sustain it. In the alternative, he asks us to remand with
instructions to vacate his second sentence because the imposition of sentences for both
offenses is barred under Minn. Stat. § 609.035.
I. Sufficient evidence proves that Peters on possessed tools with the intent to
commit a burglary.

Peterson argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he possessed tools with the intent to commit a burglary. A person is
guilty of possession of burglary tools when he “has in [his] possession any device,
explosive, or other instrumentality with inte nt to use or permit the use of the same to
commit burglary.” Minn. Stat. § 609.59. “The intent necessary is a general intent to use the
tools in the commission of a bu rglary and not an intent to commit a particular burglary.”
State v. Conaway , 319 N.W.2d 35, 41 (Minn. 1982 ). Thus, “[t]here is no absolute
requirement that the state link the defend ant to any past or future burglary.” Id. Intent to

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use burglary tools may be inferred from the character of th e tools and from the
circumstances surrounding their possession. Id. Intent is gene rally proved using
circumstantial evidence. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997).
“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence . . . warrants heightened scrutiny.”
State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010 ). Appellate courts perform this
heightened scrutiny through a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598
(Minn. 2013). First, we identify the circumstances proved. Id. In doing so, we “defer to the
jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record
that conflicted with the circum stances proved by the [s]tate.” Id. at 598-99 (quotations
omitted). We “consider only those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.” Id.
at 599. Second, we consider the inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances
proved. We analyze “whether the circumstances proved ar e consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). At
this step, we do not defer to the jury’s “choice between reasonable inferences.” Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d at 474 (quotation omitted). To sustain a conviction, “[c]ircumstantial evidence
must form a complete chain that , in view of the evid ence as a whole, leads so directly to
the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference
other than guilt.” Id. at 473 (quotation omitted). We w ill not overturn a conviction based
on mere conjecture. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 331 (Minn. 2010) (quotation and
citations omitted).
The circumstances proved are as follows. The officer found Peterson parked in a car
outside an apartment building in Moorhead, where Peterson’s child and the child’s mother

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lived. Three officers searched Peterson’s car and found a broken screwdriver and another
broken hand tool among multiple other tools. In Officer Kellen’s experience, the broken
tools are consistent with items used to pry things open in the co mmission of burglaries.
The officers found a locked briefcase with Social Security cards, checkbooks, prescription
medication bottles, and other sensitive personal information belonging to other individuals.
T.L.’s Minnesota State University Moorhead ID card and her checkbook were among the
items. T.L.’s garage was burgla rized six months earlier in Fa rgo. T.L. did not remember
throwing away or disposing of either her ID card or her checkbook, and she believed that
the items were stolen from he r garage. T.L. did not sign th e check found in Peterson’s
possession. Finally, T.L. did not know Peterson.
Peterson argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational
hypothesis of innocence. He contends that the circumstances cannot exclude the reasonable
possibility that he did not have the specific intent required by the statute. See Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599 (“Under th[e] second st ep, we must determine whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt, not simply whether the infere nces that point to guilt are
reasonable.” (quotations omitted)). Specifically , Peterson argues that the circumstances
proved are consistent with the rational hypothesis that he intended to use the broken tools
for a lawful purpose, for example, to fix hi s car. He contends that this hypothesis of
innocence is especially rational because he wa s not convicted of the burglary of T.L.’s
garage, he was not caught in the act of committing burglary when police encountered him
on June 14, and the state introduced no evidence of prior burglaries or thefts by Peterson.

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We conclude that Peterson’s asserted explanation is not rational. See Silvernail, 831
N.W.2d at 599. Peterson’s intent to use burg lary tools may be inferred from the character
of the tools and from the circumst ances surrounding their possession. Conaway, 319
N.W.2d at 41. While screwdri vers may have a benign purpose, flathead hand tools, as
Officer Kellen testified, are also used to pry things open during the commission of
burglaries, and the tools in Peterson’s car had broken tips. These tools were found together
with a locked briefcase full of sensitive materials belonging to other individuals, including
the proceeds from a victim of a past burglary. The character of the sp ecific tools in this
case and the circumstances surrounding their possession lead only to the rational inference
that Peterson had the general intent to use the tools in the commission of a burglary. See
Conaway, 319 N.W.2d at 41. Any hypothesis th at Peterson had those items in his
possession without having committed or intending to commit a burglary is based on mere
conjecture and is not supported by the record. We will not overturn Peterson’s conviction
based on mere speculation. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 330.
Thus, the circumstances proved are consistent with Peterson’s guilt and
“inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at
474-75 (quotations omitted). The evidence is therefore suffi cient to support Peterson’s
conviction for possession of burglary tools. We affirm the conviction and turn to Peterson’s
alternative argument regarding sentencing.
II. The district court did not err by imposing sentences for both offenses.

Peterson argues that the district court erred by sentencing him for both offenses and
that his sentence for receipt of stolen property should be reversed. Minn. Stat. § 609.035,

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subd. 1, generally prohibits multiple sent ences for crimes committed during a single
behavioral incident. State v. Williams , 608 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. 2000).This statute
protects the defendant from multiple sentences and multiple prosecutions and ensures that
“punishment . . . will be comme nsurate with the criminality of defendant’s conduct.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavioral incident is
a fact-dependent inquiry. State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995). When
the facts are not in dispute, as is the case here, the decision whether multiple offenses are
part of a single behavioral incident presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 2012). In determ ining whether multiple
offenses arose from a single behavioral incident, we consider whether the acts were unified
by time and place and whether the conduct was motivated by the same criminal objective.
State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. 2011).
Peterson is convicted of possession of burgla ry tools and receipt of stolen property.
He argues that these two offenses arose from a single behavioral incident because the
criminal conduct for both offenses occurred at the same time and at the same place—that
is, Peterson’s possession of T.L.’s ID card and checks and his possession of the two hand
tools occurred at the same time in his car. But Pete rson fails to articulate how the
undisputed facts show that th e offenses were motivated by a “single criminal objective.”
The criminal objective for possessing burglary tools is to us e them to commit a burglary.
But the criminal objective for receiving stol en property containing sensitive personal
information is presumably to sell the stolen materials or ot herwise use them to steal an
individual’s identity. A lthough it is true that the possessi on of burglary tools conviction

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was supported, in part, by evid ence that Peterson possessed stolen items, the criminal
objective for each possession charge remains discrete. We conclude that the district court
did not err by imposing sentences for both offenses.
III. Peterson’s pro se arguments fail.

Peterson makes several arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. The state moves
to strike Peterson’s pro se supplemental brief in its entirety, arguing that Peterson asserts
facts outside the record and makes arguments based on those facts. The record on appeal
consists of only papers filed in the district court, offered exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings. Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 8. Pro se litigants generally are held to the
same standards as attorneys, and a pro se litigant’s allegation that is outside the record must
be disregarded. State v. Meldrum, 724 N.W.2d 15, 22 (M inn. App. 2006), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 24, 2007).
In his supplemental brief, Peterson assert s explanations for why he possessed the
hand tools in his car and how he came to possess the personal property of others, and he
argues that those explanations demonstrate the insufficiency of the evidence to support his
possession-of-burglary-tools conviction. But, because Peterson did not testify to those
explanations at trial, they ar e therefore not part of the reco rd. To the extent that Peterson
asserts facts outside the record concerni ng his possession of tools and other persons’
property and makes arguments on those asserted facts, we grant the state’s motion to strike
those portions of the supplemental brief. We base our review of the sufficiency of the
evidence—an issue that was thoroughly briefed by Peterson’s appellate counsel—only on

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the record evidence. And, in that review, we have concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support his conviction.
But Peterson makes other arguments in his supplemental brief, and, as to those
portions of the brief, we deny the state’s motion to strike. Nevertheless, these other
arguments fail. Apart from his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his
possession-of-burglary-tools conviction, Peters on complains about the search of his car,
his lawyer’s waiver of an omnibus hearing, the fact that jurors were permitted to go home
at night during his two-day trial, the speediness of his trial, and his four-year probationary
term. But Peterson presents no legal argument or citation to legal authority to support any
claim of error, and no prejudicial error “is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Bartylla,
755 N.W.2d 8, 22-23 (Minn. 2008). The arguments are therefore forfeited, and we do not
address their merits. Id.
Affirmed; motion granted in part and denied in part.