State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2046

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kartumu Sonia King,
Appellant.

Filed January 4, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-VB-19-55488

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul C ity Attorney, Ivars P. Krievans, David Hunt, Assistant City
Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kartumu King, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Kartumu Sonia King contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
the adjudication of her petty misdemeanor sp eeding offense. Additionally, King argues
that the district court abused its discre tion by denying her request to submit a video

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recording—taken the day after the offense—of the residential streets in the area where the
speeding occurred. Because the officers’ testimony suppor ts the adjudication and the
recording is of little, if any, probative value, we affirm.
FACTS
On patrol in an unmarked ca r in residential St. Paul, tw o officers spotted a Toyota
“kicking up dust” and driving rapidly in a 30-mile-per-hour zone. After briefly losing sight
of the vehicle, the officers saw the same car once again speeding on an adjacent street. The
officers cited King for a petty misdemeanor speeding offense in vi olation of Minnesota
Statutes section 169.14, subdivision 2(a)(1) (2018).
King appeared for trial pro se. Both citing officers and King testified. The officers
reported seeing King speeding an estimated 50 miles per hour on Milford Street before
losing her and spotting her agai n on Front Street. The driving officer testified to
accelerating to at least 60 miles per hour to ca tch up to King on Front Street. Both
residential streets are in a 30-mile-per-hour zone.
King denied speeding. To support her te stimony, King sought to play a video she
recorded on her phone the day after her speeding citation to demonstrate where she believed
she had driven and how she could not have been on the streets as testified by the officers.
The court denied the introduction of the video, found King guilty of speeding, and imposed
a fine of $10.00 plus fees and surcharges. This appeal follows.

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DECISION
I. The officers’ testimony was sufficient for the district court to find King guilty
of the petty misdemeanor offense of speeding.

First, King argues that the evidence was in sufficient for her to be found guilty of
speeding. When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder credited
testimony that supported the verdict and discredited testimony that did not.
State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1994). We will not overturn the verdict
if the fact-finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable do ubt, could reasonably conclude that a
defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77
(Minn. 2004).
Under Minnesota law, vehicle speed that ex ceeds a properly post ed speed limit is
prima facie evidence of a speeding violation. Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2. The elements
of a speeding violation are: (1) that the defe ndant drove a vehicle in an area where there
was a posted speed limit; and (2) the speed of defendant’s vehicle exceeded the posted
speed limit. Id. Here, it is undisputed that the resi dential streets had posted speed limit
signs of 30 miles per hour. Both officers testified to visually seeing King driving at roughly
50 miles per hour on Milford St reet, and later around 60 miles per hour on Front Street.
This is the only testimony re quired to find someone guilty of speeding. While King
disagreed, we defer to the credibility finding of the district court. Sefkow v. Sefkow,
427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). When comparing the required elements to the record

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evidence, the state sufficien tly proved King’s guilt. See State v. Ali , 679 N.W.2d 359,
367-68 (Minn. App. 2004) (finding officer’s visual estimate alone was sufficient to
establish that appellant exceeded speed limit).
Still, King argues that the officers did not provide evidence of their training and that
the officers had conflicting testimonies. These arguments are not persuasive.
The state does not have the burden of prov ing the exact speed that a defendant was
traveling, just that the defendant was exceeding the speed limit by some amount. Id. at 368.
And when relying on an officer’s visual estimate of a vehicle’s speed, there is no need for
proof of training. Id. As to the conflicting testimonies of the officers, King broadly cites
to the transcript but does not clarify what actu ally makes the versions contradictory. Nor
does our review reveal material inconsistencies.
Because sufficient evidence supports King’s guilt, the evidence is sufficient to
support a verdict for misdemeanor speeding.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to receive a video
of streets in the area.

Next, King contends that the district c ourt erred by limiting her testimony when it
denied the inclusion of a vide o purporting to prove that King was not on the streets that
police testified to seeing her on.
1

1 Additionally, King summarily challenged the judge’s actions as putting herself in the role
of the prosecutor. Our review of the transcript reveals the judge’s inquiries were clarifying
questions, and we note that a j udge has broad discretion in running a trial, including the
authority to ask questions. Minn. R. Evid. 614(b); see also State v. Rasmussen ,
128 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Minn. 1964) (stating that interrogation that is intended merely to
clarify the record does not constitute reversible error).

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This court will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.2
State v. Ali , 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Min n. 2014). When the dist rict court’s evidentiary
ruling results in the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence, the verdict must be reversed
unless the error was harmless be yond a reasonable doubt. State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99,
102 (Minn. 1994). Relevant evidence ma y be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by co nsiderations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.3 Minn. R. Evid. 403.
The district court denied admission of the cell phone video because it was recorded
the day after the events and b ecause it was cumulative. The r ecord firmly supports this
decision. The only purpose of the recording was as an illustrative exhibit of streets where
King claimed to have driven that day. An d King testified to this during the hearing,
rendering the video cumulative. Nor was the video probative of whether King was
speeding the day before it was recorded.4 Finally, even if the video was allowed and could
exonerate her for speeding on Milford Street, as King asserts, it would not negate the
testimony from the officers that King was also speeding on Front Street.

2 Additionally, King challenges the district court’s denial of her request to continue to trial
to allow her to present more ev idence. This argument is at its core the same argument as
the denial of the video testimony, because th e continuance was requested specifically to
review the recording.
3 King also asked for the court to release and review the officers’ body camera and squad
car footage. We do not address this claim as it was not raised below. Thiele v. Stich ,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988).
4 Moreover, as the district court noted, introduction of the video would cause undue delay
because the video recording was not in a proper format to play before the court, as it was
only on her phone.

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Because King’s cell phone recording is both cumulative and otherwise would not
affect the outcome of the speeding ticket, the district court’s rejection of the recording was
within its wide discretion.
Affirmed.