State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2022

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Richmel Van Richards,
Appellant.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-8120

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Connolly, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for second -degree assault with a dangerous
weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2019) arguing th at the state failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife appellant used in the assault was used in a manner
calculated to produce death or great bodily harm . Because the record supports the jury’s
verdict, we affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on April 2, 2019, A.J. (victim) left his apartment to
pick up food from his cousin’s ( M.K.) girlfriend ( H.A.) who was parked outside of the
building. M.K. was inside A.J.’s apartment taking a shower. Surveillance footage from a
nearby gas stat ion shows that M.K. and appellant Richmel Van Richards had been in a
physical altercation earlier that night.
H.A. stayed in her vehicle with another witness, A.F., while A.J. picked up the food.
As A.J. turned to go back inside, holding a tray of food, A .J. saw appellant drive up and
park behind H.A.’s car. Appellant then approached A.J. with a knife. Appellant began
asking A.J. “where [M.K.]” was. When A.J. said he did not know, appellant swung the
knife towards him and “slashed” the container of food. After the food fell onto the ground,
appellant swung the knife at A.J. again. This time, appellant made contact with A.J.’s left
knee. Appellant left the scene in his vehicle.
A.J. “felt pain and thought a vein had been cut.” H.A. saw the wound immediately
after the incident and someone called 911. A.J. was eventually taken to the hospital in an

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ambulance, where he received three stitches. He also received crutches that he used for
one month. The paramedic who treated A.J. testified at trial that “[t]here was a cut…about
three to four inches above the knee that was long and wide, cons istent with a puncture
wound.” The paramedic testified that based on seven years of knowledge and training,
A.J.’s wound was “absolutely” consistent with how A.J. said he was injured. He also stated
that “it was through the first layer of skin and into the muscle.”
The police were able to identify appellant’s vehicle using the surveillance footage
from the gas station. Four days after the assault, police stopped appellant’s vehicle and
conducted a search of it. In the vehicle, officers found an 8.5 inch silver KitchenAid knife,
Windex, napkins that smelled like Windex, and a T -shirt that was covered in a substa nce
that appeared to be blood. The evidence was taken to a lab, but the DNA that was recovered
did not match anyone in the sy stem. At trial, in response to a question about whether
Windex could remove DNA, the forensic analyst said “that’s possible.”
Appellant was charged with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon under
Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1. At trial, A.J. “still had pain in his leg and had a scar above
his knee.” A jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense. Appellant challenges his
conviction, arguing that the state fail ed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife
appellant used in the assault was a dangerous weapon.
D E C I S I O N
“When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a

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reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d
257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quot ation and citations omitted). “The evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact -finder
disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. “The verdict will not be
overturned if the fact -finder . . . could reasonably have found the defendant gu ilty of the
charged offense.” Id.
Evidence must be sufficient to prove each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011). The jury found
appellant guilty of second-degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 provides that a
person who “assaults another with a dangerous weapon” is guilty of second-degree assault.
The state was required to prove that appellant (1) committed an assault (2) with a dangerous
weapon.
Appellant concedes that he committed an “assault,” stating in his brief that “A.J.’s
testimony combined with the state’s other evidence . . . is arguably sufficient to prove that
[appellant] ‘stabbed’ A.J., that is, that he used a knife to inflict bodily harm upon A.J. This
constitutes an assault.” We conclude that the assault element of the charge was supported
by sufficient evidence.
What is at issue is the second element. A dangerous weapon is defined as “any
firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon and capable of
producing death or great bodily harm, any combustible or flammable liquid or other device
or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or
likely to produce death or great bodily harm .” Minn. Stat. § 609.02 subd. 6 (2019)

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(emphasis added). To establish that a dangerous weapon was used to assault the victim ,
the state was required to prove th at appellant (1) had a device or instrumentality (2) that
was used in a manner that was calculated or likely to produce death or gre at bodily harm.
We conclude that the state met its burden.
As to “device or instrumentality,” appellant concedes that he “used a knife to inflict
bodily harm upon A.J.” There was conflicting testimony as to the length of the knife. The
victim told police that he was “stabbed with a three -inch knife.” The victim also told
paramedics that it was a “small knife.” However, at trial, the victim described the knife as
being anywhere between six inches and a foot; he also said it wa s “like a saw” and “big.”
A.F., who also saw the knife, testified that the knife was “big.” This court assumes the
jury believed the state’s witnesses. See Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 263 ([i]t must be assumed
that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict).
Appellant also argues that the state failed to establish that the knife found in the
trunk was the knife used in the assault. This argument fails. While DNA evidence would
have been helpful to the state’s case, it was not required to find the appellant guilty of
second-degree assault. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the
inference that the knife obtained from the appellant was the k nife used to stab the victim.
The “instrumentality or device” element is supported by sufficient evidence.
We turn to whether the knife was used in a manner that was calculated or likely to
produce “great bodily harm.” Great bodily harm is defined as “bodily injury which creates
a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which
causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member

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or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2019). The evidence
at trial established that the appellant used the knife in a manner calculated to or likely to
cause the victim great bodily harm under this definition.
The victim testifie d at trial that appellant approached him with a knife; “he was
pointing it straight at my face.” Appellant then “slash[ed] the food out of my hand . . .
[a]nd then when I jumped back, that’s how he just snatched me with the knife.” “Rich
stabbed me with a knife.” The victim made several gestures during trial which are indicated
on the transcript as “slashing” motions.
Appellant argues that this evidence is insufficient because t he knife used was not
designed to be a weapon. An instrument, howeve r, does not need to be designed as a
weapon; it need only be “used in a manner” that is likely to cause bodily harm. “Some
things that are not ordinarily thought of as dangerous weapons become dangerous weapons
if so used.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983). See State v. Weyaus, 836
N.W.2d 579 , 585-86 (Minn. App. 2013) , review denied (a folding chair was used as a
dangerous weapon).
Here, the fact that the knife was not designed as a weapon does not negate the fact
that it was “used in a manner” that was calculated or likely to —and in fact did—produce
great bodily harm . See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6. It is true that not all knives are
dangerous weapons. But here, a ppellant approa ched the victim holding a knife and
proceeded to slash the knife in the direction of the victim two times. Furthermore, the knife
actually caused great bodily harm. The victim suffered an injury that caused him great
pain; he received treatment from the hospital; three sti tches were required; and the victi m

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had to use crutches for a month. T he wound left a visible scar, which was viewed by the
jury. This evidence is sufficient to conclude that the knife, as used by appellant, was a
dangerous weapon.
Appellant argues that the state needed expert medical te stimony to make this
inference: “without more – e.g., medical testimony regarding the depth of the wounds, the
proximity of the wounds to vital organs, and the long-term effects of the wounds – there is
no basis for concluding that [appellant] ‘used’ the object in a manner that was ‘calculated
or likely’ to produce great bodily harm. ” Even if medical testimony was required, the
paramedic who treated the victim did testify. The paramedic testified as to the nature of
the wound and the treatment that was provided.
Appellant cites State v. Galle, an unpublished opinion from this court, to support his
argument that he did not use the knife “in a manner that was ‘calculated or likely’ to
produce great bodily harm.” 2020 WL 1845966, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 13, 2020). First,
unpublished opinions are not precedential. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc. ,
762 N.W.2d 572, 582 n.2 (Minn. 2009) . And, Galle is distinguishable from the present
case. In Galle, the appellant was charged with first-degree assault, and this court held that
the victim’s injuries were not serious enough to constitute “great bodily ha rm” with a
“dangerous weapon.” Id. But here, appellant challenges his conviction for second-degree
assault; he does not argue that the victim was not seriously injured, rather, he insists the
knife he used was not a dangerous weapon.

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Because the jury “could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged
offense” while viewing the evidence in a “light most favorable to the verdict” the “verdict
will not be overturned.” Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 263.
Affirmed.