State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2028

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Joel Case,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-16-4021

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Tom Kelly, Wright County Attorney, Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order revoking his probation and executing
his sentence. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding that
the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. We affirm.

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FACTS
In August 2016, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Christopher Case
with three counts of first-degree crimin al sexual conduct (CSC), three counts of
second-degree CSC, and two counts of fourth-degree CSC. The charges related to conduct
involving his stepdaughter. Case subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree
CSC and the remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement with the state.
Consistent with the agreement, the dist rict court sentenced Case to 144 months’
imprisonment with ten years of conditional re lease, stayed execution of the sentence,
placed him on probation for a period of 30 years, and imposed a year of local confinement.
As conditions of probation, the district court ordered that Case successfully
complete sex-offender treatm ent, attend individual thera py as directed, complete a
chemical-dependency evaluation, and follow the recommendations of the evaluation. Case
was also prohibited from (1) possessing porno graphy; (2) possessing devices capable of
accessing the internet unless the device was approved by probation; (3) using
mood-altering chemicals, including alcohol; and (4) having any contact with the victim and
having any unsupervised contact with any females under the age of 18.
Case had a number of probation violations before the district court ultimately
revoked his probation in September 2019. In May 2018, Case’s probation officer filed a
probation-violation report alleging that Case violated the terms of his probation by using
methamphetamine and by being terminated fro m sex-offender treatment due to rule
violations, including drug use. Case admitted to both of the alleged violations. For these

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violations, the district court continued Case on probation but required him to spend 30 days
in local confinement.
In January 2019, Case’s probation officer filed another probatio n-violation report
alleging that Case violated the terms of his probation by using methamphetamine and
failing to complete his outpatie nt chemical-dependency treatment program. Case again
admitted the violations. The district court continued Case on probation and ordered him to
spend 21 days in local confin ement. Three months later, Ca se’s probation officer filed a
third probation-violation report. This repor t alleged that Case had left an inpatient
chemical-dependency treatment program with out completing it. An addendum to the
probation-violation report was later filed alle ging that Case had used methamphetamine.
Case admitted the violations, and the district court once again continued Case on probation.
The district court also ordered Case to serve 60 days in local confinement.
A fourth probation-violation report was filed in August 2019. This report alleged
that Case had used methamphetamine, possessed undisclosed smart phones, and possessed
and viewed pornography. At a probation-violation hearing, Case admitted the violations.
The state then sought execution of Case’s stayed prison sentence. In response, Case argued
for “one more opportunity to be on probation,” and requested that he be allowed to enter
concurrent residential chemical-dependenc y treatment and outpatient sex-offender
treatment.
The district court granted the state’ s request, revoked Case’s probation, and
executed his sentence. The district court foun d that Case violated the conditions of his
probation and that the violations were knowing, willful, and inexcusable. The district court

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also found that the need fo r confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation,
emphasizing that Case had been given numer ous opportunities to address both his sexual
conduct and his chemical dependency issues through treatment.
This appeal follows.1
D E C I S I O N
Case argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his stay of
execution because the record does not support the district court’s finding that the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. We disagree.
“A district court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence
to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.”
State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). A district court
“abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, w ithout justification, or in contravention of
the law.” State v. Mix , 646 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 20, 2002).
If an offender with a stay of execution adm its a probation violation, a district court
may either continue the offender on prob ation or revoke probation and execute the
sentence. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(2)(b)(iv)-(v). Before a district court revokes
an individual’s probation, it must make thre e specific findings: (1) that the probationer
violated a specific condition of his or her probation; (2) that the violation was intentional

1 The state did not file a brief, and this court ordered the appeal to proceed under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that if a resp ondent fails to file a brief, the case shall be
determined on the merits).

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or inexcusable; and (3) that the need fo r confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation. State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). These findings are
commonly known as the Austin factors. In making these fi ndings, “courts must seek to
convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” Modtland,
695 N.W.2d at 608. Fundamentally, a district court’s decision to revoke probation “cannot
be a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing
that the offender’s behavior demonstrates th at he or she cannot be counted on to avoid
antisocial activity.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court c onsidered each of the three Austin factors. Case challenges
only the district court’s finding on the third Austin factor—that the need for his
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. When assessing this third factor,
a district court should balance whether: (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public
from further criminal activity by the offender”; (2) “the offender is in need of correctional
treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined”; or (3) “it would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the viola tion if probation were not revoked.” Modtland,
695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). A district court is not required to find that all three
considerations weigh in favor of confinement in order for the third Austin factor to be met.
See Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Min n. 2008) (stating that “we
normally interpret the conjunction ‘or’ as disjunctive rather than conjunctive”).

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In assessing the third Austin factor, the district court found that the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation 2 because Case had been given
“numerous opportunities to address both [his] criminal-sexual-conduct behavior and [his]
chemical-dependency issues,” and because he is in need of treatment that can be provided
most effectively during confinement. The district court also found that “it would depreciate
the seriousness of the violation on this fourth violation if I were not to revoke your
probation given the fact that you were give n a significant downward departure in the
beginning.”
Case argues that the district c ourt’s findings regarding the third Austin factor are not
supported by the record. Specifically, he conte nds that the district court failed to give
sufficient weight to his proposed treatment opportunity, which “w ould allow him to
simultaneously take part in chemical-depe ndency and sex-offender treatment programs,
when during prior attempts he’d had to a ttempt to tackle one a time.” We are not
persuaded.
The record reflects that the district cour t specifically considered Case’s proposed
treatment request. The district court fo und that Case had be en given numerous
opportunities, but failed to take advantage of the treatment opportunities and services that
were provided to him. The district court then declined Case’s request to participate in a
concurrent treatment opportunity, finding that “I don’t think [y our treatment failures are]

2 The district court actually found that “the need for confinement is outweighed by policies
favoring probation.” But the district court appears to have misspoken because the court’s
findings on the record as to this factor demonstrate otherwise, as does its decision to revoke
Case’s probation.

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because you haven’t found the right treatment that’s a good fit for you, I think it’s because
you are choosing not to take advantage of those serv ices when they’re offered to you.”
(Emphasis added.)
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. The re cord reflects that
this was Case’s fourth probation violation. Each of Case’s first three violations involved
his failure to complete chemical-dependency or sex-offender treatment. And all of Case’s
four probation violations involved his continued use of methamphetamine. Case has been
offered treatment on multiple occasions but has failed to take advantage of these
opportunities or to show a commitment to rehabilitation. Th erefore, it was not
unreasonable for the district court to conclude that Case had failed at treatment outside of
confinement. Further, the district court was not required to provide Case with another
opportunity to seek outpatient treatmen t before revoking his probation. See
State v. Osborne, 732 N.W.2d 249, 252, 255-56 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant’s probation without giving the
defendant an opportunity to seek additional probationary resources, including inpatient
treatment). Accordingly, it was within the district court’s discretion to have rejected Case’s
request to participate in his proposed new treatment opportunity.
Moreover, in addition to Ca se’s treatment failures and continued use of controlled
substances, the record reflects that Case possessed unauthorized electronic devices and
possessed pornography. Given that Case plead ed guilty to criminal sexual conduct, the
record supports the district court’s determin ation that the seriousness of Case’s probation
violations would be denigrated if probation were not revoked.

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The district court has broad discretion in weighing the need for confinement against
the policies favoring probation, and the court revoked Case’s probation as a last resort. The
record supports the district court’s determination that the need for confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by revoking Case’s probation and executing his sentence.
Affirmed.