A19-2038

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2033
A19-2038

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shaun Michael Maubach,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-17-2708

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-5958

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hy dukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (A19-2033); and

John Choi, Ramsey County At torney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (A19-2038) (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In these consolidated app eals from orders denying postc onviction relief, appellant
Shaun Michael Maubach challenges his two sentences for engaging in sex trafficking. He
argues that neither sentence should include a 48-month sentence enhancement under Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.G.9 (2016) because he had not committed a requisite “prior qualified
human trafficking-related offense” as define d by Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 14 (2016).
Because we conclude that the statutory definition is unambiguous and that a plain reading
of the definition includes Maubach’s earlier offense of receiving profits from prostitution,
we affirm.
FACTS
In 2017, Maubach pleaded guilty to two coun ts of sex trafficking of an individual
under Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(4) (2 016), based on two incidents in separate
counties. Both pleas were entered pursuant to a single plea agreement.
In Washington County, Maubach pleaded guilty to engaging in sex trafficking and
the district court sentenced him to a prison term of 180 months (the top of the presumptive
guidelines range), plus an additional 48 months based on a 2010 conviction for receiving
profits from prostitution, for a total of 228 months. In Ramsey C ounty, Maubach also
pleaded guilty to engaging in sex trafficking and was likew ise sentenced to 228 months’
imprisonment—180 months plus a 48-month en hancement—to run concurrently with the
Washington County sentence.

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In both cases, Maubach pe titioned for postconviction relief, challenging the 48-
month sentence enhancements . He argued that his 2010 conviction for receiving
prostitution profits did not qualify as a prio r qualified human-traff icking offense under
Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 14. The postconviction courts disagreed and upheld his
sentences.
Maubach appealed both orders, and this court granted his motion to consolidate the
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse
of discretion but review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo. See Pearson
v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Min n. 2017). Appellate courts also review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018).
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. “T he first step in statutory
interpretation is to determine whether the st atute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”
State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). “A statute is ambiguous only if
it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In both Washington County and Ramsey County, Ma ubach pleaded guilty to
engaging in sex trafficking pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(4), with reference
to Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(b)(1). Subd ivision 1(b)(1), togeth er with Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.G.9.a, adds a 48-month senten ce enhancement if the person has a “prior
qualified human trafficking-related offense.” That term is statutorily defined as follows:

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A “prior qualified human trafficking-related offense” means a
conviction or delinqu ency adjudication wi thin the ten years
from the discharge from proba tion or parole immediately
preceding the current offense for a violation of or an attempt to
violate section . . . 609.322, subdivision 1a (solicitation,
inducement, and promotion of prostitution; sex trafficking in
the second degree).

Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 14 (emphasis added).
Section 609.322, subdivision 1a, referenced in that definition, makes it a second-
degree sex-trafficking crime if a person:
(1) solicits or induces an individual to practice
prostitution;
(2) promotes the prostitution of an individual;
(3) receives profit, knowing or having reason to know
that it is derived from the prostitution, or the promotion of the
prostitution, of an individual; or
(4) engages in the sex trafficking of an individual.

Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a.
Maubach’s 2010 conviction was for receiving profits from prostitution in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(3) (2006).1 Maubach argues that the statutory definition
of prior qualified human-trafficking offense in section 609.321, s ubdivision 14, does not
include the offense of receiving prostitution pr ofits in violation of subparagraph (3). He
reasons that, although the definition referenc es section 609.322, su bdivision 1a, it also
includes a parenthetical phrase that does no t include—and therefore must exclude—the
offense of receiving prostitution profits. The st ate, on the other hand, argues that the

1 Maubach was convicted under the 2006 versi on of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a. The
2006 version did not include subpar agraph (4), which was added later, see 2009 Minn.
Laws ch. 137, § 7, at 3, but it did include subparagraph (3), prohibiting the receipt of
prostitution profits, which was Maubach’s crime.

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definition of a prior qualified human trafficki ng offense includes all vi olations of section
609.322, subdivision 1a , including receiv ing profits from prostitution under
subparagraph (3).
The state’s is the only r easonable interpretation. The parenthetical phrase in the
definition simply repeats verbatim the subhe ading of section 609.3 22, subdivision 1a—
namely, “Solicitation, inducement, and promo tion of prostitution; se x trafficking in the
second degree.” The only reasonable reading of that subheading is that it includes all of the
subparagraphs beneath it, including subparagr aph (3). In any event, “[t]he headnotes
printed in boldface type before sections and subdivisions in editions of Minnesota Statutes
are mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the section or subdivision and are not part
of the statute.” Minn. Stat. § 645.49 (2018). Moreover, it is not reasonable to conclude that
the legislature would refer to subdivision 1a as a whole, without expressly excluding any
of the numbered subparagraphs within that subdivision, but then , by means of that
parenthetical phrase, would exclude some of those subparagraphs from the definition.
In sum, we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 14, is unambiguous and that
a plain reading of the statute includes Maubach ’s prior conviction under section 609.322,
subdivision 1a, for receiving profits from prostitution as a prior qualified human-trafficking
offense. The postconviction courts correctly concluded that Maubach’s sentences properly
included the 48-month sentence enhancements.
Affirmed.