State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2026

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Earl Peguse,
Appellant.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-6968

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Tracy M. Smith, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Ramsey County jury found David Earl Peguse gu ilty of second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon. The conviction is based on evidence that Peguse used his vehicle
to chase a man across a grassy area of a city park and either hit the man with his vehicle,
attempt to do so, or cause the man to fear that he would be hit. We conclude that the district
court did not err by denying Peguse’s motion for a new trial, which was based on the state’s
non-disclosure of evidence that Peguse coul d have used to impeach two of the state’s
witnesses. We also conclude that the district court did not err by no t instructing the jury
on Peguse’s defense-of-others defense or by admitting evidence that Peguse has a prior
conviction. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from an altercation between Peguse and a man, W.R., who was
in a relationship with a woman, M.F., with whom Peguse previously had been in a
relationship. According to Peguse’s trial te stimony, he and M.F. were in a relationship
from the summer of 2017 to early 2018. They did not communicate with each other
between March and August of 2018. During that period, Peguse learned that M.F. was
pregnant, and he believed that he was the biological father of the child. In approximately
mid-September 2018, Peguse saw M.F. at Heritage Park in St . Paul, shortly after she had
given birth. Peguse noticed bruises and bite marks on M.F.’s arms, so he offered her a
temporary place to stay, and she accepted the offer. Peguse and M.F. moved some of her
belongings to his home, but she later decided not to stay with Peguse.

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Peguse testified at trial as follows about the in cident for which he was convicted:
On September 23, 2018, he tried to contact M. F. so that he could return some of her
possessions. He dropped off the items at her residence, but she was not there. Peguse
received a text message from M.F. and drove to meet her at Heritage Park. Upon arriving
there at approximately 8:00 p.m., he parked his sport-utility vehicle in a parking lot near a
pavilion. M.F. approached his vehicle with an open can of beer in her hand and sat in the
passenger seat. After a short conversation, M. F. exited Peguse’s vehicle, leaving the can
of beer in Peguse’s cup-holder. Peguse watched M.F. walk toward the pavilion, where she
spoke with a man, later identified as W.R. From his vehicle, Peguse saw an argument and
a physical altercation between M.F. and W.R. Peguse pointed his headlights at the pavilion
and honked his horn, intending to distract W.R. and deter him from attacking M.F. When
W.R. did not stop attacking M.F., Peguse drove his vehicle through the park on a sidewalk
to create a “diversion” that would allow M.F. to “get away” from W.R. and “scare [him]
off.” Peguse testified that, as he was driving away from the pavilion, W.R. ran toward his
truck. According to Peguse, when his vehicle came to a stop, W.R. “flew in front of” it.
Peguse testified that his vehicle did not come into contact with W.R.
At that particular moment, two St. Pa ul police officers—Officer Grundei and
Officer Wild—were traveling in a squad car in the westbound lanes of Phalen Boulevard,
which passes along the southern side of Heritage Park. Office r Wild testified at trial that
he saw a vehicle speed through the park, take a sharp right turn, and hit a person. Officer
Wild lost visual contact with the person wh en the person fell into tall grass. Officer
Grundei testified similarly that he saw a vehicle driving through the park on the grass,

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following closely behind a person who was running. As the officers stopped their squad
car and activated the emergency lights, Officer Grundei saw both the person and the vehicle
turn right, toward the north, a nd saw that the person was thrown forward into tall grass,
“much faster than when he was running,” which caused Officer Grundei to believe that the
vehicle had struck the person. The officers exited their squad car, drew their handguns,
and ordered the driver to exit the vehicle. The driver looked at the officers and drove away,
so the officers returned to their squad car and pursued him.
The incident at the park was recorded by the office rs’ squad car’s dashboard
videocamera. The video-recording, which was introduced into evidence and played for the
jury, shows that a vehicle drove through the park and made a sharp right turn. As it did so,
its headlights illuminated a person who was in front of the vehicle until the person
disappeared from view. The vehicle backed up, the driver looked in the direction of the
dashboard videocamera, and then the vehicle drove away across the park, exited the park,
and drove through a nearby intersection before coming to a stop. Another officer found a
can of beer in Peguse’s vehicle, detected the odor of alcohol on Peguse, and saw that he
had bloodshot eyes. The officers arrested Peguse for driving while impaired and obtained
a search warrant authorizing a blood draw. Peguse refused to submit to the blood draw.
The state charged Peguse w ith second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609. 222, subd. 1 (2018); fleeing a peace officer in a motor
vehicle, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2018); and driving while impaired
(DWI) based on his refusal to submit to chemic al testing, in viol ation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2018).

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The case was tried to a jury on two days in May 2019 . The state called five
witnesses: Officers Grundei and Wild as we ll as Officers Becerra, Mena-Carrion, and
Avent. The state did not call either W.R. or M.F., both of whom were uncooperative,
according to the prosecutor’s op ening statement. Peguse tes tified in his own defense, as
described above, but did not present any other evidence.
The jury found Peguse guilty on all counts. After a post-trial motion for a new trial
(which is discussed below in part I), the district court imposed an executed sentence of 29
months of imprisonment on the conviction of s econd-degree assault, a stayed sentence of
15 months on the conviction of fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle, and a sentence
of 365 days in jail on the DWI conviction. Peguse appeals.
DECISION
I. Motion for New Trial
Peguse first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new trial
based on the state’s non-disclosure of evidence that would have allowed Peguse to impeach
two of the state’s witnesses, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1104
(1963). He seeks a new trial only with respect to his conviction of second-degree assault.
This issue arose after trial and before sentencing when Peguse’s trial attorney saw a
newspaper article reporting that the St. Pa ul Police Department had terminated the
employment of five officers—including Officers Grundei and Wild, who testified for the
state in this case—after an internal inves tigation revealed that they had engaged in
misconduct in a different matter. Peguse promptly moved for a new trial and for post-trial
discovery into the other matter, and the district court allowed Peguse to conduct discovery.

6
After doing so, Peguse supplemented his new-tria l motion with evidence that the internal
investigation led to the conclusion that Offi cer Grundei and Officer Wild “had submitted
multiple untruthful statements to internal affa irs investigators.” He argued that the state
had breached its duty to disclose evidence in this case. He argued further that, if the
evidence had been disclosed be fore trial, he could have impeached the two officers’
testimony about the key facts of this case. The district court denied the motion in a detailed
18-page order.
The supreme court has summarized the applicable law as follows:
In Brady, the United States Suprem e Court held that “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87, 83 S. Ct.
at 1196-97. The Court has subsequently defined three
components necessary for a “true Brady violation.” Strickler
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999).
First, the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory or it is impeaching. Id. Second,
the evidence must have been su ppressed by the state, either
willfully or inadvertently. Id. at 282, 119 S. Ct. at 1948. Third,
prejudice to the accused must have resulted. Id. All three
components must be met in orde r for a Brady violation to be
found. Id.

Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459 (Minn. 2005).
In this case, the district court reasone d that Peguse had established the first and
second requirements of a Brady violation but that he ha d not established the third
requirement. On appeal, the state disagrees with the district court’s analysis with respect
to each of the three requirements. But the st ate’s primary argument for affirmance is that
the district court correctly analyzed the third requirement. Thus, we focus on the question

7
whether Peguse has established the third requirement. Becau se Peguse seeks a new trial
only with respect to his conviction of second-degree assault, we confine our analysis to the
question whether the Brady violation prejudiced his ability to defend against that charge.
To satisfy the third requ irement of the three-part Brady test, “the evidence must be
‘material.’” Id. at 460 (citation omitted). “Evidence is material ‘only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had th e evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding wo uld have been different.’” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667,
682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 ( 1985)). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is one that is ‘sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct.
at 3383). We apply a de novo standard of review to a distri ct court’s determination as to
whether the third requirement of the Brady test is satisfied. Id.
In analyzing the third requirement of the Brady test with respect to the conviction
of second-degree assault, the district court reviewed the testimony of each of the state’s
witnesses as well as Peguse’s testimony. The district court reasoned that the testimony of
Officer Grundei and Officer Wild, that Peguse’s vehicle struck W.R., was “important” but
also was “corroborated to a very significant degree by” the video-recording created by their
squad car’s dashboard videocamera as well as other video evidence of the aftermath of the
incident. The district court reasoned that the video evidence “is quite inconsistent with
Defendant’s testimony that he did not hit [W.R .] and that [W.R.] ‘fl ew in front of my
truck’ . . . and ‘land[ed] on the sidewalk.’”
Our review of the evidence, including the video-recordings that were played for the
jury, confirms the district court’s analysis. The officer’s dashboard videocamera captured

8
Peguse’s vehicle driving at a relatively high speed in an area of the park that is not intended
for vehicles. The video-recording shows that Peguse’s vehicle followed a person who was
on foot before the person disappeared, apparently because he fell in tall grass. That part of
the video-recording gives a view er the clear impression that Peguse used his vehicle to
chase the other person. Another video-reco rding, recorded by Officer Mena-Carrion’s
body-worn camera, shows that W.R. lay on the ground after the incident, apparently unable
to stand up by himself an d obviously in pain. That part of the video-recording gives a
viewer the impression that Peguse’s vehicle actually struck and injured W.R.
Peguse attempts to persuade us that the officers’ testimony was more important than
the video evidence because the prosecutor em phasized the officers’ testimony in closing
argument. But the prosecutor actually described the video evidence first, before describing
the officers’ testimony. It appears from the transcript that the prosecutor played the video
for the jury three times during his closing argument. Contrary to Peguse’s contention, the
state relied primarily on the video evidence during closing arguments.
Peguse asserts that the officers’ testimony was critical because they testified that
Peguse’s vehicle actually struck W.R. while the video evidence is inconclusive on that
point. It is true that the video evidence doe s not clearly show contact between Peguse’s
vehicle and W.R. But Peguse’s conviction do es not depend on evidence that his vehicle
actually collided with W.R.’s body. A person may commit an assault in any of several
ways: by inflicting bodily harm on another person, by attempting to do so, or by intending
“to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 10 (1) (2018). The district court instructed the jury on all of these alternative means

9
of committing an assault. And in closing argument, the prosecutor specifically mentioned
the alternatives, stating: “[H]e doesn’t even have to have contact. He doesn’t even need
to make contact with [W.R.] fo r it to be an assault because even the attempt is enough.
Even the intent to cause fear is sufficient.”
The Brady caselaw concerning the materiality of undisc losed evidence favors
evidence that tends to show that the defendant did not commit a crime and disfavors
evidence that is merely impeaching. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 291, 119 S. Ct. at 1952-
53. Our supreme court has summarized this principle by stating as follows:
Nondisclosure of evidence that is merely impeaching may not
typically result in the kind of prejudice necessary to warrant a
new trial. For example, where testimony of the witness sought
to be impeached by nondiscl osed evidence was not the only
damning evidence against defendant, we have determined that
the likelihood of prejudice is decreased.

State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 30 0-01 (Minn. 2000) (q uotations omitted). In this case,
the undisclosed evidence is me rely impeaching and is “not the only damning evidence
against” Peguse. See id. It was quite a coincidence that Officer Grundei and Officer Wild
were driving past the relevant part of Heritage Park at the precise moment that the incident
occurred, and it is fortuitous for the state that the officers’ dashboard videocamera captured
Peguse’s conduct in significant, if not perfe ct, detail. Peguse’s own testimony confirms
much of the video evidence. The jury likely relied on the video evidence to determine that
Peguse assaulted W.R., which was a relatively ea sy inference in light of all the evidence.
Consequently, there is not “‘a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

10
to the defense, the result of the pro ceeding would have be en different.’” See Pederson,
692 N.W.2d at 460 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383).
Thus, the district court correctly determin ed that Peguse did not establish the third
requirement of the Brady test. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying Peguse’s
motion for a new trial.
We note that Peguse also argues that this court should reverse all of his convictions
and remand for a new trial “in the interests of justice.” He relies primarily on caselaw
concerning the supreme court’s supervis ory authority over the state courts. See State v.
Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn. 1992); State v. Schwantes , 314 N.W.2d 243, 245
(Minn. 1982); State v. Zeimet, 310 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1981). But this court may not
exercise that type of authority. See, e.g., State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 n.6 (Minn.
2006); State v. Stewart, 923 N.W.2d 668, 677 n.8 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 16, 2019); State v. Gilmartin, 535 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 20, 1995). In the alternative, Peguse suggests that this court should grant him
a new trial based on a rule of criminal proce dure that authorizes such relief in “[t]he
interests of justice,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04, subd. 1(1), or based on a rule of appellate
procedure that authorizes appellate relief “as the interest of justice may require,” Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 103.04 (first pa ragraph). We decline Peguse’ s request for relief on those
general grounds because we have concluded that he is not entitled to a new trial based on
the more-specific criteria of the well-developed Brady caselaw.

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II. Defense-of-Others Defense
Peguse next argues that the district court erred by not giving the jury an instruction
on the law of defense-of-others. In conjunc tion with that argument, he argues that the
district court erred by not allowing him to introduce the testimony of a police officer who,
one week before the incident at Heritage Park, had responded to a report of domestic abuse
by W.R. against M.F., which, Peguse asserts, would have helped him prove the defense of
defense-of-others.
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case “if there is evidence
to support it.” State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 578 (Minn. 1977). The defendant has the
burden of producing evidence to support a claim of defense-of-others. See State v. Basting,
572 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. 1997); State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006).
The elements of the defense of defense-of-others are
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that [another
person] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the absence of
a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger.

See Basting, 572 N.W.2d at 285; see also State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn.
2017); State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014 ). If a defendant has produced
evidence to support a defense, “the State bears the burden to disprove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, one or more of the . . . elements” of the defense. Devens, 852 N.W.2d at 258.
This issue arose at the pre-trial conference, when Peguse gave notice of his intent to
call Officer Obrestad. According to Peguse’s proffer, the officer would have testified that,
on a prior occasion, W.R. injured M.F. in a domestic dispute but M.F. resisted the officer’s

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attempt to take photographs of the injuries. The district court reserved ruling on the
admissibility of the officer’s testimony. Peguse raised the issue again during the defense
case. The district court ruled that it would no t instruct the jury on the law of defense-of-
others because there was insuffi cient evidence to support the instruction in light of the
evidence that M.F. was not in danger because she was quite distant from W.R. when Peguse
drove his vehicle at W.R. The district court also ruled that it would not admit the testimony
of Officer Obrestad because it would be irrele vant in light of the fact that she was not
present for any of the incident at Heritage Park.
Peguse contends that the district court erred by weighing Peguse’s evidence relevant
to the defense rather than view ing the evidence in the light most favorable to him. The
question is whether a reasonable juror could find that the evidence satisfies the elements of
the defense. See State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 257-58 (Minn. 1990). Peguse’s testimony
might have supported a defense-of-others inst ruction if he had assaulted W.R. near the
pavilion while M.F. was still in danger. But according to his testimony, he effectively
broke up that altercation. The question is whether Peguse was justified in assaulting W.R.
at a later moment in time in a different place. On that point, his testimony does not allow
a reasonable jury to find that the third or fourth elements were satisfied when he drove his
vehicle at W.R. The evidence shows that Peguse did not have a reasonable belief that M.F.
was “in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm” at the relevant time. See Devens,
852 N.W.2d at 258. Similarly, the evidence does not show that there was an “absence of a
reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid danger” in light of the evidence that Peguse was
in a vehicle and W.R. was on foot. See id.

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Peguse contends that the district cour t erred by excluding the testimony of Officer
Obrestad. Given the district court’s reasons for not giving a defense-of-others instruction
to the jury, there was no other reason for Officer Obrestad’s testimony. Peguse contends
that the officer’s testimony would have helped him develop his defense-of-others defense
by corroborating his testimony that he believed that M.F. previously had been injured in a
quarrel with W.R. The officer’s testimony mi ght have corroborated Peguse’s testimony
about his general concern for M.F.’s safety. But Officer Obrestad’s testimony could not
have filled the gaps in the ev idence with respect to the third and fourth elements of the
defense. See id. Because Officer Obrestad had no apparent knowledge of the Heritage
Park incident, the district court did not a buse its discretion by ruling that her testimony
would be irrelevant. See Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403.
Thus, the district court did not err by not instructing the jury on the law of defense-
of-others or by excluding the testimony of Officer Obrestad.
III. Evidence of Prior Conviction
Peguse next argues that the district c ourt erred by overruling his objection to the
state’s evidence that he has a prior conviction of violating an order for protection.
This issue arose during Peguse’s trial te stimony. On direct examination, Peguse
testified that, because of his job, he had been “certified by the Department of Human
Services [with] random background checks [and] fingerprints through the BCA.” He also
testified that “there is no excuse for” a ma n to hit a woman and that “[y]ou don’t hit a
woman, and especially one that just had a baby two weeks ago.” When cross-examining
Peguse, the state requested permission to elicit testimony from Peguse that he had pleaded

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guilty to violating an order for protection for which the protected person apparently was a
woman. The state argued that Peguse had “opened the door” to the issue by expressing his
“disgust and horror” about W.R.’s alleged phys ical abuse of M.F. The district court
granted the request. The prosecutor asked Pegus e to admit that he had pleaded guilty in
2017 to violating an order for protection, and Peguse answered in the affirmative.
Evidence that ordinarily is inadmissible may nonetheless be admitted if the other
party has “opened the door” to it. State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425, 436 (Minn. 2006).
“Opening the door occurs when one party by introducing certain material creates in the
opponent a right to respond with material th at would otherwise have been inadmissible.”
Id. (quotations omitted). The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that one party does “not
have an unfair advantage” in their ability to offer testimony on a particular subject without
providing the other party opportunity to refute or respond to the testimony. Id. (quotation
omitted). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s
ruling to admit evidence under the opening-the-door doctrine. Id. at 434.
Peguse contends that the district court misapplied the opening-the-door doctrine.
First, he asserts that the district court sust ained an objection to his testimony about his
certification by the department of human serv ices. That much is true, but there was no
motion to strike Peguse’s testimony from the record, so it remained before the jury. Peguse
also asserts that it was not unfair or misleading for him to testify as he did. The district
court reasoned that Peguse’s testimony left “t he impression . . . that he has got a clean
record” and “that he certainly abhors any kind of viol ence towards women.” The
connection between Peguse’s testimony on dir ect examination and on cross-examination

15
was not extremely close. None theless, the district court di d not abuse its discretion by
determining that, given the cont ext, Peguse might gain “an unfa ir advantage” if he were
allowed to give the jury the impression, without any challenge , that he always has been
law-abiding and that he is above repr oach in his conduct toward women. See Valtierra,
718 N.W.2d at 436.
Thus, the district court did not err by overruling Peguse’s objection to the evidence
that he has a prior conviction of violating an order for protection.
IV. Cumulative Error
Peguse last argues, in the alternative, that even if none of the issues discussed above
independently requires a new trial, the cumula tive effect of the district court’s multiple
alleged errors requires a new trial. “Cumulative error exists when the cumulative effect of
the errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales,
operate to the defendant’s prejudi ce by producing a biased jury.” State v. Penkaty ,
708 N.W.2d 185, 200 (Minn. 20 06) (quotation omitted). In ot her words, if an appellant
establishes that a district court committed tw o or more procedural errors, none of which
individually requires a new trial, the appe llant nonetheless may be entitled to a new trial
“if the errors, when taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying appellant a fair trial.”
State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 698 (Minn. 2006 ) (quotation omitted). We have
concluded, however, that the district court did not commit any error, let alone multiple
errors. Thus, the cumulative-error doctrine does not apply.
Affirmed.