State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2027

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brandon Michael Kramer,
Appellant.

Filed January 4, 2021
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CR-17-734

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stephen F. O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorn ey, Erin L. Kueste r, Assistant County
Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Ju dge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgm ents of conviction for eight counts of
possessing pornographic work involving minors, appellant argues that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress eviden ce obtained after executing an amended

2
search warrant for his apartmen t. First, appellant argues that officers acted outside the
scope of the original search warrant for a single-family home when they entered his
apartment on the lower level. Second, appellant argues that the amended search warrant
for his apartment impermissibly relied on info rmation from the initial warrantless entry.
We assume, without deciding, that officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering
appellant’s apartment. Applyi ng the independent-source doctrin e, we determine that the
affidavit supporting the amended warrant, redacted of tainte d information, independently
provided probable cause for the search of appe llant’s apartment. Thus, we affirm without
considering the parties’ alternative arguments.
FACTS
The following summarizes the evidence an d testimony received at the contested
omnibus hearing.
In early 2017, the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) conducted a statewide
investigation into child porno graphy. A Goodhue C ounty Sheriff’s Office investigator
testified that the BCA informed him about child pornography linked to an IP address at a
Pine Island home. Specifically, the BCA informed the investigator that they had recovered
eight images of child pornography from file-s haring technology that allowed the BCA to
download the images directly from this particular IP address.
The investigator searched the property and tax records for the home and found it
was “a single-family dwelling” owned by C.C. and his spouse. The investigator surveilled
the home and, on March 14, 2017, saw a vehicle registered to appellant Brandon Michael
Kramer parked outside the house. The inves tigator testified that he “ran [Kramer’s]

3
plate . . . ran his driver’s license, and saw his picture.” The investigator agreed that he knew
only that Kramer’s vehicle was parked outside the residence.
The investigator applied for and obtained a search warrant that identified “the
premises to be searched” as “the residence” of C.C. and his spouse, and stated the home’s
street address in Pine Island. A copy of the warrant and affidavit was received into
evidence. The investigator an d other officers executed the warrant on March 15, 2017.
Kramer answered the door and officers detained him outside the home.
The investigator explained that, while executing the search warrant, the officers first
“cleared the house” for safety reasons. This entailed entering the home, walking through,
finding anyone inside, and temporarily detain ing them outside while they searched the
home. Officers cleared the upper level and deta ined C.C. At about the same time, other
officers, including the investigator, cleared the lower level.
The investigator testified that he walked down a short fli ght of stairs to reach the
lower level. The hallway led to a “wide open” door. As soon as the i nvestigator walked
through the doorway of the apartment, he “b ecame immediately aware” it was a separate
apartment. The investigator agreed that, at the same time, he said, “[w]e got to get a warrant
for this.” The investigator continued to walk into the apartment to clear it. The investigator
testified that “when [he] walked into that room, [he] saw a computer to [his] left side, which
had child pornography playing on it . . . .”
The investigator testified that he spoke with C.C., learned Kramer paid rent, and
then applied for and obtained an amended wa rrant to search Kramer’s apartment. The

4
amended warrant and affidavit was received into evidence and was similar to the original
warrant. Like the original warrant, the ame nded warrant identified the “premises to be
searched” as “the residence” of C.C. and his spouse, and stated the home’s street address
in Pine Island. But the amended warrant adde d: “including the areas of the residence
occupied” by Kramer. In the affidavit attached to the amended warrant, the investigator
stated that he entered the ap artment on the lower level a nd, “inside the bedroom,” he
“observed a computer screen projecting images of pre-pubertal females, ages 3 to 6 years
of age, running around.” The investigator le arned the naked images were on a “live feed
directly into the residence.”
C.C., the homeowner, testified that he, his spouse, and thei r children live on the
upper level of a split-level home. C.C. also agreed that the home appears from the outside
to be a single-family residence. The lower level has a “mother-in-law” apartment that has
a door with a lock; the lower level also has storage rooms, a utility room, and a shared
laundry room. C.C. testified that Kramer lived on the lower level. Kramer is C.C.’s first
cousin and their living arrangement was informal—Kramer never signed a lease and paid
C.C. $350 a month as rent “under the table” as well as some utilities. C.C. testified that
they had one internet account for the entire home and wireless access throughout the home.
After testimony ended, Kramer argued that the evidence obtained with the amended
warrant was tainted because the investigator’s initial entry of his apartment was outside the
scope of the original warrant and he used information discov ered in the illegal entry to
secure the amended warrant. In a memorandum opposing the motion to suppress, the state

5
contended that the investigator acted within the scope of th e initial warrant because he
reasonably believed the home was a single-family residence, the information in the initial
search-warrant application provided probable cause to search the entire residence, and “the
search of the space occupied by the defendant did not occur until the second search warrant
was signed by a District Court Judge.”
In a written decision, the district court ma de key factual findings before its legal
determinations. The district court found that, “from the outside,” the home “appears to be
a single family residence” and no “clear i ndicators” suggested that the home was a
multiple-occupancy residence. The district court also found that when the investigator “got
to the bottom of the basement steps, he sa w the door to the rental area. He could tell
immediately that this was a separate unit. Because the door to this unit was wide open, he
proceeded into the apartment because he was ‘still fo cused on safety.’” According to the
district court’s findings, “after the entire house was cleared, [the investigator] was told by
the owners that [Kramer] was the occupant of the basement apartment. He then applied for
and obtained an amended search warrant.” The district court also found that the “search of
the area occupied by [Kramer] did not take place until after the amended search warrant
was obtained.”
Addressing Kramer’s arguments, the district court determined that the original and
amended affidavits “had more than sufficient probable cause” to support the warrants. The
district court found the initial entry of the apartment “was done for safety reasons and did
not violate [Kramer’s] constitutional rights.” Once the investigator entered the apartment,

6
the district court determined that “there was plain view of child pornography displayed on
the computer screen.” Finally, the district court determined that, “in the exercise of caution,
[the investigator] obtained an amended sear ch warrant,” therefore “the officers acted
reasonably by applying for a second search warrant after learning while executing the
search warrant that the home contained a mo ther-in-law apartment where [Kramer] was
living.” The district court denied Kramer’s motion to suppress.
After a five-day trial, the jury found Kr amer guilty of eight counts of possessing
pornographic work involving minors in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4 (2018).
The district court sentenced Kramer to 54 months in prison. Kramer appeals.
DECISION
Kramer argues the officers exceeded the scope of the original search warrant when
they entered his basement apartment, and then relied on the fruits of that warrantless search
to obtain an amended warrant authorizing a search of Kramer’s apartment. Kramer
contends the initial illegal entry requires exclusion of all evidence obtained while executing
the amended search warrant. Kramer also argues that the independent-source doctrine does
not save the evidence because the original warrant did not provide a nexus between the
criminal activity and the place to be searched.
The state responds that the officers did not exceed the scope of the original search
warrant because the warrant identified the Pi ne Island home, polic e entered Kramer’s
apartment only to “clear” it before executing the valid original search warrant, found child

7
pornography in plain view, a nd acted reasonably when they secured an amended warrant
before searching Kramer’s apartment.1
When reviewing a district court’s pret rial order denying a motion to suppress
evidence, “we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard
and the district court’s lega l determinations de novo.” State v. Jordan , 742 N.W.2d 149,
152 (Minn. 2007). Appellate courts independently review facts that are not in dispute, and
determine, “as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” State v. Gauster,
752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Othoudt , 482 N.W.2d 218, 221
(Minn. 1992)).
Generally, evidence obtained as the direct or indirect result of an unlawful search
under the Fourth Amendment must be suppre ssed and may not be introduced at trial.
Murray v. United States , 487 U.S. 533, 536-37, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2533 (1988). The
independent-source doctrine, however, permit s “evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
that is genuinely independent of a prior unla wful search and would have been obtained
‘even if what actually happ ened had not occurred.’” State v. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51, 55
(Minn. App. 1996) (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 542 n.3, 108 S. Ct. at 2536 n.3). “The
ultimate question, therefore, is whether the search pursuan t to warrant was in fact a

1 The state did not adequately brief the independent-source doctrine. Still, “it is the
responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that
responsibility is not to be dilu ted by counsel’s oversights, la ck of research, failure to
specify issues or to cite relevant authorities.” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673
n.7 (Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted).

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genuinely independent source of the informa tion and tangible evidence at issue . . . .”
Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S. Ct. at 2536.
The independent-source doctrine requires a two-step analysis. Id.; State v. Lozar ,
458 N.W.2d 434, 439-40 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990). The
“court must determine (1) whether the decision of the issuing magistrate was ‘affected’ by
the tainted information, and (2) whether th at information prompted law enforcement
officials to seek the warrant.” Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d at 55.
2
The first step requires us to determine whether the amended warrant application,
redacted of tainted informatio n, established probable cause. Id. Probable cause
determinations involve “a practical, comm on-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

2 Kramer contends that this court has esta blished two separate standards by which to
measure the first Murray prong: an “effect on the magistrate test” and a “sanitized
affidavit” test. We disagree because Lieberg connected the two tests.

[T]he trial court must determine (1) whether the decision of the
issuing magistrate was “affected” by the tainted information,
and (2) whether that informa tion prompted law enforcement
officials to seek the warrant. In performing this two-step
analysis, the trial court may answer the first question by
determining whether a sanitized affidavit would establish
probable cause, but must conduct a factual inquiry into whether
the unlawful search prompted the authorities to seek a warrant.

553 N.W.2d at 55. The “san itized affidavit” test determined whether the tainted
information affected the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant, and whether probable
cause to issue the warrant existed without the tainted information. The “ultimate question”
is the same: “whether the sear ch pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent
source of the information and tangible evidence at issue.” See Murray, 487 U.S. at 542,
108 S. Ct. at 2536.

9
will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2332 (1983). The Minnesota Supreme Court explained that probable cause requires “a
direct connection, or nexus, between the a lleged crime and the particular place to be
searched.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). “An appellate court reviews
a district court’s decision to issue a warrant only to consider whether the issuing judge had
a substantial basis for concludi ng that probable cause existed.” State v. McClain ,
862 N.W.2d 717, 727 (Minn. App. 2015) (quoting State v. Rochefort , 631 N.W.2d 802,
804 (Minn. 2001)).
Here, the district court found the original warrant “provided mo re than sufficient
probable cause,” and Kramer did not challenge the original warrant. The district court also
found that the “amended warrant described the rented area and added it to the search area.
The affidavit described the circumstances of discovering that the house contained a
separate rented area. The affidavit provided more than sufficient probable cause for the
Judge to sign the amended search warrant.” (Emphasis added.)
Two cases instruct our analysis. In Lozar, an informant told police that the
defendant’s greenhouse contained growing mar ijuana plants. 458 N.W.2d at 437. Police
used details from the informant to find the greenhouse in a rural location, opened the
greenhouse door without a warrant, and saw marijuana plants inside. Id. Police then
obtained a search warrant that relied in part on the officers’ observations. Id. The state did
not dispute that the officers’ first entr y of the greenhouse was an unlawful search. Id. at
438. But this court determined that the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress

10
because the search-warrant affidavit, “redacted of the tainted information, independently
provides probable cause for the warrant’s issuance” because the affidavit summarized the
details provided by the informant. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
In State v. Hodges, the defendant concealed stolen vehicles in a warehouse that he
rented from a third party. 287 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Minn. 1979). The third party saw the
stolen vehicles and informed police. Id. at 415. Police entered the warehouse without a
warrant using the third party’s key. Id. Police later obtained a search warrant for the
warehouse based in part on their observations during the warrantless entry. Id. The supreme
court first determined that th e warrantless entry of the wa rehouse violated the Fourth
Amendment because the thir d party’s consent was insufficient to legally enter. Id. at
415-16. Even so, the supreme court held that the district court correctly denied suppression
of the evidence because the information provided by the third party and recited in the
affidavit, “by itself and without the information the police had obtaine d pursuant to the
warrantless entry, would have justified the issuance of the warrant.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the amended affidavit included the investigator’s observations from inside
Kramer’s apartment of “a computer screen projecting images of pre-pubertal females, ages
3 to 6 years of age, running around.” But that was only one paragraph in an 18-page warrant
and is easily redacted. The sa nitized, amended affidavit detailed the BCA’s investigation
and its confirmation that officers downloaded child pornography fro m the particular IP
address located at C.C.’s Pine Island home, and explained the need to seize every electronic
device connected with this IP address.

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More specifically, without the tainted information, the amended affidavit provided
probable cause because it included the following information: (1) the BCA’s findings that
“a device at [the home’s] IP address . . . was discovered to be sharing torrents3 containing
files of images believed to be ch ild pornography” through BitTorrent; 4 (2) “using a
computer running investigative BitTorrent software, a direct connection was made to the
device at [the home’s IP address]”; (3) the BCA downloaded three “file(s) that the device
at [the home’s IP address] was making availa ble” through BitTorrent; (4) that those files
“contain[ed] videos that depict minor children engaging in sexual acts”; (5) “that searches
and seizures of evidence from computers and other internet access devices . . . require
agents to seize most or all electronic items [using the IP address] . . . to be processed later
by a qualified digital evidence expert in a c ontrolled environment”; (6) “electronic data
contained on cell phones or other portable electronic devices are easily transferred to other
electronic mediums such as computers, flash drives, removable storage devices, and other
devices”; (7) “collectors of child pornography often maintain their collections, in a digital
or electronic format, in a safe, secure, and private environment”; (8) child pornography
collectors “often maintain [their collections] for many years”; (9) “[c]ollectors frequently

3 As described in the warrant affidavit, “[a] torrent file is a small file that contains
information about the file(s) and provides a method for a user to download the file(s)
referenced in the torrent fro m other BitTorrent users.” Put simply, a “torrent” is an
electronic file that contains information about other files and how to access them.

4 As stated in the warrant affidavit, BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing platform
that “allows people using P2P software to download and share files with other P2P users
using the same or compatible P2P software.”

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keep their collection close by”; (10) collectors share collections with other “similar minded
individuals” as “part of the validation process that their behavior is normal.”
Without the tainted information obtained by the first entr y of Kramer’s apartment,
the amended affidavit provided more than a “fair probability” that evidence of digital child
pornography on an electronic device may be found anywhere in C. C.’s home, including
the area rented by Kramer. See Gates , 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. Thus, the
sanitized affidavit provided a nexus between Kramer’s apartment and the criminal activity.
See Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 747. We c onclude that the tainted information in the amended
affidavit did not affect the judge’s decision to issue the amended warrant.
Next, we consider the second step of th e independent-source doctrine: whether the
tainted information prompted the officers to se ek a warrant for Kramer’s apartment. This
is a factual determination for the district court. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d at 58. Kramer’s brief
to this court does not challenge the applicati on of the doctrine under the second step. The
district court determined that “as soon as th e investigator discovered the existence of a
mother-in-law apartment within the residen ce . . . he stopped and applied for a second
search warrant with the updated information. ” The record supports the district court’s
finding because the investigator testified th at, upon noticing the sepa rate apartment, he
stated, “[w]e got to get a warrant for this.”
The amended search warrant, redacted of tainted information, also supports the
district court’s determination that officers planned to search the entire residence, including
the mother-in-law apartment once they found it on the lower level. As discussed above, the
sanitized affidavit established that all electronic devices connected to the IP address must

13
be seized for forensic analysis. Thus, the tainted information did not prompt the officers to
obtain a warrant for Kramer’s apartment; po lice obtained the amended search warrant
based on the investigator’s discovery of the apartment and the information in the original
affidavit.
We also conclude that applying the excl usionary rule here would put police and
society in a worse position than if no warrantless entry had occurred. Murray provides
instructive reasoning:
Knowledge that [child pornography] was in the [apartment]
was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it
was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant,
and if that later acquisition was not the result of the [unlawful]
earlier entry there is no reason why the independent source
doctrine should not apply. Invoking the exclusionary rule
would put the police (and society) not in the same position they
would have occupied if no violation occurred, but in a worse
one.

See Murray, 487 U.S. at 541, 108 S. Ct. at 2535. Because the amended affidavit, minus the
tainted evidence, provided pr obable cause to search Krame r’s apartment, there was an
independent source to justify the search.
5
Even if we assume that the amended a ffidavit used to obtain the amended search
warrant included tainted information, the tain ted information did not affect the judge’s

5 We rest our decision on a different rationale th an that of the district court. The district
court concluded probable caus e existed for both warrants, relied alternatively on the
plain-view doctrine, and determined the office rs acted reasonably within the scope of the
original warrant. Our decision rests on the i ndependent-source doctrine because it is an
alternative ground supported by the facts in the record, addressed by parties’ legally
supported arguments, and which does not require this court to expand any relief. See State
v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003).

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decision to issue the amended warrant, nor di d it prompt police to apply for the amended
search warrant. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Kramer’s motion to suppress
the evidence, and we do not reach or decide the alternative arguments raised by the parties.
Affirmed.