State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2023

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alize Khudari Perkins,
Appellant.

Filed September 14, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-3108

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentence for first-degree burglary, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downwar d dispositional departure.
He also contends, in a pro se supplemental brief, that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance at sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2019, appellant Alize Khudari Perkins went to his child’s mother ’s
apartment. She refused to allow Perkins into her apartment. Perkins broke down her door,
physically assaulted her, took her phone, and prevented her from leaving the apartment.
Perkins was 22 years old at the time. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Perkins with
first-degree burglary, felony domestic assault, a nd threats of violence. Perkins pleaded
guilty to first-degree burglary in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the other two charges
and agreement not to seek an aggravated sentence. Under the terms of the plea agreement,
Perkins could seek a sentencing departure.
According to the presentence investigation, Perkins has a criminal history that
includes felony convictions for third-degree assault and violation of a domestic -abuse no-
contact order. He was on probation for those felonies when he committed the burglary in
this case. The presentence investigation indicates that Perkins had a difficult childhood
and was exposed to domestic abuse at a young age.
Perkins moved for a downward dispositio nal departure, arguing that he wa s
particularly amenable to probation. He informed the district court that he had been

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accepted at a treatment facility and was scheduled to begin outpatient treatment for his
substance-abuse issues. He also informed the court that he had taken steps to receive
therapy from two other programs. The state opposed the motion.
The district court denied Perkins’s request for a downward dispositional departure,
reasoning:
There are a lot of reasons why I’d rather not send you to prison,
but . . . I can’t find that there are substantial and compelling
reasons for me to deviate from the sentencing guidelines, and
that’s because of the nature of the offense that you committed
when you were placed on probation and the fact that you were
on supervision for that . . . . But supervision was not sufficient
to prevent this crime, and I don’t think that outpatient treatment
or mental health therapy by itself without confinement will be
successful and protect the public and other people from harm.

So—and I looked at this thr ee or four times, as
thoroughly and as seriously as I can, and I think that . . . these
are all the ordinary reasons why I would not want to send
somebody to prison, but they’re just not substantial and
compelling factors or reasons for me to deviate in this case.

The district court sentenced Perkins to serve 67 months in prison, which was at the
low end of the presumptive range under the sentencing guidelines. Perkins appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“The sentences provided in the [ Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines] Grids are
presumed to be appropriate for the crimes to which they apply.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.1 (2018). “[A] sentencing court can exercise its discretion to depart from the
guidelines only if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present, and those
circumstances provide a substantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines

4
sentence.” State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (cita tions and quotations
omitted).
District courts have great discretion in imposing sentences, and this court will
reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 307-08. “[A]s long
as the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented [to it] before making a determ ination,” we will not interfere with the district
court’s decision to impose a presumptive sentence. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255
(Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). Only in a “rare” case will an appellate court
reverse a district court’s refusal to depart. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
When considering a dispositional departure, the district court focuses “more on the
defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him
and for society.” State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). “[A] defendant’s
particular amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting will justify
departure” from a guidelines sentence. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted). The
requirement of particular amenability “ensure[s] that the defendant’s amenability to
probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial
and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id. at 309
(quotation omitted).
Relevant factors for determining whether the defendant is particularly amenable to
probation include the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude
in court, and support of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
But a district court is not required to depart from the presumptive -sentence range even if

5
there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be amenable to probation. State v.
Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. App. 2009).
Perkins contends that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to
consider circumstances demonstrating that he is particularly amenable to probation ,
including his acceptance of responsibility, remorse, cooperation during the prosecution,
acceptance into a treatment program, motivation to change, and commitment to
rehabilitation.
The sentencing -hearing transcript, however, demonstrates that the district court
considered those circumstances . The district court acknowledged th at Perkins was
scheduled to begin treatment, but it also expressed concern that Perkins had committed the
current offense while on probation for another offense. The district court noted that
Perkins’s supervision on probation “was not sufficient to preve nt this crime” and that the
court did not believe that Perkins’s treatment “by itself without confinement [would] be
successful and protect the public and other people from harm.” The district court
recognized that a downward dispositional departure requires particular amenability to
probation and reasoned that although there were “ordinary” reasons for not imposing a
prison sentence, they were not “substantial and compelling.”
In sum, the record reflects that the district court appropriately weighed the relevant
considerations when making its decision and did not abuse its discretion by denying
Perkins’s motion for a downward dispositional departure. This is not a “rare” case in which
we would reverse a district court’s refusal to depart. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.

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In a pro se supplemental brief, Perkins suggests that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at sentencing, noting that his attorney did not inform the district court
that he was willing to complete the Teen Challenge inpatient treatment program. We
analyze a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part test set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984). State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003). To prevail on such a claim,
the defendant must show that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel’s errors.” Id. (quotation omitted). A court need not address both
parts of the test if one is determinative. Id.
For the reasons that follow, Perkins does not satisfy the second part of the Strickland
test. First, the record doe s not indicate that Perkins had been accepted at the Teen
Challenge inpatient treatment program . Second, Perkins’s counsel informed the district
court that he had been accepted at an outpatient treatment facility, that he was scheduled
to begin that progr am, and that he had taken steps to receive therapy from two other
programs. The district court nonetheless refused to depart because it determined that
treatment alone would not be sufficient to protect the public. On this record, Perkins fails
to show that there is a reasonable probability that the district court would have granted his
request for a downward dispositional departure if counsel had mentioned Perkins’s
willingness to pursue inpatient treatment at Teen Challenge.
Affirmed.