State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2032

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Meade Terrell Stademeyer,
Appellant.

Filed November 2, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-5952

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramse y County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief App ellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
In this direct appeal from judgments of conviction for fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct and threats of violence, appellant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea to the threats-
of-violence offense , arguing that it lacked an adequate factual basis and was therefore
invalid. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 2019, the state charged appellant Meade Terrell Stademeyer by amended
complaint with one count each of first-, second-, third-, attempted third-, and fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct, as well as three counts of threats of violence.
According to the complaint, Stademeyer attended a party at an apartment in August
2018 with his girlfriend, F.F.P. After the party ended, Stademeyer, F.F.P., and two other
women, N.K.W. and F.R.P., remained in the apartment. Stademeyer, F.F.P., and N.K.W.
were in the bedroom, and F.R.P. was in the bathroom. F.F.P. told police that while she
was sleeping, Stademeyer forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent.
F.F.P. reported that when she rejected Stademeyer’s sexual advance, he repeatedly punched
her in the face and said, “B-tch I’ll kill you if you don’t [have sex].”
N.K.W. left the bedroom to get F.R.P. Stademeyer went into the bathroom, lifted
N.K.W. onto a counter, pushed aside her underwear, and attempted to sexually penetrate
her. N.K.W. pushed Stademeyer away. Stademeyer told the women that he would kill
them if they told anyone what had happened. N.K.W. went back into the bedroom.
Stademeyer followed and told N.K.W. to perform oral sex on F.F.P. Stademeyer grabbed

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N.K.W.’s head and placed it between F.F.P.’s legs. N.K.W. pretended to perform oral sex.
N.K.W. could see that F.F.P. was frightened and did not want to participate. N.K.W. and
F.R.P. later fled the apartment and contacted police. Officers responded to the apartment
and observed swelling and bruising around F.F.P.’s eye.
In May 2019, Stademeyer pleaded guilty to one count of fourth -degree criminal
sexual conduct and one count of threats of violence , in exchange for dismissal of the
remaining charges. He tendered a signed plea petition to the district court.
As a factual basis for his guilty plea, Stademeyer admitted that he forced F.F. P. to
have sex and that he made “threats of violence” by threatening “to kill her.” He
acknowledged that these threats were part of the force or coercion that he “used against
F.F.P. in order to engage in sexual intercourse.” He also acknowledged that hi s penis
entered F.F.P.’s vagina, and that this act was committed with sexual intent . He admitted
that F.F.P. was intoxicated and “kind of out of it .” He further admitted that he took
advantage of F.F.P.’s condition and “threatened her” and “made her feel that she should
just go ahead and comply.” Lastly, he admitted that he “violated the law both in terms of
making a threat of violence and also engaging in criminal sexual conduct in the fourth
degree.”
The district court sentenced Stademeyer to serve 24 months in prison for his threats-
of-violence conviction. The district court stayed a 48-month prison sentence for
Stademeyer’s fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Stademeyer appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Stademeyer contends that he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to threats
of violence , arguing that it was inaccurate and therefore invalid . “A defendant has no
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d
90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But “the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon
a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
A manifest injustice results if a guilty plea is invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Minn. 2007). To be valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 2002). “A proper factual basis
must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716
(Minn. 1994). “The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant
from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to
insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). An
assessment of the validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law that this court reviews
de novo. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Stademeyer pleaded guilty to violating Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018), which
criminalizes threatening, “ directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with
purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”
“Terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe,
237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975).

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Stademeyer pleaded guilty to violating the “reckless disregard” portion of the
statute. “The crime of recklessly making terroristic threats . . . contains no specific-intent
element.” State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 17, 2009). “ Recklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known,
substantial risk. ” Id. at 57. The test of whether wo rds or phrases are harmless or
threatening is the context in which they are used. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d at 613.
Stademeyer concedes that he threatened to commit a crime of violence when he
threatened to kill F.F.P. See Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (defining “crime of violence”
to be the same as a “violent crime” and referencing statute that lists murder as a “violent
crime”). But Stademeyer argues that his guilty plea to the threats-of-violence charge was
inaccurate because “he never acknowledged that [he] intended to cause F.F.P. extreme fear
or that he acted in reckless disregard of the risk of causing that extreme fear.”
Although Stademeyer did not specifically admit that his threat to kill F.F.P. was
made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing extreme fear, his admissions nonetheless
satisfy us that his guilty plea was accurate. Stademeyer admitted that the threat was part
of the force or coercion that he “used against F.F.P. in order to engage in sexual
intercourse.” He also admitted that F.F.P. was intoxicated and “kind of out of it,” and that
he took advantage of F.F.P.’s condition , “threatened her ,” and “made her feel that she
should just go ahead and comply.” When Stademeyer’s threat is considered in the context
in which it was mad e, it is adequate to establish that he acted in reckless disregard of
causing extreme fear. His threat to kill F.F.P. was not harmless.

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Once again, the accuracy requirement protects a defendant from “pleading guilty to
a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.”
Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. Based on the record before us, we do not have that concern.
Affirmed.