Richard Minder III, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2018

Richard Minder III,
Respondent,

vs.

Jai Maria Negri,
Appellant.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-07-806

Jeffrey A. Berg, Henningson & Snoxell, Ltd., Maple Grove, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kathryn M. Lammers, Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this custody and parenting time dispute, appellant-mother argues that the district
court erred in three respects : (1) by awarding father permanent sole legal custody; (2) by
denying mo ther’s motion to modify the previous physical custody determination; and
(3) by permanently restricting mother’s parenting time. Because the record supports the
district court’s factual findings regarding the statutory best interests factors, we affirm th e
district court’s legal custody decision. In addition, we affirm the district court’s denial of

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mother’s motion to modify physical custody because the evidence supports the district
court’s factual findings that father’s conduct did not endanger the chil dren. Finally,
because the district court restricted mother’s parenting time without analyzing the required
statutory provisions, we reverse the determination of parenting time and remand to the
district court for further proceedings.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Jai Negri and respondent -father Richard Minder III were never
married and had two daughters together, M.I.N. (age 16) and A.M.N. (age 14). The parties
followed an initial custody and parenting time order from 2007 until 2017, when father
moved to modify custody and parenting time. Based on the parties’ agreement in 2018,
the district court modified the original order. In 2019, mother brought motions to modify
custody and parenting time. Mother now appeals the denial of her requests. We first briefly
address the procedural history in this case, before turning our attention to the evidence
presented and findings made after the 2019 evidentiary hearing.
A. Procedural History
In July 2007, the district court issued its initial custody order, a warding the parties
joint legal custody and grant ing sole physical custody to mother. Mother enjoyed the
majority of parenting time with the children in the ensuing years , although father’s
parenting time varied. Beginning in March 2014, father exercised regular parenting time
during one overnight every other Saturday , two additional overnights during holiday
parenting time, and two weeks of vacation parenting time.

3
In February 2017, father moved for temporary and permanent modification of th e
2007 custody order, arguing that the children were endangered in mother’s care and
seeking sole legal and sole physical custody of the children. In an ex parte order and in the
order following an initial hearing to address father’s emergency motions, the district court
awarded father temporary sole legal custody and temporary sole physical custody of the
children. The district court also substantially restricted mother’s parenting time on a
temporary basis, 1 appointed a guardian ad litem, and ordered t he parties to undergo a
custody and parenting time evaluation. The temporary parenting time schedule permitted
mother to exercise parenting time during one overnight every other Saturday. After a
review hearing in April 2017, the district court expanded mother’s parenting time to also
include every other Friday night. For the duration of 2017, the district court held periodic
review hearings, pending an evidentiary hearing to address father’s 2017 motions to
permanently modify custody and parenting time.
Prior to the scheduled evidentiary hearing on father’s 2017 modification motions,
the parties entered into a preliminary agreement on March 9, 2018. Based on this
preliminary agreement, the district court struck the evidentiary hearing from the calendar,
and the parties continued to finalize a stipulation to dispose of father’ s pending motions.
In the preliminary agreement, the parties agreed to follow a two -phase parenting time
schedule for the next six months, with a review hearing scheduled for Septem ber 2018 to
address future interim expansion of mother’s parenting time. During those six months,

1 Mother exercised the vast majority (approximately 85%) of parenting time prior to the
district court’s February 13, 2017 ex parte order.

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mother’s parenting time included unsupervised parenting time every Thursday evening and
every other Saturday overnight. Prior to the scheduled six -month review hearing, mother
moved the court to establish a permanent, 50/50 parenting time schedule. Shortly
thereafter, the parties reached a final agreement, which included the appointment of a
parenting consultant to address mother’s request to establish a per manent 50/50 parenting
time schedule.
The parties signed the final stipulation in September 2018, and the court adopted
the stipulation in an order dated October 1, 2018 (the 2018 Stipulat ed Order). The 2018
Stipulated Order disposed of father’s pending motion to permanently modify physical
custody. Pursuant to the 2018 Stipulated Order , father was awarded permanent sole
physical custody. The 2018 Stipulated Order did not, however, reach a final disposition
regarding father ’s motion to permanently modify legal custody or regarding father’s
motion to permanently modify the previously imposed parenting time schedule. Instead,
the 2018 Stipulated Order expressly reserved a permanent determination of legal custody
pending a review after one year. Likewise, the district court and the parties referred father’s
2017 motion to permanently modify the parties’ parenting time schedule and mother’s
subsequent request for an equal parenting time schedule to the parenting consultant.
On March 1, 2019, mother filed emergency motions requesting temporary joint
legal custody, temporary sole physical custody , and a temporary suspension of father’s

5
parenting time subject to the recommendations of a guardian ad litem.2 In support of these
motions, mother alleged that M.I.N. had been admitted to the hospital after cutting herself
and expressing suicidal thoughts, and that she would not be safe if she returned to father’s
home. The district court agreed that M.I.N.’s situation constituted an eme rgency, but it
denied mother’s requested ex parte relief, and scheduled a n expedited hearing on the
emergency motions. Following this hearing, the district court denied mother’s temporary
requests, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing to consider the disputed issues of physical
custody, legal custody, and parenting time.
The evidentiary hearing was held over the course of three separate days between
May and July 2019. The district court construed mother’s motion regarding legal custody
as a request to conduct the contemplated one -year review, even though one year had not
yet passed. Based on the parties’ agreement in the 2018 Stipulated Order, the district court
applied the best interests factors to determine permanent legal custody , but applied the
custody modification requirements to mother’s motion regarding physical custody. The
district court also applied the best interests factors to mother’s motion regarding parenting
time without addressing the temporary nature of the parenting time provisions in the 2018
Stipulated Order.
In its November 8, 2019 order, t he district court concluded that the best interests
factors weighed in favor of awarding father permanent sole legal custody of both children.

2 Although Mother’s emergency motion s only related to one of the children, M.I.N., the
district court construed these motions as relating to both children. The evidentiary hearing
and the district court’s order concerned the custody of and parenting time for both children.

6
The district court also concluded that mother had not met the statutory grounds of
endangerment necessary for modification of physical custody . Finally, the district court
concluded that the best interests factors weighed in favor of permanently restricting
mother’s parenting time for both children to fo ur supervised parenting time sessions
totaling 14 hours every two weeks.
B. Evidence Presented and the District Court’s Findings
Mother challenges the district court’s findings regarding the following f ive best
interests factors: the preferences of the children, the mental health of mother and father,
the ability of mother and father to provide ongoing care for the children, each party’s ability
to support the children’s relationship with the other parent , and each party’s ability to
cooperate with the other parent in the rearing of their children . In addition, mother
challenges the district court’s findings regarding whether father’s conduct endangers the
health and well-being of the children.
First, the district court made findings regarding the preference of the children and
concluded that this factor was neutral. T he district court received evidence that, in
February and March 2019, M.I.N. expressed a preference to live with mother rather than
father. The district court also received into evidence a custody evaluation from September
2017, which included summaries of the evaluator’s interviews with the children. The
evaluator believed that the children could not express an independent, reliable preference
because they had been continually exposed to mother’s unfounded allegations of father’s

7
abuse.3 According to the evaluat or, mother made such accusations to “nearly every
healthcare provider the children have se en in recent years,” many times “in front of the
children.” Even though the evaluation was more than two years old, the district court found
it to be reliable in light of testimony and medical records documenting mother’s efforts in
2019 to influence the children’s perceptions and to disparage father. It therefore concluded
that this factor was neutral because the children were “unable to express an independent
and reliable preference regarding custody and parenting time.”
Second, the district court made findings regarding the p arties’ mental health and
concluded that this factor favored father’s positions . The district court credited findings
from 2017 psychological evaluation s of both parties . Father’s psychological evaluation
ruled out a diagnosis of depressive disorder even though father had been previously
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder in a 2005
psychological evaluation.
Mother’s psychological evaluation yielded a diagnostic profile of adjustment
disorder with mixed anxiety, depressed mood, and histrionic traits. The evaluator
recommended that mother undergo dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT), which had been
previously recommended, but never completed by mother. 4 Further, the evaluator

3 The district court explained that mother’s allegations “have permeated nearly every aspect
of this case since its inception,” and that “[t]he record that exists over the last six years of
litigation in this matter is filled with domestic abuse allegations by [mother] on behalf of
the children against [father].” During her testimony at the evidentiary hearing, however,
mother stated that she now no longer believes father abused the children.
4 Mother’s 2005 psychological evaluation, also admitted into the record , included
conclusions that mother had clinically significant impairment in social, occupati onal,
educational, relational, and parenting skills. The evaluator in 2005 diagnosed mother with

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observed that although mother presented herself “as positively as possible,” mother’s
“assertions were frequently contradicted in collateral documents.” The district court also
considered testimony by mother’s therapist, Noureen Wallani. This district court
discounted this testimony, finding that Ms. Wallani’s testimony rested only on mother’s
self-reported beliefs , “which have been frequently inaccurate or misleading.” In her
testimony, Ms. Wallani acknowledged that she had not reviewed the district court’s
previous orders or the 2017 custody evaluation, which concluded that mother “engaged in
what appears to be a deliberate manipulation of the facts across multiple providers.” In
addition, the district court identified inconsistencies between statements that mother made
to Ms. Wallani and statements that mother made to M.I.N.’s medical providers in February
2019.
Third, the district court made findings regarding the p arties’ respective abilities to
provide ongoing care for the children and concluded that this factor also favored father’s
positions. The district court found that both parents we re willing to care for the children.
However, mother continued to use an “extreme consent -based parenting style, ” which
affected the hea lthy development of the children. For example, the district court cited
A.M.N.’s refusal to allow blood draws and her removal of a feeding tube during her
hospital stay in 2017 for an eating disorder. The district court also concluded that mother’s
parenting style resulted in M.I.N. arriving late to school twenty separate times because she
refused to take the bus. At the evidentiary hearing, mother testified that she does not use a

a personality disorder with borderline features and recommended intensive DBT treatment.
Mother never completed the recommended DBT.

9
consent-based parenting style, but the district court disbelieved mother’s testimony, citing
examples from 2017, 2018, and 2019. For instance, mother twice violated a 2019 order
prohibiting her from communicating with M.I.N. through the use of a secondary or secret
cell phone. The district court concluded that these actions “ clearly violate the plain intent
of the Court’s order” and “undermine [father’s] parenting decisions.” Moreover, mother’s
testimony at the evidentiary hearing explaining her behavior “significantly dimin ishe[d]
her credibility.” The district court concluded that this factor favored father because
mother’s ongoing parenting style and “frequent tendency to ignore or violate Court orders”
limit her ability to care for the children “in a way that is developmentally appropriate,
healthy, and safe.”
Fourth, the district court made finding s regarding mother’s attempts to impair
father’s relationship with the children . These findings relate to two best interests factors :
the eleventh factor (“the disposition of each parent to support the child[ren]’s relationship
with the other parent and to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between
the child[ren] and the other parent”) and the twelfth factor (“the willingness and ability of
parents to cooperate in the rearing of their child[ren]; to maximize sharing information and
minimize exposure of the child [ren] to parental conflict; and to utilize methods for
resolving disputes regarding any major decision concerning the life of the child [ren]”).
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd s. 1(a)(11), (12) (2018). The district court heavily emphasized
the importance o f the se factors in its ultimate decision, repeatedly finding that mother
sought to hinder father’s relationship with the children by continually making unfounded
allegations that father abused the children. The evidence presented included the following

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statement from a 2016 child protection investigation report: “The Department is concerned
that [A.M.N.] and [M.I.N.] are being emotionally abused and manipulated by their
mother’s actions and derogatory c omments about [father] in the children’s presence.”
Similarly, the evidence included multiple examples in 2016 and 2017 of mother’s
statements to medical providers that father caused A.M.N.’s anorexia. The custody
evaluation in 2017 summarized mother’s behavior:
The information gathered during this evaluation indicates that
[mother] has not only continued, but has also amplified, her
campaign to disparage [father]. [Mother] has attempted to
correlate the children’s physical and emotional issues with
alleged abusive behavior on [father’s] part with nearly every
healthcare provider the children have seen in recent years;
many of these allegations have been in front of the children.
Multiple CP investigations have found no evidence that
[father] had engaged in emotionally or physically abusive
behavior toward the children.

The evidence before the district court also included medical records from M.I.N.’s hospital
admission on February 20, 2019. These medical records indicate that mother and M.I.N.
continued to allege that father neglected and mistreated the children. After one of the
doctors reported his concerns about father to child protective services, another child
protection investigation occurred. The district court received the report into evidence and
received the testimony of the social worker who completed the 2019 investigation. This
evidence showed that mother continued to disparage father to school officials and hospital
employees in 2019. The social worker ultimately concluded that mother h ad influenced
the children’s statements and did not credit them. Based on this evidence, the district court

11
found that mother “has repeatedly demonstrated that she has an inconsistent desire and no
proven ability to co-parent with [father].”
Given its conclusions regarding these five factors as well as the other best interests
factors, the district court awarded permanent sole legal custody to father. The district court
also permanent ly restricted mother’s parenting time to 14 hours every two weeks and
required supervision during all of mother’s parenting time indefinitely.
Finally, the district court concluded that the evidence presented did not show that
the children were endangered while in father’s care. Mother claimed that the children faced
a dan ger to their health and well -being when placed in father’s care because M.I.N.’s
cutting and suicidal ideation occurred under a parenting time arrangement in which father
exercised the vast majority of parenting time. Mother did not present corroborating
evidence, however, for her conclusion that father’s conduct endangers the children, and the
district court questioned mother’s inference regarding causation: “The specific causes of
[M.I.N.’s] difficulties and the sources of her physical and emotional enda ngerment are,
however, not as clearly determined as [mother’s] allegations attempt to portray. As
addressed below, the ongoing condition of being put in what the appointe d parenting
consultant calls a ‘ loyalty bind’ causes the children considerable emotio nal stress and, at
times, places them in danger.” Further, the district cour t disbelieved mother’s testimony,
finding that it was “riddled with inconsistencies and demonstrated fabrications” and that
she had “engaged in a pattern of deceit and manipulatio n.” By contrast, the district court
found that “multiple evaluations, Guardian ad Litem reports, police reports, and extensive
medical and therapy records repeatedly support [father’s] recollection and descriptions of

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events.” Therefore, the district cou rt denied mother’s motion to modify the previous
permanent sole physical custody award to father. Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother challenges three aspects of the district court’s order: (1) the award of
permanent sole legal custody to father based on its best interests findings; (2) the denial of
mother’s motion to modify the 2018 physical custody determination; and (3) the permanent
restriction of mother’s parenting time.
I. Determination of Legal Custody
Mother argues that the district court erred in making it s factual findings regarding
five of the best interests factors. Because the record supports these findings, we conclude
that the district court did not clearly err in making these findings.
A district court shall not modify a prior custody order unless it finds “that a change
has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties and that the modification is
necessary to serve the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2018). In
applying these standards, the district court shall retain the existing custody arrangement
unless the moving party establishes one or more of the following five bases:
(i) the court finds that a change in the custody
arrangement or primary residence is in the best interests of the
child and the parties previously agreed . . . to apply the best
interests standard in section 518.17 . . . ;
(ii) both parties agree to the modification;
(iii) the child has been integrated into the family of the
petitioner with the consent of the other party;
(iv) the child’ s present environment endangers the
child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s
emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a

13
change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a
change to the child; or
(v) the court has denied a request of the primary
custodial parent to move the residence of the child to another
state, and the primary custodial parent has relocated to another
state despite the court’s order.

Id. Paragraph (d)(i) applies to the legal custody issue here because, in the 2018 Stipulated
Order, the parties agreed to use the best interests standard from section 518.17 to review
the temporary award of legal custody.
Section 518.17, subdivision 1(a), sets forth twelve factors that the district court must
consider when evaluating the best interests of the children. We review the district court’s
custody determination under different standards, depending on the particular error asserted.
E.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 471 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Minn. App. 1991) (stating “[i]n determining
the child’s best interests, the [district] court weighs statutory criteria in light of findings on
underlying facts, and the court’s conclusions will reflect decisions on mixed questions of
law and fact, ‘ul timate’ facts, and matters of law”) (citing Maxfield v. Maxfield , 452
N.W.2d 219, 221 (Minn. 1990)), review denied (Minn. Aug. 12, 1991).
Where a party raises a purely legal question, such as the interpretation of the custody
statutes, we review the conclusion de novo. See, e.g., Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592,
596 (Minn. 2018) (citing Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 2008)).
Where a party contests the district court’s weighing of factors or its ultimate decision
regarding custody, we review the disputed conclusion for an abuse of discretion. E.g.,
Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 794 (Minn. 2019); Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 2 82
(Minn. 2008). We do not reweigh the best interests factors. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607

14
N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that there is “scant if any room for an
appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”).
Where a party disputes the factual findings regarding one or more of the statutory
factors, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Thornton, 933
N.W.2d at 790. A finding is clearly errone ous if the reviewing cou rt is “ left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d
797, 800 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). When determining whether the district court’s
findings are clearly erroneous, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). We do not reweigh the evidence,
and underlying findings of fact based on conflicting evidence will be affirmed unless they
are “manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence as a whole.” Kucera v. Kucera, 146
N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966).
Mother contests the district court’s factual findings regarding f ive of the statutory
best interests factors: (1) the preferences of the children; (2) the mental health of mother
and father; (3) the ability of mother and father to provide ongoing care for the children;
(4) each party’s ability to support the children’s relationship with the other parent; (5) and
each party’s ability to cooperate with the other parent in the rearing of their children. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subds. 1(a)(3), (5), (7), (11), (12).
Mother first disputes the district court ’s factual determination that she influenced
the children by maki ng unfounded accusations that father abused them. This factual
determination relates to three best interests fact ors. For example, the district court
concluded that, due to mother’s influence, the children could not express an independent

15
and reliable preference. The district court also emphasized this behavior when concluding
that mother had demonstrated inability to support the children’s relationship with father
and to cooperate with father in the rearing of their children. The district court’s findings
are supported by the record, which includes ample evidence that mother made unfounded
accusations of abuse in front of the children. In the 2016 child protection investigation
report, the child protective services agency concluded the following: “The Department is
concerned that [A.M.N.] and [M.I.N.] are being emotionally abused and manipulated by
their mother’s actions and derogatory comments about [father] in the children’s presence.”
Similarly, the evidence included multiple examples in 2016 and 20 17 of mother’s
statements to medical providers that A.M.N.’s eating disorder resulted from father’s poor
parenting and abuse. The custody evaluator concluded that mother made such accusations
to “nearly every healthcare provider the children have seen in recent years,” many tim es
“in front of the children.”
Contrary to mother’s arguments on appeal, the district court did not base its findings
only on evidence from 2017. The district court also admitted medical records from
M.I.N.’s hospital stay in February 2019. These medical records indicate that mother and
M.I.N. continued to allege that father neglected and mistreated the children, and the social
worker who completed the 2019 investigation testified that mother continued to disparage
father to school officials and hospital employees in 2019. The 2019 evidence in particular
caused the district court to disbelieve mother when she testified that she no longer believed
that father abused the children and had stopped accusing him of this behavior. Based on
this evidence, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err when it found that

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mother made unfounded accusations of abuse against father or when it found that these
accusations influenced the children’s stated preferences.
Mother next challenges the district court findings that mother’s mental health
negatively affects the children’s development. Mother primarily argues that the district
court neglected to consider evidence that she ha d attended to her mental health, includ ing
testimony from her therapist, Ms. Wallani. In this regard, mother asks us to reweigh the
evidence presented and reconcile conflicting evidence in a way that contradicts the district
court’s findings. We are satisfied that the record supports the dist rict court’s decision to
discount Ms. Wallani’s testimony. The district court observed that , unlike the custody
evaluator and the psychological evaluator in 2017, Ms. Wallani’s testimony rested only on
mother’s self -reported beliefs, and Ms. Wallani had n ot reviewed mother’s previous
custody evaluations. We are not left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made” in the weight given to the conflicting evidence presented regarding
mother’s mental health. See Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800.
Mother also disagrees with the district court’s findings regarding how her parenting
style impairs her ability to provide ongoing care for the children.5 Again, we conclude that

5 The legislature set fo rth two related factors regarding parents’ abilities to care for their
children, one focused on the history of providing care and one focused on providing care
in the future. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd.1(a)(5), (6). Mother does not contest the findings
related to the historical factor and only contests the district court’s conclusions regarding
the forward-looking factor. Considering one of these two factors apart from the other,
however, is not always meaningful. For instance, the district court first concluded that
mother previously exhibited problematic parenting behaviors that prohibited her from
being able to care for the children in the past, such as an “extreme consent-based parenting
style,” and making unfounded accusations that father was abusing the children, many times
in front of the children or directly to the children. In addition, the district court recounted

17
the record supports the district court’s findings. The evidence that mother encouraged and
defended A.M.N.’s refusal to allow blood draws and A.M.N.’s removal of a feeding tube
while in the hospital supports the district court’s findings that mother’s “extreme consent -
based parenting style” affect s the healthy development of t he children. In addition,
mother’s decision to provide M.I.N. a secret cell phone in violation of the district court’s
order in 2019 supports the district court’s finding that mother’s ongoing parenting style
and “frequent tendency to ignore o r violate Court orders” limit her ability to care for the
children “in a way that is developmentally appropriate, healthy, and safe.”
Finally, mother asserts that the district court clearly erred when it found that she
interfered with and hindered father’s relationshi p with the children. The district court
relied on this finding when it weighed the eleventh and twelfth best interests factors. We
conclude that the record supports the district court’s finding. As noted above, reports and
medical records from 2016, 2017, and 2019 received into evidence included documentation
that mother disparaged father in front of the children by making unfounded accusations of
father’s child abuse. Mother’s violation of the district court’s order in 2019 also supports
the finding that mother’s conduct undermined father’s relationship with the children. We

examples of mother’s past failures to comply with previous parenting time orders and
mother’s improper denial of father’s parenting time, including incidents in January 2017
and August 2017 involving the police. The district court concluded that because mother
continued to exhibit these same problematic parenting behaviors at the time of the
evidentiary hearing , she had an impaired a bility to provide care for the children in the
future. We review the challenged findings in light of the uncontested historical findings
made by the district court.

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find no error in the district court’s determination that mother “has an inconsistent desire
and no proven ability to co-parent with [father].”
The district court made 132 paragraph s of factual findings regarding the best
interests factors and carefully considered the evidence presented . The record at the
evidentiary hearing contains sufficient support for the disputed findings above , and we
affirm the district court’s decision to grant father permanent sole legal custody.
II. Denial of Mother’s Motion to Modify Physical Custody
Mother also appeals the denial of her motion to modify the 2018 permanent sole
physical custody determination. Unlike legal custody, which the parties agreed to review
in one year, the parties reached a definitive agreement regarding physical custody in 2018.
The district court, therefore, correctly treated physical custody differently than legal
custody, applying section 518.18(d)(iv) to the physical custody is sue in this case and
requiring mother to establish endangerment.
To modify permanent physical custody in the absence of an agreement or evidence
of integration, the district court must determine, among other factors, that “the child[ren]’s
present environment endangers the child[ren]’s physical or emotional health or impairs the
child[ren]’s emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a change of
environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child [ren].” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18(d)(iv). The party requesting modification has the burden to show endangerment,
and failure to do so results in denial of the modification motion. Nice-Petersen v. Nice -
Petersen, 310 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. 1981); Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735
(Minn. 1978); Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007).

19
Endangerment is not precisely defined , and not all evidence of harm establishes
endangerment. See Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting that
a “single incident of borderline abuse” did not establish endangerment) . Rather, the
moving party must present evidence that the conduct of the custodial parent puts the child
at a “significant degree of danger,” and that the child suffers actual adverse effects. In re
Weber, 653 N.W.2d 804, 811 (Minn. App. 2002); Ross v. Ross , 477 N. W.2d 753, 756
(Minn. App. 1991) . The existence of endangerment is a factual determination that this
court reviews for clear error. Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Minn. App. 2000),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).
The district court concluded that the evidence presented did not show that father’s
conduct endangered the children. We defer to the district court’s credibility determination
regarding mother’s testimony. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. The district court found
that mother’s testimony was “riddled with inconsistencies and demonstrated fabrications”
and that she had “engaged in a pattern of deceit and manipulation.” In addition, while the
children have both endured serious health crises, the record contains insufficient evidence
to conclude that father’s conduct puts the children in danger. Thus, the district co urt did
not clearly err in its findings regarding endangerment.
III. Restriction of Mother’s Parenting Time
Mother also challenges the district court’s decision to restrict her parenting time.
Because the 2018 Stipulated Order left open the establishment of a permanent parenting
time schedule, we conclude that the district court failed to conside r the statutory
requirements when it restricted mother’s parenting time.

20
When modifying a previously imposed parenting time schedule, the district court
must make findings to justify reductions that constitute a “restriction” of parenting time:
Mother is correct that findings are required for a restriction of
parenting time. Under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (2008),
a district court “may not restrict parenting time unless it finds
that: (1) parenting time is likely to endanger the child ’s
physical or emotional health or impair the child ’s emotional
development; or (2) the parent has chronically and
unreasonably failed to comply with court-ordered parenting
time.”

Dahl v. Dahl , 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009 ); see also Minn. Stat. § 5 18.175,
subd. 1(b) (2018); Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 218 (Minn. App. 2010) (noting
that “a ‘restriction’ requires a finding of endangerment or noncompliance with court
orders”). While not all reductions in parenting time constitute restrictions, a restriction
“can occur when a change to parenting time is substantial.” Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d
179, 182 n.1 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
In addition, “[i]n the absence of other evidence, t here is a rebuttable presumption
that a parent i s entitled to receive a minimum of 25 percent of the parenting time for the
child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2018). As we have previously stated, “Dahl
directs district courts to demonstrate an awareness and application of the 25% presumption
when the issue is appropriately raised and the court awards less than 25% parenting time.”
Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 217. When the presumption applies, a district court commits
reversible error when it fails to analyze the applicability of the presumption:
Section 518.175, subdivision 1[(g)], is a legislatively imposed
benchmark for parenting time. As such, the provision would
be stripped of its purpose if appellate courts could, after the
fact, calculate parenting time in a light most favorable to the

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decision and supply findings as a basis to conclude that the
presumption, if considered, would have been overcome. See
Moylan v. Moylan , 384 N.W.2d 859, 865 (Minn. 1986)
(stating, in child-support context, that “[w]hile the record may
support a trial court’s decision, it is nevertheless inadequate if
that record fails to reveal that the trial court actually considered
the appropriate factors”). Here, the record does not indicate
the district court considered the 25% presumption. The failure
to consider the issue is error. Therefore, we hold, as this court
did in Dahl, that the district court erred by not considering or
addressing subdivision 1[(g)].

Id. at 218.
The requirements of section 518.175, subdivisions 1(b) and 1(g), apply in this case.
Prior to father’s 2017 motion to modify parenting time, mother exercised the vast majority
(approximately 85%) of parenting time. As a result of father’s emergency motion, the
district court substantially restricted mother’s parenting time on a tempora ry basis,
appointed a guardian ad litem, and ordered the parties to undergo a custody and parenting
time evaluation. The parties’ preliminary agreement in March 2018 included a temporary,
six-month parenting time arrangement , which permitted mother to gra dually increase her
parenting time. The parties then agreed to refer the issue of a permanent parenting time
schedule to a parenting consultant as part of the 2018 Stipulated Order. When mother filed
her 2019 parenting time motion, t he district court had not yet established a pe rmanent
parenting time schedule. In other words, the parties operated under a temporary, pendente
lite parenting time schedule from the district court’s ex parte order on February 13, 2017 ,
through the district court’s parenting time order on November 8, 2019.
As mother’s affidavits and pretrial pleadings make clear, mother first requested that
the district court suspend father’s parenting time. In the alternative, mother requested an

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equal parenting time schedule. And, in an alternative to that position, mother requested at
least 25% parenting time pursuant to the subdivision 1(g). The district court denied each
of these requests and instead, permitted mother to exercise supervised parenting time for
14 hours every two weeks. T his decision represents a substantial reduction of mot her’s
previously ordered parenting time from approximately 85% to less than 1%.
We conclude that this reduction constitutes a restriction under subdivision 1(b) and
falls below the 25% threshold stated in subdivision 1(g). We follow the disposition in Dahl
and Hagen, reverse the decision to restrict mother’s parenting time, and remand the
determination of a permanent parenting time schedule to the district court for further
proceedings. The district co urt may, at its discretion, reopen the record, require new
parenting time evaluations, or impose other requirement s on the parties, if it deems such
actions necessary to fully analyze and apply subdivisions 1(b) and 1(g).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.