In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: L. R. D., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2000

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: L. R. D., Parent.

Filed April 27, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Sibley County District Court
File No. 72-JV-19-93

Scott L. Nokes, Glencoe Law Office, Glencoe, Minnesota (for appellant mother L.R.D.)

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent father
S.M.G.)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M. , Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from the distr ict court’s grant of respondent -father’s private petition to
terminate appellant-mother’s parental rights, mother argues that (1) the record does not
show that she abandoned the child, (2) she rebutted the presumption that she is palpably
unfit to parent, and (3) termination of her parental rights was not in the child’s best interests.
We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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FACTS
Mother and fa ther are the biological parents of K.P.G. who was born in 2010.
Mother and father’s marriage was dissolved in 2013. In 2016, father was granted sole legal
and physical custody of K.P.G. and mother was granted supervised parenting time.
In April 2018, based on mother’s drug use, Meeker County Social Services sought
to terminate mother’s parental rights to her older child, K.L.S. , on the grounds that
(1) mother substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with
the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship; (2) mother was palpably unfit
to be a party to the parent -child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct or specific conditions; (3) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s placement out of the home; and (4) the child was neglected and in
foster care. Prior to the county’s filing of the termination petition, the district court relieved
the county of its obligation to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions leading to
the out-of-home placement. The district court found that further efforts were futile, given
mother’s noncompliance with her case plan, her refusal to meet with her case workers, her
failure to demonstrate sobriety and her contin ued, active use of methamphetamine. The
district court involuntarily terminated mother’s parental rights to K.L. S. in August 2018.
Following the termination of mother’s parental rights, father, who is not K.L.S.’s biological
father, adopted K.L.S. Father, K.L.S., and K.P.G. currently live together.
In August 2019, father petitioned for the involuntar y termination of mother’s
parental rights to K.P.G. on the grounds that mother abandoned K.P.G. and that mother is
palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship. At the trial on father’s petition,

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the district court heard testimony from four witnesses, including father, mother, and two
friends of mother. The district court incorporated the August 2018 findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order terminating mother’s parental rights to K.L.S.
Father testified that in 2014, when K.P.G. was four -years-old, K.P.G. was present
at mother’s home during a “drug raid” and K.P.G. answered the door. Father explained
that after this incident, K.P.G. was diagnosed with post -traumatic stress disorder and
abandonment issues. Since then, K.P.G. has undergone two years of “intense trauma
therapy” and is currently doing well, has completed all of his trauma and abandonment
therapies, and is no longer in th erapy. Father explained that the last visit between mother
and K.P.G. occurred in 2015 before he was granted sole custody of K.P.G. in 2016. He
also stated that since 2017, mother has not requested to see K.P.G., nor asked about his
well-being, health or schooling. Father testified that in his opinion, contact between mother
and K.P.G. would “probably throw [K.P.G.] back into therapy.” Father also testified that
K.P.G. has not requested to see mother and that K.P.G. “doesn’t remember” mother.
Mother testified that she has her “life going on track” and while she has had
chemical dependency issues in the past, she has been sober for 11 months . She explained
that she maintains sobriety by “[l]ooking forward to [her] kids.” Mother testified that she
has been involved in the Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous program s
(NA/AA) since “September 3 [of] this year” —approximately two months before trial in
this matter, but mother did not provide any documentation to support this. She also testified
that she recently submitted all of her paperwork and completed her initial appointment with
a mental-health professional, but again did not provide any documentation to support this.

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Mother explained that she lives with G.W., who has been helping her complete a workbook
and that she and G.W. work on “critical thinking” and how to make better decisions. She
stated that she has done “[d]ifferent exercises and coping skills” and has done “[a] lot of
self-help stuff” to address her mental health . Mother also conceded that she has three
felony convictions on her record and that there are two charges pending against her. She
explained that she had recently entered an Alford plea to a theft-of-a-motor-vehicle charge.
Finally, mother testified that prior to living with G.W., she was in custody at the Wright
County jail.
G.W. testified on mother’s behalf and stated that they had known each other for
approximately two and a half months at the time of trial. G.W. explained that she has been
working in mental health and chemical dependency for over 30 years as an advocate and
social worker. G.W. did not provide any information about her education, traini ng or
professional licenses. G.W. explained that she has “very little knowledge” of mother’s
history with chemical dependency but has no reason to believ e mother currently has
chemical dependency issues. Finally, G.W. testified that while she is not “treating” mother
as one of her clients, she is a facilitator of a “wellness recovery reaction plan,” and that she
and mother have been working together on a wellness plan and workbook to help mother
alleviate stress in her life.
C.C. also testified on mother’s behalf. C.C. has known mother since 2014. C.C.
testified that mother is “a good mother in general” and is “always good with . . . kids.” The
district court concluded that G.W.’s and C.C.’s testimony was of very limited value.

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Following the trial, the district court involuntarily terminated mother’s parental
rights to K.P.G., finding that father had proved by “clear and convincing evidence that
abandonment shall be presumed and does exist pursuant t o Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 2(a)(1),” that mother failed to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness, and that
termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of K.P.G. Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the district cour t must find that at least
one of the eight statutory conditions for termination exist[s].” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554
N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). The district court is afforded “considerable defer ence”
regarding its termination-of-parental-rights decisions; however, appellate courts carefully
inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it is clear and convincing.
In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted).
On appeal from a district court’s termination-of-parental rights order, “we will review the
district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805
N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
I. The district court did not err in concluding that mother failed to rebut the
statutory presumption of palpable unfitness.

Mother challenges the district court’s determination that she failed to meet her
burden to overcome the presumption of palpable unfitness. Generally, “the natural parent
is presumed to be fit and suitable to be entrusted with the care of his or her child.” In re

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Welfare of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2003). However, “[i]t is presumed
that a parent is palpably unfit to be a par ty to the parent and child relationship upon a
showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily
terminated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). The statutory presumption is
“easily rebuttable” because it “imposes only a burden of production, which means that a
parent may rebut the statutory presumption merely by introducing evidence that would
justify a finding of fact that [the parent] is not palpably unfit.” In re Welfare of J.A.K., 907
N.W.2d 241, 2 45-46 (Minn. App. 2018) (alternation in original) (internal quotations
omitted). “[W]hether the evidence satisfies the burden of production is determined on a
case-by-case basis.” Id. at 246 (quotation omitted). If the parent introduces evidence
sufficient to “create a genuine issue of fact on the issue of palpable unfitness” then the
statutory presumption is considered rebutted and it “has no further function at the trial.”
Id. (citations omitted). The court of appeals will review de novo a district c ourt’s
determination regarding whether the parent has rebutted the statutory presumption. Id.
(citing In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn. App. 2011), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012)).
Stating that mother “presented scant evidence to the Court that s he has made
substantial changes since her rights to another chil d were involuntarily terminated, ” the
district court concluded that mother failed to overcome the presumption of palpable
unfitness. We agree.
Mother testified that she has attended NA/AA meetings, is maintaining sobriety and
has attended one intake meeting with a mental -health professional to address her mental -

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health needs. But mother did not provide any documentation to support her claims that she
has completed a mental -health intake appointment or attended NA/AA meetings. And
mother has not attended any treatment facility for her chemical-dependency issues despite
the fact that she was previously diagnosed with severe cannabis and stimulant dependency
and struggled to maintain sobriety during her previous child protection case.
In addition, mother’s witnesses testified that mother does well with children and has
completed self-help type lessons. But, the district court noted that G.W. did not “testify to
any training or credentials which might give some weight to the program she is offering.”
And although C.C. testified that he had known mother since 2014 and had seen her with
“her child on approximately three occasions,” the record is clear that mother had not seen
K.P.G. since 2015 or even asked about his well-being since 2017.
Finally, mother acknowledged that she ha d felony charges pending at the time of
the TPR trial, as well a s prior convictions on her record , and th at she was recently
incarcerated. Though the presumption of palpable unfitness is “easily rebuttable,” we
affirm the district court’s determination that mother has not “introduc[ed] evidence that
would justify a finding of fact that [she] is not palpably unfit.” J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 245-
46. The district court did not err in concluding that mother failed to r ebut the statutory
presumption that she is palpably unfit to parent K.P.G. and the record substantiates that
finding.
Because only one statutory bas is for termination is required for involuntary
termination of parental rights, we need not address whether the district court erred in
terminating mother’s parental rights on the ground that she abandoned K.P.G. See Minn.

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Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2018); see also L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at 396 (stating that the
district court must find at least one of the eight statutory conditions exists to involuntarily
terminate parental rights).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
termination of mother’s parental rights is in K.P.G.’s best interests.

When a statutory basis for terminating parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1 , is present, t he best interests of the child is the “paramount consideration ” in
addressing whether to terminate parental rights. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
When analyzing the child’s best interests, the district court must balance three factors:
“(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any co mpeting interest of the child.”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905; Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58. 04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests
include such things as a stable environment, hea lth considerations and the child’s
preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B ., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992) (citation
omitted). The court of appeals reviews “a district court’s ultimate determination that
termination is in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at
905 (citation omitted).
Although mother argues that it is not in the best interest of K.P.G. that her parental
rights be terminated , she does not appear to challenge any of the district court’s best -
interest findings or legal analysis. The district court concluded that termination of mother’s
parental rights is in the best interests of the child. The district court weighed mother’s
“object[ion] to the termination of her parental rights” against the fact that th e child has

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“expressed no interest in maintaining the parent -child relationship” with mother. The
district court also considered the competing interest of the child, including “the harm which
could occur to the child by reversing years of therapy to overc ome the childhood trauma
caused by [mother]” if K.P.G. and mother were to resume a parent -child relationship, and
the effect that mother’s volatile behaviors, periods of incarceration, and ongoing criminal
behaviors would have on K.P.G. The district court conducted the best-interest analysis in
accordance with the relevant legal authority, and the district court’s findings are supported
by the record. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that it is in
K.P.G.’s best interests that mother’s parental rights be terminated.
Affirmed.