State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2011

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jordan Lee Wachter,
Appellant.

Filed February 1, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Big Stone County District Court
File No. 06-CR-19-137

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph P. Glasrud, Big Stone County Attorney, Ortonville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea to felony domestic assault, arguing that
his plea was not constitutionally valid. Because appellant’s plea was accurate, intelligent,
and voluntary, we conclude that the plea was valid. We, therefore, affirm.

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FACTS
The complaint in this matter alleges th at in early July 2019, a police officer
responded to a 911 call from a home in Ortonville. When the officer arrived, the
homeowner told him that the emergency involved a friend who was inside the home. The
homeowner’s friend (the victim) was a woman who had been living with appellant Jordan
Lee Wachter. She told the officer that, earlier that day, Wachter had struck her repeatedly
on the left side of her face. The victim explained that the incident occurred in the entry of
Wachter’s home. The responding officer then went to Wachter’s home to speak with him.
When the officer arrived, Wa chter was “very belligerent” a nd “obviously intoxicated.”
After speaking with Wachter, the officer arrested Wachter and cited him for misdemeanor
fifth-degree assault. Wachter initially denied hitting the victim, but admitted doing so after
receiving the citation.
At the July 5 arraignment hearing, th e state orally amended the charge to
misdemeanor domestic assault. A little less than two weeks la ter, the state filed a formal
complaint. The complaint fu rther amended the charge to felony domestic assault.
The state amended the charge to a fe lony because Wachter had two prior
domestic-assault-related convictions. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2018)
(enhancing a misdemeanor domestic-assault charge to a felony domestic-assault charge if
the charge occurs with in ten years of two “previous qu alified domestic violence-related
offense convictions”).
On July 17, Wachter appeared for arraignment on the amended charge, represented
by counsel. At the July 17 hearing, Wachter’s counsel informed the court that the parties

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had reached an agreement to settle the case. The agreement was a guilty plea with a
presumptive stayed sentence. The district c ourt expressed reservations about accepting a
guilty plea so early in a fel ony proceeding. In response , Wachter’s counsel summarized
the advice that he offered Wachter. He stat ed, “we have talked about . . . Mr. Wachter’s
trial rights, any defenses that we may have had, we’ve talked about intoxication, we talked
about self[-]defense as possible defenses in this case, [a nd] we talked about the length of
probation.” Wachter’s counsel concluded by saying, “I don’t know what else I would say
to him if the case was delayed for a couple of weeks. I don’t know what additional advice
I would give to him.”
After hearing from defense counsel, the di strict court advised Wachter of the rights
that he would be waiving by entering a guilty plea. The district court specifically advised
Wachter of his right to be presumed innocent, to review and challenge the evidence against
him, to cross-examine the state’s witnesses, to call witnesses on his own behalf, and to
remain silent. The district court also asked Wachter if he understood that the charge against
him was an enhanceable offense. Wachter responded that he understood his rights and the
consequences of his plea. And he agreed that he still wished to enter a guilty plea.
Wachter’s counsel then revi ewed the signed plea pe tition on the record with
Wachter and inquired as to his reasons for pleading guilty. Defense counsel noted that the
plea petition indicated that Wachter had a histor y of mental illness, had been treated in a
mental hospital in 2006, and was currently receiving psychiatric treatment. Defense
counsel then asked Wachter, “[D]o you feel like you’re making a rational decision today,”
to which Wachter responded, “Yes, I do.” Th is colloquy is the onl y time that Wachter’s

4
mental illness was addressed during the July 17 hearing. Wachter also indicated that he
did not remember hitting the victim on the f ace, as alleged in the complaint, but did
remember “doing something else that was an assault to her.”
After accepting the plea petition, the distri ct court conducted further inquiry to
develop the factual basis for Wachter’s guilty pl ea. In response to the district court’s
questions, Wachter admitted to “t rying to pull [the victim] out the door by her hair” and
telling her to leave. In response to the next question, he reiterated that he “pulled her hair”
and “asked her to leave the house” but then, somewhat inconsistently, testified that he did
not “remember any of this.” He later clarified that he did not remember striking the victim
repeatedly as alleged in the co mplaint. He stated that he “might have clocked her in the
head once.” He was not sure. But he did re member that the victim resisted leaving his
house. And he specifically remember ed “pulling her and dragging he r out the
door . . . [d]own the stairs and telling her to get lost.” Wachter also admitted to two
previous assault convictions. And, in response to a question from the prosecutor, Wachter
testified that the victim had been living with him “on and off,” and that he considered her
to be his girlfriend. Based on Wachter’s tes timony, the district court found a “sufficient
factual basis” to support a conviction of felony domestic assault and accepted Wachter’s
guilty plea.
During the presentence investigation, Wach ter explained that he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia and sees his mental health provider bi-weekly. He receives a twice-monthly
intramuscular injection to stabilize his schizoph renia. At sentencing, the district court

5
adjudicated Wachter guilty of felony domestic assault and placed him on probation for five
years under a stay of execution. Wachter now appeals.
DECISION
Wachter argues that his conviction should be reversed and he should be permitted
to withdraw his plea because his plea was not accurate, intelligent, or voluntary. The state
argues that Wachter’s plea was valid in all respects. We agree with the state.
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accura te, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (M inn. 2010). “If a guilty plea fails to
meet any of these three requirements, the plea is invalid.” State v. Johnson ,
867 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). The
validity of a guilty plea presen ts a question of law that th is court reviews de novo.
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016). The appellant “bears the burden of
showing his plea was invalid.” Id. (quotation omitted).
I. Wachter’s guilty plea was accurate.
Wachter first argues that his plea was inva lid because it was not accurate. “The
accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense
than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be accurate, a plea must be established on a proper factual basis.”
Id. “The factual basis must establish sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion
that defendant’s conduct falls within the char ge to which he desire s to plead guilty.”
Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

6
Wachter pleaded guilty to the offense of domes tic assault under Minn.
Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. That statute sets forth two types of domestic assault: domestic
assault-fear and domestic assault-harm. Id., subd. 1 (2018). Wachter argues that his plea
was inaccurate because the factual basis for his plea was insufficient to support a conviction
for either type of domestic assault. The state contends that Wachter admitted to a sufficient
factual basis to support a conviction for either form of domestic assault. We conclude that
Wachter admitted to sufficient facts to support a conviction of domestic assault-harm.
A person is guilty of domestic assault-harm if the person “intentionally inflicts or
attempts to inflict bodily harm up on” a family or hou sehold member. Id., subd. 1(2).
Bodily harm means “phy sical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2018). A “family or household member”
includes “persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the
past.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(4 ) (2018). Domestic assault-harm is a
general-intent crime, meaning that the evidence need only show that the defendant intended
to do the prohibited physical act, not that the defendant intended to violate the law or cause
a particular result. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2012).
The record includes sufficien t evidence to conclude that Wachter’s conduct could
support a jury verdict of domestic assault-harm. Wachter admitted that the victim had been
living with him “on and off,” sa tisfying Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(4). He further
admitted grabbing and pulling the victim down the stairs. And he admitted to doing so by
pulling her hair.

7
Wachter contends, however, that his admissi on was not sufficient to establish that
the victim actually suffered bodily harm. Wachter argues that the record fails to establish
that the victim suffered any pain or injury when he pulled her hair and dragged her out of
the house. He notes that ther e is no direct testimony that th e victim experienced pain or
any evidence of an injury. Bu t case law establishes that the facts admitted to during the
plea hearing need only be sufficient to “reasonably infer[]” that the defendant is guilty of
the crime charged. Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861 (“Our standa rd is clear: ‘It is well
established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the trial judge must make certain
that facts exist from whic h the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably
inferred.’” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Neumann , 262 N.W.2d 426, 430
(Minn. 1978))). Direct testimony or evidence is not required if the defendant’s guilt can
be reasonably inferred from testimony at the plea hearing. See id.
Here, Wachter’s testimony is more than sufficient to reasonably infer that the victim
experienced pain as a result of his intentional conduct. Wach ter admitted that he “pulled
her hair,” that he “was trying to pull her out the door by her hair,” and that he did so because
“[s]he was resisting” leaving hi s house. He further testified that he eventually “pull[ed]
her and dragg[ed] her out the door . . . and [d]own the stairs.” Based on this testimony, it
is reasonable to infer that Wachter caused the victim to experience pain, probably severe
pain. And “[p]ain alone will suffice” to satisfy the definition of bodily harm.
State v. Blegen, 387 N.W.2d 459, 464 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. July 31,
1986).

8
In sum, Wachter’s guilty plea established an adequate factual basis for the offense
of domestic assault-harm. 1 The record supports the dist rict court’s determination that
“there is a sufficient factual basis” to support a conviction of domestic assault.
II. Wachter intelligently and volun tarily entered his guilty plea.
Wachter next argues that, due to his hi story of mental illness, the record is
insufficient for this court to conclude that his plea was intelligent or voluntary. The state
contends that the record reflects that Wachter intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea.
We agree with the state.
An intelligent guilty plea is a plea that is “knowingly and understandingly made.”
State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). A defendant pleads guilty intelligently
if he does so “after [he] has been informed of and understands the charges and direct
consequences of a plea.” State v. Byron, 683 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. App. 2004), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). A guilty plea is voluntary if the defendant’s decision to
plead is not based on “improper pressure or coercion.” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861
(quotation omitted).

1 Wachter argues alternatively that his plea should have been evaluated as a Norgaard plea
by the district court because he testified to not remembering details of the offense. A
defendant enters a Norgaard plea where he testifies to not remembering the underlying
incident, but admits that th e record contains sufficient evidence for conviction. Johnson,
867 N.W.2d at 215; see also State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash , 110 N.W.2d 867, 871-72
(Minn. 1961). We need not consider this argument because we conclude that his plea was
accurate and otherwise constitutionally valid. Further, the record reveals that neither party
considered Wachter’s plea to be a Norgaard plea at the time it was made, and Wachter
never signed a Norgaard plea addendum.

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In a felony case, the district court must make specific factual findings to ensure that
the defendant understands the consequences of pleading gu ilty before accepting a plea.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1. And a district court must not accept a guilty plea from a
defendant who is incompetent. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. A defendant is
incompetent if, due to mental illness, the defendant lacks th e ability to rationally consult
with counsel or understand the proceedings. Id. The district court must order a competency
evaluation if it determines, on its own initiative or upon motion of either party, that there
are reasons to question the defendant’s competence. Id., subd. 3. “[A] defendant’s
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to
stand trial are all relevant in determinin g whether further inquiry is required.”
Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Drope v. Missouri ,
420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908 (1975)). “There are, of course, no fixed or immutable
signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed;
the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle
nuances are implicated.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908. A district court violates
due process when, having reason to doubt the defendant’s competence, it does not
“observe procedures adequate to en sure the defendant’ s competency.” State v. Bauer ,
245 N.W.2d 848, 854 (Minn. 1976).
Wachter does not argue that he was not in formed of the charges against him or the
consequences of entering a guilty plea. Nor does he argue that he was improperly pressured
or otherwise coerced into pleading guilty. Instead, he argues that his guilty plea could not
have been intelligent or voluntary if he was not competent, and that his history of mental

10
illness along with his behavior at the July 17 hearing “t riggered the district court’s
responsibility” to inquire into his competency before accepting his plea.
Wachter relies heavily on Bonga to support his argument that the district court had
a duty to inquire into his competence on its own initiative. 797 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 2011).
In Bonga, the defendant attempted to kill himself in his jail cell about an hour after
confessing to committing a murder. Id. at 714. The defendant appeared in court the next
day and pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. Id. The defendant’s standby counsel, who
had been working with him for about a year, opined that: “Mr. Bonga has an understanding
of what is going on, u nderstands the seriousness of the ch arges, has made an intelligent,
knowingly [sic], voluntary decision from his perspective to enter a Plea of Guilty.” Id. at
715. The district court then examined Bonga’s mo tivations for both the suicide attempt
and his guilty plea, and concluded that Bonga was competent to proceed. Id. at 716-17.
On review from the denial of Bonga’s petition for postconviction relief, the issue
before the supreme court was “whether the district court gave sufficient weight to evidence
suggesting incompetence when it concluded that there was no reason to doubt Bonga’s
competency to plead guilty.” Id. at 713. The supreme court concluded that the district
court had done so. Id. at 721. The supreme court recognized that Bonga’s suicide attempt
was “an act which suggests a rather substa ntial degree of mental instability.” Id. at 720
(quotation omitted). But the supreme court found that counsel and the court were able to
observe Bonga at the plea hearing after the suicide attempt, and Bonga “demonstrated that
he was capable of understanding the proceedings and participating in his defense when he
informed the court” before pleading guilty th at he understood the penalty he faced by

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pleading. Id. at 720. The supreme court also noted that the district court inquired into both
Bonga’s history of mental illness as well as hi s decisions to attempt suicide and to plead
guilty. Id. at 720-21.
Wachter contends that Bonga demonstrates that an inquiry into Wachter’s
competence by the district court was necessary to determine if his guilty plea was both
intelligent and voluntary. Wachter notes that, in Bonga, the district court engaged in a
colloquy to determine if B onga was competent to plead guilty after Bonga attempted
suicide. Wachter maintains that his history of mental illness and his somewhat inconsistent
answers to questions about the assault at the July 17 hearing required further inquiry.
Bonga is distinguishable from this ca se. Unlike the defendant in Bonga, Wachter
did not give the district cour t any objective indication of a “substantial degree of mental
instability.” He did not attempt self-harm or evince irrational behavior. He acknowledged
on the record that he understood the consequenc es of pleading guilty, and that he wanted
to do so notwithstanding his history of mental illness. The district court heard the following
colloquy when Wachter’s attorney questioned him about th e plea petition, as well as his
mental health and his desire to plead guilty:
Q: And then after you decided to plead guilty, we went
through a form together, four pages long, I have the
original, you have a copy?
A: Yep.
Q: And first thing on the botto m of the fourth page there’s
a signature; is that your signature?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: Signed it after we had gone through it together?
A: Yep.
Q: Okay. Now there’s a number of places where we
answer questions about yo ur mental health and

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medications. So you have b een a patient in a mental
hospital, correct?
A: Yep.
Q: And you’re currently seeing a psychiatrist or counseling
correct?
A: Ah, I see – yeah. Yeah, I do see a psychiatrist.
Q: Okay, and you’re taking some – some pills that or some
medications?
A: I get a – I get a[n] inner muscular injection every two
weeks and I also take other pills.
Q: Okay. Now there’s a ques tion behind those bunch of
questions and that’s this: With the counseling and
medication, do you feel like you’re making a rational
decision today?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Feel like you know what your alternatives are?
A: Yep.

The district court then received the plea pe tition into the record. On the plea petition,
Wachter indicated that he had been in a mental hospital in 2006. He also indicated that he
was currently being treated by “a psychiatrist or other person for a nervous or mental
condition” but he had “not been ill recently.”
Wachter’s testimony, taken together with the plea petition, demonstrates that he was
capable of understanding the proceedings a nd participating in his defense when he
informed the court that he was pleading guilty. Wachter ga ve intelligent answers to the
questions posed. He acknowledged his history of mental illness but indicated that he had
not been ill recently. He told the court that he was receiving treatment for that illness and
was able to make the rational decision to plea d guilty. He also stat ed that he understood
the consequences of pleading guilty and that he desired to do so, supporting a conclusion
that his plea was voluntary. And Wachter’s attorney never gave any indication that he had
a concern as to Wachter’s competency. Nor did his attorney request that the district court

13
order a competency evaluation. In sum, Wachter presented th e district court with every
indication that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty and that he desired to do
so.
At the end of his brief, Wachter seems to suggest that his history of mental illness
alone required the district court to inquire into his competence. We disagree. We are not
aware of any case law that requires a district court to conduct such an inquiry solely on the
basis of a mental health diagnosis. As th e United States Supreme Court recognized in
Drope, “[t]here are . . . no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for
further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed.” 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908. Rather,
the determination of whether it is necessary to conduct su ch an inquiry is made on a
case-by-case basis. See id. ; see also State v. Pietraszewski , 283 N.W.2d 887, 890
(Minn. 1979) (“A commitment because of ment al illness is not a determination that a
defendant is legally incompetent.”). Ac cordingly, we conclude that, under the
circumstances presented by this case, the district court was not required to inquire further
into Wachter’s competence.
Because the record demonstrates that Wa chter’s guilty plea to felony domestic
assault was accurate, intelligent, and voluntary, we conclude that the district court did not
err when it accepted his plea.
Affirmed.