Melissa Casanova, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1996

Melissa Casanova,
Appellant,

vs.

Tri-County Community Corrections,
Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CV-18-2160

Darren M. Sharp, Lauren A. D’Cruz, Schaefer Halleen, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Margaret A. Skelton, Frank E. Langan, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pres iding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.


U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Melissa Casanova appeals the summary-judgment dismissal of her claims
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and her claim for to rtious interference

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
with contract against respondent Tri-County Community Corrections. Because no genuine
issues of material fact exist and because the di strict court did not err in its application of
the law, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Tri-County Co mmunity Corrections (TCCC ) is a government entity
formed by Norman, Polk, and Red Lake counties to provide correctional services. TCCC
operates the Northwest Regional Corrections Center (the NWRCC), a jail facility located
in Crookston, Minnesota. At all times relevant to this appeal, appellant’s then-husband
David Casanova (David) was employed by TCCC as the jail administrator at the NWRCC.
TurnKey Corrections is a company th at provides commissary services to
correctional facilities. TurnKey has a contra ct with TCCC to provi de commissary items
and vending services to inmates at the NW RCC. Appellant was a part-time, at-will
employee of TurnKey. Her job duties included filling vending machines and commissary
orders at the NWRCC. TCCC granted appellant a security clearance to access the NWRCC
and fulfill her job duties for TurnKey. In N ovember 2017, following events discussed in
more detail below, TCCC revoked appellant’s security clearance, making it impossible for
her to fulfill her TurnKey duties at the NWRCC. Appellant was not an employee of TCCC
at the time her security clearance was revoked or any other relevant time.1

1 Appellant argued to the district court that she was both a TCCC employee and a TurnKey
employee. The district court found that appellant was not a TCCC employee, and appellant
does not challenge that finding on appeal.

3
Appellant sued TCCC, alleging claims of (1) marital discrimination in employment
in violation of MHRA, (2) marital discriminati on in public services in violation of the
MHRA, (3) sex discrimination in employme nt in violation of the MHRA, (4) sex
discrimination in public services in violation of the MHRA, (5) reprisal in violation of the
MHRA, and (6) common-law tortious interfe rence with contract. TCCC moved for
summary judgment on all of appellant’s claims, which the district court granted. Only the
latter three claims are at issue in this appeal. The parties do not disagree on the fundamental
facts underlying appellant’s latter three claims, but they disagree over the legal implication
of those facts. The evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant,
establishes the following:
In September 2017, appellant went to Da vid’s office at the NWRCC. David was
not present. She looked at David’s phone, which was on his desk, and saw that David had
received a text message from a subordinate TCCC employee asking him for a kiss. When
David returned to his office, appellant asked him about the message. David told appellant
that the subordinate had accident ally sent the message to him. Appellant di d not believe
David. She attempted to leave David’s offi ce with his phone to show the message to
David’s boss, the executive director of TCCC. Appellant planned to show the message to
David’s boss because she believed that TCCC ’s policies prohibited David from having a
romantic relationship with a subordinate. David told appellant that the executive director
would not believe her because he had already told the executive director “a bunch of things
about her.” According to appellant, David blocked her from leaving his office with the
phone, and smashed her fingers in his office door in the process. He also threatened to use

4
to the “man down” button if she did not give him the phone back. Appellant took a picture
of the text message with her own phone, a nd David eventually let her leave his office
without the phone. Another TCCC employee hear d the altercation in David’s office and
cleared inmates out of the adjacent hallway.
On the day of this incident, appellant ca lled TCCC’s executive director and left a
voicemail message. Appellant called the executive director intending to inform him about
the text message between David and his subordinate. Appellant does not remember exactly
what she said in the voicemail, but testified at her depo sition that she provided her name
and indicated that she had “some concerning information” about David. The executive
director received the message but did not call appellant back.2 Before appellant called the
executive director, David had to ld the executive director that he and appellant had a
confrontation over a phone in his office and that appellant might be calling him. David did
not inform the executive director about the subordinate’s text message at that time.
Between September 2017 and November 20 17, appellant and David’s relationship
was “rocky.” When they argued, David “r egularly” threatened to revoke her NWRCC
security clearance or have it revoked. On November 20, 2017, appellant sent her TurnKey

2 The executive director claims that he ca lled appellant back after he received the
voicemail. He testified at his deposition that he called appellant back, she did not answer,
and he did not leave a voicemail. We recite the facts in a light most favorable to appellant,
consistent with our standard of review in summary-judgment appeals. See Commerce
Bank v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. , 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Mi nn. 2015) (indicating that on
appeal from summary judgment, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment was granted”).

5
superiors an email informing them that David had threaten ed to revoke her security
clearance. She indicated in the email that she wanted to continue working for TurnKey.
On November 21, 2017, appellant and Da vid got into another argument at their
home. Appellant, still suspicious that David was havi ng an affair with the subo rdinate,
grabbed David’s phone out of his pocket. David told appellant to give his phone back, but
she would not. David pushed appellant onto a couch, held her down, and told her not to
read his messages. David eventually let a ppellant go and the two agreed to read his
messages together later in the day. Appell ant then left the house and brought David’s
phone with her. Before she returned home, she began read ing David’s messages. The
messages were being deleted as she read them. The messages that she read unambiguously
demonstrated that David was having an affair with the subordinate.
Appellant returned home and argued with David. She called the subordinate, who
answered but denied having a relationship with David. Ap pellant again threatened to tell
TCCC’s executive director about David’s affair. A physical altercation ensued. According
to appellant, David trapped her in their bedroom and threw a laptop. The laptop shattered
into pieces, some of which hit her. Appellant escaped the room and David followed her
into the kitchen. Appellant recalled that David picked up a knife while in the kitchen and
then threatened to cut his ha nd and report that appellant ha d cut him. Appellant suffered
bruises on her hands and face as a result of the incidents on that day.
That night, David reported his version of the November 21 events to TCCC’s
executive director. He told the executive director that he and his wife had a major dispute,

6
that he had left the house, and that his wife had taken his phone. A few days later, appellant
told David that she wanted a divorce.
On November 22, the next day, TCCC’s executive director decided to revoke
appellant’s security clearance. The executive director felt that it was not appropriate for
appellant to continue to work at the NWRC C for TurnKey because it would exacerbate
existing tensions in the workplace to have David and appellant in the same building. That
day, appellant learned from TurnKey that her security clearance for the NWRCC had been
revoked.
In deciding to revoke appellant’s security clearance, TCCC’s executive director
relied exclusively on informatio n provided by David. He di d not speak with appellant
about either the September or November incidents, or conduct any other investigation. But
he testified at his deposition that David never mentioned th e idea of revoking appellant’s
security clearance.
TCCC’s executive director reached out to TurnKey management to inform them of
the decision to revoke appellant’s security clearance. At his deposition, TCCC’s executive
director testified the reason that he revoked appellant’s security clearance was “the
relationship and resulting dysfunction within the home, which has the potential to infringe
and impact the work environment.” TCCC’s executive director told TurnKey management
that the decision to revoke appellant’s secu rity clearance was not based on performance
and that he would not object to appellant working at another correctional facility for
TurnKey. TurnKey offered a ppellant a position at another f acility, but she declined the
offer based on the hours and a longer commute.

7
On November 25, 2017, appellant sent an email to TCCC’s executive director and
TCCC’s board of commissioners explaining her relationship with David, exposing David’s
affair with the subordinate, an d telling her version of the rece nt incidents. She attached
pictures of her bruising from the November incident and pictures of David’s text messages
with the subordinate. In response to appellant’s email, TCCC’s executive director placed
David on paid administrative leave. TCCC paid for an independent, outside investigation
into the allegation of employment misconduct against David. After interviewing appellant,
TCCC’s executive director, David, and the subordinat e, the investigator concluded that
TCCC’s executive director alone decided to revoke appellant’s security clearance, and that
David was not invol ved in that decision. TCCC ultimat ely decided to terminate David’s
employment as jail administrator based on David’s failure to disclose his relationship with
the subordinate.
TCCC did not reinstate appellant’s security clearance. TCCC’s executive director
testified at his deposition that, because the subordinate still worked at the NWRCC, there
was a possibility that there would be conflict between appellant and the subordinate.
Based on the evidence in the record, th e district court granted summary judgment
to TCCC on all of appellant’s claims in a thorough and detailed order. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district cour t erred in granting summary judgment to
TCCC on her claims of tortious interference with contract, reprisal under the MHRA, and
sex discrimination in public services under the MHRA. We address appellant’s arguments
with respect to each claim in turn, but we first address the applicable standard of review.

8
A district court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01 . Summary judgment is “inappropriate when
reasonable persons might draw different c onclusions from the evid ence presented.”
Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
On appeal from summary judgment, we a pply a de novo standard of review.
Visser v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 938 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn. 2020). “[W]e
examine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court
erred in its application of the law.” Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc. , ___ N.W.2d ___,
___, 2020 WL 2893352, at *3 (Minn. June 3, 2020). In doing so, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party agai nst whom summary judgment was granted and
resolve all doubts and factual infere nces against the moving party. Warren, 926 N.W.2d
at 375. We “may affirm a grant of summa ry judgment if it can be sustained on any
grounds.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).
I. The district court did not err in gr anting summary judgment to TCCC on
appellant’s tortious-interference-with-contract claim.

Appellant’s tortious-interference-with-contract claim alleges that TCCC and David
intentionally “procured the br each of [appellant’s] TurnKey employment contract.” The
district court granted summary judgment to TCCC on this cl aim based on its conclusion
that TCCC, as a government entity, was entitled to vicarious official immunity against the
claim. The district court also concluded th at even if TCCC was not entitled to vicarious
official immunity, appellant could not establish all of the elements of her claim.

9
Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgement on the
claim. Appellant contends that TCCC is not entitled to vicarious official immunity because
the decision to revoke appellant’s security clearance was based on false information
provided by David to TCCC’s executive direct or and because David provided this false
information to further his malicious desire to have appellant’s security clearance revoked.
According to appellant, under the “cat’s paw” theory of liability, David’s malicious intent
may be imputed to TCCC and, as a result, TCCC is not entitled to vicarious official
immunity against the claim. Appellant also challenges the district court’s alternative
conclusion that TCCC is entit led to summary judgment b ecause the evidence does not
establish all of the elements of a tortious-interference-with-contract claim.
We first address the applicability of the “cat’s paw” theory of liability to this claim.
We then turn to the district court’s determination that TCCC is entitled to vicarious official
immunity, and finally we discuss the district court’s alternative conclusion that appellant’s
evidence failed to establish all elements of this claim.
A. The “cat’s paw” theo ry of liability does no t apply to appellant’s
tortious-interference-with-contract claim because appellant was not an
employee of TCCC.

The “cat’s paw” theory of liability has been applied by courts in the context of
employment-discrimination claims brought by an employee against an employer. “In the
employment discrimination context, ‘cat’s paw’ refers to a situation in which a biased
subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in
a deliberate scheme to trigger a di scriminatory employment action.” Qamhiyah v. Iowa
State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 566 F.3d 733, 742 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing the “cat’s paw”

10
theory in a case brought by a professor against her university-employer, where the
professor alleged that the board of regent s denied her tenure application based on
discrimination that existed at lower-levels of her tenure review). “The purpose of this rule
is to ensure that an employer cannot shield itself from liability for unlawful termination by
using a purportedly inde pendent person or committee as the decisionmaker where the
decisionmaker merely serves as the conduit, vehicle, or rubber stamp by which another
achieves his or her unlawful design.” Cherry v. Siemens Hea lthcare Diagnostics, Inc. ,
829 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2016).3
Appellant argues that we should apply the “cat’s paw” theory to her
tortious-interference-with-contract claim against TCCC, a third-party who contracted with
her employer. Appellant contends that because TCCC’s executive director relied
exclusively on false and misleading information provided by her then-husband David when
deciding to revoke appellant’s security clearance, the “cat’s paw” theory of liability applies

3 The origins of the theory, and its name, have been described by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals:
In the fable of the cat’s paw (a fable offensive to cats and cat
lovers, be it noted), a monkey w ho wants chestnuts that are
roasting in a fire persuades an intellectually challenged cat to
fetch the chestnuts from the fire for the monkey, and the cat
does so but in the process burns its paw. In employment
discrimination law the “cat’s paw” metaphor refers to a
situation in which an employee is fired or subjected to some
other adverse employment action by a supervisor who himself
has no discriminatory motive, but who has been manipulated
by a subordinate who does have such a motive and intended to
bring about the adverse employment action.

Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 2012).

11
to her tortious-interference-with-contract claim.4 Appellant contends that the evidence of
David’s malicious bias against her—evidence that David regularly threatened to have her
security clearance at NWRCC revoked, evidence that David physically prevented her from
taking his phone to show the executive director his text messages, and evidence that David
assaulted her in their home when appellant agai n threatened to disclo se his affair to the
executive director—is ev idence that TCCC’s decision to re voke her security clearance,
made by TCCC’s executive director, was motivated by that same malice.5
TCCC argues that the “cat’s pa w” theory applies only to
employment-discrimination claims against an employer, and accordingly, does not apply
to appellant’s claim for tortious interference with contract. We agree.
As noted above, the “cat’s paw” theory of liability has been applied in the
employment law context. The federal circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have
all adopted some version of “cat’s paw” liability in employment-discrimination cases or
employment-retaliation cases. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp. , 562 U.S. 411, 422,
131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (applying “cat’s paw” theory to an employment-
discrimination claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act); Qamhiyah, 566 F.3d at 742; Ossanna v. Nike, Inc. , 365 Or. 196, 207
(Or. 2019) (observing, in a case involving a lawsuit brought by a former employee against

4 TCCC argues that appellant did not raise her “cat’s paw” theory argument to the district
court. We have reviewed the record and determined that she did raise the argument.
5 It is clear that, when the ev idence is viewed in a light mo st favorable to appellant, there
is sufficient evidence to establish that David had a motive to terminate appellant’s security
clearance either to prevent appe llant from reporting his affair with the subordinate or to
retaliate against appellant for discovering and complaining to him about the affair.

12
his former employer, that all of the federal circuit courts of appeals have adopted the “cat’s
paw” theory “in an employment discrimina tion or retaliation case”). We too have
recognized the applicability of “cat’s paw” liability to employment-discrimination claims
in non-precedential unpublished opinions . See, e.g. , Abou v. Univ. of Minn. ,
No. A16-1948, 2017 WL 2836175, at *5 n.3 (Minn. App. July 3, 2017) (discussing “cat’s
paw” liability in a case involving a lawsuit brought by an assistant professor against his
employer). But there is no case that we are aw are of applying the “ cat’s paw” theory of
liability to a tortious-interfere nce-with-contract claim. And, appellant has not identified
any caselaw to support her argument that the “cat’s paw” theory of liability applies more
broadly than only to employment claims.6
Appellant also argues that “cat’s paw” liab ility is generally applicable because it is
simply a method of determining proximate caus e. We are not persuaded. The theory is
not a method of determining proximate cause—it instead requires a showing of proximate
cause as a prerequisite to its applicability. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 422, 131 S. Ct. at 1194
(“We therefore hold that if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus
that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is

6 Appellant cites Dinkens v. New Dawn Enterprises, LLC , 8 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1319-20
(D. Kan. 2014), to imply that the “cat’s paw” theory has been applied to a claim of tortious
interference. In Dinkens, the federal district court discussed Staub and the “cat’s paw”
theory of liability in addre ssing a tortious interference with an expected business
relationship. 8 F. Supp . 3d at 1318. But the Dinkens court explicitly noted that the case
was “not a cat’s paw case.” Id. Thus, the court did not appl y the “cat’s paw” theory of
liability. Id.

13
a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under the
USERRA.” (Footnote omitted)).
Our review of the caselaw leads us to c onclude that “cat’s paw” liability has been
applied to claims for employment discrimina tion or retaliation against an employer.
Appellant asks us to extend the app lication of “cat’s paw” liability to her
tortious-interference-with-contact claim against TCCC, who was not her employer. As an
error-correcting court, it is not our role to extend the law or create public policy. See
Clark v. Connor, 843 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Minn. App. 2014) (“[B]ecause this court is limited
in its function to correcting errors it cannot create public policy.”). For these reasons, we
decline to apply the “cat’s paw” theory of liability to appellant’s tortious-interference-with-
contract claim against TCCC.
B. The district court did not err in concluding that TCCC was entitled to
vicarious official immunity against appellant’s tortious-interference-
with-contract claim.

The district court granted summary judgment to TCCC on appellant’s
tortious-interference-with-contract claim based on its conc lusion that TCCC was entitled
to vicarious common-law offici al immunity concerning the executive director’s decision
to revoke her security clearan ce. “Common law official im munity generally applies to
prevent a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his
judgment or discretion from being held persona lly liable to an individual for damages.”
Schroeder v. St. Louis County , 708 N.W.2d 497, 508 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
The purpose of official immunity is to “insure that the threat of potential liability does not
unduly inhibit the exercise of discretion required of public officers in the discharge of their

14
duties.” Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn. 1991 ) (quotation omitted). “Official
immunity does not extend to officials charged with the execution of ministerial, rather than
discretionary, functions.” Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 505 (q uotation omitted). And,
“[o]fficial immunity does not apply: (1) when a ministerial duty is either not performed or
is performed negligently, or (2) when a willful or malicious wrong is committed.” Id. “In
general, when a public official is found to be immune from suit on a particular issue, his
government employer will enjoy vicarious official immunity from a suit arising from the
employee’s conduct.” Id. at 508 (citing Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. School
Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 663-64 (Minn. 2004)).
Here, the district court c oncluded that TCCC, a government entity, was entitled to
vicarious official immunity because TCCC’s executive director made a discretionary
decision, without malicious intent, to terminate appellant’s security clearance. Appellant
argues that the district court erred by exte nding vicarious official immunity to TCCC
because the willful-or-malicious-wrong exceptio n applies to TCCC’s decision to revoke
her security clearance.
For the purposes of the willful-and-malic ious-wrong exception, “[m]alice means
nothing more than the intentio nal doing of a wrongful act w ithout legal justification or
excuse, or, otherwise stated, the willful violation of a known right.” Rico, 472 N.W.2d at
107 (quotation omitted). “In th e official immunity context, willful and malicious are
synonymous.” Id. To defeat official immunity, the “defendant must have reason to know
that the challenged conduct is prohibited,” mean ing that the official must know his act is
wrongful at the time he commits the act. Id.

15
Appellant’s argument that the willful-a nd-malicious-wrong exception applies relies
on the “cat’s paw” theory. Appellant contends that David influenc ed TCCC’s executive
director’s decision to revoke appellant’s security clearance and, as a result, David’s
malicious intent precludes vicarious official immunity. But as discussed above, we
conclude that appellant’s “cat’s paw” theory is inapplicable to this tortious-interference-
with-contract claim. And, according to th e executive director’s undisputed testimony,
David never discussed revoking appellant’s security clearance with him and it was the
executive director alone who revoked appellant’s security clearance. Moreover, appellant
does not contend that the executive director acted maliciously when he revoked her security
clearance.
Because TCCC’s executive director made the decision to revoke appellant’s
security clearance, and because his decision—while misinformed—was not malicious, we
conclude that the district court did not err in determining th at TCCC was entitled to
common-law vicarious official immunity against appellant’s tortious-interference-with-
contract claim.
C. There is no evidence that TCCC in tentionally procur ed a breach in
appellant’s contract with TurnKey.

The district court alternatively concluded that the evidence in the record did not
establish the elements of a tortious-inte rference-with-contract claim. “[T]ortious
interference with contract has five elements: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged
wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3 ) intentional procurement of its breach;
(4) without justification; and (5) damages.” Sysdyne Corp. v. Rousslang, 860 N.W.2d 347,

16
351 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). The di strict court determined that there was no
genuine issue of material fa ct that TCCC did not intenti onally procure a breach of
appellant’s employment cont ract with TurnKey and th at TCCC had a legitimate
justification for revoking appellant’s security clearance. Appellant argues that the district
court erred because, considerin g the evidence of David’s malicious intent, there are
genuine issues of material fact regarding whether TCCC intentionally procured a breach of
contract and whether TCCC’s justificati on for revoking her security clearance was
justified.
In our de novo review of the record, we agree with the district court’s assessment
that no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whet her TCCC intentionally
procured a breach of appellant’s contract with TurnKey. Intentional procurement of breach
is an element of a tortious inte rference with contract claim. See Sysdyne, 860 N.W.2d at
351. Intent, or intentionally, means that th e actor wants to cause the consequence of his
act or knows that his act is substantially certain to cause those consequences. See
Victor v. Sell, 222 N.W.2d 337, 339-40 (Minn. 1974); see also 4A Minnesota Practice,
CIVJIG 60.10 (Supp. 2019) (defining “intent” for intentional torts). As discussed above,
we conclude that the “cat’s paw” theory does not apply to this case and that David’s malice
is not imputed to TCCC. Further, the undisputed evidence shows that when the executive
director revoked appellant’s security clearance, he explained to TurnKey management that
he was not revoking appellant’s security clea rance based on performance issues, and that
he would not object to appellant working for TurnKey at a different facility. TurnKey, in
fact, did offer appellant a position at a different correctional facility, but appellant turned

17
the offer down based on a longer commute and the hours she would be required to work.
Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, we conclude that there is
no genuine issue of material fact regarding in tent. The undisputed facts demonstrate that
TCCC did not intend to cause appellant to lose her job with TurnKey when it revoked her
security clearance.
II. The district court did not err in dismissing appe llant’s reprisal claim at
summary judgment.

The next claim at issue is appellant’s repr isal claim, brought under the MHRA. It
is an “unfair discriminatory practice” to “int entionally engage in any reprisal against any
person because that person . . . opposed a pr actice forbidden under [the MHRA].” Minn.
Stat. § 363A.15 (2018). “A reprisal includes, but is not limited to, any form of intimidation,
retaliation, or harassment.” Id. Appellant’s reprisal claim alleged that TCCC revoked her
security clearance because she opposed a practice fo rbidden under the MHRA—
specifically, what she reasonably believed to be David’s sexual harassment of the
subordinate.
The district court granted TCCC summa ry judgment on this claim because the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, failed to establish that appellant
held a good-faith, reasonable belief that th e practice she opposed was sexual harassment
within the meaning of the MHRA. Appellant asserts that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment because genu ine issues of material fact exist regardin g whether her
purported belief that David was engaged in sexual harassment was reasonable.

18
A plaintiff may prove a reprisal clai m by the direct method or by “using
circumstantial evidence in acco rdance with the three-part burden-shifting test set out by
the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792,
93 S. Ct. 1817 [(1973)].” Hoover v. Norwest Pr ivate Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534,
542 (Minn. 2001); see also Friend v. Gopher Co. , 771 N.W.2d 33, 37-40 (Minn.
App. 2009) (explaining th e direct method of proof ). Appellant argues that she put forth
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment under either the direct method or the
McDonnell Douglass method. We conclude that, regardless of whether the direct method
or the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies, there are no genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether the conduct underlying appellant’s re prisal claim—her purported
objections to sexual harassment perpetrated by David—was statutorily protected conduct.
Our supreme court has acknowledged two po ssible standards to govern whether a
plaintiff has alleged statutorily protected conduct under the MHRA—one standard that
requires the plaintiff to “plead opposition to a practice that is actually forbidden under the
MHRA” and one standard that merely requi res the plaintiff to plead “a good-faith,
reasonable belief that the opposed prac tice was forbidden under the MHRA.”
Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. 2010). The Minnesota Supreme Court
has not yet decided which of these standards apply to a reprisal claim under the MHRA.
See id. (declining to decide whether a plaintiff must demonstrate that she opposed a practice
that was actually forbidden under the MHRA to establish a reprisal claim). The parties
appear to agree that the g ood-faith, reasonable-belief sta ndard applies. Because we
conclude that appellant’s reprisal claim fa ils even under the good- faith, reasonable-belief

19
standard—a standard that is more favorable to appellant—we need not determine which
standard applies.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Cour t has not adopted the good-faith,
reasonable-belief standard, it has discussed the federal courts’ application of the standard
and provided some helpful guidance on its application:
When determining whether a party has a reasonable belief,
federal courts in Title VII cases appear to use two different
tests: (1) whether a reasonable fact-finder could believe that
the conduct complained of was unlawfully discriminatory, see,
e.g., Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d
315, 322 (3d Cir.2008) (“[I]f no reasonable person could have
believed that the underlying incident complained about
constituted unlawful discrimination, then the comp laint is not
protected.”); or (2) whether the party’s belief is unreasonable
in light of applicab le substantive law, see, e.g., Butler v. Ala.
Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir.2008) (stating
that a party’s belief is unrea sonable if “binding precedent
squarely holds that [the] particular conduct is not an unlawful
employment practice,” and “no decision of [the presiding
court] or of the Supreme Court has called that precedent into
question or undermined its reasoning”).

Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 83. The supreme court ac knowledged that “the reasonableness of a
party’s belief must be connected to the substantive law” and that “for there to be statutorily
protected conduct a party does have to alle ge that the party had a good-faith, reasonable
belief that the opposed practices were prohibited by the MHRA.” Id. at 83-84. The
supreme court indicated that “[ i]f a practice is not unlawful under the plain terms of the
MHRA, a party’s belief that the practice is unl awful cannot be reasonable,” and that the
“position that the basis for reasonable belief need not be tied to substantive law, in some
way, would allow a plaintiff to rely entirely on the plaintiff’s own reasoning and sense of

20
what is discriminatory.” Id. at 84. “[T]here is both a su bjective and objective element to
a good-faith, reasonable-belief standard.” Id. at 82.
Because a plaintiff’s good-faith, reasonable belief must be rooted in the substantive
law for there to be statutorily protected conduct, we turn to the text of the MHRA. The
MHRA defines “sexual harassment”:
“Sexual harassment” includes unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact
or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a
sexual nature when:

(1) submission to that conduct or communication is made a
term or condition, either explicitly or implicitly, of
obtaining employment, public accommodations or public
services, education, or housing;
(2) submission to or rejection of that conduct or
communication by an individual is used as a factor in
decisions affecting that indi vidual’s employment, public
accommodations or public services, education, or housing;
or
(3) that conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with an individual’s employment,
public accommodations or publ ic services, education or
housing, or creating an intim idating, hostile, or offensive
employment, public accommodations, public services,
educational, or housing environment.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 43 (2018).
The district court concluded that appella nt did not have a r easonable, good-faith
belief that David’s relationshi p with the subordinate was a practice forbidden under the
MHRA (i.e. “sexual harassment”) because the information available to appellant
demonstrated that the subordinate was a “willi ng participant in the affair.” The district
court concluded that “no reasonable jury could conclude that [appellant] believed that the

21
sexual contact between David Casanova and [the subordinate] was unwelcome, constituted
a quid pro quo, or otherwise interfered with [the subordinate’s] employment, so as to
objectively constitute ‘sexual harassment’ under the MHRA.”
Appellant argues that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to her claim,
demonstrates that she had a good-faith, reasonable belief that David was engaged in sexual
harassment. She argues that her reprisal claim does not fail simply because her good-faith,
reasonable belief that David’ s conduct constituted “sexual harassment” was ultimately
incorrect. Appellant argues that she believed David’s relationship violated TCCC’s policy,
that it was impossible for her to know whether David’s rela tionship with the subordinate
was consensual because David lied about it, and that the power imbalance between a
supervisor and a subordinate is inherently suspect. We are not persuaded that the evidence
in the record leaves a genuine issue of material fact re garding whether appellant held an
objectively reasonable belief that David’s affa ir with the subordinate constituted sexual
harassment under the MHRA.
While appellant may have reasonably believed that David’s affair with the
subordinate violated TCCC’s policy, 7 we disagree that her belief is sufficient to
demonstrate a good-faith, reasonable belief that David’s conduct violated the MHRA. As
noted above, a good-faith, reasonable belief must be rooted in the substantive law, not in

7 TCCC’s policy noted that sexual harassment “i s a form of employee misconduct that is
demeaning to another person, undermines the integrity of the employment relationship, and
is strictly prohibited.” We ag ree that the evidence , viewed in a light most favorable to
appellant, demonstrates that appellant had a good-faith, reasonable belief that David’s
relationship with the subordinate violated TCCC’s policy.

22
the policies of a particular employer. Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 83-84; cf. Kenneh ,
2020 WL 2893352, at *6-7 (rejecting appella nt’s argument that her MHRA claim should
be evaluated based on her form er employer’s “employee guide” and holding that the text
of the MHRA defines the conduct that violates the act). And, as the district court found,
there was no information availabl e to appellant to suggest th at David’s affair with the
subordinate was unwelcome. Appellant’s susp icion that David was engaged in an affair
was based on a text message from the subordinate asking David for a kiss. While there is
precedent to support the premise that a supervisor may use his position to inconspicuously
harass a subordinate, not all re lationships between a superv isor and their subordinate
employee constitute sexual harassment. Cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth ,
524 U.S. 742, 763, 118 S. Ct . 2257, 2269 (1998) (recognizin g that “a supervisor’s power
and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character”).
Appellant presented no evidence that would suggest that David used his position to harass
the subordinate who sent him the text asking for a kiss.
In the absence of any information to suggest that David’s conduct towards the
subordinate was unwelcome or constituted sexual harassment, we conclude that the district
court did not err when it determ ined that there was no genui ne issue of material fact
regarding the reasonableness of appellant’s belief. Consequently, we conclude that it was
not error to grant summary judgment to TCCC on appellant’s reprisal claim on the grounds
that the evidence could not es tablish that appellant oppose d conduct that she reasonably
believed to be prohibited by the MHRA.

23
III. The district court did not err in dism issing appellant’s sex-discrimination-in-
public-services claim under the MHRA.

Finally, appellant argues that the di strict court erred by dismissing her
sex-discrimination-in-public-services clai m under the MHRA. “It is an unfair
discriminatory practice to discriminate agai nst any person in the access to, admission to,
full utilization of or benefit from any public service because of . . . sex.” Minn.
Stat. § 363A.12, subd. 1 (2018). The MHRA defines “public service” as “any public
facility, department, agency, board or commission, owned, operated or managed by or on
behalf of the state of Minnesota, or any s ubdivision thereof, includi ng any county, city,
town, township, or independent district in the state.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 35
(2018). Appellant claims that she was deprived of the full utilization and benefit of TCCC
because she was deprived of her security clearance, and that TCCC revoked her clearance
because of her sex.
There are two ways to establish discriminati on in public services. “A finding that
an unfair discriminatory practice has occurred may be made when the record establishes
(1) an adverse difference in treatment with respect to public services of one or more persons
when compared to the treatment accorded others similarly situated except for the existence
of an impermissible factor such as race, co lor, creed, sex, etc.; or (2) treatment so at
variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent discrimination that
discrimination is the probable explanation.” See City of Minneap olis v. Richardson ,
239 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Minn. 1976 ). The purpose of these two standards is to “guide the
evaluation and review of evidence in discrimination cases.” Id.

24
We first observe that appellant’s claim that TCCC revoked her security clearance
based on her sex is inconsistent with her theory of the case. Her theory asserts that David
caused the revocation of her security clearance in an effort to prevent her from disclosing
his affair with the subordinate. She claims that TCCC’s executive director was duped by
David’s false and misleading information about the September and November incidents.
Neither David nor the executive director, according to appella nt’s theory of the case,
decided to revoke appellant’s security clearance because she is female.
We next turn to the district court’s anal ysis of her claim. The district court
concluded that appellant’s sex-discrimination claim failed the similarly-situated standard.
It determined that appellant failed to identify a similarly-situated male contract service
provider who was involv ed in or accused of si milar conduct but disc iplined differently.
The district court also determined that appellant and David were not similarly situated, and
rejected appellant’s assertion that evidence of favorable treatment afforded to David is
evidence that appellant was discriminated against based on her sex.
On appeal, appellant maintain s that the district court erred by failing to consider
David a person “similarly situat ed” except for his gender. Sh e maintains that a “relaxed
standard” of comparison applies when the pl aintiff submits evidence of pretext or
discrimination beyond merely evid ence of disparate treatment. See Scott v. County of
Ramsey, 180 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating that a “strong showing” of
discrimination is needed only “when the only evidence of pretext or discrimination is
disparate treatment”). TCCC argues that the district court properly concluded that

25
appellant is not similarly situated to David, and that a proper comparator under Richardson
must be similarly situated in all respects except the comparator’s gender.
We conclude that, even if a relaxed sta ndard of comparison applies, David was so
dissimilarly situated from appellant that evidence of TCCC’s treatment towards him is not
evidence that TCCC discriminated against appellant based on her sex. David was a TCCC
employee—the jail administrator of the NWRCC. Appellant was a TurnKey employee
with limited access to the NWRCC. Appellant ’s job duties, relati onship to TCCC, and
access to the facility were not comparable to those of David. The only similarity between
appellant and David in this context is that bo th were involved in the incidents that led to
TCCC’s decision to revoke appellant’s security clearance. We conclude that, even viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, comparison between TCCC’s treatment
of David to TCCC’s treatment of appellant does not demonstrate sex discrimination.
The district court also concluded that the evidence failed to establish sex
discrimination under the so-at-variance stan dard, which would require a showing that
TCCC’s treatment of appellant was “so at variance with what would reasonably be
anticipated absent discrimination that disc rimination is the probable explanation.” See
Richardson, 239 N.W.2d at 202. Appellant argues on appeal that the district court erred
because the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to her claim, establishes a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether her treatment was so at variance with reasonable
expectations that the probable explanation is that TCCC revoked her security clearance
based on her sex.

26
In applying the so-at-variance standard, a court must examine the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged discriminatory conduct. State by Beaulieu v. City
of Mounds View , 518 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Minn. 1994 ). “The very purpose of the
so-at-variance standard is to address less blatant acts of wrongful discrimination by
allowing a fact finder to examine misconduc t and weigh the circumstances to determine
underlying motives by indirect evidence.” Minneapolis Police Dept. v. Kelly ,
776 N.W.2d 760, 768 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2010).
Appellant argues that TCCC’s treatment of her was “so at variance” of what would
reasonably be expected because (1) there was no investiga tion, (2) the executive director
stated that he revoked appellant’s security clearance based on her marital problems with
David, (3) appellant had neve r violated TCCC’s policies, (4) David received favorable
treatment, and (5) the executive director gave warnings to other third-party-contractor
employees before he revoked their security clearance. She argues that, given these
circumstances, a jury could reasonably conclude that TCCC’s conduct was so at variance
with what would reasonably be anticipated that discrimination on the basis of sex is the
likely explanation.
We are not persuaded that there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether TCCC’s decision to revoke appellant’s security clearance was “so at variance”
with what would reasonably be expected that discrimination based on sex is likely.
Appellant does not identify what treatment would be reasonably e xpected under these
circumstances. She argues that the execu tive director gave warnings to other
third-party-contractor employees before he revoked their security clearance. But the record

27
demonstrates that those contractor employees were women. The fact that they received a
warning does not support an argument that a ppellant was treated differently based on her
sex. The only eviden ce in the record to support a find ing of sex discrimination is that
David is male and appellant is female. We conclude that the district court did not err in
determining that appellant’s evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to her claim,
and under either the similarly-situated standa rd or the so-at-variance standard, failed to
demonstrate that TCCC revoked her security clearance based on her sex.
Because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorab le to appellant, failed to
establish that TCCC revoked appellant’s secur ity clearance based on her sex, the district
court did not err in dismissing appellant’s se x-discrimination-in-public-services claim at
summary judgment.
In sum, we affirm the district court’ s grant of summary judgment on all counts
because no genuine issues of material fact exist and TCCC is en titled to judgment as a
matter of law. We decline to extend the “ cat’s paw” theory of liability to appellant’s
tortious-interference-with-contract claim agai nst a non-employer. We conclude that the
district court did not err in concluding that TCCC is en titled to common-law vicarious
official immunity against appellant’s tortious-interference-with-contract claim and that the
evidence does not support a co nclusion that the willful-and -malicious-wrong exception
applies. Alternatively, we determine that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to
appellant, failed to establish that TCCC intentionally procured a breach of appellant’s
employment contract with TurnKey. We conclude that appellant’s reprisal claim under the
MHRA fails because the evid ence does not establish that appellant held a good-faith,

28
reasonable belief that David was sexually harassing the subordinate. And we conclude that
appellant’s sex-discrimination-in-public-servi ces claim fails because, under either the
similarly-situated standard or the so-at-variance standard, the evidence does not support a
finding that TCCC revoked appellant’s security clearance based on her sex.
Affirmed.