In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1993

In re the Marriage of:

Andrew Lowe Billett, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

RuthAnne Billett,
Appellant.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-FA-17-3863

Steven P. Groschen, Kohl meyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Tami L. Peterson, Saxton Peterson Law Firm, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appella nt-wife argues that the district court erred
by (1) underestimating wife’s need for attorn ey fees; (2) dividing the marital assets
inequitably; (3) miscalculating husband’s and wife’s income s for the purpose of spousal

2
maintenance; and (4) miscalculating husband’s and wife’s incomes for the purpose of child
support. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant RuthAnne Maihan Billett (w ife) and respondent Andrew Lowe Billett
(husband) were married in 1994. They ha ve one minor son who was born in 2003.
Husband petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in 2017.
The family predominantly relied on husband’ s income during the parties’ marriage.
Husband worked full-time for many years in upper management at a commercial printing
company. Between 1994 and 2003, wife worked at a num ber of different jobs, including
clerical jobs. Wife also took some college classes. Beginning in 2004, wife became a
stay-at-home parent but did some occasional part-time work and also completed her college
degree. After graduating from college in 20 11 with a degree in in formation technology
(IT), wife held a part-time IT-related position with husband’s employer. From 2016 until
the time of the dissolution trial, wife homesc hooled the parties’ son and did not work
outside the home.
In March 2018, the district court grante d wife’s request for temporary need-based
attorney fees and ordered husband to pay wife $5,000. The district court held a trial one
year later, in March 2019. At trial, the par ties disputed issues related to calculating each
of their incomes, the division of the marita l property, the amount of spousal maintenance
and child support, and the amount of attorney fees.
Wife testified about her em ployment prospects. She di scussed her plans to move
from Minnesota to North Carolina with the parties’ son after the family home sold. At that

3
time, wife did not know precis ely where in North Carolina sh e would live. She testified
that she intended to find a job after arriving in North Carolina and that she planned to seek
out clerical positions rather than jobs in the IT field because she had no desire to work in
IT. In response to further questions about her job prospects in North Carolina, wife testified
that she had researched clerical jobs and found that they paid between $9 and $11 per hour
but identified only one specific job opportunity.
On July 8, 2019, th e district court issued its finding s of fact, conclusions of law,
order for judgment, and judgment decree, dissolv ing the parties’ marri age. The district
court awarded joint legal custody of the minor child to husband and wife but awarded sole
physical custody to wife. The district court also ordered the parties to enroll their child in
a public or private school for the 2019-2020 school year, rather than have the child attend
home school.
The district court awarded $428,076.47 in net marital assets to husband and
$409,554.42 to wife. The district court al so ordered husband to pay wife permanent
spousal maintenance in the sum of $2,250 per month and child support in the sum of $1,255
per month. In calculating the maintenance and child-support awards, the district court
considered both parties’ monthly incomes and expenses. Th e court found that husband’s
net monthly income was $8,597. To determine wife’s income, the district court considered
wife’s education, current unemployed status, previous job positions a nd salaries, plan to
move to North Carolina, and testimony that sh e planned to find clerical work, as well as
testimony from a vocational expe rt. The court imputed an income of approximately

4
$31,000 per year to wife based on a wage of $15 per hour, finding that wife “can obtain a
job paying at least $15 per hour immediately upon her move to North Carolina.”
The district court also orde red husband to pay wife $15,154 in need-based attorney
fees and $1,353.75 in expert fees. The court determined that husband had the ability to pay
the attorney-fees award if the payment was “structured correctly.” The court then ordered
husband to pay the attorney-fees award “in lie u of a property equalization payment.” It
noted that structuring the payment in this manner was “most convenient.”
Wife subsequently moved for amended findi ngs of fact or a new trial. She argued
that the district court failed to properly a ccount for the temporary- attorney-fees award in
the property division, should have ordered husband to pay a property equalization payment
of $9,261 in addition to wife’s need-based attorney fees, and erred in determining
husband’s and wife’s incomes for the purposes of spousal maintenance and child support.
She further challenged the district court’s order regarding the education of the parties’ son,
but husband and wife have since resolved that dispute. In an order dated October 25, 2019,
the district court denied wife’s motion in its entirety.
Wife appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Wife makes several arguments on appeal. She first contests the amount of her
need-based attorney-fees award. Second, she challenges three aspects of the marital
property division. Third, she argues that the district court abused its discretion in
calculating her spousal-maintenance award. Fi nally, she contends that the district court
abused its discretion in calculating the child-support award. We address each issue in turn.

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I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in determining the need-based
attorney-fees award.

Wife argues that the district court erred in awarding her $15, 154 in need-based
attorney fees because it failed to consider the entirety of her need for attorney fees. We are
not persuaded.
In a marital-dissolution case, the district court “shall award attorney fees, costs, and
disbursements in an amount necessary to en able a party to carry on or contest the
proceeding,” provided that the district court finds:
(1) that the fees are n ecessary for the good faith
assertion of the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.

Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 ( 2018). This court has stated that an award of need-based
attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, su bd. 1, “rests almost entirely within the
discretion of the trial court an d will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
Crosby v. Crosby , 587 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn. App. 1998) (quo tation omitted), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999).
Here, wife did not request any specific amount of attorney fees. Instead, she
submitted an affidavit from her attorney asserting that her attorney fees through submission
of the post-decree filings totaled $63,377 and that she had paid $48, 223 of that amount.
She further testified at trial that she had arou nd $15,000 in outstandi ng fees that she was

6
unable to pay. Based on that information, th e district court concluded that wife was left
with an outstanding balance of $15,154 in attorney fees. The court then made the specific
findings required under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, including that wife did not have the
means to pay the fees, that husband had the me ans to pay them, and that the fees were
necessary for wife’s assertion of her rights in the proceeding. The court consequently
ordered husband to pay wife need-based attorney fees in the sum of $15,154.
Wife contends that the district court ab used its discretion in its determination of
wife’s need-based attorney fees in the judgment and decree because it failed to expressly
consider certain credit card debt that wife had incurred to pay her attorney.1 Wife relies on
Bone v. Bone, 438 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. App. 1989), for her argument that the district court
erred by failing to make “specific findings” indicating that it considered the relevant credit
card debt in determining wife’s need for fees.
Wife’s reliance on Bone is misplaced. First, Bone predates the 1990 amendment of
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, into its current format requiring the statutory findings of fact.
See Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 817 n.2 (Minn. App. 2001) (addressing viability
of pre-amendment caselaw). And, as noted a bove, the district court made the statutory
findings now required. Second, Bone did not address the specific findings a district court
needs to make regarding an attorney-fees award. Rather, Bone addressed whether a district
court erred when it amended a marital property settlement. Bone, 438 N.W.2d at 452-53.

1 While wife does not specify th e amount of debt she acquired, the district court found in
its order denying wife’s motion fo r amended findings of fact or a new trial that wife had
incurred approximately $8,500 in debt on a Discover credit ca rd to cover part of her
attorney fees.

7
And we are not aware of any caselaw requiring a district court to make the specific findings
requested by wife.
In light of the evidence suggesting an out standing balance of $1 5,154, and in the
absence of a request from wife for a specific amount, it was reasonable for the district court
to determine that $15,154 was th e extent of wife’s need. Ac cordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not abus e its discretion by awarding wife $15,154 in need-based
attorney fees.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in dividing the marital property.
Wife challenges three aspects of the mar ital property division. She asks us to
reverse the district court on the grounds that it apportioned wife’s need-based attorney fees
as part of the property division, failed to account for a $5,000 withdrawal that husband
made from the marital account, and abused its discretion by awarding husband more than
one-half of the marital property. We concl ude that none of th ese arguments require
reversal.
A. Allocation of Attorney Fees
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by improperly apportioning
the attorney-fees award as part of the prope rty division. Specifically, she challenges the
district court’s order that husband pay wife $15,154 in need-based attorney fees “in lieu of
a property equalization payment.”
A district court has broa d discretion over the division of property in a marital
dissolution proceeding and w ill not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). “A district court abuses its discretion

8
when it makes findings unsupported by the ev idence or when it im properly applies the
law.” Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen , 767 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. App. 2009), review
granted (Minn. Sept. 29, 2009) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb. 1, 2010).
Our precedent establishes that attorney fees acquired in a marital dissolution “are
not part of the marital estate, and thus are not apportionable as property.” Bone,
438 N.W.2d at 452; see also Filkins v. Filkins , 347 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Minn. App. 1984)
(stating that “[a]ttorney’s fees for the dissolution are not part of the marital estate” and
“should not therefore be considered” in a property division).
Here, the district court failed to follo w that legal standard when it explicitly
considered need-based attorney fees in its allocation of th e marital property. In the
judgment and decree, the district court alloca ted the marital assets and debts in a manner
that resulted in a preliminary property award of $428,076.47 to husband and a preliminary
award of $409,554.42 to wife. The district court then addressed the disparity between the
two preliminary awards by ordering husband to pay wife’s need-based attorney fees “in
lieu of” any equalization payment. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
The Court considered awarding a property equalization award
from [h]usband to [wif e;] . . . however, it is most convenient
that in lieu of a property equalization payment, [h]usband pay
[wife’s] outstanding legal fees in the amount of $15,154.00.
Such amount takes into consid eration both the equalization
payment and the attorney’s fees request.

In doing so, the district court improperly ap portioned wife’s need -based attorney-fees
award in its allocation of the marital property. This conclusion is confirmed by the district
court’s balance sheet which shows the distribu tion of the parties’ ma rital property. The

9
balance sheet lists husband’s subtotal prop erty award as $428,076.47, then lists a
$15,154.00 deduction for husband’s responsib ility for wife’s need-b ased attorney-fees
award, and finally reflects a resulting “tot al asset/debt allocation” to husband of
$412,922.47. In other words, the balanc e sheet reflects that husband’s final marital
property award of $412,922.47 is equal to his preliminary award minus a deduction for the
amount of need-based attorney fees ($428,076.47 – $15,154.00). Because caselaw makes
clear that a court may not allocate attorney fees as part of a property division, the district
court erred by apportioning wife’s need-based attorney fees as part of the property division.
Bone, 438 N.W.2d at 452; Filkins, 347 N.W.2d at 529.
Although we are persuaded that the di strict court erred by apportioning the
need-based attorney f ees in the property award, we de cline to reverse on this ground
because the court’s error was de minimis. We have previously held that we will not reverse
and remand where the district court’s error was de minimis or where the appellant failed to
show that the error was s ubstantially prejudicial. See, e.g., Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark ,
787 N.W.2d 690, 694 n.1 (Minn. App. 2010) (s tating that a district court’s failure to
account for $400 in value of land worth $99, 000 and with $54,900 in equity was a
de minimis error and declining to remand), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010);
Duffney v. Duffney, 625 N.W.2d 839, 843 (M inn. App. 2001) (holdi ng that understating
father’s monthly income by $20 to $25 was “de minimis and does not warrant a remand”).
Here, the parties had a sizable marital estate that totaled nearly $ 840,000. The district
court’s error, in which it impr operly allocated $15,154 in a ttorney-fee debt to husband,
amounts to approximately two percent of the marital estate. In light of the marital estate’s

10
total value, this amount is relatively insignificant. In sum, while we agree that the district
court erred by apportioning the need-based attorn ey fees as part of the property division,
we decline to reverse and remand on the grounds that the court’s error was de minimis.
B. Failure to Account for a $5,000 Withdrawal by Husband
Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to account for
a $5,000 withdrawal made by husband from a joint bank account to pay an award of
temporary attorney fees.
In a March 2018 order, near the start of the proceeding, the district court found that
wife was in need of funds to pay her atto rney and ordered husband to pay $5,000 in
temporary attorney fees. This amount is sepa rate from the final need-based attorney-fees
award. In its March 2018 order, the district court stated, “To the extent [h]usband must
use marital property to pay the attorney’s fees it shall be accounte d for appropriately.”
Husband then withdrew $5,000 from a joint acc ount to make the payment to wife. Wife
testified that she provided husband with a check in order to make the withdrawal.
The district court ultimately did not acc ount for the $5,000 in its division of the
marital assets and debts. Following the ju dgment and decree, wife requested that the
district court order husband to pay her $5,0 00 from his share of marital property after
division. The district court denied this request. The court determined that wife “agreed to
have [husband] take the $5,000 from the account.” Because the withdrawal date was prior
to the estate valuation date, the court found that “[t]he di ssipation of an account for any
legitimate expense would be shared by the parties.”

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Wife contends that her consent to the withdrawal did not “signif[y] her willingness
to forego any appropriate accounting for the payment from [the] joint account.” She states
that the district court’s failure to account for the withdrawal from the join t account
diminished the value of the marital account and “negates the previously granted temporary
attorney fees award entirely. ” Accordingly, she maintain s that “[h]usband should be
required to pay the $5,000.00 tem porary attorney fees award to [w]ife out of his share of
the property settlement to make [w]ife whole. ” Husband counters that wife’s consent to
the withdrawal constituted a waiver of wife’s right to have the withdrawal accounted for
in the final property division.
We need not decide whethe r the district court erred by failing to account for the
$5,000 withdrawal from the joint account because, like the error discussed above, any error
was de minimis and does not require reversal. See, e.g., Risk ex rel. Miller, 787 N.W.2d at
694 n.1 (refusing to remand for a de minimis erro r in a marital property award). We first
note that if the district court had accounted for the withdrawal from the joint account, wife
would not have received a fu ll $5,000 payment from husband but rather $2,500, because
wife was entitled to a one-half share of the jo int account. Second, the amount at issue
here—whether it is $2,500 or $5,000—comprises an even smaller percentage of the total
marital estate than the amount of the need-b ased attorney fees discussed previously. 2

2 Even if the $2,500 amount is added to the need-based attorney-fees amount of $15,154,
the total amount combined compri ses less than three percent of the total marital estate.
Any error therefore remains de minimis.

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Accordingly, we similarly decline to reverse the district court’s division of the marital
property on the basis that it failed to account for the temporary-attorney-fees award.
C. Unequal Division of Marital Assets and Debts
Wife further argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding husband
more than half of the net marital property. We disagree.
In a marital dissolution, a district court has broad discretion to divide the parties’
assets and debts. Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100. The divisi on must be fair and equitable,
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2018), but it need not be mathematically equal,
Justis v. Justis, 384 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn.
May 29, 1986). As noted above, we review a district court’s division of marital assets and
debts for an abuse of discretion. Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100. An appellate court “will
affirm the [district] court’s division of prope rty if it had an acceptable basis in fact and
principle even though [the appellate court] might have taken a different approach.” Id. A
district court abuses its discretion in dividing property if it resolves the matter in a manner
“that is against logic and the facts on record.” Rutten v. Rutten , 347 N.W.2d 47, 50
(Minn. 1984).
Based on the district court’s finding that wife could not support herself without
spousal maintenance, wife argue s that she is entitled to an e qual division of the marital
property or, alternatively, to a division that is weighted in favor of wife. She relies on
Kaste v. Kaste , 356 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. App. 19 84), for this proposition. In Kaste, the
district court had found that the wife lacked sufficient resources to meet her needs and
made a specific finding that “an equal dist ribution of marital property without additional

13
support or maintenance would be unfair.” Kaste, 356 N.W.2d at 68 (emphasis omitted).
Nevertheless, after awarding the wife spousal maintenance, the district court divided the
marital property unequally, awarding the husband over $35,000 more in marital assets than
the wife. Id. We reversed. We held that the dist rict court’s findings revealed that the
district court at least intended to equally divide the property. Id. Because the record
indicated that the wife needed at least half of the marital property and provided no evidence
that the husband could not meet his needs if the marital property were equally divided, the
district court’s failure to make an equal division was an abuse of its discretion. Id.
Wife argues that the present case is analogous to Kaste because the district court in
this case made “similar statements” about wife’s inability to meet her needs such that she
requires permanent spousal maintenance. Th e present case, however, is distinct from
Kaste. While the district court found that wi fe required spousal maintenance, it did not
make a specific finding that it would be unfair for wife to receive less than half of the
marital property. Because the court here made no such statements, Kaste is not controlling
on this issue.
The district court was well within its discretion when it unequally divided the
marital property. The court made detailed findings with respect to the factors it was
required to consider under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. For instan ce, it considered the
age, health, employability, need s, occupation, and income of each party, as well as the
contribution of each party to the amount and value of the marital property. The court
further explained in its order denying wife’s motion for amended fi ndings or a new trial
that each party received over $400,000 in assets. And it explained that the largest disparity

14
between the parties resulted from the different values of their respective cars and the
checking accounts they had in their own names. Regarding the checking accounts, the
court explained that wife was assigned more debt—the full balance of her Discover credit
card—because she had used the Discover card to pay her own livin g expenses following
the parties’ separation. The court found that dividing the bank accounts based on who had
the account in their name was “more convenient.” Because the court considered the proper
factors and gave a reasonable explanation based on the facts for the disparity between the
parties’ net property awards, it did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital assets
and debts.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining husband’s and
wife’s incomes for the purp ose of spousal maintenance.

Wife argues that the district court erred in calculating the inco mes of both parties
for purposes of determining spousal mainte nance and thus failed to award sufficient
spousal maintenance to meet wi fe’s needs. An appellate court reviews a district court’s
original award of spousal maintena nce for an abuse of discretion. Curtis v. Curtis ,
887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 2016). A district court abuses its discretion regarding spousal
maintenance if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies
the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 & n.3 (Minn. 1997) (citing
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988 )). The court’s determination of
income for the purpose of spousal maintenance is a finding of fact that will be set aside
only if it is clearly erroneous. Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004).
In order to successfully challenge a district court’s findings of fact, “the party challenging

15
the findings must show that despite viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the
[district] court’s findings . . . , the record still requires the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake was made.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000).
A. Wife’s Income

After determining that a party seeking spousal maintenance has demonstrated a
showing of need, a district court may awar d spousal maintenance “in amounts and for
periods of time, either temporary or perm anent, as the court deems just.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018). In determining the amount of the award, the district court
considers a variety of factors. Id. These include the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, the party’s ability to meet needs independently, the time needed for that party
to acquire sufficient education in order to find appropriate employment, the party’s age and
physical and emotional condition, the standard of living established during marriage, and,
in the case of a homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the extent to
which any education or skills have become outmoded. Id.
In determining the amount of wife’s spous al-maintenance award, the district court
recognized that wife planned to move to North Carolina afte r the parties’ house sold and
determined that wife could “obtain a job paying at least $15 per hour immediately upon
her move to North Carolina.” Wife argues the district court erred both by finding (1) that
she could immediately earn any income after a rriving in North Carolina, and (2) that she
could obtain employment at $15 per hour. Neither argument is persuasive.
The district court based its determination th at wife could obtain a job paying at least
$15 per hour immediately upon her move to North Carolina on its review of wife’s

16
employment history and education. It fo und the following facts relevant: between
1999 and 2003, wife earned between $12 and $1 3.50 an hour working clerical jobs; wife
has primarily been a stay-at-home parent since 2004, but has worked some part-time jobs;
wife earned a bachelor’s degree in IT in 2011 and graduated summa cum laude; wife
worked part time from 2013 to 2015 as an independent contractor for the company at which
husband is employed and earned $40 per hour during that period; and wife has not worked
in any capacity outside the home since 2015. The court further found, in its order denying
wife’s motion for amended findings of fact or a new trial, that wife worked part time in
2010 earning $15 per hour. Th e court recognized that wife had been homeschooling the
parties’ son for the last several years and th erefore had been unable to work outside the
home during the day, but conclu ded that wife would be able to work outs ide the home
again upon moving to North Carolina because the parties’ son would be attending public
or private school in North Carolina.
Wife argues that the court’s determin ation that she could earn an income
immediately after moving to North Carolina wa s “inappropriate speculation.” She
contends that the district court should have relied on her testimony that she needed to wait
until after the parties’ home sold and she moved to North Carolina to secure a job and that,
accordingly, the district court should have imputed an income of $0 for wife when
calculating spousal maintenance. She further suggests that th e district court could have
revisited “the obligation when [w]ife actually obtained employment and her income was a
known fact.” Alternatively, wife argues that the district court “should have included a step

17
decrease in spousal maintenance, allowing for a reasonable time for [w]ife to find
employment following the dissolution.”
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that wife could
immediately earn income in North Carolina. The court reviewed wife’s education,
employment history, and employment pros pects and determined that wife could
immediately begin earn ing an income “without any a dditional training or skillset.”
Furthermore, there is no indication that wife was unable to search and apply for jobs via
the internet or telephone before she moved to North Carolina. She also had ample time
during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding and prior to the sale of the parties’ home
to search for jobs. It was not unreasonable for the court to find that she could secure a job
before she moved and therefore begin earni ng an income immediat ely upon arriving in
North Carolina.
Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it found that she
could earn $15 per hour. In particular, she argues that the only evidence the court received
about her potential income in North Carolina was her own testimony that “she could obtain
[clerical] positions earning between $9 and $11 per hour.” She contends that “[n]othing in
the record supports the [d]ist rict [c]ourt’s finding that [she ] can earn $15.00 per hour in
rural North Carolina.”
Based on the limited salary information in the record regarding clerical positions in
North Carolina, it was not unreasonable for the court to settle on a wage of $15 per hour.
Wife testified that she had researched clerical job opportunities in North Carolina and that
they paid $9 to $11 per hour, but she specifically identified only one opportunity—an

18
opening at a church in the area where she planned to m ove. The court rejected her
testimony on this point based on evidence that she had earned a higher wage than that in
similar jobs between 1999 and 2003. Given the great deference this court accords to a
district court’s credibility determinations , we will not disturb this finding. See
Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. App. 20 09) (“When evidence relevant to
a factual issue consists of conflicting testimony, the district court’s decision is necessarily
based on a determination of witness cred ibility, which we accord great deference on
appeal.”). Furthermore, the wage of one job opportunity in North Carolina cannot be taken
to adequately represent the wages of other clerical jobs in the area. Wife cannot be heard
to complain about the district court’s failure to rule in her favor “when one of the reasons
it did not do so is because [s he] failed to provide . . . the evidence that would allow the
district court to fully address the question.” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235,
243 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
Because wife failed to prov ide adequate evidence about her potential future income
working in North Carolina, the district cour t needed to consider the other available
evidence of wife’s potential in come. As described above, the court made extensive
findings with respect to wife’s education and employment history. The district court found
that wife earned between $12 and $13.50 an hour working clerical jobs between 1999 and
2003. The court furthe r found that wife made $15 per hour in 2010 doing part-time IT
work. While wife’s testimony at trial may imply that husband had some influence over her
wage for that position, which was an internship with husband’s employer, it is not clearly
erroneous to assume wife would be able to obtain a job at the same wage on her own. The

19
district court’s finding that wife could ma ke $15 per hour was reasonably based on the
evidence at trial.
Because wife failed to meet her burden to provide sufficien t evidence of her
potential income in North Carolina, and the other evidence in the record suggests $15 per
hour is a reasonable estimate, the district cour t’s finding is not clear error. The district
court did not abuse its discre tion in determining wife’s income for the purpose of
computing spousal maintenance.
B. Husband’s Income

Wife also argues that the district court erred in its calculation of husband’s income
by excluding potential future bonuses that husband might receive.
A district court may consider “bonuses which provide a dependable source of
income” when calculating futu re income for the purpose of spousal maintenance.
McCulloch v. McCulloch , 435 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn. App. 1989) (quoting
Lynch v. Lynch, 411 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. App. 1987)). A district court does not err in
omitting bonuses from its income calculation where a party’s prospects for receiving future
bonuses are “too speculative.” Id.
At trial, the parties disagreed as to whether husband’s futu re bonuses should be
considered in calculating his income. Husband testified that although he had received some
substantial bonuses in the past, his employer changed the bonus structure in 2016, making
bonuses more difficult to achieve. The district court also heard testimony from a longtime
employee of husband’s comp any who stated that empl oyees now receive bonuses
“probably 30 percent of the time or less” and are “not ever supposed to expect to get a

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bonus.” Based on this testimony, the district court determined that the likelihood of
husband receiving income bonuses in the futu re was too uncertain to consider in its
determination of spousal main tenance. The district cour t accordingly determined that
“bonuses can no longer be presumed and are awarded less frequently,” and so declined to
include them in husband’s income.
Wife contends the district court erred beca use “it is possible for [h]usband to receive
bonuses in the future, as he has frequently in the past.” She argues that if husband’s
chances of receiving future bonuses are ques tionable, the district court should have
awarded her spousal maintenance that “included a percentage of [h]usband’s bonus if and
when there was one received.” But a district court is not required to consider bonus income
where bonuses are too speculative. Moreover, the “base-plus-a-percent” award sought by
wife is disfavored. McCulloch, 435 N.W.2d at 567. Given the testimony at trial, it was
not clear error for the district court to find that husband’s prospects of receiving a bonus in
the future are too unpredictable to consider in its determination of husband’s income.
In sum, the district court did not clearly err in determining either party’s income and
therefore did not abuse its discretion in calculating spousal maintenance.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining husband’s and
wife’s incomes for the purpose of child support.
Wife also argues that the district court erred in calculating both her income and
husband’s income for the purpose of child support. A court’s determination of income for
child-support purposes “must be based in fact and will stand unless clearly erroneous.”

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Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015).
Wife again argues that the district cour t should have included husband’s potential
bonuses when it determ ined husband’s child-support ob ligation. Minnesota statutes
provide that “gross income” is used to establish child support obligations. Minn.
Stat. § 518A.34(b)(1) (2018). Gross income is defined as “any form of periodic payment
to an individual” and can include bonus income. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2018);
Desrosier v. Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. App. 1996). But, as discussed above,
a district court need not consider potential bonus income where the income is not a regular,
dependable form of payment. Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, for the same
reasons discussed with respect to the spousa l-maintenance calculation, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by disregarding husband’s poten tial future bonuses in its
calculation of husband’s child-support obligation.
Turning to wife’s income, wife assert s that the district court erred in its
consideration of wife’s earning potential in North Carolina. Under Minn. Stat. § 518A.32,
subd. 2(1) (2018), a district court may determine a party’s potential income for
child-support purposes according to “the pare nt’s probable earnings level based on
employment potential, recent work history, and occu pational qualifications in light of
prevailing job opportunities and earnings levels in the community.” Wife argues that the
phrase “in the community” under Minn. Stat. § 518.32A, subd. 2(1), re quired the district
court to consider wife’s earning potential in “rural North Carolina” and that the court’s
reliance on evidence of wife’s past and pot ential income in Minnesota was therefore

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erroneous. However, as discussed earlier re garding the spousal maintenance award, wife
failed to present sufficient ev idence from which the district court could determine her
potential income in North Carolina. The district court therefore did not commit clear error
when it relied on the other evidence in the reco rd to determine wife’s potential income in
North Carolina.
Affirmed.